CourtListener 10758457•People v. Buchanan CA2/6
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Filed 12/15/25 P. v. Buchanan CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337550
(Super. Ct. No. NA113460)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
JOHN EDWARD BUCHANAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
John Edward Buchanan appeals his conviction, by
jury, of the second degree murder of Jaynie Sauter. (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a).)1 He was sentenced to state prison for 15 years
to life. He appeals contending the trial court erred because its
instructions to the jury regarding implied malice and causation
did not require the jury to find the act he committed involved a
“high probability of death,” and that death must have been
foreseeable in order for it to have been the natural and probable
All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless
1
otherwise stated.
consequence of his act. He further contends, and respondent
correctly concedes, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to
reflect the actual sentencing date and custody credits. We will
direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment and, in
all other respects, affirm.
Facts
Appellant and Jaynie Sauter lived together in an
apartment in Long Beach. Sauter’s friends, Cheryl Henjum and
Bruce Gillies, lived in an apartment in the same neighborhood.
On December 3, 2019, Sauter appeared at their apartment “in an
alarmed state.” She was “panicky and scared, frantic” and told
Henjum she was “scared for her life.” Sauter was having trouble
getting her words out and seemed to be afraid that something
would happen to her if she went home. Henjum and Sauter went
shopping and Sauter seemed to calm down. When they got back
to Henjum’s apartment, however, Sauter became anxious again.
She stayed with Henjum until late that night.
That evening, a group of Henjum and Gillies’ friends
were hanging out at their apartment. One of the women, Selwyn
Powers, noticed that Sauter had a bad cut on her leg. Another
guest, Angel Walkington, noticed that Sauter had a black eye
that appeared to be a few days old. No one saw Sauter using
alcohol or illegal drugs that night.
At one point, one of the guests accused Powers of
stealing money. Gillies told her to leave. Powers gathered her
things and left the apartment. She rode her bicycle down an
alleyway behind the building in the direction of Sauter and
appellant’s apartment. As she was riding, Powers saw appellant.
He asked her to come inside the apartment.
2
Appellant asked Powers if she knew where Sauter
was. Powers told him. He left the apartment, taking Powers’
bike with him. Powers stayed at the apartment because
appellant had taken her bike and she had nowhere else to go.
Appellant arrived at Gillies’ apartment shortly after
Powers left. He was very angry and yelled at Sauter to go home.
She got up immediately and left for the apartment. Appellant
stayed behind to argue with Gillies.
When Sauter got to her apartment, she was upset to
see Powers was there. Sauter was angry that Powers told
appellant where she was, explaining, “‘You know he beats me.’”
Sauter insisted that Powers leave. She threw Powers’ belongings
outside. Powers left. Neighbors testified they were awakened by
the sound of two women fighting.
Powers was homeless at the time. It was raining, so
she took shelter under a carport across the alleyway from the
back door to Sauter’s and appellant’s building. About 20 minutes
later, appellant came back and went inside the building. Powers
could hear appellant and Sauter fighting, although she could not
hear exactly what they were saying. “I could hear them yell at
each other. And then after, like, maybe like 20 minutes I started
hearing [Sauter] screaming.” After a while, Powers walked away
because she “didn’t know what else to do.” The screaming was
still going on. To Powers, “It sounded like somebody was getting
hurt.”
Sean Glynn spent that night sleeping in his truck
which was parked outside of Gillies’ apartment. The next
morning, at about 7 a.m., he went inside. Sauter showed up at
about 8 a.m. Glynn described her as “distressed, crying. [¶] She
was – she was all, like, beat up or something. She was crying.
3
She was crying, holding herself . . . upset.” At some point, Glynn
noticed that Sauter “had blood coming out of her ear, and then
she had a large lump on the back of her head.” Sauter said that
she had been fighting with appellant. She said that “she was
laying on the ground and he was standing over her and hitting
her . . . striking her in a downward motion.” Sauter said she had
been hit before, “but she’s never been hit like that.” It was the
hardest she had ever been hit. Sauter was very scared. Glynn
got her a bag of frozen vegetables for her head. After about an
hour, Sauter calmed down and left the apartment.
Another friend of Sauter’s, Angel Walkington, was
living in a converted delivery truck that was parked in the same
neighborhood. Sauter showed up at the truck early on the
morning of December 4. She was wearing spandex pants, half a
T-shirt, no shoes and no jacket. Sauter was “hysterical.
