People v. Agustin CA4/1

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Filed 12/12/25 P. v. Agustin CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083921

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN425910)

PASCUAL AGUSTIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura E. Duffy, Judge. Affirmed.
Bulldog Law, Mario Tafur and Joshua J. Schroeder for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pascual Agustin appeals from his seven-count sex crime conviction,
challenging the actions of all involved in his trial. He argues (1) the jury’s
verdicts were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court abused its sentencing
discretion; (4) the trial court was biased; and (5) the prosecutor committed
misconduct. Agustin raises more claims in his reply and supplemental
briefing regarding immigration policies, bias, and additional misconduct by
the People. Finding Agustin’s claims either forfeited or lacking merit, we
affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2021, Agustin raped 12-year-old D. Agustin also
touched D.’s breasts, inserted his fingers into her vagina, and forced D. to
orally copulate him. D. told her parents the following day, leading to
Agustin’s arrest on August 13.
The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office charged Agustin with

three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Pen. Code,1 § 269,
subd. (a); count 1: penis to vagina, count 2: penis to mouth, count 3: finger
to vagina) and four counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child (§ 288,
subd. (b)(1); count 4: penis to vagina, count 5: penis to mouth, count 6: hand
to vagina, count 7: hand to breasts). The People alleged that the forcible
lewd acts in counts 4–6 involved substantial sexual conduct. (§ 1203.066,
subd. (a)(8).)
1. Pre-trial Motion Regarding Immigration Status
Prior to trial, and pursuant to defense counsel’s request, the trial court
authorized Agustin to question D. and her family at an Evidence Code

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
section 402 hearing (402 hearing)2 about U visas3 being a potential motive to
fabricate the allegations against Agustin. At that hearing, D.’s mother,
Carolina, said she never discussed U visas with anyone. D.’s father, Jesus,
stated that he was not aware of U visas prior to the incident with Agustin, he
applied for a U visa for himself and his family about one week after the
incident because he was informed that he could, and he told Carlonia about
that U visa application. D. expressed confusion about the difference between
U visas and regular visas, stating that prior to the incident, she was unaware
that being the victim of a crime could help a person stay in the United States.
The trial court then granted defense counsel’s request to cross-examine
Carolina and Jesus about U visas at trial.
2. The People’s Evidence
D. testified at Agustin’s 2023 trial. She explained that Agustin was her
neighbor in 2021, and that he helped her with her English. D. stated that on
the morning of August 11, 2021, she awoke to Agustin inviting her to his

2 The purpose of a 402 hearing “is to decide preliminary questions of fact
upon which the admissibility of evidence depends.” (People v. Superior Court
(Blakely) (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 202, 209, fn. 6.)
3 U visas provide temporary immigration benefits to victims of specified
crimes and their family if a law enforcement agency certifies the victim was
helpful in the prosecution of the crime. (Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi,
L.L.C. (5th Cir. 2016) 838 F.3d 540, 545.) We grant Agustin’s request for
judicial notice of five statutes relating to U visas and immigration (8 U.S.C.
§§ 1325, 1182, 1101, 1227; Cal. Pen. Code § 679.10). (Evid. Code, § 451,
subd. (a).) Agustin also requests judicial notice of two facts: “human beings
are not automatically rational,” and “incompetent human beings tend to
inflate assessments of their own capabilities.” We deny this request because
Agustin has failed to show that these matters “cannot reasonably be the
subject of dispute,” or “are capable of immediate and accurate determination
by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452,
subds. (g) & (h).)

