CourtListener 10744966•George v. Hartman CA6
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Filed 11/26/25 George v. Hartman CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
KOSHY PUTHUKKERIL GEORGE, H051697
(Santa Clara County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CH010234)
v.
ERIC FLOYD HARTMAN,
Appellant.
Eric Floyd Hartman appeals from an order granting a request to renew a civil
harassment restraining order. Prior to the issuance of the original restraining order in this
case, Hartman filed a peremptory challenge to disqualify the assigned judicial officer
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6,1 which was granted. Two years later,
the disqualified judge granted the restraining order extension. Hartman contends the
judge was disqualified from hearing the renewal request and acted in excess of
jurisdiction in granting the request and thus, the order is void. We agree, and remand for
a new hearing in front of a different judge.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In August 2021, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on Koshy
Puthukkeril George’s ex parte request for a civil harassment restraining order against
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
1
We omit the underlying factual allegations, which are not material to Hartman’s
2
appeal. Further, we note that George filed a motion to augment the record. We
Hartman, and set a hearing for 64 days later.3 At that hearing, George did not stipulate to
the court commissioner, who continued the hearing to December 2021. In November,
prior to the hearing on the restraining order, Hartman filed a peremptory challenge
pursuant to section 170.6 to the judge assigned to hear the matter, Judge Carol Overton,
which the judge accepted.
On December 13, 2021, a different judge, Judge Shawna Schwarz, heard the
matter, and the court issued a civil harassment restraining order against Hartman, which
protected George, in addition to his wife and daughter. The order had an expiration date
of December 16, 2023. In February 2023, Judge Schwarz granted George’s request for
modification of the civil harassment restraining order and issued an amended restraining
order without changing the expiration date.
On September 21, 2023, George filed a request to renew the restraining order. In
the request he stated: “I have a reasonable fear that future abuse, harassment and
intimidation by Respondent Eric Hartman will continue unless the Civil Harassment
Restraining Order – First Amended is renewed. This is supported by the concurrently
previously granted the motion as to pages 1-43 of the attached documents, and deferred
George’s alternative request for judicial notice of the remaining documents for
consideration with this appeal. These documents include our prior opinion in another
appeal involving these parties, several civil case information statements, notices of
appeal, a notice designating the record on appeal for another appeal with these parties,
and documents concerning a motion for recovery of fees. The request for judicial notice
is denied. Although we can take judicial notice of court records, the remaining
documents are not relevant to or necessary for the resolution of this appeal. (Evid. Code,
§ 452 subd. (d); Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063
[“Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters [citation], only relevant
material may be noticed.”].)
3
We derive a portion of the procedural history from the opinions in prior appeals
arising out of this lawsuit. (George v. Hartman (Nov. 9, 2023, H049735, H049886)
[nonpub. opn.]; George v. Hartman (Dec. 26, 2024, H050941) [nonpub. opn.].) In the
2023 appeal, Hartman disputed the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue a civil harassment
restraining order and award attorney fees in this case. In the 2024 appeal, Hartman
appealed the trial court’s grant of George’s request to modify the civil harassment
restraining order. We affirmed the subject orders in both appeals.
2
filed Declarations.”4 On September 24, 2023, Judge Overton set a hearing date for the
renewal request on October 24, 2023, in Department 4. Hartman filed his opposition to
the extension of the order on October 20, 2023.
Hartman did not appear at the hearing on October 24, 2023. In a written
opposition to the request, he asserted that he was “continuing to specially appearing (sic)
only via these filed court documents so as not to waive his defense that the Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.” George and one of the other protected parties appeared.
Despite her earlier disqualification, Judge Overton heard the request to renew the
restraining order on October 24, 2023.5 There was no record of any objection to Judge
Overton presiding over the proceedings. Following the hearing, the trial court granted
the request to renew the civil harassment restraining order, with a new expiration date of
December 16, 2028. Hartman timely appealed the order renewing the civil harassment
restraining order.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hartman argues that because Judge Overton was previously
disqualified in the civil harassment action, the court acted in excess of jurisdiction by
ruling on the request to renew the restraining order and that the order is therefore void.
George contends the request to renew was a new proceeding based on subsequent events,
so the challenge to Judge Overton no longer applied. Specifically, George argues:
(1) renewal of a restraining order is not automatic, and the request to renew the
restraining order was a new proceeding and required a new peremptory challenge;
(2) Hartman waived his rights in the trial court; (3) Hartman did not file a petition for a
4
The declarations are not in the record.
