CourtListener 10748393•In re A.Y. CA4/3
Texto completo
Filed 12/5/25 In re A.Y. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re A.Y. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G065555
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 17DP0725B,
v. 23DP0399)
A.M., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
June Jee An, Judge. Affirmed.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minors.
* * *
In April 2023, the Orange County Juvenile Court (the court)
issued a protective custody order for then five-year-old A.Y. (Aiden) and one-
year-old M.Y. (Malakai). This was based on reported incidents of domestic
violence and drug use by their parents A.M. (Mother) and S.Y. (Father). The
Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) took custody of both
children and placed them with K.G. (Godmother), where they remain to this
day and appear to be doing well.
The court later terminated the parent’s reunification services and
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set a selection and implementation hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)
In April 2025, at the section 366.26 hearing, the court found the children to
be adoptable and terminated parental rights. On appeal, Mother claims the
court erred by not applying the parental-benefit exception to the statutory
preference for adoption. We disagree.
Thus, we affirm the court’s order terminating parental rights.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2023, Mother was driving a car with the two
children (Aiden and Malakai) in the backseat and Father in the front seat.
Father pushed Mother’s face against a window and choked her. Aiden saw
this and was frightened. There had been previous reported incidents of
domestic violence, and the parents had extensive histories of substance
abuse. Father was using fentanyl and methamphetamine. In the parent’s
home there were marijuana “roaches” within reach of the children. The
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2
parents also had an older son who had previously been adopted after his
juvenile dependency case was terminated.
On April 11, 2023, the Agency filed for a petition for a protective
custody warrant. The Agency was “concerned that the father may continue to
engage in domestic violence against the mother, in the presence of the
children. This may result in physical injury and/or emotional trauma
(anxiety, nightmares, depression, etc.) to the children.” The court issued the
warrant, and the two boys were placed with Godmother.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Proceedings
On April 13, 2023, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency
petition alleging the children were at a substantial risk of serious physical
harm. The Agency noted that Aiden “reported witnessing multiple recent
incidents of domestic violence including witnessing the father choke the
mother in a store, witnessing the mother strike the father with a glass bottle
and being present when the father threatened to kill the mother with a gun
that the father kept in the home.”
On August 14, 2023, the court declared the children to be
dependents and removed them from the custody of their parents. The court
ordered reunification services to include counseling, a domestic violence
program, parenting education, and substance abuse treatment and testing.
The court ordered supervised parental visitations with the children.
Six-Month Review Hearing
On February 27, 2024, the court conducted a six-month review
hearing (it had been continued by stipulation). Prior to the hearing, the
Agency filed a status review report, a case plan update, and an addendum
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report. The Agency reported that the children were doing well in their
placement and Godmother had expressed a willingness to adopt the children
should reunification efforts fail. The parents provided limited information
about where they were living or their employment status. The parent’s
compliance with the case plan services was described as “NONE.” Mother’s
visitations were inconsistent. In December 2023, Mother cancelled or failed to
appear for each scheduled visitation.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court adopted the Agency’s
recommendations, which were that were that the children continue as
dependents, and that reunification services continue. Mother and Father
were informed “that pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section
366.21(e), if the [children] cannot be returned home by the 12 month
permanency hearing, the case may be referred to a Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 366.26 hearing that can result in the termination of parental
rights and the adoption of the [children].”
12-Month Permanency Hearing
On August 20, 2024, the court conducted a 12-month permanency
hearing (it had been continued by stipulation). Prior to the hearing, the
Agency filed a status report, case plan updates, and addendum reports. The
Agency reported that the children continued to do well in their placement.
Mother’s compliance with the case plan was described as: “MODERATE.”
Father’s compliance with the case plan was described as: “NONE.” Mother’s
participation in substance abuse testing was inconsistent. The Agency noted
that during the months of March and April 2024, the parents were consistent
in attending visitations, but they were inconsistent in June, July and August.
