People v. Veliz CA2/2

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Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Veliz CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B335528

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. YA098201)

CHRISTIAN FRANCISCO VELIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelly M. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay
Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Christian Veliz (appellant) of two murders
he committed when he was 18 years old. He was sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He argues the
trial court erred in admitting statements he made to undercover
agents during a Perkins1 operation and in instructing the jury on
the failure to explain or deny incriminating evidence (CALCRIM
No. 361). He also contends that his sentence is cruel and unusual
punishment. We reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts
Appellant was born in Guatemala, but moved to the United
States when he was young. He met Saul Reyes (Reyes) and
Christian Martinez (Martinez) through his male cousin who
dated Reyes before eventually moving out of state. Appellant and
Reyes became friends, and when appellant was 17 years old, he
worked in Reyes’s sunglasses shop.
At some point, appellant borrowed $700 from Reyes. Reyes
then contacted him repeatedly to repay the loan or to have sex
with him in lieu of repayment. Appellant did not want to have
sex with Reyes, and had a girlfriend at the time. According to
appellant, Reyes drugged him at a party one time and had sex
with him while he was incapacitated.
On the evening of April 29, 2018, appellant was cooking at
the home he shared with his female cousin and his girlfriend.
Around 10:00 p.m., he went outside to meet Reyes and Martinez
who were sitting in a car. After appellant got into the car, he
shot Reyes and Martinez in the head several times each and slit
their throats with a box cutter. Appellant took their cell phones,

1 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 [110 S.Ct. 2394].

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returned home, washed up, and disposed of his bloody clothes in
the dumpster outside of his apartment building.
2. Procedural background
On June 5, 2019, appellant was charged by information
with two counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).2 He was
further charged with personal use of a firearm causing great
bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and use of a deadly and
dangerous weapon—a box cutter (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted him
on both counts and found true both enhancements.
DISCUSSION
1. The Perkins operation3
After appellant’s arrest, he was placed in a cell with two
undercover agents. He told the first agent that he reads the
Bible and asked whether the agent wanted to read the Bible with
him. Appellant eventually began reading from it, and he and the
agent took turns reading chapters. Appellant preached and
recited a prayer.
At some point, the second Perkins agent entered the cell,
and he and appellant discussed their jobs and the reason for
appellant’s arrest. The agent then told appellant, “Look, don’t

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 The record contains only part of the transcript from the
Perkins operation, which was apparently provided in full to the
trial court, along with a video recording of the operation also not
in the record on appeal. Some missing portions of the transcript
were recited and summarized by appellant in his motion to
exclude and by the trial court at the hearing on the motion, and
the parties do not appear to dispute the accuracy of those
depictions.

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start feeling down, fool. . . . You gotta have faith.” Appellant said
that he did have faith, and the agent referred to a part in the
Bible about a burning pit. He then said to appellant, “Sometimes
God calls on you. . . . Sometimes he knocks on the door and we’re
blind to it. . . . We don’t wanna listen. Sometimes things happen
and like the Bible says, God calls on whomever He wants. You
know?” Appellant responded, “Exactly.” The agent continued,
“Sometimes when stuff like this happens, you have to come and
use your head and repent for anything you’ve done wrong. You
know? God is great and He can help you. . . . God is one thing
and God is with you, ’cause, look, Peter used to be this huge
murderer, you know? And what did Peter do? He gave his life for
God, right?” Appellant replied, “Of course.” The agent went on,
“But don’t let the world fuck you either. You know? You have to
use your head. Sometimes life is cruel, but . . . [e]verything has a
solution.” Appellant stated that he knew he was going to get out
because he had not done anything wrong. The agent and
appellant discussed Bible songs and verses, and then the agent
shared general information about criminal proceedings. The
agent eventually said something to the effect of “everything is in
God’s hands.” Shortly thereafter, without any intervening
discussion of religion, appellant made statements showing his
guilt. An agent asked appellant, “[W]hy did you do it?” And
appellant responded, “The dude fucking bugged me a lot. He was
gay. . . . He would harass me a lot.” He also said he took the
victims’ cell phones and threw his clothes away.
The People sought to introduce these statements, and
appellant moved to exclude them because they “were not a
product of a rational intellect and a free will.” After reviewing
the Perkins operation in its entirety, the trial court found under