5
There is nothing in the record indicating Judge Overton was aware at the time
that she had been previously disqualified in the civil harassment restraining order
proceedings approximately two years earlier.
3
writ of mandate; and (4) Hartman has not argued his challenge was proper in form,
service, or effectiveness.
A. Legal Principles
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 provides that “[a] judge, court
commissioner, or referee of a superior court of the State of California shall not try a civil
or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character nor hear any matter
therein that involves a contested issue of law or fact when it is established . . . that the
judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against a party or attorney or the interest of a
party or attorney appearing in the action or proceeding.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(1).) The
statute “serves the Legislature’s evident purpose of ‘maintaining the appearance as well
as the fact of impartiality in the judicial system: the business of the courts ... must be
conducted in such a manner as will avoid even the “suspicion of unfairness.” ’
[Citation.]” (Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1252.) It is “ ‘liberally
construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Smith (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 854, 859.)
Section 170.6 grants “litigants the right to disqualify judges for ‘prejudice’ without
proof. Prejudice is deemed to be established if a party or an attorney declares, under
penalty of perjury, a good faith belief the judge is prejudiced. The affidavit of prejudice
is incontestable, both regarding the alleged prejudice and the declarant’s sincerity.
[Citation.]” (Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 408, fn. omitted.)
Once accepted by the challenged judge, a peremptory challenge takes place
“ ‘instantaneously and irrevocably’ ” and “ ‘later events (such as dismissal of the party
who asserted the challenge) do not cause a rescission of the challenge.’ [Citation.]”
(Davcon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1362; see also Frisk v.
Superior Court, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th 402, at p. 411 [it is a “long-standing principle
that peremptory challenges, once accepted by the court, remain effective notwithstanding
the subsequent dismissal of the challenging party”].) “The resulting change of judge
4
completes the peremptory challenge.” (Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 142, 147.) “[T]he [challenged] judge is thereupon disqualified from hearing
any contested issue of law or fact in that case.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1981) 124
Cal.App.3d 1059, 1062 (Brown).) Disqualification under section 170.6 “is not limited to
a particular motion or issue, but deprives the disqualified judge of jurisdiction in all
further contests in that action.” (Id. at p. 1061.) A judgment rendered by a judge who
was the subject of a successful section 170.6 challenge is void. (In re Jenkins (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 1162.)
“A party is only allowed one such challenge per action.” (Pickett v. Superior
Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 887, 892 (Pickett); § 170.6, subd. (a)(4).) This “limitation
applies even when a separate proceeding is merely a ‘continuation of the original action
out of which it arises and it involves “substantially the same issues” as the original
action.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 893.)
In this appeal, we are faced solely with a question of law based on undisputed
facts. When a “case presents only questions of law based on undisputed material facts[,]
[o]ur review of the trial court’s decision is . . . de novo.” (Defend Bayview Hunters Point
Com. v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 846, 851; see also
Earnest v. Commission on Teacher Credentialing (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 62, 73 [“The
interpretation of a statute and the application of a statute to undisputed facts are legal
issues subject to de novo review. [Citations.]”].)
B. Analysis
It is not reasonably subject to dispute that Judge Overton was disqualified pursuant
to section 170.6 prior to the ruling on the original restraining order, and that a different
judge then issued the order after hearing. The question is whether Judge Overton
remained disqualified for the request to renew the restraining order. We conclude she
continued to be disqualified at the time she granted the request to renew the restraining
order in the same case and ordered a new expiration date.
5
i. Procedural Arguments
We first address several procedural arguments raised by George. These include
his arguments that Hartman: (1) waived his rights in the trial court; (2) did not file a
petition for a writ of mandate; (3) has not argued his challenge was proper in form,
service, or effectiveness.
1. Waiver/Forfeiture
George contends Hartman waived his right to contest Judge Overton’s
consideration of the renewal request by failing to object or even to appear for the hearing.
George asserts Hartman did not file a motion for reconsideration or a motion to set aside
the judgment.
We first note that the California Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he term
‘waiver’ has [ ] been loosely used at times, including in the disqualification context, to
signify what is properly understood as a forfeiture. [Citations.]” (North American Title
Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155, 177, fn. omitted.) “ ‘Whereas forfeiture is
the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 178.)
George’s argument appears to be not one of waiver, but rather that Hartman forfeited his
right to appellate review of the renewed restraining order by not objecting in the superior
court.
