People v. Johnson CA3

CourtListener 10749241Calctapp8 de dez. de 2025

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Filed 12/8/25 P. v. Johnson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101200

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 05F06126)

v.

JOSEPH TERRELL JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2006, defendant Joseph Terrell Johnson was convicted of first degree murder
with special circumstances and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life for related firearm
enhancements and 34 years four months for other convictions and enhancements. In
2023, defendant moved for an evidence preservation proceeding and appointment of
counsel pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook

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(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). The trial court granted the motion and scheduled the
Franklin proceeding.
Our Supreme Court decided People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin I)
before the scheduled date. Hardin I rejected an equal protection challenge to the youth
offender parole statute—Penal Code section 3051—by an offender sentenced to LWOP
for special circumstance murder, but did not foreclose “other as-applied challenges” to
the statute “based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of
individual cases.”1 (Hardin I, supra, at p. 864.) Defendant proposes to bring an as-
applied challenge to section 3051 and urges us to reverse and remand the matter so he
may present his arguments to the trial court. We agree with defendant that reversal is
appropriate and remand with directions to give him an opportunity to demonstrate his
eligibility for a Franklin hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant and two confederates committed a series of robberies and attempted
robberies of Sacramento area gas stations in 2005. (People v. Johnson (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 253, 261.) Defendant shot and killed an attendant during the last attempted
robbery. (Ibid.) Defendant was 18 years old at the time.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found
true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during an attempted robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The jury also found defendant guilty of five counts of second
degree robbery (§ 211) and two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211), and found
firearm and armed principal enhancements to be true (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53,
subds. (b) & (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to LWOP for the special
circumstance murder with an additional 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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attached to the murder conviction, and an additional consecutive determinate term of 34
years four months for the remaining convictions and enhancements. Defendant appealed,
and another panel of this court affirmed. (People v. Johnson, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
p. 262.)
Fast forward to July 2023, when defendant filed an in propria persona motion for a
Franklin/Cook proceeding to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future youthful
offender parole hearing and for appointment of counsel. Relying on People v. Hardin
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273 (Hardin II), defendant argued the Legislature had no rational
basis for making young adult LWOP offenders ineligible for youth offender parole
hearings while allowing young adult offenders serving the functional equivalent of
LWOP sentences to seek such relief. The trial court appointed counsel and set the matter
for a hearing on September 13, 2024.
Our Supreme Court reversed Hardin II on March 4, 2024, some six months before
the date set for defendant’s Franklin/Cook proceeding. (See Hardin I, supra, 15 Cal.5th
834.) The trial court entered an order referring to Hardin I and stating the court “no
longer ha[d] authority to hold a Franklin hearing for a youthful offender sentenced to
LWOP.” The trial court then vacated the earlier order granting defendant’s motion for a
Franklin/Cook proceeding, denied the motion, and vacated all future court dates
regarding the matter.
This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to
LWOP for murder in the commission of a robbery under section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(17)(A) violates equal protection as applied to him. He directs our attention to People
v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, in which the defendant successfully raised an as
applied challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders convicted of
special circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Briscoe, supra, at pp.

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484-485.) He also directs our attention to cases involving what are said to have been
similar crimes by equally culpable offenders, who would now be eligible for parole while
he is not. (See, e.g., People v. Fortman (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 45; People v. Mulqueen
(1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532; People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831.) These
authorities do not establish any violation of defendant’s right to equal protection; they do,
however, allow for the possibility that he might be able to develop one.
As mentioned, Hardin I forecloses any challenge to section 3051 “either on its
face or as applied to [those] serving life without parole sentences for special
circumstances murder” generally. (Hardin I, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) But Hardin I
leaves open the possibility that an LWOP offender might successfully advance “other
challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special circumstances statute based on a more
robust record or a more focused as-applied inquiry.” (Id. at p. 862; see also People v.
Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.) Defendant proposes to raise such an as-
applied challenge here.
Defendant does not say much about the particulars of that as-applied equal
protection challenge, and we are hard pressed to imagine it. All the same, he should have
been given an opportunity to present his as-applied challenge and any other arguments he
believed would establish his eligibility for an evidence preservation proceeding in the
wake of Hardin I. We will remand for that purpose.

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III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s May 20, 2024 order denying defendant’s request for a
Franklin/Cook proceeding is vacated. The matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/S/

WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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