Inconsolable.” It was also very difficult to understand Sauter.
“She was just all over the place. She was just hysterical. The
night before she was still able to talk to us and was a lot calmer.”
Sauter was slurring her words and having a hard time calming
down to speak, but she told Walkington that “he kept hitting
her.”
It seemed to Walkington that Sauter could not catch
her breath or calm down. Eventually, she said she wanted to lie
down and Walkington made space for her. Sauter fell asleep but,
“[s]he continued to breathe really erratically and funny. She
rolled around on the ground for hours crying, gagging, peeing on
herself.” At about 5 p.m., Walkington noticed that Sauter had
stopped making noise and was no longer breathing. She called
911 and performed CPR while waiting for the paramedics to
arrive. While she was performing CPR, Walkington noticed that
4
Sauter had bruises on her face. Paramedics arrived and took
Sauter to the hospital where she died a few days later, on
December 7.
Appellant, meanwhile, spent December 4 with his
friend Kristine Rodgers. At around 5 p.m., appellant received a
text message from Walkington’s boyfriend stating that Sauter
was dead.2 To Rodgers, appellant seemed “shocked and
questioning.” Appellant “broke down and started . . . kind of
walking around in circles . . . .” He started crying and saying, “It
can’t be.” Rodgers testified that appellant got down into the fetal
position in the middle of the street. Eventually, appellant told
Rodgers that he and Sauter had a fight that morning and he hit
her with an open hand. While describing the fight, however,
appellant gestured with a closed fist. At one point, appellant told
Rodgers, “oh, my gosh. I might have . . . caused this, or
something along those lines.”
The coroner who performed the autopsy on Sauter
testified that she died due to complications of a subdural
hematoma. The autopsy also showed that Sauter had several
traumatic injuries including bruises on her left jaw, both wrists
and both thumbs. In addition to the subdural hematoma, Sauter
had a soft tissue injury to her middle forehead. These injuries
were caused by blunt force trauma to the head. The bruises on
Sauter’s head were consistent with multiple blows to the head,
although even a single punch could have caused the bleeding that
led to her death. Although it is theoretically possible these head
injuries could have been caused by a fall, the coroner opined that
her injuries were more consistent with having been hit.
2This information was incorrect. Sauter died on December
7, 2019.
5
The defense theory was that Sauter died of causes
other than appellant hitting her. She may have gotten into a
physical fight with Powers or another person that caused her
fatal injuries. She could also have fallen after leaving the
apartment the next morning. The defense also speculated that
drugs or alcohol could have contributed to Sauter’s death from
blows that would otherwise not have been lethal.
A pharmacologist retained by the defense explained
that, Sauter had fentanyl, methamphetamine and diazepam in
her system before she was administered any medication at the
hospital. Fentanyl and diazepam could cause confusion,
sedation, a risk of falling and unconsciousness.
Methamphetamine may cause a person to be very talkative,
violent or paranoid. These substances were present in Sauter’s
blood at levels sufficient to trigger the side effects. The expert
opined, however, that it is not possible to determine how much of
any substance Sauter had taken in the 15 to 20 hours before her
admission to the hospital.
Contentions
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it
instructed the jury on implied malice and causation. He contends
the jury should have been instructed that the natural and
probable consequences of the act causing death must have been
dangerous to human life in that the act involved “a high
. . . probability that it would result in death.” He further
contends the jury should have been instructed that death must
have been a foreseeable result of an act in order for death to be
the natural and probable consequence of that act. The failure to
include “high probability of death” and “foreseeability” in the
instructions, appellant contends, deprived him of due process,
6
relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof, eliminated a valid
defense to murder and directed a verdict on the issues most
subject to reasonable doubt. Additionally, the parties agree that
the abstract of judgment in this matter reflects an incorrect
sentencing date and incorrect custody credits.
Standard of Review
The trial court has an obligation to instruct the jury
on all general principles of law relevant to the issues presented
by the evidence. (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 115.) We
review de novo the question whether the trial court erred in its
instructions. (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 66.) In doing
so, “we view the challenged instruction in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in
an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1186, 1229.) If possible, we interpret the instructions to support
the judgment rather than defeat it. (People v. Ramos (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.) Even where an erroneous instruction
has been included, we are required to reverse “‘“only when it
appears the error was likely to have misled the jury.”’” (People v.
Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 546.)
Discussion
Instructions on Implied Malice. Appellant was
charged with second degree murder. The trial court instructed
the jury on the elements of this offense using CALCRIM No. 520.