Whether characterized as forfeiture or waiver, George’s argument necessarily
relies on his contention that the request for a renewed restraining order was a new
proceeding requiring a new peremptory challenge. As we discuss infra, we conclude the
renewal proceeding was a continuation of the original restraining order proceeding and
did not require another challenge under section 170.6. At the time of the renewal
proceeding, Judge Overton was already disqualified. George cites no case law that
supports a position that after a judge has been disqualified, a litigant must assert that
disqualification or it is either forfeited on appeal or otherwise waived, nor do we hold as
6
such. Even if Hartman had wanted to waive the disqualification at that point in the case,
he would have been unable to do so. (See Brown, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 1062
[“The statute does not provide any exception for the benefit of a party who uses the
declaration to remove a judge from one hearing, and then wishes to reinstate that judge
for a subsequent hearing in the same case.”].)
It is correct that Hartman did not appear at the hearing on October 24, 2023, and
therefore made no objection in the trial court to Judge Overton hearing the restraining
order renewal request. Nor did he object to the court’s issuance of the order renewing the
restraining order. Failure to raise an issue or object in the trial court often results in
forfeiture of the right to have that issue reviewed on appeal. (People v. Saunders (1993)
5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590 [“ ‘ “An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural
defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where
an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some
appropriate method.” ’ ”].)
Nevertheless, “[a]lthough ‘appellate courts will not ordinarily consider matters
raised for the first time on appeal[,] ... whether the rule shall be applied is largely a
question of the appellate court’s discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985)
40 Cal.3d 703, 722, fn. 17; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An
appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been
preserved for review by a party.”]; Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Schirmer Stevedoring Co.
(1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 607, 610 [“an appellate court may, in its discretion, consider
issues which are raised for the first time on appeal”].) Matters raised for the first time on
appeal “will often be considered where the issue relates to questions of law only.”
(Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.)
The issue before us involves California’s statutory disqualification scheme, which
is “ ‘intended to ensure public confidence in the judiciary.’ ” (People v. Freeman (2010)
47 Cal.4th 993, 1001.) Thus, even if a litigant could forfeit a peremptory challenge that
7
has already been granted, we would exercise our discretion to reach this important issue
in this appeal.6
2. Petition for Writ of Mandate
George argues the only method to obtain review of an order denying a
disqualification motion is by filing a petition for a writ. Generally, “a writ of mandate
[is] the exclusive means of challenging a denial of a motion to disqualify a judge.”
(People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 275, italics added; § 170.3, subd. (d).) In this
appeal, the motion to disqualify Judge Overton was granted. Thus, we are concerned
only with the question of whether the disqualified judge acted in excess of jurisdiction by
ruling on the request for the renewed restraining order, not with whether the earlier
peremptory challenge was denied. A restraining order issued pursuant to section 527.6 is
appealable as an order granting an injunction. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6); R.D. v. P.M. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) Hartman’s challenge to the order is therefore properly
subject to appeal.
3. Form, Service, and Effectiveness of Original Peremptory
Challenge
George asserts that Hartman has not argued that his original peremptory challenge,
titled a “Notice of Motion of Pre-emptory Challenge to Disqualify Continued Return
Hearing Before Judge Carol Overton Pursuant to CCP § 170.6(5)(6)(7),” was proper in
form, properly served, or effective. George states further that the challenge was
expressly limited to a return hearing set for December 6, 2021.
We observe that Judge Overton accepted the peremptory challenge. Hartman
consequently had no reason to seek a writ at that time, and he does not seek in his current
appeal to have that order reversed. Nor does the record show that George objected to or
6
George also appears to argue Hartman consented to personal jurisdiction by
making a general appearance through the filing of an opposition, or by failing to appear
and object. Personal jurisdiction is not at issue in this appeal.
8
otherwise contested Judge Overton’s granting of the peremptory challenge, in 2021 or at
any other time. Accordingly, the adequacy of the peremptory challenge from 2021 is not
before us in this appeal.
ii. New Proceeding
George contends the request to renew the civil harassment restraining order was a
new proceeding and a new peremptory challenge is required “each time a judge is
assigned to hear a subsequent matter.” We must reject George’s premise under the
circumstances of this case. The request for a renewed restraining order was not a “new
proceeding” requiring Hartman to file a new peremptory challenge. In fact, doing so
would have had no effect because Judge Overton had already been disqualified.
