Meeker v. Chen CA4/1

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Filed 12/12/25 Meeker v. Chen CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN MEEKER, D084993

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
00058819-CU-BT-NC)
GUOGIANG CHEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Offices of Seth B. Bobroff and Seth B. Bobroff; Jacobs and
Adam Sherman for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin Meeker, in pro per, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Meeker obtained a default judgment against Guogiang Chen
on his complaint for civil extortion, unfair business practices, and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Chen moved to set aside that
judgment, arguing the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The
trial court denied Chen’s motion, finding both that his supporting evidence
was inadmissible and that there existed a proper basis for personal
jurisdiction. Chen challenges that ruling on appeal but fails to establish any
error. We therefore affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
On November 6, 2019, Meeker sued Chen for civil extortion, unfair
business practices, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress.1 The complaint alleged that Chen, a New York resident, attempted
to extort Meeker, a California resident, by emailing two letters to Meeker in
2019 regarding their joint Hawaiian business venture and a related

Hawaiian lawsuit.2

After being served by publication,3 Chen failed to answer the complaint
or otherwise defend the action in the time required by law. The trial court
entered Chen’s default on June 28, 2021, followed by a default judgment in
favor of Meeker in the amount of $1,649,800 on October 9, 2023.
On March 1, 2024, Chen filed a motion to set aside the default and
default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473,

subdivision (d).4 Chen argued the judgment was void because the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Chen claimed he had “zero
connections” to California and that Meeker’s complaint failed to establish a

1 The matter also involved Andre Hurst as plaintiff, and Jianhao Hu and
Caihua Shang as defendants, but they are not parties to this appeal.
2 Meeker’s request for judicial notice of records regarding the status of
the Hawaiian lawsuit is denied because those records are not relevant to our
resolution of this appeal.
3 Chen did not challenge the sufficiency of service by publication in the
trial court, nor does he in this appeal.
4 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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valid basis for personal jurisdiction. In support of the motion, Chen filed his
own declaration, as well as the declaration of Qingqing Miao. Chen then filed
supplemental declarations from himself and Miao with his reply.
The trial court denied the motion, finding all of Chen’s supporting
evidence inadmissible. The court determined that Chen and Miao’s
declarations did not comply with section 2015.5, a statute governing
admissibility of declarations, because they were executed outside of
California and were not signed under penalty of perjury under the laws of
California. The court further determined that Miao, who purported to
translate Chen’s declarations, failed to aver that she is a certified translator.
As an independent basis for denial, the trial court concluded that it had
specific personal jurisdiction over Chen based on his contacts with California.
Chen’s timely appeal of the ruling followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 473(d) and Standards of Review
A trial “court may, upon motion of the injured party, . . . set aside any
void judgment.” (§ 473, subd. (d).) “A judgment is void if the trial
court . . . lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” (W. Bradley
Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) “ ‘ “A
judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is
apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.” ’ ” (Kremerman v. White

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370.)5 Otherwise, voidness may be shown
through extrinsic evidence. (Ibid.)

5 “When a default judgment has been taken, the judgment roll consists of
‘the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint; the
request for entry of default . . . , and a copy of the judgment.’ ” (Kremerman
v. White, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 370.)

3
“[I]nclusion of the word ‘may’ in the language of section 473,
subdivision (d) makes it clear that a trial court retains discretion to grant or
deny a motion to set aside a void judgment. [Citation.] However, the trial
court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a
judgment that is not void. [Citation.] Thus, the reviewing court faces two
separate determinations when considering an appeal founded on section 473,
subdivision (d): whether the judgment is void and, if so, whether the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in setting (or not setting) it aside.
[Citation.] The trial court’s determination whether a judgment is void is
reviewed de novo; its decision whether or not to set aside a void order is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Kremerman v. White, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 369.)
Additionally, “[w]e review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion.” (Pilliod v. Monsanto Company (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 591, 630.) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (Jones v. Solgen
Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1203.)
Finally, “a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment. . . . ‘ “[I]f the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, citations
omitted.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding Chen’s
Supporting Declarations Inadmissible

