People v. Williams CA2/5

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Filed 12/5/25 P. v. Williams CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B336310

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA442745)
v.

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Dismissed.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
Michael Williams appeals the superior court’s minute
order, dated December 13, 2023, taking his Penal Code1 section
1172.75 hearing for recall and resentencing off calendar.
In the opening brief, Williams states that his appeal is
from a post-judgment order denying a resentencing hearing
pursuant to section 1172.75. However, the superior court did
not issue an order denying resentencing. Rather, the court
took the matter off calendar after Williams, who was not
present at the hearing, refused to waive his presence. We
conclude that the superior court’s minute order is not
appealable, and we dismiss the appeal.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Plea

On May 5, 2016, Williams pleaded no contest to charges in
three separate cases. In case No. BA427710, Williams pleaded no
contest to forcible rape and admitted the allegation that in
commission of the rape he inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim. Williams also admitted a prior strike conviction in the
rape case. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In the
present case, Williams pleaded no contest to resisting an
executive officer (§ 69) and admitted two prior prison term
allegations (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to a term of
five years in prison, to run concurrently with the 15 year
sentence in case No. BA427710. Williams’s sentence was
comprised of the upper term of three years for resisting an officer,

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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plus one year each for the prior prison term enhancements. In a
third case, Williams pleaded no contest to robbery, and was
sentenced to the middle term to run concurrently with his other
two sentences.

B. Resentencing Pursuant to Section 1172.75

In 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified Williams as an inmate who was potentially eligible for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 because he was serving
a sentence that included two now-illegal one-year enhancements
imposed pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The superior
court appointed counsel and set a resentencing hearing.
The matter was continued several times.
In a hearing on July 13, 2023, defense counsel informed the
court that Williams was in state custody in Louisiana. Counsel
stated that he would seek a waiver of Williams’s presence for the
resentencing hearing. The court offered to have Williams appear
remotely via Webex, and indicated that if Williams waived his
presence, the court would only be comfortable proceeding if
Williams appeared on video.
In a hearing on November 20, 2023, defense counsel
informed the court that the Allen Correctional Facility where
Williams was incarcerated used Zoom for remote appearances.
Counsel had not been able to speak with Williams during the
prior two weeks, but when he had last spoken with Williams,
Williams did not want to waive physical presence. The court
emphasized to counsel that if Williams decided not to proceed,
“the court doesn’t have a lot of choices.” If Williams did not
appear or waive his appearance, the court could not reduce his

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sentence. The court informed counsel that although California
courts do not use Zoom for remote appearances, the court was
willing to do so in this instance to facilitate Williams’s
appearance in conformance with Allen Correctional Facility’s
procedures. Defense counsel advised the court that Williams still
refused to waive his presence at the resentencing hearing. The
court again warned counsel that if Williams refused to appear,
the court could not proceed in his absence.
In a hearing on December 13, 2023, the court was prepared
to proceed via Zoom, which defense counsel had coordinated with
the Allen Correctional Facility. Counsel informed the court that
Williams did not wish to waive his right to be personally present
and would not appear via Zoom. The court noted that Williams
was entitled to resentencing. The court emphasized that it had
accommodated Williams by agreeing to use Zoom, which was not
one of the platforms that California courts utilize, and that
defense counsel had coordinated the Zoom call. The court stated
that it had “no other ability to get Mr. Williams here in court nor
will the court order him out of Louisiana state prison. . . .” “So by
not desiring to proceed . . . via Zoom today, Mr. Williams [is]
advised that he may be giving up his right to be resentenced,
whatever that is; because there is a finite statute date that runs
on December 31st, 2023.[2] [¶] . . . [Section] 1172.75 permits
virtual resentencings upon agreement by the parties. With that,
the court is taking the resentencing off calendar.” Defense
counsel reiterated that Williams was requesting to be brought to

2 The question of whether the December 31, 2023 deadline
contained in section 1172.75, subdivision (c)(2) precludes a
defendant from being resentenced after that date was not yet ripe
for decision, and the court did not purport to rule on the issue.

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court in person. Counsel emphasized that Williams was not
refusing resentencing; he was refusing virtual resentencing. The
court took the matter off calendar.
Williams did not move the court to place the hearing back
on calendar. Instead, Williams purported to appeal in this court
the superior court’s “failure to hold a resentencing hearing.”

DISCUSSION

A. Resentencing Pursuant to Section 1172.75

Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that a prior
prison term enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior to January 1, 2020, is invalid, except for an
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense. Section 1172.75 requires that “[t]he Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the county
correctional administrator of each county shall identify those
persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment
that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) and
shall provide the name of each person, along with the person’s
date of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to
the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.”
Upon receipt of this information, the court determines
whether the defendant’s judgment includes an invalid prior
prison term enhancement, and, if so, recalls the sentence and
resentences the defendant. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) The superior
court must complete review and resentencing “[b]y October 1,
2022, for individuals who have served their base term and any
other enhancement and are currently serving a sentence based on

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the enhancement[, or] [b]y December 31, 2023, for all other
individuals.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1) & (2).)
“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this
section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one
originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
“The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Although defendants have a right to be personally present
at a resentencing hearing (People v. Simms (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 987, 996), a defendant may waive that right (People
v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 673). Pursuant to section
1172.75, subdivision (e) “the resentencing hearing may be
conducted remotely through the use of remote technology, if the
defendant agrees.”