3
house. D.’s parents were at work and Agustin spoke to D. through the
window next to D.’s bed. D. went over to Agustin’s house, believing he was
going to help her with her English.
D. testified that her brother, J., came over to Agustin’s house that
morning looking for her. J. then returned home after borrowing Agustin’s
Xbox, which D. helped J. carry.
D. told the jury that once back in Agustin’s home, she and Agustin
went into Agustin’s bedroom, where Agustin pushed D. onto the bed, removed
her clothes, and held her arms down over her head. D. stated that Agustin
touched D.’s breasts while she attempted to push him off with her feet and
hands. D. also explained how Agustin penetrated her vagina with his fingers
and penis, after which Agustin grabbed her by the arm, pushed her onto her
hands and knees on the floor, and forced her to orally copulate him. After the
abuse ended and when D. was leaving, Agustin told her that “no boy of [her]
age was going to do it like that.”
D. testified that she went home and showered that night, but she did
not disclose the abuse because she was confused, scared, and Agustin told her
not to tell anyone. The following day, D.’s parents kept asking her if
something happened because she was acting strange. She initially invented
a story that she had sex with a boy her age, but Carolina did not believe that
because D. never left the house. D. said her parents asked her about Agustin
because Jesus watched their surveillance footage from August 11 and saw
Agustin come over to their house. D. then told her parents what happened,
and Jesus called the police.
D.’s parents also testified at trial. They both said that D. acted
abnormally in the days following the incident, with Carolina reporting that
she did not see D. shower during that time. Carolina stated she was able to

4
get D. to disclose the abuse by telling her she had an upcoming medical
appointment that would reveal any sexual activity.
Jesus testified that on August 12, he checked his home’s surveillance
footage from August 11 due to D.’s odd behavior. The footage depicted
Agustin coming to their home and knocking on the window, causing Jesus to
pressure D. to tell him what happened.
Thirteen separate clips from Jesus’s surveillance footage were played
for the jury. Those clips showed Carolina and Jesus leaving for work;
Agustin approaching the window next to where D. slept; D. following Agustin
towards his home; J. going toward Agustin’s house and returning with D. and
video game equipment; D. going back toward Agustin’s home; D. returning to
her home about 40 minutes later; Agustin leaving in his truck approximately
30 minutes later wearing different clothing than before; and Jesus arriving
home from work.
Each of the clips played for the jury had date of “2019-01-01,” but Jesus
explained that date was an incorrect default date that he did not know how to
change. Jesus also confirmed that the first two clips showing he and
Carolina leave for work were from August 11. The remainder of the clips
appear to be from the same date based on the timestamps and the settings
depicted, but Jesus testified that the final clip, depicting him arriving home
from work, was from a different day.
Jesus testified that he applied for U visas about one week after
reporting Agustin’s abuse of D., and that he discussed it with Carolina.
Carolina stated that she did not recall any discussions after August 11
regarding visas for crime victims.
Forensic interviewer Christina Shultz, forensic nurse examiner
Michelle Meyer, and detective Crystal Ventura also testified on behalf of the

5
People. All three recounted for the jury their August 13, 2021 interviews of
D., which were largely consistent with D.’s trial testimony except that D. told
the interviewers the abuse included anal sex. D. did not recall any anal
penetration at trial.
Meyer conducted a sexual assault response team (SART) examination
of D. on August 13, 2021. The exam revealed redness on D.’s hymen but no
other injuries. Meyer acknowledged that the hymen injury could have been
from something other than sex, but stated that SART exams commonly do
not reveal any injuries. Dr. Nicole Ayson, a pediatrician and child abuse
expert, confirmed that it is uncommon for an examiner to find physical
injuries on a child who has been sexually assaulted. Dr. Ayson testified that
D.’s hymen injury could have been from sex, and it was not present at D.’s
follow-up examination on October 1, 2021.
Investigators did not find any semen on D.’s clothing nor Agustin’s
DNA on D.’s body. However, Meyer testified that D. reported showering and
doing other daily hygiene activities after the assault that could have washed
away evidence. Kelly Ledbetter, the criminalist who analyzed the evidence in
this case, agreed that these activities can eliminate DNA. Dr. Ayson stated
that the best chance to find DNA is within 24 hours of an assault, and D.’s
SART exam was beyond that time frame. Detective Ventura also told the
jury that the perpetrator’s DNA is not always found in sexual assault cases.
3. Defense Evidence
Nurse practitioner Nicole Frankel testified on Agustin’s behalf. She
reviewed the report from D.’s SART exam and stated that the lack of more
significant injuries is not conclusive but weighs in favor of there being no
assault. Frankel stated that D.’s hymen injury could have been from
anything that causes friction, such as tight clothing or excessive activity.