At the hearing, the court told the parents that “unfortunately, in
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juvenile dependency proceedings, you’re not given an unlimited amount of
time in order to reunify with your kids. In no shape or form am I saying that
you don’t care about your kids or that you don’t love your kids. It’s just you’re
up against sometimes a very, very tight timeline . . . .” The court found return
of the children to their parents would create substantial risk of detriment to
their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. The court
adopted the Agency’s recommendations, which were to terminate
2
reunification services, and to set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
On December 18, 2024, Mother filed a petition to modify the
court’s orders based on an alleged change of circumstances. (See § 388.) The
court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing to be heard concurrent with
the section 366.26 hearing.
Section 366.26 Hearing
On April 11, 2025, the court began the section 366.26 hearing. A
few weeks prior to the start of the hearing, the parents gave birth to another
child, Geno, who tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines
(Geno is not a party to these proceedings). Three witnesses testified over the
course of a few weeks.
Prior to the hearing, the Agency reported “the children have been
observed to be close to the prospective adoptive parent, seeking her for
attention and comfort. The prospective adoptive parent has provided the
children with a stable and loving family environment and has been diligent
about providing the children with a safe and secure home, and the care that
2
The court told the parents that although reunification services
were “technically” terminated, the Agency would continue to provide the
reunification services that were already in place.
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is consistent with their needs . . . .” The Agency reported that recent
supervised visitations with the parents were consistent; however, the parents
did “not have stable housing or employment. Despite working toward
creating a stable environment, the parents have not addressed the Agency’s
concern as evidenced by inconsistent drug testing, no current housing
stability, and a lack of completion of previous case plan services.”
The Agency’s social worker testified that she had worked on the
case since September 2023. The social worker said Mother was inconsistent
with drug testing and visitations, and that the Agency’s recommendation was
to terminate parental rights because “the children are deserving of
permanency.” The social worker had concerns regarding the children’s safety,
noting that Mother wanted the children to have visitations with a relative,
despite his prior sustained allegations of abuse. The social worker also had
concerns about Mother’s current substance abuse given Geno’s toxicology
results. The social worker testified that recent visitations had been going
well, but she opined that the children could not safely be returned to the
parent’s care. She believed that adoption would be the most appropriate
permanent plan for the children.
Mother testified that she completed her case plan. Mother said
that she had a close relationship with her children, particularly Aiden.
Mother said that her most recent visit with the children had gone well.
Mother testified that Godmother had recently cancelled a visitation and
“she’s been a big distraction in my case.” Mother testified that her visitations
never increased and as a result she “felt cheated.”
When Aiden testified he was seven years old. Aiden said that he
did not want to live with Mother. When asked why, he said: “Because I feel
like she’s going to leave me alone again.” Aiden said that it would be a good
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thing to see his mother once a week. When asked why, he said: “Because
sometimes I don’t want to see her, and sometimes I do.” Aiden testified that
he feels safe living with Godmother. Aiden said that he would not feel safe
living with Mother or Father. When asked if he could choose any person to
live with right now for forever and ever, Aiden said he would choose
Godmother. Aiden testified that he would choose living with Godmother even
if that meant he could not see Mother and Father.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the children to
be adoptable and terminated parental rights. The court found no change in
circumstances (this ruling is not being appealed). The court also found that
the beneficial relationship exception did not apply (the court’s analysis will be
covered verbatim in the next section of this opinion).
II.
DISCUSSION
Mother claims the court erred by not applying the parental-
benefit exception to the statutory preference for adoption. We disagree.
In this discussion we will: A) consider the relevant legal
principles regarding the parental-benefit exception; B) directly quote the
court’s ruling at the section 366.26 hearing, and C) analyze whether the
court’s ruling is consistent with the relevant legal principles.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
At the section 366.26 hearing, a juvenile court determines a
permanent plan for the child, and generally orders adoption, guardianship, or
long-term foster care. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528.) “‘[T]here is
strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’” (In re
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Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 394–395.) Ordinarily, if the juvenile
court finds the child adoptable it must then terminate parental rights. (In re
E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 75–76 (E.T.).) “‘In order to avoid termination
of parental rights and adoption, a parent has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that one or more of the statutory exceptions to
termination of parental rights . . . apply.’” (Ibid.)
