People v. Latimer CA2/3

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Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Latimer CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B341300

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA085849)
v.

LORENZO MICQUELL LATIMER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Xiomara Costello and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 2011, a jury convicted Lorenzo Micquell Latimer of
premeditated attempted murder, aggravated mayhem, inflicting
corporal injury on the mother of his child, arson, hit and run
driving, and the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The jury
also found true use of a deadly weapon and great bodily injury
enhancements. Latimer admitted serving a prior prison term
within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).1
The trial court sentenced Latimer to an aggregate term of life in
prison plus 11 years and 2 months. The sentence included a one-
year prior prison term enhancement.
In 2024, the trial court resentenced Latimer under
section 1172.75. The court struck Latimer’s now-invalid one-year
prior prison term enhancement, but otherwise reimposed the
original sentence.
On appeal, Latimer contends the trial court erred by
reimposing the upper terms for two of his convictions and two
enhancements. He relies on section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),
which limits the trial court’s ability to impose upper term
sentences absent a defendant’s stipulation or a trier of fact’s
finding of the truth of aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In January 2009, Latimer and the mother of his child,
Darlene Diaz, their one-year-old son, and Diaz’s two other
children, were staying in a motel. In the middle of the night,
Latimer punched Diaz in the face when she refused to perform
oral sex on him. As they argued, Latimer grabbed Diaz and
threatened to kill her. The next morning, Diaz and Latimer
continued to argue in front of the motel. Latimer attacked Diaz
with razor blades. Diaz’s teenage son yelled at Latimer, who
stopped attacking Diaz but then kicked her in the head. Latimer
left, taking Diaz’s car. Later that morning, Latimer hit another
vehicle while driving Diaz’s car. He drove away after the
collision. (Latimer, supra, B232280.) Law enforcement later
found Diaz’s car on fire on the side of a road. Latimer was sitting
nearby. (Latimer, supra, B232280.)
Diaz sustained a two-and-a-half-inch cut to her mouth
across her inner lip, a five-to-six-inch cut across her throat, and
other injuries. Her injuries required surgery on her cheek, hand,
finger, neck, and chest, and she was left with scarring on her
fingers and hand. (Latimer, supra, B232280.)
In 2011, a jury convicted Latimer of inflicting corporal
injury on the mother of his child (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1);
arson (§ 451, subd. (d); count 3); unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4); hit and run
driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 5); attempted willful,
deliberate, and premediated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664;

2 We take the factual background from the opinion in the
previous direct appeal, People v. Latimer (Jan. 23, 2013,
B232280) (nonpub. opn.) (Latimer). We take judicial notice of
that opinion on our own motion. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).)

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count 6); and aggravated mayhem (§ 205; count 7).3 The jury also
found true enhancements for the use of a deadly and dangerous
weapon and infliction of great bodily injury (§§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (e)). Latimer admitted he served a
prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
In 2011, the court sentenced Latimer to a total term of life
in prison plus 11 years and 2 months. (Latimer, supra, B232280.)
On count 1, the court imposed the upper term of four years, plus
one year for a section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement, and
stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654. On count 3, the
court imposed the upper term of three years. On count 4, the
court selected a sentence of one-third the mid-term of eight
months. On count 5, the court imposed 180 days. On count 6,
the court imposed a life sentence, plus the upper term of five
years for a section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement, one
year for a section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement, and one
year for a section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
enhancement. On count 7, the court imposed life plus the upper
term of five years for a section 12022.7, subdivision (e)
enhancement, plus one year for a section 12022, subdivision (b)(1)
enhancement, and stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654.
A panel of this court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (Latimer,
supra, B232280.)
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified Latimer as eligible for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75 because he was an inmate serving a
prison term for a judgment that included a section 667.5,
subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancement.