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the totality of the circumstances that appellant’s statements were
voluntary and allowed them to be introduced. Specifically, the
court found, having “watched the video, the tone, cadence, body
language, and dynamics of the interaction,” that appellant was
comfortable with the agents, whom he believed to be fellow
inmates, and that none of his statements to them were coerced.
The court further noted that it was appellant who raised the topic
of religion, and he continued to raise it repeatedly during the
operation.
2. The trial court did not err in admitting appellant’s
statements to the Perkins agents
Appellant argues that the trial court’s refusal to suppress
his confession violated his due process rights because the
confession was involuntary. “An involuntary confession may not
be introduced into evidence at trial.” (People v. Carrington (2009)
47 Cal.4th 145, 169 (Carrington); Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S.
477, 483 [92 S.Ct. 619].) The test for determining whether a
confession is voluntary is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant’s will was overborne when he
confessed. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 165; People v.
Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 818.) We independently
review the trial court’s voluntariness finding, while accepting its
findings with respect to the circumstances surrounding the
confession if supported by substantial evidence. (People v.
Falaniko (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1250.)
Appellant did not provide the video and audio recording or
the full transcript of the Perkins operation, which are pieces of
evidence the trial court relied on in making its determination.
Based on the limited record before us, we agree with the trial
court that appellant’s confession was voluntary. (See People v.

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Malabag (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1422 [all presumptions are
indulged to support the trial court’s determinations where the
record is silent].) Although the Perkins agents connected with
appellant by discussing religion, nothing suggests that the agents
used religion to overcome his will. (See People v. Kelly (1990) 51
Cal.3d 931, 951–953 [appeals to the defendant’s religious
upbringing and questions about belief in Jesus and about going to
heaven were not “so coercive as to overcome [his] free will”].)
Indeed, it was appellant who repeatedly raised the topic of
religion and suggested the agents read from the Bible. Nor does
the record does show that any appeals to religion immediately
preceded appellant’s incriminating statements. Rather, his
statements showing guilt were preceded by the agent telling
appellant, “I just want to give you assistance about how you can
work your case,” and “[s]ometimes one makes mistakes but that
doesn’t mean that you’re a bad person.” Appellant’s behavior
showed that he trusted and was comfortable with the Perkins
agents when he confessed, not that he was coerced by them, by
appeals to religion or otherwise. (See People v. Williams (2010)
49 Cal.4th 405, 443 [“ ‘ “The courts have prohibited only those
psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so
coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both
involuntary and unreliable” ’ ”].)
Appellant relies on People v. Montano (1991) 226
Cal.App.3d 914 to argue that his confession was involuntary, but
that case is readily distinguishable. There, officers repeatedly
refused to honor the defendant’s attempts to invoke his right to
remain silent. (Id. at p. 920.) After “numerous futile efforts at
terminating the interrogation, [the] defendant made an
admission so damaging as to be tantamount to a confession.”

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(Ibid.) The Montano court concluded that “the officers’ flagrant
trampling of [the] defendant’s rights,” paired with their
“conjur[ing] up . . . the picture of . . . going to hell” if he did not
confess, constituted “ ‘deliberate means calculated to break the
[defendant’s] will.’ ” (Id. at p. 935.) Here, on the other hand,
there was no interrogation, and no flagrant trampling of anyone’s
rights. Appellant was unaware that the men in his cell were law
enforcement agents, instead believing them to be fellow inmates
in whom he could confide. He therefore made no attempts to
invoke his right to remain silent, and nothing in the record shows
the agents employed any means designed to break his will.
People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, which
appellant also cites, is also distinguishable. In that case, the
interrogating sheriff had known the defendant for several years
from having attended the same church, and the defendant
“regarded him as a friend.” (Id. at p. 986.) The sheriff also knew
that the defendant was “particularly vulnerable” because she
“was ill and had guilt[y] feelings.” (Id. at pp. 986, 989.) While he
interrogated her, “she was emotional and anxious, with facial
expressions ‘just short of crying.’ ” (Id. at p. 985.) In this context,
the Adams court concluded that the sheriff’s repeated references
to “sin” and “guilt,” along with his suggestion that “she was a
candidate for a nervous breakdown because she would not tell the
truth,” induced an involuntary confession. (Id. at pp. 988–990.)
Here, however, appellant had no preexisting friendship or
familiarity with the agents. Nor was he aware that they were
acting at the behest of law enforcement. Nothing in the record
suggests the agents exploited any particular vulnerability they
knew appellant to have. They followed appellant’s lead in
framing their discussion around religion. In short, the