Under the parental-benefit exception, a parent is required to
show three things: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship,
the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
“‘“[B]ecause a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court
has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in
an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail
over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.”’” (In re I.E. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 683, 690.)
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’
taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] Again here,
the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of
factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in
the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Ibid.) “Concerning the
third element—whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the child due
to’ the relationship—the court must decide whether it would be harmful to
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the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Id. at p. 633.)
As to the first two elements, the substantial evidence standard of
review applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) “The
determination that the parent has visited and maintained contact with the
child ‘consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by the court’s
orders’ [citation] is essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise
essentially a factual determination whether the relationship is such that the
child would benefit from continuing it.” (Ibid.)
“The third element—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child—is somewhat different. As in assessing
visitation and the relationship between parent and child, the court must
make a series of factual determinations. These may range from the specific
features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm that would
come from losing those specific features to a higher-level conclusion of how
harmful in total that loss would be. The court must also determine, for the
particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even
counterbalance those harms. In so doing, it may make explicit or implicit
findings ranging from specific benefits related to the child’s specific
characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion about the benefit of adoption
all told. All these factual determinations are properly reviewed for
substantial evidence.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
“[T]he court must also engage in a delicate balancing of these
determinations as part of assessing the likely course of a future situation
that’s inherently uncertain. The decision . . . require[s] assessing what the
child’s life would be like in an adoptive home without the parent in his life.
[Citation.] The court makes the assessment by weighing the harm of losing
the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home.
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And so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
“A court abuses its discretion only when ‘“‘the trial court has
exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination.’”’ [Citation.] But ‘“‘[w]hen two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has
no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’”’” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)
“‘The reviewing court must . . . draw all reasonable inferences,
and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling.’” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) “The
reviewing court should interfere only “‘if we find under all the evidence,
viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could
reasonably have made the order that”’” was made. (Ibid.)
B. Court Proceedings
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, after reviewing
the relevant Agency reports, and after listening to evidence and argument,
the court ruled (verbatim and in full) as follows:
“Turning now to the .26, I don’t believe anyone is disputing that
the children, Aiden and Malakai are adoptable, so I am just going to jump
straight into the parental-benefit exception.
“So, [Mother], I will explain to you -- and, unfortunately, your
attorneys know and are very well aware -- due to recent case law that has
come down, outside of your case and in many other cases, the legal burden on
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the parents remains very steep in dependency cases, especially when we’re at
a .26, because at each step of the way, along with your case, the burden does
shift. It’s different when we’re still in reunification; it’s different once
reunification has been terminated; and now at a .26 it is very, very steep,
because basically all the Court is looking at is whether or not the children are
adoptable. If they are adoptable, then the recommendation is to terminate
parental rights, and that is because the legislature has instructed us that the
preference is always adoption over legal guardianship.
“That being said, with legal guardianship if parents can
demonstrate, what we call, a parental-benefit exception, then the Court
should be inclined to grant legal guardianship over the preferred plan of
adoption; however, that burden remains very, very steep and very high, and
we have been told countless times that it is only to be used in rare
circumstances.
“In this case, obviously, we did not have Malakai testify, as he is
only age three, and Aiden’s testimony I had to go back -- and thank you for
allowing me that time to go back and look through my notes -- I do not expect
Aiden, at age seven, to understand the gravity of this decision or to
understand the difference between adoption and legal guardianship and/or
even to grasp not being able to see you or his father moving forward. That is
too much for a seven-year-old. In no way is the Court giving the decision to
Aiden, for Aiden to choose what the best path is moving forward. That
decision does remain with the Court.