3 Count 2 was dismissed.

4
Through counsel, Latimer filed a motion to strike and
dismiss his now-invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement and for recall and full resentencing under
section 1172.75. He requested that the court strike the great
bodily injury enhancements and impose the midterm on all terms
for which the sentencing court had originally imposed an upper
term.
The People opposed any reduction to the original sentence
other than the striking of the invalid one-year prison prior
enhancement. They argued the upper term was still warranted
for the section 273.5, subdivision (a) and section 451,
subdivision (d) convictions based on the facts of the crimes,
Latimer’s criminal history, and his continued criminal conduct in
prison. The People also argued the upper term was warranted on
the great bodily injury enhancements based on Diaz’s
vulnerability, Latimer’s abuse of her trust, Latimer’s multiple
attacks on Diaz, and the seriousness of the injuries Latimer
inflicted.
In September 2024, the court conducted a resentencing
hearing and struck Latimer’s one-year prison prior enhancement.
The court “did not find it in the interest of justice to strike
anything else,” and reimposed the original sentence. The court
observed that “in regards to the high-term and mid-term . . .
1172.75 specifically says that unless the defendant was originally
sentenced under the upper term, then the court needs to proceed
in a certain way.” “But in this case . . . the allegations here are
particularly heinous and certainly weigh on this court, especially
when, frankly, there is absolutely nothing on the other side to
weigh against it.”
Latimer filed a timely notice of appeal.

5
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles
“Until 2007, section 1170, former subdivision (b), provided
that, when a penal statute specifies three possible prison terms,
‘the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 370,
review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628 (Mathis); see also People
v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 746 (Lynch).)
“In 2007, however, the United States Supreme Court held
that California’s upper term sentencing scheme violated the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it allowed a
defendant’s prison sentence to be increased beyond the statutory
maximum based on facts that had not been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury or admitted by the defendant. (See
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 274−275
(Cunningham); see also Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 746−747.)
The statutory maximum, for Sixth Amendment purposes, is the
maximum sentence the court may impose without finding any
additional facts beyond those necessary to support the verdict.
(Lynch, at p. 747.) Cunningham explained that, except for prior
conviction allegations, the Sixth Amendment requires ‘any fact
that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence’ to be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cunningham, at
p. 281.) Cunningham noted that California could comply with
the Sixth Amendment either by requiring jury findings for any
facts necessary to impose an aggravated sentence, or by
authorizing sentencing courts ‘ “to exercise broad discretion . . .
within a statutory range.” ’ (Cunningham, at p. 294; see Lynch,
at p. 747.)” (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 370–371.)

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“In response to Cunningham, the California Legislature
amended section 1170 in 2007 to provide that the choice between
the lower, middle, and upper terms ‘shall rest within the sound
discretion of the court,’ with the court ‘select[ing] the term which,
in the court’s discretion, best serves the interests of justice’ and
stating reasons for its decision. (Former § 1170(b), enacted by
Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2, pp. 6−7.) The amendment gave judges
‘broad discretion in selecting a term within a statutory range,
thereby eliminating the requirement of a judge-found factual
finding to impose an upper term. . . .’ . . . By enacting this
amendment, the Legislature selected the second option presented
by the high court in Cunningham.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 747–748.)
Subsequently, effective January 2022, the Legislature
again amended section 1170, subdivision (b). (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 748.) “The effect of the 2022 amendment was to
embrace Cunningham’s first option.” (Ibid.) As relevant here,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) now provides: “When a judgment
of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” A court may now “impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Thus, the middle term is now the

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presumptive sentence unless certain circumstances exist. (People
v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.)
Section 1172.75 also became effective January 2022.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” It establishes
procedures for the identification of persons serving sentences that
include now-invalid prior prison term enhancements, and for the
recall of such sentences and resentencing.
At resentencing, the “court shall apply the sentencing rules
of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) In addition, “[u]nless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
We review de novo questions of law and statutory
interpretation. (See Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 366.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Reimposing the
Upper Term Sentences
Latimer asserts that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)
required the trial court to apply “changes in law that reduce