6
Frankel also opined that minors who are not sexually active or who have not
started menstruating are at a higher risk of injury from sexual assault, and
that women who menstruate heal much faster. This was inconsistent with
Dr. Ayson’s testimony, who stated that menstruation does not impact
injuries, and that D. had already started menstruating.
Clinical psychologist Bruce Yanofsky also testified for the defense.
Dr. Yanofsky evaluated Agustin in 2021, and his testing revealed that
Agustin had no indication of sexual deviance, no commonality with known
child molesters or rapists, and a normal sexual profile. Dr. Yanofksy
concluded that Agustin did not appear to be sexually interested in children,
teenagers, or forceful sexual activity.
4. Jury Verdicts
The jury found Agustin guilty of all seven counts, determining that
counts 4–6 involved substantial sexual conduct. The trial court sentenced
Agustin to 45 years to life in prison, consisting of three consecutive 15-year-
to-life sentences for counts 1–3. The trial court imposed 8-year sentences for
counts 4–7 but stayed them pursuant to section 654. Agustin appealed from

the judgment.4
III. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdicts
Agustin claims the verdicts were not supported by substantial evidence
because D.’s testimony was inconsistent with her prior statements, D. and
her family were not credible because they were interested in obtaining a
U visa, and the jury could not use the absence of physical evidence as
circumstantial evidence of guilt. We disagree.

4 Agustin’s notice of appeal was untimely, but this court granted him
permission to proceed.
7
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) We do “ ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024)
15 Cal.5th 622, 646.) “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
Here, D. testified at trial, providing a detailed firsthand account of
Agustin’s crimes. D.’s testimony was corroborated by (1) her largely
consistent statements to the forensic interviewer, the forensic nurse
examiner, and a detective; (2) the surveillance footage from outside D.’s
home; (3) D.’s parents’ testimony regarding her disclosure of the abuse;
the injury to D.’s hymen; Meyer and Dr. Ayson’s testimony that the lack
of other injuries is common; and Meyer, Dr. Ayson, Ledbetter, and
Detective Ventura’s testimony that the absence of Agustin’s DNA was not
unusual. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Agustin was guilty of all seven counts. (See, e.g., People v. Elliott (2012)
53 Cal.4th 535, 585 [“Unless it describes facts or events that are physically
impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction.”].)
Agustin is correct that D.’s trial testimony was not exactly consistent
with her prior descriptions of the abuse, such as her inability to remember

8
previously disclosed anal penetration by Agustin. And perhaps D. and her
family also could have been motivated to lie based on their U visa
application. But these are matters of credibility the jury resolved in D.’s
favor, and we do not reweigh that determination on appeal. Nor was the jury
unreasonable here since most of the details in D.’s prior statements were
consistent with her testimony, and the evidence revealed that D.’s family was
not aware of U visas until after they already reported Agustin’s crimes.
As for the absence of physical evidence, such as DNA, Agustin claims
the jury could not use those facts as circumstantial evidence of guilt. He
claims doing so would violate CALCRIM No. 224, which instructed the jury,
“[i]f you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial
evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and
another to guilt, you must accept the one that points to innocence.” But this
was not a circumstantial evidence case. D.’s testimony was direct evidence of

Agustin’s guilt,5 which the jury necessarily accepted as shown by its verdicts.
Meyer, Dr. Ayson, Ledbetter, and Detective Ventura’s testimony that the
absence of physical evidence is common in assault cases merely corroborated
D.’s testimony, and CALCRIM No. 224 is inapplicable “where circumstantial
evidence is incidental to and corroborative of direct evidence.” (People v.
Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1171.)
Based on the foregoing we hold that substantial evidence supports the
guilty verdicts.

5 “ ‘[D]irect evidence’ means evidence that directly proves a fact, without
an inference or presumption.” (Evid. Code, § 410.) Circumstantial evidence
is “ ‘ “that which is applied to the principal fact, indirectly, or through the
medium of other facts, from which the principal fact is inferred.” ’ ” (People v.
Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 14.)
9
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) that counsel’s representation “ ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,’ ” and (2) “ ‘resulting
prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”
(People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.)