“I know much has been made whether or not you and [Father]
maintained regular visitation and contact with your children, to the extent
visitation was permitted. To that I will say, I know that there were missed
visits, canceled visits . . . , you know, lateness showing up to visits; however, I
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don’t think that’s what this case really hinges on.
“I know the children have been in this system for over two years.
I do show that the last eight months of visits were more regular. I know much
was made about, you know, being late to visits. To me, the lateness, the
tardiness, that is not, in and of itself alone, an issue; however, I think what it
demonstrates is that if you’re late to visits -- and I think this happened to
[Father] -- the visitations at the visitation center are canceled, then referrals
have to be resubmitted, and there’s a wait, and there’s a delay. It’s all of
those things combined, in the sense of whether or not you’re prioritizing visits
with your children.
“Obviously, life happens, people are going to be late, but if you
are consistently late beyond, you know, obviously the grace period window
and the visitation center marks that, and then after three or five -- I think it
differs for each center -- cancels that visitation referral, then we’re back at
square one. I think that’s wherein lies the issue that I have, is whether or not
the visits are being prioritized, whether or not you’re doing everything in
your power to arrive.
“I do understand you are traveling from very far. There was a day
where I instructed your attorney for you to just turn around because the ETA
for you to arrive at court was going to be something like 3:57 in the afternoon.
“You have been late to court, as were some of my attorneys this
morning, but like I said, looking at those things alone, in and of itself, I agree
with your attorneys, it’s not enough; however, it does go to the larger picture
of whether or not you are actively engaging, whether or not you are
prioritizing these visits with your children, whether or not demonstrating -- I
guess moving forward, whether or not the children are going to be safe.
It’s not because you’re going to miss a doctor’s appointment, or you’re going to
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be late to a doctor’s appointment, but if you’re not on time for the visits and
they’re not regularly happening, to me, that’s probably the reason why the
Agency never liberalized your visits; why they never went to unsupervised;
why you never started an overnight; why they never were released, at least
on this case. I’m not talking about the [earlier] matter [with the other child].
“Parents must show that the child has a substantial positive
emotional attachment to the parents, and that the children would benefit
from a continuing relationship.
“Malakai has been with [Godmother] for two out of his
three years of life; however, Aiden did testify that he loves you both very
much; he looks forward to the visits; if he could, he would visit with you seven
days a week. The social worker even did testify that when he was not
having regular visits with you, it did create harm to him, he was emotionally
harmed from not having those visits.
“If this were a question merely of how much you love your
children, this Court would never terminate parental rights. I don’t think it’s a
matter of how much you love Aiden and Malaki and Baby Geno; however, it
must show that the attachment to you both would be so detrimental that
when balanced against being placed in a new adoptive home -- basically the
detriment to Aiden and/or Malakai is so great that it’s not worth placing
them in a permanent adoptive home, and here, per Aiden’s own testimony, I
cannot find that there is such a grave detriment due to the fact that he very
clearly stated that although he enjoys the visits, and although he does want
to see you more often, it’s more the case, I believe, of friendly visitor.
“At the end, when he was pressed to choose where he
would continue to reside, he did choose and say that he wanted to remain
with [Godmother]. He enjoys his visits, but he very clearly stated he does not
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want to live with either you or [Father], and did not feel that Malakai would
be safe residing with either one of you.
“I know, per your testimony, that there was an explanation given
that you did state you did not leave him alone, and you knew exactly what he
was referring to; however, like I have stated, per his own testimony and in
his own words, I don’t find that severing the parental bond would be
detrimental to Aiden at this time.
“Like I said, he is seven. I do not believe he understands the
gravity of the decision that the Court is making today; however, I have to
base my decision on the facts that I have been presented with at this time
and with these children.”
C. Application and Analysis
Here, under the first element of Caden C., Mother maintained
visitations with the children; however, there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the court’s finding that the visitations were lacking
consistency over an extended period of time. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 632 [“The question is . . . whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into
account ‘the extent permitted by court orders’”].)
