CourtListener 10748382•People v. Torrez CA4/1
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Filed 12/5/25 P. v. Torrez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086921
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF1800603)
MICHAEL DAVID TORREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
James S. Hawkins, Judge. Affirmed.
Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Retired Judge of the Riverside Superior Court assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
I
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Michael David Torrez of second degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)), after he drove his truck while under the influence of
alcohol and caused an automobile accident that took the life of another
motorist on the road.1 The trial court sentenced Torrez to prison for an
indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Torrez contends the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the jury, over the objection of the
prosecution, on the crime of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(§ 191.5, subd. (a)). We reject this argument and affirm the judgment.
II
BACKGROUND
One evening, Torrez drove his Ford F-150 truck westbound on Ramon
Road in Palm Springs. Torrez drove at a speed of at least 55 miles per hour
in a driving zone with a speed limit of 45 miles per hour. On the west side of
the intersection of Ramon Road and El Cielo Road, Ramon Road narrows
from a three-lane street to a two-lane street. Torrez ran a red light at the
intersection while driving in the number three lane, closest to the curb. As
Ramon Road narrowed to a two-lane street, Torrez rearended the right
passenger-side of a Nissan Versa driving ahead of him in the number two
lane. The impact pushed the Nissan Versa off the roadway and onto the
sidewalk. Meanwhile, Torrez’s truck veered sharply to the left, entered the
opposing lanes of traffic, and spun out. The truck collided with the front end
of a Nissan Sentra travelling eastbound on Ramon Road. Mario Garcia, the
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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driver of the Nissan Sentra, died at the scene of the accident from blunt force
trauma injuries.
After the collision, witnesses noticed an odor of alcohol emitting from
the cab of Torrez’s truck. Torrez yelled obscenities and was uncooperative as
medical personnel transported him to the hospital to treat his injuries, which
included a dislocated hip, broken ribs, a broken nose, and a laceration to the
forehead. At one point, when Torrez was wheeled into the emergency room,
he stated, “I better not get a DUI.” Torrez had to be sedated in a trauma
room for treatment and law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant
to procure a blood sample from him while he was under sedation. The blood
sample, which was drawn about two and a half hours after the collision,
showed that Torrez had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.159
percent—about twice the legal driving limit. At trial, a toxicologist testified
that Torrez’s BAC was likely between 0.184 and 0.209 percent at the time of
the accident. The toxicologist opined Torrez would have consumed 17 to 23
alcoholic drinks to reach that BAC percentage based on his weight.
Prior to the fatal accident at issue, Torrez sustained a 2008 conviction
for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code
section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b). In connection with that conviction,
Torrez was sentenced to three years of summary probation, 30 days in county
jail, completion of an 18-month driving-under-the-influence education
program, 52 hours of group counseling, 12 hours of alcohol and drug
education, six hours of community reentry monitoring, and biweekly
individual interviews for the first six months.
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III
DISCUSSION
Torrez was charged with a single count of second degree murder, which
is commonly known as Watson murder when the defendant kills the victim
while driving under the influence. (See People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d
290.) After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on
principles of homicide (CALCRIM No. 500) and murder (CALCRIM No. 520).
Additionally, defense counsel requested instructions on uncharged
offenses including reckless driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 23103
(CALCRIM No. 2200), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in
violation of section 191.5, subdivision (a) (CALCRIM No. 590), and vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of section 191.5, subdivision (b)
(CALCRIM No. 591). Defense counsel claimed the instructions on the
uncharged offenses were supported by the evidence and “would give the jury
an opportunity to decide what happened here besides just murder.” The
prosecutor objected to the requested instructions on the ground that the
uncharged offenses at issue are not lesser included offenses of murder. The
trial court sided with the prosecution and declined to give the instructions on
the uncharged offenses.
On appeal, Torrez contends the trial court should have instructed the
jury on gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, at minimum,
because the court’s failure to give the instruction unjustly presented the jury
with an all-or-nothing choice between a murder conviction and acquittal.
However, as Torrez concedes, Supreme Court precedent barred the court from
giving the requested instruction without the consent of the prosecution.
“California law has long provided that even absent a request, and over
any party’s objection, a trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser
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offense ‘necessarily included’ in the charged offense, if there is substantial
evidence that only the lesser crime was committed. This venerable
instructional rule ensures that the jury may consider all supportable crimes
necessarily included within the charge itself, thus encouraging the most
accurate verdict permitted by the pleadings and the evidence.” (People v.
Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 112 (Birks); People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th
175, 215 [“a trial court must instruct on an uncharged offense that is less
serious than, and included in, a charged greater offense, even in the absence
of a request, whenever there is substantial evidence raising a question as to
whether all of the elements of the charged greater offense are present”].)
Notwithstanding this instructional duty, the Supreme Court has held
that a defendant does not have a unilateral right to demand instructions on
uncharged lesser offenses that are not necessarily included in the charged
offenses, but merely bear some relationship thereto.2 (Birks, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 136; see People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 [“A
defendant has no right to instructions on lesser related offenses, even if he or
she requests the instruction and it would have been supported by substantial
evidence, because California law does not permit a court to instruct
concerning an uncharged lesser related crime unless agreed to by both
parties.”].) As the High Court explained, a contrary rule allowing a
defendant to demand instructions on so-called “lesser related offenses,”
without the prosecution’s consent, would contravene the fundamental
principles of neutrality and mutual fairness by granting the defendant
substantially greater rights than the People either to require, or prevent, the
2 In reaching this holding, the Supreme Court overruled a prior decision,
People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, which had allowed a defendant to
demand—over the prosecution’s objection—an instruction on a “lesser related
offense” supported by the evidence. (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 112.)
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consideration of lesser nonincluded offenses. (Birks, at pp. 126–130.) Such a
rule would also potentially violate the separation of powers doctrine by
interfering with the discretion of the prosecuting authorities to determine
whom to charge and what offenses to bring. (Id. at pp. 134–135.)
The Supreme Court has also recognized that gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder.
(People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 991 (Sanchez).) As the court
explained, there is a “general principle that an offense is necessarily included
within a greater offense when the greater offense cannot be committed
without committing the lesser offense.” (Id. at pp. 990–991.) But, “[w]hen we
compare the elements of murder with the elements of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated, it appears ... that the statutory elements of
murder do not include all the elements of the lesser offense. Gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements that need not be
proved when the charge is murder, namely, use of a vehicle and intoxication.
Specifically, section 191.5 requires proof that the homicide was committed ‘in
the driving of a vehicle’ and that the driving was in violation of specified
Vehicle Code provisions prohibiting driving while intoxicated.” (Id. at p. 989;
see also id. at p. 992 [“gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated ...
requires proof of additional elements that are not included in the offense of
murder”].) Thus, “gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated should not
be treated as a lesser included offense of murder.” (Id. at p. 992.)
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the trial
court had no duty, or even discretion, to instruct the jury on the crime of
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. As all parties agree, gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of
murder. (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 992.) Further, the prosecution did
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not consent to defense counsel’s request for an instruction on gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated; therefore, Torrez was not entitled to demand
an instruction on the uncharged crime. (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136.)
In his appellate briefing, Torrez advances several equity- and policy-
based arguments as to why a trial court should be required to instruct a jury
on the crime of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in Watson
murder cases. However, the Supreme Court’s Birks and Sanchez decisions
are binding upon all lower courts, including our court and the trial court.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) To the
extent Torrez hopes to change the current state of the law, he must address
his arguments to the Supreme Court.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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