People v. Spears CA2/6

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Filed 12/1/25 P. v. Spears CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B341703
(Super. Ct. No. 24ARCF00020)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

RODNEY SPEARS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Rodney Spears appeals after a jury convicted him of
carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211). 1
Appellant contends the trial court erroneously denied his petition
for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. We will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Trial
Dylan Ferro was at a gas station to put gas in his rental car
when appellant approached from behind, put his arm around
Ferro’s chest, and “pulled a knife.”

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant said “Where are the keys? Where’s the cash?” or
“Give me the keys. Give me the cash.” Ferro gave appellant the
keys but told him the cash was in the car. Appellant left in
Ferro’s rental car. The car contained a laptop, one thousand
dollars cash, credit and debit cards, and a suitcase full of clothes.
At about 8:00 p.m. that evening, law enforcement arrested
appellant following a traffic stop. Appellant was the vehicle’s
driver and sole occupant. Law enforcement recovered about $600
in appellant’s possession. The car contained around $300 in new
clothes.
Surveillance video captured the incident. Ferro testified
the perpetrator “could be” appellant but said he “can’t be a
hundred percent sure.”
The jury convicted appellant of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a))
and robbery (§ 211). As to both offenses, it found true the
allegation appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon (knife) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced
appellant to a total term of six years in prison.
Mental Health Diversion
Before trial, appellant petitioned for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36. Dr. Robin Campbell conducted a
psychological evaluation of appellant. Appellant had previously
been diagnosed with schizophrenia. He began hearing voices in
2022. He experienced a range of hallucinations and delusions.
He began using methamphetamine in 2023 after his brother died.
Before the charged offenses, appellant was hearing voices
and suffered a panic attack. He had not been taking medication
and had used methamphetamine the day before.
Dr. Campbell diagnosed appellant with schizophrenia
complicated by substance abuse. Appellant “would also qualify
for a diagnosis of an amphetamine-type use disorder.” Dr.
Campbell opined appellant “would not pose an unreasonable risk

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of danger to public safety if his psychiatric symptoms were
controlled with treatment.” “A dual-diagnosis treatment program
that addresses his psychiatric disorder and substance abuse
disorder would be most beneficial.”
Appellant submitted a conditional letter of acceptance to a
three-month residential treatment program. The letter stated
“‘[c]lients can be ‘stepped down’ to Recovery Bridge Housing and
outpatient aftercare.”
At the hearing, the prosecutor opposed diversion given the
seriousness of the charges and appellant’s record. The prosecutor
described appellant’s conduct in his two probation cases. In one
case, appellant tried to break into a woman’s apartment. In
another, he damaged hotel guest doors with a baseball bat.
When later confronted by hotel security, appellant “pull[ed] out”
a machete and said, “‘I will slice you the fuck up,’” and, “‘Sling an
arm at me and I will slice your fucking arm off.’” The prosecutor
argued appellant was dangerous and “likely to commit a super
strike.”
The court “agree[d] that [appellant] is a danger.” It
determined the three-month program was not appropriate. The
court indicated an in-patient program with “some level of security
provided for the [statutory maximum] two-year period” would
“meet [appellant’s] particularized needs.” The court also asked
about or discussed the People’s offer, appellant’s potential prison
time, and the existence of any proof problems. The court denied
mental health diversion.
DISCUSSION
Section 1001.36
Section 1001.36 authorizes mental health diversion for
defendants who meet eligibility and suitability criteria. (Vaughn
v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn).)
“Eligibility entails satisfaction of two prongs: (1) a defendant has

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been diagnosed with a recognized mental health disorder, and (2)
the disorder was ‘a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense.’” (Ibid.; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) If eligibility is
established, “the court must consider whether the defendant is
suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)
“A defendant is suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified
mental health expert, the defendant’s mental health disorder
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4)
the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety’ as defined in section 1170.18 if treated in the
community.” (Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134;
§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).) Such a risk of danger “exists only if
the evidence indicates it is likely the defendant will commit a so-
called ‘super strike’ violent felony.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890 (Sarmiento).)
Super strike offenses include “any homicide offense
(including any attempted homicide offense), solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any
serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or
death, and certain sex offenses.” (People v. Williams (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 990, 1001; see also § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)
The court must be “satisfied” the recommended program
“will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the
defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); Sarmiento, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) “Before approving a proposed treatment
program, the court shall consider the request of the defense, the
request of the prosecution, the needs of the defendant, and the
interests of the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(ii).)

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Finally, the court retains residual discretion to deny
diversion. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) This
discretion “must be exercised ‘“consistent with the principles and
purpose of the governing law.”’” (Ibid.; see also § 1001.35.)
Standard of Review
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health
diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual
findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.)
“‘“‘[T]he term judicial discretion “implies absence of
arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical
thinking.”’ [Citation.] ‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court
exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being
considered.’”’” (People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207,
213.) “‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary
or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence
[citation].’” (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.)
Contentions
Appellant challenges the court’s denial of the mental health
diversion petition on several grounds. First, he contends the trial
court impermissibly “collapsed the analysis of the dangerousness
prong under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) into the question
of a suitable treatment program under section 1001.36,
subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) . . . .” We disagree.
Section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) provides that in
assessing risk of danger, the court may consider, among other
factors, “the defendant’s treatment plan” and “any other factors
that the court deems appropriate.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).) Thus, the
court could properly consider appellant’s proposed treatment
program in evaluating his dangerousness under section 1001.36.