Under the second element of Caden C., there was some evidence
Mother’s relationship with the Aiden and Malakai was to some extent
positive. However, the testimony of Aiden at the hearing, and the totality of
the evidence in the Agency’s reports provides substantial evidence to support
the court’s ruling that Aiden’s relationship with Mother was more akin to a
“friendly visitor” rather than as a parent. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632; see also In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165–1166 [“‘“it is
only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will
14
prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement”’”].)
Finally, under the third discretionary element of Caden C., when
“weighing the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of
placement in a new, adoptive home,” we find that the court was plainly
conversant with the applicable legal authorities governing as well as the facts
of the case. (In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1291 [“Exercises of
discretion must be ‘“grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal
principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue”’”].)
The court noted at the start of the section 366.26 hearing that it
was undisputed that that the children were adoptable; therefore, the focus of
the court’s analysis had shifted to the needs of the children for permanency
and stability. The court then engaged in a thoughtful and thorough analysis
of the facts as applied to the appropriate legal considerations. As the court’s
analysis amply reflects, the court did not reach its decision in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [noting
“when a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding,
‘“a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has
exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination”’”].)
In sum, we hold that the factual elements of the court’s ruling
were supported by substantial evidence, and we further hold that the court
otherwise did not abuse its discretion (i.e., the court was not arbitrary or
capricious) when it ruled that the parental-benefit exception to the statutory
preference for adoption did not apply. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
640–641 [a juvenile court’s determination regarding the parental-benefit
exception is reviewed under a hybrid standard of review].)
Thus, we affirm the court’s order terminating parental rights.
15
Mother argues that the case of E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 68,
compels a different result. We disagree.
In E.T., twin children were removed from Mother’s custody when
they were four months old. (E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 70–71.) The
children were placed with their godparents. (Id. at p. 75.) After over a year of
reunification services, the children were returned to Mother. (Id. at p. 71.)
Mother then experienced a drug relapse, and again lost custody of her twin
children, but eventually reunification services were again resumed. (Ibid.)
The mother thereafter maintained consistent visitations. (Id. at p. 73.) At a
later section 366.26 hearing, the visitations were described as therapeutic,
and it was noted that the children experienced negative behaviors when they
were separated from Mother. (E.T., at pp. 73, 76.) The juvenile court
terminated parental rights, but the appellate court held that the lower court
erred in failing to apply the parental-benefit exception. (Id. at p. 77.) The
court found that “the visits coupled with Mother’s efforts during the
dependency showed that the children would benefit from continuing their
relationship with her. They love Mother. She provided them comfort and
affection, and she was able to ease their fear and anxiety.” (Id. at p. 76.)
Here, the facts are distinguishable. There was never a period in
this proceeding in which the children were returned to Mother’s care. Also,
there was no evidence in the record that Mother’s visits with the children
were therapeutic. The children did not experience negative behaviors that
were specifically related to their separation from Mother, and it appears that
the children adjusted very well to their placement with Godmother. In short,
we find the facts and the holding of E.T. are inapposite.
Mother also argues that removing her from the children’s lives
“would cause much detriment to their identity and character, especially
16
Aiden’s, and cause him to lose sense of belonging in the world that he has
lived with for his entire life.” We are not persuaded.
As a reviewing court, we are not an arbiter of facts. And we must
generally leave discretionary decisions concerning the “identity and
character” of the involved dependent children to the judgment of the court
that conducted the section 366.26 hearing. Having found that the court’s
discretionary ruling was neither arbitrary nor capricious, we have no
authority to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. “‘The
reviewing court must . . . draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all
evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.’” (In
re Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)
To reiterate and conclude, we affirm the order of the court, which
found that the parental-benefit exception did not apply.
III.
DISPOSITION
The challenged order of the juvenile court terminating Mother’s
parental rights is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
SCOTT, J.
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