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Section 2015.5 “permits use of declarations signed outside California if,
among other things, the declarant certifies the truth of his statements both
‘under penalty of perjury’ and ‘under the laws of the State of California.’ ”
(Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 614
(Kulshrestha).) An out-of-state declaration that fails to include the phrase
“ ‘under the laws of the State of California’ ” is inadmissible. (Id. at p. 618.)
The initial declarations of Chen and Miao filed in support of Chen’s
motion to set aside the default and default judgment are not included in the
record. There is no transcript from the hearing on the motion because the
proceeding was not reported, and the parties have not provided an agreed or
settled statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134, 8.137). Accordingly, we
have no way to meaningfully review the trial court’s finding that these two
declarations were inadmissible under section 2015.5, and we must affirm
that ruling.
As for the supplemental declarations from Chen and Miao filed in
support of Chen’s reply, which are in the record, both were executed outside
of California. Chen signed his in Connecticut, and Miao signed hers in
Washington. Both declarations contain the following statement at the end:
“I hereby declare that the above statement is true to the best of my
knowledge and belief, and that I understand it is made for use as evidence in
court and is subject to penalty for perjury.” These supplemental declarations
are inadmissible under section 2015.5 because they were executed outside
this state and do not recite that they were made “ ‘under the laws of the State
of California.’ ” (Kulshrestha, at p. 618.)
Chen does not dispute that the four declarations were inadmissible
under section 2015.5. Instead, he claims the trial court erred because Meeker
did not object to the declarations, thereby waiving any claims of

5
inadmissibility, and the trial court should not have denied his motion for

“hyper-technical” curable defects.6 We disagree.
First, we see no waiver. “[A] court may find evidence to be inadmissible
without an objection having been raised by a party.” (Estate of Herzog (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 894, 911.) Additionally, the concept of waiver is based
on fairness, and it applies when a party and the trial court did not have
an opportunity to address an issue. (Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 556, 567.) Both parties had an opportunity to argue the four
declarations’ admissibility because that issue was raised in the court’s
tentative ruling. Nor would it be unfair to consider the declarations’
admissibility on appeal because that was an express basis for the trial court’s
order. Further, even if waiver applied in this context, the lack of any record
of the motion hearing prevents Chen from showing that Meeker failed to
object. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“ ‘ “[I]f any matters
could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized
the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were
presented.” ’ ”].)
Second, the trial court’s ruling was not “hyper-technical.” In
Kulshrestha, the California Supreme Court affirmed a ruling excluding an
out-of-state declaration that failed to aver that it was made “ ‘under the laws
of the State of California.’ ” (Kulshrestha, at p. 607.) The declaration merely
stated, “ ‘I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and
correct.’ ” (Ibid.) As our Supreme Court explained, section 2015.5’s “ ‘under
the laws of the State of California’ ” requirement is not “pointless or

6 Chen improperly raises these arguments in a footnote. (Sandhu v.
Board of Administration etc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1062 [“ ‘Footnotes
are not the appropriate vehicle for stating contentions on appeal.’ ”]) We
nonetheless consider them.
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optional,” and “an out-of-state declaration which materially deviates from
section 2015.5 in this regard cannot be used as evidence.” (Id. at pp. 611,
618.) The high court found the phrase “necessary for validity and
admissibility purposes” because the legislature determined “that declarations
used in California courts, particularly those signed outside the state, would
not be sufficiently trustworthy absent an express, mandatory reference to
California law.” (Id. at pp. 617–618.)
Accordingly, the trial court was not being “hyper-technical” in finding
the Chen and Miao declarations inadmissible for failing to include the phrase
“under the laws of the State of California.” Instead, the court was enforcing a
requirement that is “necessary for validity and admissibility purposes.”
(Kulshrestha, at p. 618; see also, Safieddine v. MBC FZ, LLC (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1094, fn. 9 [“A declaration not signed under penalty of
perjury under the laws of California has ‘no evidentiary value’ and can be
disregarded.”].)
Lastly, Chen fails to show that the trial court did not allow him an
opportunity to cure the defects in the declarations. The trial court stated its
intention to exclude the declarations in its tentative ruling, giving Chen an
opportunity to address the issue before the trial court ruled. Based on the
lack of a motion hearing record, we must presume Chen had the option of
curing the defects at the hearing. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 609.) If he then argued to the trial court that the omission could be cured,
and requested an opportunity to do so that the court unreasonably refused, it
was his obligation to make and present an adequate record for us to review.