“[W]hen a second action or special proceeding ‘involves “substantially the same
issues” ’ and ‘ “matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues” ’ in the original
case, the second action or proceeding is considered a continuation of the earlier action or
proceeding for purposes of section 170.6. [Citation.]” (Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1
Cal.5th 962, 979 (Maas).) A peremptory challenge under section 170.6 “cannot be
entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original
proceedings.” (Jacobs v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187,
190 (Jacobs).) Conversely, when an “action arises out of later events distinct from those
in the previous action[,] . . . the [later] action does not constitute a continuation of the
previous action.” (Bravo v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1494.) Only
when the later action is not a continuation of the earlier action may a party make a
“second” peremptory challenge. (See Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182,
190, fn. 6 [Section 170.6 “bars any party from making more than one motion ‘in any one
action or special proceeding’; by negative implication, in two successive actions a party
may move to disqualify in each, or may disqualify in the later action without waiving that
right by failing to so move in the earlier.”]; see also McClenny v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County (1964) 60 Cal.2d 677, 681-683; see also Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
9
p. 979; see also Jacobs, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 190.) It follows that if the later proceeding
is merely a continuation of the earlier one, a party has neither the right to file a new
peremptory challenge nor any obligation to attempt to do so again if the trial judge from
the earlier proceeding has already been disqualified.
Cases have found a later action or proceeding to be a continuation of the earlier
one in a variety of circumstances. For example, “[i]n situations involving guardianship
and custody orders subsequent proceedings to obtain changes in custody are
continuations of the original proceeding to determine custody.” (Jacobs, supra, 53
Cal.2d at p. 190.) In Jacobs, the court concluded a motion to modify the judgment and a
supplemental petition for appointment of guardians “must be deemed to be continuations
of the prior proceedings” because, aside from an alleged change in circumstances, the
parties and “the paramount questions to be decided by the court” were the same as in the
prior proceedings. (Id. at p. 191.)
Likewise, “proceeding[s] for contempt or for revocation of probation, . . . are
considered a continuation of the earlier action.” (Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 980; see
also People v. Barnfield (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 210, 215 [“revocation of probation is a
continuation of the plea bargain proceeding with its sentencing and placing appellant on
probation”]; see also Astourian v. Superior Court (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 720, 725
[finding an order to show cause re contempt gave rise to the issue whether a previously
issued injunction had been violated, and the substantially similar issues meant the later
action was a continuation of the original action].)
A request to obtain renewal of an existing civil harassment restraining order is
analogous to these types of cases. As is the situation here, they involve the same parties.
Further, a request to renew a restraining order necessarily involves consideration of the
same issues as the original proceeding. In contrast to the above-mentioned proceedings,
however, the renewal of a restraining order does not require new facts for its
determination. In fact, the trial court “may rely solely on the record in the original case”
10
in exercising its discretion to renew the order. (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 77, 90, italics added (Cooper).) Section 527.6 provides: “The order may be
renewed, upon the request of a party, for a duration of no more than five additional years,
without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the original
order. . . .” (§ 527.6, subd. (j)(1), italics added; Cooper, supra, at p. 91 [section 527.6
“grants the trial court discretion to renew a restraining order based on its review of the
record of the past harassment underlying the original issuance of the restraining order and
without the protected party presenting any new evidence”].) In this sense, the evidence
considered for the renewal proceeding for the additional period of up to five years can be
identical to the original proceeding, with the two proceedings separated only by time.
The record here does not suggest any deviation from the usual circumstances
underlying the restraining order renewal procedure. The request to renew the restraining
order occurred in the same case (with the same case number) as the original restraining
order proceeding, it involved the same parties, and it raised essentially the same question
to be decided by the court: whether to restrain Hartman from contacting the Georges.
We also note that the same restraining order had just been modified in February of 2023
after a hearing by another judge. We conclude the proceeding for a renewed restraining
order was not a new proceeding requiring a new peremptory challenge.
George argues that the renewal proceeding is a new proceeding because it is based
on new facts and changed circumstances. While George asserts the renewal proceeding
included new facts, the record does not show that the court disregarded the record from
the original proceedings, or whether such “new” facts were considered by the trial court
or were meaningfully different from the facts presented in either the original proceeding
or the modification proceeding.7 Moreover, additional new facts alone do not
automatically convert a continuation of a proceeding to a new one.
7
The record contains a number of documents dated later than the date on which
the original restraining order was granted in 2021, which are attached to Hartman’s
11
Antonio G. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 422 (Antonio G.) is
instructive. In Antonio G., a minor was made a ward of the court based on a finding that
he had unlawfully possessed a controlled substance for sale. (Id. at p. 424.) Prior to a
hearing on a petition alleging drug use by the minor, the minor filed a peremptory
challenge to the judge. (Id. at p. 425.) “The judge denied the challenge on the ground
that the hearing on the supplemental petition was a continuation of prior hearings in the
case, as distinguished from a determination of any new criminal charge, and hence the
new hearing did not give rise to an opportunity to interpose a peremptory challenge.”