Agustin claims ineffective assistance of counsel on eight grounds.6 We
disagree with each.
First, Agustin claims his counsel failed to assist him in asserting his
right to testify. Agustin claims his decision regarding testifying was unclear
because his counsel asked him, “Are you going to testify? You’ve decided not
to testify?” to which Agustin responded, “Yes.” Although these questions
were framed oppositely, the parties and the court proceeded with the
understanding that Agustin would not testify, and there is no indication that
Agustin disagreed with that outcome. Additionally, Agustin and his counsel
had previously conferred off the record and Agustin confirmed that he had no
questions about his right to testify. Thus, we see no demand to testify in the
record, defeating any claim of error by defense counsel. (People v. Bradford
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1053 [“ ‘When the record fails to disclose a timely and
adequate demand to testify, “a defendant may not await the outcome of the
trial and then seek reversal based on his claim that despite expressing to
counsel his desire to testify, he was deprived of that opportunity.” ’ ”].)

6 Agustin cites 10 different instances, but three of them relate to defense
counsel’s alleged failure to address D. and her family’s immigration status,
and we address those three jointly.
10
Second, Agustin claims his trial counsel failed to introduce evidence of
D. and her family’s immigration status, abdicating Agustin’s strongest
argument—that D.’s family pressured her into accusing Agustin of abuse so
they could obtain U visas.
At the 402 hearing, defense counsel questioned D. and her parents
about U visas. The family’s testimony reflected that none of them were
aware of U visas prior to the rape, and that Jesus applied for a U visa
approximately one week after he reported the crime. Defense counsel elicited
similar testimony from Carolina and Jesus at trial. During closing
argument, defense counsel argued that D. fabricated her accusations against
Agustin to cover up an encounter she had with a boy, and that when her
father subsequently applied for a U visa it created added pressure for her and
prevented D. from telling the truth.
As can be seen, Defense counsel presented evidence of D. and her
family’s immigration status and argued the pending U visa application
effected D.’s credibility. Agustin appears to believe that D.’s family had a
preexisting knowledge about U visas and that their potential motive to lie
should have been explored deeper. But that position is not supported by the
record because the evidence indicates D.’s family was unaware of U visas
prior to reporting Agustin’s crimes to the police. Defense counsel’s argument
was reasonable considering that evidence, as well as D.’s testimony that she
initially fabricated a story about a boy, and Carolina’s testimony that she
used an existing medical appointment to convince D. to disclose what
happened. Under these circumstances, defense counsel’s pursuit of the
immigration issue did not fall below prevailing professional norms.
Third, Agustin claims “defense counsel failed to object to hearsay about
underwear.” Agustin fails to support this claim with a citation to the record

11
or argument. It is therefore waived. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.)
Fourth, Agustin points to three questions the prosecutor asked that
resulted in long responses to which defense counsel failed to object that those
answers had become a narrative. One of the questions was to Carolina about
D.’s behavior after the abuse, and the other two were to the forensic
interviewer about her interview with D. But assuming narrative objections
had been asserted and sustained, Augustin fails to show how the responses
could not have been obtained through further questioning or that they were
otherwise inadmissible. Augustin therefore fails to establish any prejudice.
Fifth, Augustin asserts that based on a confusing question by the
prosecutor, it was unclear if Jesus testified that D. disclosed the abuse at 11
or 12 at night or if Jesus called the police at that time. In asserting defense
counsel should have objected, Agustin merely claims the “question was
confusing and added to the confusion of the jury about this matter about
relevant issues to the case,” without any further explanation. This imprecise
assertion is insufficient to establish any prejudice.
Sixth, Agustin cites two instances where evidentiary arguments and
rulings may have been made during unreported sidebar conferences,
asserting defense counsel erred by not putting those matters on the record.
Again, Agustin’s conclusory claim that “[t]hese errors cumulatively
prejudiced the defense” without any further elaboration falls short of the
required prejudice showing.
Seventh, Agustin contends that defense counsel should have objected to
the foundation of Jesus’s surveillance footage because that footage indicated
the wrong date. However, Jesus laid an adequate foundation by testifying
that the videos had the default date (“2019-01-01”) which he did not know