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Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding the Chen and Miao declarations inadmissible under section 2015.5.7
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Chen’s Motion
Chen’s motion to set aside asserted that Meeker’s complaint failed to
establish a valid basis for jurisdiction, apparently challenging the facial
validity of the judgment. We disagree.
All four causes of action in the complaint were based on Chen’s two
extortionate letters. The complaint alleged that Chen sent these letters from
within San Diego, and that Meeker’s resulting injuries occurred in San Diego.
Personal jurisdiction is proper when a non-California resident commits a tort
within California. (Doe v. Damron (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 684, 691 [“it is well
settled that jurisdiction is proper even when the alleged tort occurred during
a single, brief visit. The classic example is a visitor who negligently causes a
car accident.”].)
Even if we were to find the complaint’s allegation that Chen’s torts
were committed in California too conclusory as Chen argued, Chen’s alleged
New York residency does not necessarily defeat personal jurisdiction. “[T]he
commission of an intentional tort that is directed at a California resident may
provide sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.” (Integral Development Corp. v.
Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 576, 587.) That is what the complaint
alleges here; namely, that Chen attempted to extort Meeker, a California
resident, by directing two letters to Meeker. (See, e.g., Abbott Power Corp. v.
Overhead Electric Co. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 272, 279 [in action for

7 Because of this outcome, we need not address the trial court’s
additional ruling that Chen’s declarations were inadmissible for lack of a
proper translation.
8
intentionally inducing breach of contract, court had personal jurisdiction over
New Mexican defendant who sent three letters to California urging breach of

a contract with Californian plaintiff].)8
Accordingly, the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction is not apparent
from an inspection of the complaint. Rather, the facts alleged in the
complaint could provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over Chen, and
based on the entry of default, those allegations are deemed admitted by
Chen. (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 392.) Chen
has therefore failed to show any facial invalidity in judgment.
As for invalidity based on extrinsic evidence, the only evidence Chen
submitted was two declarations from himself and two from Miao. As
discussed above, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding those
four declarations, leaving unsupported Chen’s claim of insufficient contact
with California.
Based on the facially valid judgment and the lack of any evidence to
support Chen’s motion, there is no basis to find the judgment void. As such,

8 We also note that the transmission of the extortionate letters by email
does not defeat personal jurisdiction as Chen suggests. He cites Burdick v.
Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 28, for the proposition that “ ‘[t]he
connection between the place where an email is opened and a lawsuit is
entirely fortuitous.’ ” That case is distinguishable because the quoted
language comes from a case involving “ ‘email blasts’ ” in which the court
acknowledged the result “ ‘may be different if there were evidence that a
defendant in some way targeted residents of a specific state.’ ” (Ibid.) Chen
also relies on two breach of contract cases that held that email, phone, and
mail contact between the parties was insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. (Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Combined Management, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2010) 371 Fed.Appx. 834; Azzarello v. Navagility, LLC (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 16, 2008, No. C-08-2371 MMC) 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 117119.) Those
cases are unpersuasive because they did not involve an intentional tort
directed at a California resident.
9
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to set

aside the judgment.9

9 We note that there are potentially conflicting burdens on Chen’s
motion. “A party seeking relief under section 473 bears the burden of proof.”
(Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205; see also Cruz v. Fagor
America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495 [“Although a trial court has
discretion to vacate the entry of a default or subsequent judgment, this
discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown that
there is a proper ground for relief.”].) On the other hand, “ ‘When jurisdiction
is challenged by a nonresident defendant, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that sufficient “minimum contacts” exist between the
defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal
jurisdiction.’ . . . [¶] If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.” (Swenberg v. dmarcian, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 280, 291,
citations omitted.) It seems appropriate to place the initial burden on Chen
as the party seeking to set aside a judgment, but the parties do not address
this issue. In any event, even if the initial burden was on Meeker, it would
be satisfied by the deemed admitted allegations of the complaint, and Chen
would not be able to meet his corresponding burden due to his failure to
submit any admissible evidence.

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IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Meeker is awarded costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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