8
sentences or provide for judicial discretion” at his resentencing.
Specifically, he contends the trial court was required to
implement the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)
permitting a court to impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term only when the facts underlying the aggravating
circumstances supporting the upper term have been stipulated to
by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a
jury.
We conclude that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4)
provides an exception to this requirement. It unambiguously
states: “Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the
court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation . . . stipulated to
by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Ibid.,
italics added.) Based on the plain meaning of this text, the court
in People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466–
467, concluded it was “evident the Legislature intended the new
burden of proof amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)
apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term for the
first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing. Section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) is, therefore, an exception to the general rule
that the trial court must apply ameliorative changes in the law at
a section 1172.75 resentencing.” We agree with Brannon-
Thompson’s reading of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4).
(People v. Singh (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 147, 152 [in interpreting a
statute, if there is no ambiguity, its plain meaning controls].)
Here, it is undisputed that the trial court merely reimposed the
previous sentence and was not imposing any upper term for the
first time. It therefore did not err.

9
To the extent Latimer is also arguing that the trial court
could not reimpose the upper terms without violating the Sixth
Amendment, we disagree. Latimer relies on People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, which acknowledged the reasoning of
Brannon-Thompson, but held that “another reasonable
interpretation of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) would simply
restrict the scope of defendants eligible to receive the upper term at
resentencing to those who previously received the upper term,
instead of creating a condition or exception independently
justifying the imposition of the upper term.” (Id. at p. 329.)
Gonzalez concluded that Brannon-Thompson’s approach of
excluding defendants who previously received upper term
sentences from the requirement that facts must be stipulated to
or found true by a reasonable doubt by a jury could run afoul of
the Sixth Amendment. (Gonzalez, at p. 330; see id. at p. 329.)
The Gonzalez court thus disagreed with Brannon-Thompson’s
reading of the statute, applied the rule of constitutional
avoidance, and concluded that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4),
restricts the scope of defendants eligible for the upper term to
those who originally received it. 4 (Gonzalez, at p. 330.)
We conclude that Brannon-Thompson’s reading of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), not only more accurately
reflects its text, but also does not conflict with the Sixth
Amendment for the reasons discussed in Mathis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th 359. As the Mathis court explained: “We disagree
that the Sixth Amendment is implicated here. When Mathis was

4 The question reflected in the Brannon-Thompson and
Gonzalez disagreement is now pending before the California
Supreme Court. (People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903.)

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sentenced, in 2017, his sentence was imposed pursuant to the
version of section 1170, subdivision (b), that granted the trial
court broad discretion to select any of the three applicable prison
terms. As Lynch explained, under that sentencing scheme, there
was no requirement for the judge to find a particular fact to
justify [the] imposition of the upper term. [Citation.] As a result,
the court’s selection of an upper term at Mathis’s 2017 sentencing
did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.” (Mathis, at p. 373,
citing Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 747–748; id. at p. 759 [“It is
the requirement of additional factfinding that brings the Sixth
Amendment into play.”].)
Similarly, here, Latimer was originally sentenced in 2011,
under the same version of section 1170, subdivision (b) that was
in effect when the defendant in Mathis was sentenced. Because
section 1170, subdivision (b) did not at that time require the
original sentencing court to find a particular fact to impose the
upper term, “[t]hat sentencing scheme fully complied with the
Sixth Amendment.” (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.)
“We therefore reject [Latimer’s] contention that the exception in
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), for cases in which the trial
‘court originally imposed the upper term’ must be construed, as a
matter of constitutional avoidance, to nonetheless require
aggravating factors to be found by the factfinder or admitted by
the defendant. Where, as here, the trial court elects to retain an
upper term sentence that complied with the Sixth Amendment
when originally imposed, the court need not engage in any
additional factfinding under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4).
(See Brannon-Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–
467.)” (Id. at pp. 373–374.)

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In sum, we agree with the reasoning of Brannon-Thompson
and Mathis and conclude the trial court did not err in striking the
one-year prior prison term enhancement and otherwise
reimposing the original sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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