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circumstances here were entirely different from those in Adams,
and we are unpersuaded that the agents’ appeal to religion
rendered appellant’s subsequent confession involuntary.
Finally, appellant points to the lack of advisement he
received about his right to consular notification to show his
confession was involuntary. This lack of advisement does not
change our analysis. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations requires law enforcement officials to inform
arrested foreign nationals of their right to have their consulate
notified of their arrest. (Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 548
U.S. 331, 349 [126 S.Ct. 2669] (Sanchez-Llamas); People v.
Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756 (Enraca).) Suppression of
coerced confessions is required “ ‘because we disapprove of such
coercion and because such confessions tend to be unreliable.’ ”
(Enraca, at p. 757.) A violation of article 36 is unlikely to produce
unreliable confessions; nor are police likely to win any practical
advantage from such a violation. (Ibid.; see Sanchez-Llamas, at
p. 349 [article 36 “has nothing whatsoever to do with searches or
interrogations,” and there will generally be “little connection
between [such a] violation and evidence or statements obtained
by police”].) Although appellant is correct that “[a] consular
notification claim may be raised as part of a broader challenge to
the voluntariness of a confession,” here, in the absence of any
showing of coercion, “[s]uppression would be a vastly
disproportionate remedy for an Article 36 violation.” (Sanchez-
Llamas, at pp. 349, 350.)
3. The trial court properly instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 361
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving the
following instruction: “If the defendant failed in his testimony to

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explain or deny evidence against him, and if he could reasonably
be expected to have done so based on what he knew, you may
consider his failure to explain or deny in evaluating the evidence”
(CALCRIM. No. 361).4 “We independently review the propriety
of a jury instruction.” (People v. Rodriguez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
194, 199.)
Appellant’s testimony provided a basis for instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 361. He did not dispute that he had
killed Reyes and Martinez, instead urging that he was acting in
self-defense. He testified that he shot each of them because he
was scared, but stated that he did not remember the part where
he slit their throats with the boxcutter. Appellant could
reasonably be expected to know why or how he slit his victims’
throats, or at least the fact that it occurred. His failure to explain
that evidence was a proper basis for the jury instruction. (Cf.
People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 990–991 (Barrett) [similar
instruction was proper where the defendant admitted to cutting a
weapon out of his desk, but responded, “I don’t recall,” to question
about how he did it].)
Even were it error to give this instruction, there is no
reasonable probability that it affected the outcome, particularly
given the instruction’s admonition that a defendant’s failure to
explain “is not enough by itself to prove guilt” (CALCRIM No.
361), and the further instruction given that “[s]ome of these
instructions may not apply,” and that the jury must “follow the

4 The instruction further provides: “Any such failure is not
enough by itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If the defendant
failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning
and importance of that failure.” (CALCRIM No. 361.)

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instructions that do apply to the facts as you find them”
(CALCRIM No. 200). (Barrett, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 993; People
v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 683.)5
4. Appellant’s LWOP sentence is not cruel and/or
unusual punishment
Both the federal prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishment” contained in the Eighth Amendment and the state
prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” enshrined in our
Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17, italics added) bar sentences
that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime or so
disproportionate “ ‘ “ ‘ “that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ewing v.
California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [123 S.Ct. 1179]; People v. Boyce
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 719.) Applying this principle, our
Supreme Court held in People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429,
that a death sentence was not unconstitutionally
disproportionate for a homicide committed by 18- to 21-year-olds.
If a death sentence for young adults in this age range is not
disproportionate, then neither is a sentence of LWOP. (Accord,
In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439; People v. Argeta
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.)

5 Because we have found no error, we necessarily reject
appellant’s claim of cumulative error.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

SIGGINS, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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