As relevant here, this instruction informs the jury that, “The
defendant had implied malice if: 1. He intentionally committed
the act [that caused the death of another person]; 2. The natural
and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human
life; 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to
7
human life; AND 4. He deliberately acted with conscious
disregard for human life.”
About six months after appellant’s trial, CALCRIM
No. 520 was modified in light of People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981 (Reyes). The second element of its definition of implied
malice now states, “The natural and probable consequences of the
act were dangerous to human life in that the act involved a high
degree of probability that it would result in death . . . .”
(CALCRIM No. 520.) Appellant contends the trial court erred
because its instructions did not require the jury to find that his
act involved “a high degree of probability that it would result in
death.” There was no error.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “Murder is
committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately
caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a
person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’”’” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988, quoting People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th
139, 143 (Knoller).) The act causing death “must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must
‘“involve[] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.”’” (Reyes, supra, at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, at p.
152.)
People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, explains
that, historically, implied malice has been defined in two ways.
Some courts explained that an act is committed with implied
malice when it “‘involves a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.’” (Id. at pp. 103-104.) Others held that an act is
committed with implied malice where “‘“the natural consequences
8
of [the act] are dangerous to life . . . .”’” (Id. at p. 104.) Nieto
Benitez concluded these two formulations “actually articulated
one and the same standard.” (Ibid.) “[T]he two linguistic
formulations – ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life’ and ‘an act [committed] with a high probability
that it will result in death’ are equivalent and are intended to
embody the same standard.” (Id. at p. 111.)
People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981 is not to the
contrary. There, our Supreme Court held that a Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing should have been granted
because there was insufficient evidence the defendant acted with
implied malice when he traveled to rival gang territory with
other gang members. The court concluded this conduct did not
“by itself give rise to a high degree of probability that death will
result.” (Reyes, supra, at p. 989.) Reyes did not involve a claim of
instructional error, did not disapprove Nieto Benitez and did not
discuss the many opinions holding that “high probability of
death” and “natural consequences dangerous to life” describe the
same standard of implied malice. (See, e.g., Knoller, supra, at p.
152; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219; People v.
Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300.)
Appellant next contends the trial court erred when it
failed to instruct the jury that “‘[t]he death of another person
must be foreseeable in order to be the natural and probable
consequence of the defendant’s act.’” (People v. Gardner (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 473, 483 (Gardner).) There was no error because the
trial court’s instructions adequately explained the concept of a
“natural and probable consequence.”
The trial court instructed the jury that appellant
acted with implied malice if, among other things, “The natural
9
and probable consequences of the act [that caused Sauter’s death]
were dangerous to human life[.]” (CALCRIM No. 520.) The jury
was further instructed, “An act causes death if the death is the
direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the
death would not have happened without the act. A natural and
probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know
is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. . . . [¶] There
may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if
it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A substantial
factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does
not need to be the only factor that causes the death.” (Ibid.)
People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, concluded
that equivalently worded instructions “correctly embod[ied]” the
causation element of second degree implied malice murder. (Id.
at pp. 362-363; see also People v. Temple (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th
1750, 1756.) In People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271 (Roberts),
the trial court directed the jury “not to consider” whether death
was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s actions. Our Supreme
Court held the instruction “incorrectly stated the law of
proximate cause. A result cannot be the natural and probable
cause of an act if the act was unforeseeable.” (Id. at pp. 321-322.)
Here, the trial court did not run afoul of Roberts,
supra, or Gardner, supra, because it did not instruct the jury to
ignore foreseeability. To the contrary, the jury was instructed to
determine whether Sauter’s death was the “direct, natural and
probable consequence” of appellant’s act, a consequence “that a
reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
unusual intervenes.” If a reasonable person would know that a
result is likely to happen without some unusual intervention,
that result is foreseeable. The instruction adequately conveyed
10
the concept that Sauter’s death could not be a “natural and
probable consequence” of appellant’s actions if her death was
unforeseeable.
The jury was also required to find that appellant
knew his act was dangerous to human life and that he acted with
conscious disregard for that danger. If appellant knew his act
was dangerous to human life, the likelihood that death would
result from it was foreseeable to him. Similarly, if appellant
consciously disregarded the danger his act posed to human life,
he must have been subjectively aware that death was a
foreseeable result of his actions. The instruction was not in error.