B. Analysis

In the opening brief, Williams averred that his appeal was
from a post-judgment order denying a resentencing hearing
pursuant to section 1172.75. He contended that he had a right to
be present at the resentencing hearing and to refuse to appear
remotely. He urged this court to remand the matter for a full
resentencing hearing. The People argued that the claim was

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moot, and/or Williams invited error, and/or Williams impliedly
waived his right to be present at the hearing.
Following our initial review of the matter, we invited the
parties to file letter briefs regarding whether the superior court’s
minute order taking the matter off calendar is an appealable
order.
In his supplemental brief, Williams argues that the
superior court’s minute order is tantamount to an order denying
him a resentencing hearing, and implicates his substantial
rights. As such, the minute order is appealable. In their
supplemental brief, the People contend that the minute order is
non-appealable. We concur with the People.
“ ‘ “[N]o appeal can be taken except from an appealable
order or judgment, as defined in the statutes and developed by
the case law. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (City of Gardena v. Rikuo Corp.
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 595, 601, italics omitted.) “The existence
of an appealable order or judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal.” (Canandaigua Wine Co., Inc. v. County of Madera
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.)
A court’s minute order removing a matter from its calendar
is not an appealable order. “ ‘ “Off Calendar” is not synonymous
with “dismissal.” “Off” merely means a postponement whereas a
“dismissal” in judicial procedure has reference to a cessation of
consideration.’ (Guardianship of Lyle (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 153,
156.)” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
712, 719, fn. 3.) “It is permissible for good cause to delay a trial
or hearing to a later date or to drop or strike a case from the
calendar, to be restored on motion of one or more of the litigants
or on the court’s own motion . . . Courts have control of pleadings

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in a case until a valid final judgment is rendered.”
(Guardianship of Lyle, supra, at pp. 155–156.)
Here, Williams’s substantial rights are not implicated. The
superior court did not deny recall and resentencing or refuse to
hold a resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75. The
court recognized that Williams was entitled to resentencing. The
court stated that the two one-year sentence enhancements
imposed pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) were no longer
legal and should be stricken at resentencing. The court also
recognized that Williams had a right to be present at the hearing;
it took the matter off-calendar rather than resentence Williams
in his absence. The court acknowledged that proceedings were at
an impasse at the time of the hearing because Williams invoked
his right to be present at the hearing, but he was incarcerated in
another state and unable to appear. Rather than making a
substantive order that resolved the matter, the superior court
removed the hearing from its calendar, presumably until such
time as the hearing could be held with either Williams’s presence
or his waiver of the right to be present.
The superior court’s minute order removing the hearing
from calendar was not tantamount to denial of a section 1172.75
hearing. Williams could have moved the court to place the
hearing back on calendar. He did not. Instead, he asks this court
to presume that if he had moved the superior court to place the
matter on calendar the court would have refused.
We decline to do so. The superior court’s theoretical refusal
of a motion that was never made does not implicate Williams’s
substantial rights. Williams was not without recourse in the

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superior court; he simply chose not to seek appropriate relief.3
The appeal is dismissed.

DISPOSITION

We dismiss the appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J.

3 We express no opinion on the merits of any relief that

Williams may still seek in the trial court.

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The People v. Michael Williams
B336310

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

We should not be dismissing this appeal. The December
13, 2023, order taking defendant and appellant’s Penal Code
section 1172.75 hearing “off calendar” (and specifying no date
when it would be back “on calendar”) affects his substantial
rights. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b).) By its express terms, the
governing statute required the superior court to adjudicate
defendant’s entitlement to relief and resentencing by December
31, 2023. (Pen. Code, § 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).) When the trial
court convened the hearing before taking the matter off calendar,
it still could have met this deadline. That is no longer possible, of
course, and the Attorney General takes the position that the
failure to meet the deadline means defendant can no longer
obtain relief—making this appeal moot. Assuming that is
correct, and really even assuming it may be correct,1 the “off
calendar” order affected defendant’s substantial rights. A pocket
veto is still a veto.

1 The Attorney General’s position means there is now
uncertainty about defendant’s entitlement to relief where there
was none when the trial court took the matter off calendar. I
need not and do not now express a view on whether the Attorney
General’s position is correct.
In my view, we should treat the trial court’s order as a
denial of section 1172.75 relief, reverse the order, and remand
with directions to strike defendant’s prior prison term
enhancements and resentence him—in absentia if necessary.
(See generally People v. Ramirez (2022) 14 Cal.5th 176, 188.)

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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