12
how to change, and that he obtained the footage from August 11, 2021, the
day after it was recorded. Although Jesus testified that the final clip, which
showed him arriving home from work, was not from August 11, that did not
render the videos inadmissible for lack of foundation. In fact, evidence
suggesting that the footage came from a different date could have helped
Agustin’s defense. We see no deficient performance by Agustin’s attorney
based on this ground.
Finally, Agustin argues defense counsel should have asserted a hearsay
objection when D. testified that Agustin told her that she looked older than
she was. Defense counsel had no basis to object because under Evidence
Code section 1220, “[a] defendant’s own hearsay statements are admissible.”
(People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 535.) Nor do we find the statement
irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, or lacking in foundation as Agustin asserts.
In sum, Agustin has not demonstrated that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial and we reject the claim.
C. Agustin Fails to Show the Trial Court Abused Its discretion in Imposing
Consecutive Sentences for Counts 1–3
A trial court has discretion to impose consecutive sentences for
separate counts of aggravated sexual assault against a minor when the
offenses involve the same victim and same occasion. (§§ 667.6, subd. (c),
269, subd. (a); People v. Glass (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037.) Factors
that support imposing consecutive sentences include the use of great violence,
a vulnerable victim, and the defendant taking advantage of a position of
trust. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), (3), (11), 4.425(b).)
“ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show
that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to

13
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination
to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)
In imposing consecutive sentences for counts 1–3, the trial court relied
on the following aggravating circumstances: Agustin’s use of violence, D.’s
vulnerability, and Agustin’s abuse of his position of trust. At one point when
describing the violence, the trial court stated, “Agustin used force and
violence to commit the acts upon D. He did disrobe her, he pushed her onto
the bed, he put her into positions in different ways to effectuate the different,
I guess, methods of sexual assault; and, as described by the victim, it was
done with force. The phrase that she used is that Mr. Agustin described that
he was ‘going to show her what no boy her age could show her.’ The court
finds that to being an aggravating circumstance.”
Seizing on the language italicized in the previous paragraph, Agustin
argues that the trial court erred because that statement was misquoted and
lacked foundation and evidentiary support. Reading the ruling as a whole,
the statement attributed to Agustin does not appear to be an independent
basis for the trial court’s decision, but rather background information
regarding the violence Agustin employed. In any event, Agustin does not
challenge the trial court’s findings regarding D.’s vulnerability, Agustin’s use
of violence, and his abuse of trust. These are all valid grounds to impose
consecutive sentences (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.425(b), 4.421(a)(1), (3),

14
(11)), and we see no abuse of discretion here. Agustin therefore fails to carry

his burden in demonstrating error.7
D. Agustin Forfeited His Claim of Judicial Bias
Agustin seeks reversal based on judicial bias. He claims the trial judge
“made several decisions and rulings from an implicit bias in favor of sex
crime victims, and against learning about or knowing about the plight of
immigrants.”
Agustin forfeited his claim of judicial bias because he never objected on
that ground in the trial court, nor did he seek to disqualify the trial judge. “A
defendant may not go to trial before a judge, betting on a favorable result and
failing to raise objections of bias, and then argue on appeal that the judge
was biased.” (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 592.) “We likewise
note that defendant’s willingness to let the entire trial pass without
articulating an appropriate objection ‘strongly suggests’ his claim is without
merit.” (Ibid.)
E. Agustin Forfeited His Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Agustin asserts the prosecutor engaged in various instances of
misconduct throughout his trial. However, Agustin forfeited these claims by
failing to assert them in the trial court. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th
147, 204 [“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, ‘ “a
criminal defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the
trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety.” ’ ”].)

7 Agustin also briefly asserts that his sentence was cruel and unusual
under the state and federal Constitutions. This claim is forfeited because it
was not raised in the trial court (People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1247), and it is deemed without foundation based on the lack of
substantive argument and supporting authority (People v. Narvaez (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1303).
15
Agustin argues his failure to object should be excused because doing so
would have been futile. While futility is a recognized exception, it applies in
narrow circumstances. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820–822
[prosecutor’s “continual misconduct” and trial court’s repeated dismissal and
criticism of defense counsel’s objections created “poisonous” atmosphere
allowing counsel to forego further objection]; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1153, 1213 [“normal rule requiring an objection applies” except in “extreme
circumstances” such as those in Hill].)
This case presents no unusual circumstances. Many of Agustin’s
assertions of futility are conclusory and therefore unpersuasive. (People v.
Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 51 [finding “conclusory assertion . . .
insufficient to avoid waiver”].) Agustin also relies on the trial court’s denial
of other defense objections, but “[w]e cannot presume that, because the court
denied some other objections made on different grounds, it would necessarily
have denied the specific objection at issue here.” (People v. Homick (2012)
55 Cal.4th 816, 859.) Finally, we see no “poisonous” atmosphere nor
“continual misconduct” by the prosecutor. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th
at p. 821.) The trial court never criticized Agustin’s objections and sustained
many of them, and defense counsel commented near the end of trial that he
and the prosecutor “work very well together.”
Accordingly, Agustin has not shown that asserting prosecutorial
misconduct objections in the trial court would have been futile, and he has
forfeited those claims on appeal.
F. Agustin’s Reply and Supplemental Briefing Do Not Show Reversible
Error
After briefing in this matter was completed, this court granted
Agustin’s request to file a supplemental brief. In his supplemental briefing,

