CourtListener 10746679•People v. Martinez CA1/4
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Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Martinez CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, A171969
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County
JESUS MARTINEZ, Super. Ct. No. 012400929)
Defendant and Appellant.
Jesus Martinez appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence
pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.1 He contends police
unconstitutionally handcuffed and pat-searched him while executing a valid
search warrant for a car in which he was a passenger. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
On March 12, 2024, Concord Police Department Detective David Petty
and his colleagues executed a search warrant on a car belonging to Don
Mallari based on a domestic violence incident ten days earlier. The warrant
authorized searches for any guns on Mallari’s person or in his car or
residence.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript.
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The victim told police that Mallari had attacked her in his apartment
ten days earlier, beating her and threatening her with a semiautomatic pistol
with an extended magazine. Mallari also kept a rifle behind his bed, and she
had seen his roommate and friends carrying guns in his apartment around
two weeks before the assault. The victim said that she knew the roommate
by the name Sus.
Police officers located Mallari’s parked car in his building’s gated lot.
Around 7:00 p.m. they saw him get in the car with another man, later
identified as Martinez, and drive away. Detective Petty pulled the car over
approximately one block away as it turned into another parking lot.
Detective Petty believed there might be weapons in the car based on
the victim’s report that Mallari and his associates carried guns and Mallari
had used a gun when he assaulted her. Wanting to prevent “any type of
dangerous situation” for the responding officers and bystanders, he
commanded Mallari to get out of the car while he and four other officers
aimed their service pistols at the car. Officers quickly handcuffed Mallari
and patted him down.
Officers then ordered Martinez out of the car. Detective Stephanie
Wilkens was aware of the victim’s report about Mallari and his associates
possessing and carrying firearms. For “safety purposes,” accordingly, she
handcuffed Martinez and pat-searched him. It took “a matter of seconds.”
The search revealed a loaded Glock 27 pistol in Martinez’s front waistband.
Martinez moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search under
section 1538.5 at the preliminary hearing, arguing the detention was a de
facto arrest without probable cause. The magistrate disagreed, finding the
circumstances known to the police justified the search and that the
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handcuffing did not ripen it into an arrest. Martinez renewed the motion
before the trial court, again without success.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Where, as here, a motion to suppress is submitted to the superior court
on the preliminary hearing transcript, “the appellate court disregards the
findings of the superior court and reviews the determination of the
magistrate who ruled on the motion to suppress, drawing all presumptions in
favor of the factual determinations of the magistrate, upholding the
magistrate's express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence, and measuring the facts as found by the trier against the
constitutional standard of reasonableness.” (People v. Thompson (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 923, 940.) We independently determine the applicable law,
apply it to the established facts (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114,
1140), and affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is correct under any legal theory.
(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) “ ‘We are prohibited from
ordering the suppression of evidence unless federal constitutional standards
require us to do so.’ ” (People v. Lim (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296.)
B. Analysis
1. Handcuffing
Martinez concedes the police could lawfully detain him while they
executed the search warrant on Mallari’s car. He contends, however, that the
detention ripened into an unconstitutional custodial arrest when he was
handcuffed. We disagree.
“Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a
determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ . . . , the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement
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of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (California v. Beheler (1983)
463 U.S. 1121, 1125.) People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667 is instructive.
There, our Supreme Court explained that “ ‘[t]here is no hard and fast line to
distinguish permissible investigative detentions from impermissible de facto
arrests. Instead, the issue is decided on the facts of each case, with focus on
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably
designed to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly, using the least
intrusive means reasonably available under the circumstances.’ [Citations.]”
(Id. at pp. 674–675.) “Important to this assessment… are the duration, scope,
and purpose of the stop.” (Ibid.)
Handcuffing substantially increases the intrusiveness of a detention.
“Nevertheless, because a police officer may take reasonable precautions to
ensure safe completion of the officer’s investigation, handcuffing a suspect
during a detention does not necessarily transform the detention into a de
facto arrest. [Citations.] The issue is whether the handcuffing was
reasonably necessary for the detention.” (People v. Stier (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 21, 27.)
Martinez contends the handcuffing was unjustified by any reasonable
safety concerns. He is incorrect. Police were executing a warrant to search
Mallari’s car, apartment, and person based on a recent violent incident in the
apartment during which he threatened the victim with a semiautomatic
pistol. They had been informed that Mallari also had a rifle; that the victim
knew his roommate and friends to be armed; and that she had recently seen
them with guns in Mallari’s apartment. Mallari’s car was just a block from
that apartment when officers pulled it over. Under these circumstances,
briefly detaining Martinez in handcuffs was a “reasonable precaution[] to
ensure safe completion of the officer’s investigation.” (People v. Stier, supra,
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168 Cal.App.4th at p. 27; see People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499,
1517–1520 [removing defendant from car at gunpoint, ordering him them to
lie on the ground, handcuffing and placing him in patrol car, transporting
him three blocks away and holding him for 30 minutes was reasonable based
on reports car may have been involved in a homicide and its occupants
armed]; cf. Stier, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 28 [arresting officer had no
specific articulable facts suggesting suspect was dangerous].)
The brief duration of the incident is also important here. “[S]topping a
suspect at gunpoint, handcuffing him, and making him sit on the ground for a
short period, as occurred here, do not convert a detention into an arrest.”
(People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 675 [a “few minutes”]; see People v.
Soun, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1517, 1520 [30 minutes]; In re Carlos M.
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 384–385 [30-minute detention not an arrest when
officers handcuffed and transported rape suspect to hospital for victim
identification]; Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 308 F.3d 987,
989, 991–992 [45 to 60-minute detention while officers transported
handcuffed defendant to crime site not an arrest].) Viewed in the context of
these authorities, the momentary restraint on Martinez’s freedom of
movement while he was handcuffed for the “matter of seconds” necessary to
pat search him for weapons did not transform the detention into a formal
arrest.
2. Pat Search
The circumstances known to the officers also justify their decision to
conduct a pat search of Martinez for weapons. A pat search must be
warranted by the officers’ reasonable concern for their safety or that of
bystanders. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27.) There must be specific
facts leading the officers to believe the suspect may be armed; for example, it
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may not be assumed that all persons suspected of narcotics trafficking will be
armed and dangerous. (Santos v. Superior Court (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1178,
1185.) Here, however, Detectives Petty and Wilkens possessed specific
information supporting a reasonable concern that both Mallari and his
passenger were likely to be armed and dangerous. Officers faced with
articulable facts suggesting the suspect is dangerous need not wait until they
are attacked to make a precautionary search. (In re Michael S. (1983)
141 Cal.App.3d 814, 816–817.) The motion was properly denied.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Clay, J.*
WE CONCUR:
Brown, P. J.
Goldman, J.
A171969/People v. Martinez
* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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