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Appellant’s reliance on Sarmiento is unavailing. There, the
trial court “impliedly” acknowledged there was not a likelihood
the defendant would commit a super strike if granted diversion,
and the court “referenced his ‘residual’ discretion under the
statute . . . .” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895.) Here,
the court did not cite its residual discretion. Instead, the court
agreed appellant was “a danger” after the prosecutor argued he
was “likely to commit a super strike.” The court impliedly found
appellant was likely to commit a super strike offense if treated in
the community (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)).
Second, appellant contends the court improperly treated
the diversion hearing like a sentencing hearing. Appellant
further asserts the court improperly conditioned diversion on the
prosecutor’s consent. Again, we disagree.
“Ordinarily statements made by the trial court as to its
reasoning are not reviewable.” (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1440.) A limited exception exists when the
court’s comments, as a whole, “disclose an incorrect rather than a
correct concept of the relevant law, embodied not merely in
‘secondary remarks’ but in [the court’s] basic ruling . . . .” (People
v. Ortiz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 249, 253; see also People v. Tessman
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1302-1303.)
The court’s comments, viewed as a whole, do not disclose an
incorrect concept of the law. Its inquiry and comments regarding
proof issues, appellant’s potential prison time, and the People’s
offer simply reflect a desire to grasp the case’s practical reality.
Grappling with that reality did not mean the court treated the
hearing like a sentencing or imposed an added condition for
diversion. In line with section 1001.36, the court’s denial was
ultimately predicated on appellant’s dangerousness and the
failure of the proposed treatment to meet appellant’s

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particularized needs. Secondary remarks do not invalidate its
basic ruling.
Appellant next contends the court did not find he was likely
to commit a super strike as required by section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(4). But section 1001.36 does not require that
express finding. Instead, the statute provides courts “must
consider” suitability (id., subd. (c), italics added), including
whether the defendant “pose[s] an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Given the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume the court knew and applied
“‘the correct statutory and case law.’” (People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 361; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440,
451 [analyzing whether record supported “the trial court’s
implied finding that Moine was likely to commit a super strike
offense”].)
Appellant argues that even if the court made the requisite
finding, the evidence does not support it. We conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that
appellant was likely to commit a super strike offense if treated in
the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Appellant’s prior convictions and current charges
constituted a pattern of alarming conduct. Appellant attempted
to break into a woman’s apartment. In another incident,
appellant “pull[ed] out” a machete and said, “‘I will slice you the
fuck up,’” and, “‘Sling an arm at me and I will slice your fucking
arm off.’” In the current case, appellant escalated by employing a
knife to commit a carjacking and robbery. Appellant’s weapon
use elevated the risk he would commit a super strike offense,
such as a homicide offense. Appellant’s hallucinations, delusions,
and methamphetamine use further amplified this risk.

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Dr. Campbell did opine that appellant “would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if his psychiatric
symptoms were controlled with treatment.” However, a brief
residential program with subsequent services stood little chance
of adequately controlling appellant’s severe, longstanding
symptoms. Appellant’s medication compliance in custody was not
guaranteed to continue upon release. In fact, appellant told Dr.
Campbell that psychotropic medication he received when
hospitalized “had no effect.” Appellant was unlikely to continue
taking medication if he believed it to be ineffective. Additionally,
although appellant had been taking medication, Dr. Campbell’s
report indicated he “continues” to hear voices and “have some
delusional thoughts.”
Finally, appellant contends the court “abused its discretion
when it found the proposed treatment would not meet appellant’s
mental health needs.” Once again, we disagree.
Under section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i), the trial
court must be “satisfied that the recommended inpatient or
outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.”
(Id., subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) While this subdivision does not create an
added eligibility or suitability requirement, a court can still
“reject diversion” if it concludes a proposed treatment plan “could
not effectively address the defendant’s particular diagnosis.”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895, fn. omitted.)
Here, the court could reasonably conclude a brief
residential program with subsequent services would not meet
appellant’s specialized needs, given his symptoms’ severity and
duration. Moreover, the treatment letter referenced appellant’s
“addiction severity” and “self-defeating and maladaptive
behavior,” but not his schizophrenia. While appellant’s counsel
described the placement as “dual diagnosis,” the letter did not

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indicate the treatment would directly address appellant’s core
mental health issue.
Appellant argues “the trial court was not positioned well to
opine what treatment would address appellant’s mental health
needs.” But the statute tasks the trial court with making that
determination. The court was not bound to follow Dr. Campbell’s
opinion by virtue of her expert status. (In re J.S. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 205, 212 [“any trial court is not bound by an expert’s
. . . opinion”].) Furthermore, Dr. Campell’s report did not
specifically address the treatment program appellant secured.
The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the proposed
treatment would not meet appellant’s specialized needs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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William Sadler, Judge
Melissa R. Hammond, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Michael H. Casey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Harris and Allison H.
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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