Instructions on Causation. With regard to causation,
CALCRIM No. 520 provides, “An act causes death if the death is
the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the
death would not have happened without the act. A natural and
probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know
is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding
whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of
the circumstances established by the evidence. [¶] There may be
more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a
substantial factor in causing the death. A substantial factor is
more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to
be the only factor that causes the death.”
The trial court also instructed the jury regarding
causation in terms of CALCRIM No. 620. This instruction
informs the jury, “There may be more than one cause of death.
An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing
the death. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote
factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes
the death. [¶] The failure of Jaynie Sauter or another person to
11
use reasonable care may have contributed to the death. But if
the defendant’s act was a substantial factor causing the death,
then the defendant is legally responsible for the death even
though Jaynie Sauter or another person may have failed to use
reasonable care. [¶] Jaynie Sauter may have suffered from an
illness or physical condition that made her more likely to die from
the injury than the average person. The fact that Jaynie Sauter
may have been more physically vulnerable is not a defense to
murder or manslaughter. If the defendant’s act was a
substantial factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally
responsible for the death. This is true even if Jaynie Sauter
would have died in a short time as a result of other causes or if
another person of average health would not have died as a result
of the defendant’s action. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant’s act caused the death, you must find him
not guilty.”
Appellant contends these instructions violated his
rights to due process and trial by jury by eliminating a valid
defense and by directing a guilty verdict so long as the jury found
appellant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing Sauter’s
death, even if her death was not a reasonably foreseeable or
likely result of his actions. He contends the instructions
erroneously informed the jury that appellant was “legally
responsible” for Sauter’s death if his act was a substantial factor
in causing it, even if that result was unlikely. Instead, appellant
contends, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the
death of a person must be foreseeable in order to be the natural
and probable consequence of the defendant’s act. (Gardner,
supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 483.) There was no error.
12
First, as we have noted, there is no reasonable
likelihood the jury found appellant guilty of murder without also
finding that he was subjectively aware that Sauter’s death was a
foreseeable result of his act. CALCRIM No. 520 expressly
requires that finding. (Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 321-322.)
Second, there is no reasonable probability the jury
found appellant’s acts were the cause of Sauter’s death without
also finding that her death was reasonably foreseeable to
appellant. CALCRIM No. 520 informs the jury that an act causes
death if “the death is the direct, natural, and probable
consequence of the act and the death would not have happened
without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that
a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
unusual intervenes.” CALCRIM No. 620 informs the jury that an
act causes death “only if it is a substantial factor in causing the
death. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote
factor.” Consistent with these instructions, an act could not be a
substantial factor in causing death, and that death could not be a
natural and probable consequence of the act, if the death was
unforeseeable. We conclude CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 620
correctly describe the causation element of second degree murder.
(People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155; People v. Jones (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 83, 99.)
Cumulative Error. Appellant contends the
cumulative effect of the errors he has identified requires reversal.
Here, there are no errors to cumulate. (People v. Gonzalez (2021)
12 Cal.5th 367, 417.)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Appellant contends
his defense counsel was ineffective because counsel did not
request that references to foreseeability and the high probability
13
of death be included in CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 620. To prevail
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant must
establish, among other things, that “counsel’s representation was
deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms . . . .”
(People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1058.) We grant trial
counsel “wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client,”
(Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 5-6), and for that
reason, will reverse a conviction on this basis only if there could
be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions. (People
v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1254.)
Here, appellant cannot establish that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel because the instructions at
issue were not erroneous. Counsel could reasonably have decided
not to request unnecessary modifications to the pattern
instructions. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 834.)
Correction to Abstract of Judgment. The parties
agree that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect
the actual sentencing date and to award appellant the
appropriate number of custody credits. The original abstract of
judgment states that appellant was sentenced on April 16, 2024
and awards him 1,584 days of custody credits. However,
appellant was arrested on December 13, 2019 and sentenced on
April 15, 2024. Both of those days must be included in the credit
calculation. (People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827;
§ 2900.5, subds. (a), (b).) Including those dates in the calculation,
yields 1,586 days of custody credits. We will direct that the
abstract of judgment be amended to correct this error.
14
Conclusion
We direct the Clerk of the Superior Court to prepare
and forward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
an amended abstract of judgment reflecting a sentence date of
April 15, 2024 awarding appellant 1,586 days of custody credit.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
15
Richard M. Goul, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez, Nicholas J.
Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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