16
as well as his initial reply brief, Agustin raises several additional claims. As
we explain, none of these claims warrant reversal.
First, many of Agustin’s claims are based on President Trump’s
immigration practices occurring after Agustin’s trial, which Agustin attempts

to establish by citing various recent publications.8 Agustin claims that he is
now at risk of “being disappeared” to some “foreign black site,” and his trial
counsel was unable to advise him of that potential immigration

consequence.9 However, “ ‘ “an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment
as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the
trial court for its consideration.” ’ ” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th
372, 423, fn. 9.) As such, the current President’s posttrial immigration
practices are not an adequate basis to reverse the judgment on direct appeal.
Second, Agustin challenges the U visa program, requesting that we
declare California’s participation in it unconstitutional Agustin claims U
visas do not serve victims’ interests, subject victims to potential deportation,
and encourage victims to turn on other immigrants. He further contends
California’s “immigrant blind criminal system” prevents lawyers from
adequately addressing immigration related issues.
California’s participation in the U visa program existed at the time of
Agustin’s trial, and its only relevance to this case is the effect it had on D.
and her family’s credibility. As discussed above, that credibility issue was
adequately addressed at trial based on the available evidence.
As for California’s allegedly “immigration blind criminal system,”
Agustin cites section 679.10 and Evidence Code section 351.4. Section 679.10

8 Agustin’s reply and supplemental briefing do not contain a single
citation to the trial court record.
9 Agustin is from Guatemala, but his immigration status is unclear.
17
implements the U visa program in California and allows disclosure of a
participating victim’s immigration status “to comply with . . . legal process,
or if authorized by the victim or person requesting the” U visa. (§ 679.10,
subd. (m).) Evidence Code section 351.4 states, “[i]n a criminal action,
evidence of a person’s immigration status shall not be disclosed in open court
by a party or their attorney unless the judge presiding over the matter first
determines that the evidence is admissible in an in camera hearing requested
by the party seeking disclosure of the person’s immigration status.” (Evid.
Code, § 351.4, subd. (a).)
Contrary to Agustin’s claims, section 679.10 and Evidence Code section
351.4 illustrate that California limits, but does not absolutely bar, evidence
regarding immigration status. Consistent with those sections, defense
counsel elicited evidence regarding D. and her family’s immigration status
during trial, demonstrating that neither California’s criminal system, nor
Agustin’s trial were “immigration blind.”
For these reasons, Agustin’s challenges to the U visa program and
California’s limits on immigration evidence do not provide a basis for
reversing the judgment.
Third, Agustin claims that Respondent mischaracterized the law and
misrepresented evidence in its initial brief and the prosecutor committed a

Brady violation10 by failing to disclose D.’s immigration status. We see no
misrepresentations of law or fact in Respondent’s briefing. Further, Agustin

10 “ ‘[T]he term “Brady violation” is sometimes used to refer to any breach
of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . although, strictly
speaking, there is never a real “Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was
so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence
would have produced a different verdict.’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042–1043.)

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fails to support the alleged Brady violation with a record citation
demonstrating the prosecutor had prior knowledge of D.’s immigration
status, and any failure to disclose did not prejudice Agustin because he
explored that issue at the 402 hearing.
Finally, Agustin argues the trial court failed to instruct the jury
regarding implicit bias. Agustin does not cite, nor are we aware of, any
authority mandating the trial court to instruct the jury on implicit bias.
Agustin therefore forfeited the issue on appeal by failing to request implicit
bias jury instructions during trial. (People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
995, 1001.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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