(Ibid.) The minor contended on appeal that “each hearing resulting from the filing of a
supplemental petition constitutes a new and original proceeding, and that the minor is
clothed with all constitutional rights in connection with such new proceeding including
the right to utilize a peremptory challenge.” (Id. at p. 425.)
Noting that the petition was brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section
777,8 the court explained that “[t]he purpose of a [Welfare and Institutions Code] section
777 supplemental petition and the hearing which results from it is to establish that by
reason of events occurring after the grant of probation the ‘previous disposition has not
opposition to the request to renew the restraining order. These documents include the
Georges’ first amended cross-complaint filed in a separate civil case involving Hartman,
an arbitration award with Hartman and the Georges as parties, and a letter from Hartman
providing notice of purported code violations by the Georges to several City of San Jose
departments. The record also includes an “exhibit list” from George for the request to
renew the restraining order that states George “intends to introduce documentary
evidence consisting of: Ex. 1001 through 1003: videos of incident of October 19, 2023,
including summaries.” Because neither these exhibits nor the declarations that were
attached to the request to renew the restraining order are in the record, we do not know
what facts were actually presented and relied on by George in the renewal proceeding.
8
Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 provides for a noticed hearing before
the issuance of an order changing or modifying a previous order “by removing a minor
from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing
placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private institution or commitment to a
county institution” or “by directing commitment to the Youth Authority.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 777.)
12
been effective in rehabilitation. ...’ In considering the petition the court is limited to the
facts alleged in the petition, and these facts also are restricted to events occurring after the
grant of probation. [Citations.]” (Antonio G., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 425-426.)
Although the Antonio G. court acknowledged that “modification of the custody terms of a
minor charged with misconduct or the commission of a crime by a supplemental petition
may be ordered only upon a finding of new acts or circumstances involving the minor,”
the court also observed that “in determining the present status of the minor in light of his
current transgressions reference must be made to his prior history and the objective of the
probation grant he was then enjoying.” (Id. at pp. 426-427.) Therefore, “although the
original focus of a [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 777 hearing is upon newly
alleged misconduct, the ultimate disposition of the minor depends upon an analysis of his
original problems and his history on probation.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that “a
hearing on a supplemental petition under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 777,
which alleges misconduct of a minor in violation of the terms of his probation, is not a
new or original proceeding, but instead is a continuation of the court’s supervision over
the minor.” (Id. at p. 428, fn. omitted.)
Antonio G. and other cases that have been found to involve continued proceedings,
such as for modification of custody terms, or contempt proceedings, or for revocation of
probation, often rely on new facts in later proceedings, but those facts generally are
connected to the earlier proceedings and findings, and are used to make continued
determinations in the cases based on updated information. The issues in these types of
cases flow from the earlier proceedings and are substantially the same.
George asserts a request to renew a restraining order is a new proceeding because
it requires a new notice and a new hearing, and uses different Judicial Council forms.
This is no different than in other civil actions with successive motions, and George cites
no authority for the proposition that a new peremptory challenge would need to be filed
every time a different motion is heard in a civil case.
13
George points to cases under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, arguing that
the fact a restraining order issued in one court can be renewed in another court in a
different case shows the renewal is a different proceeding.9 For this proposition, he cites
Garcia v. Escobar (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 267 (Garcia) and Priscila N. v. Leonardo G.
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1208 (Priscila N.). Noting that “[b]oth the juvenile court and the
family court may issue protective orders to protect against domestic violence [citations],”
Garcia held that “after a juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction, the family court
has jurisdiction over domestic violence orders and may issue a renewal.” (Garcia, supra,
17 Cal.App.5th at p. 269.) Priscila N. held the same. (Priscila N., supra, 17 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1210 [“In this case, we hold the family court has jurisdiction under Family Code
section 6345, subdivision (a) to renew domestic violence restraining orders (DVROs)
initially granted by the juvenile court, the same conclusion reached by Division Eight of
this district in [Garcia].”].) The Priscila N. court concluded that “the legislative history
of the Family Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code indicates the Legislature
intended juvenile and family courts to work together to protect victims of domestic
violence.” (Priscila N., at p. 1210.)
These cases do not lead to the conclusion that the renewal of a civil harassment
restraining order is a new proceeding requiring a new peremptory challenge. To be sure,
there are close similarities in the language of section 527.6 and Family Code section 6345
for the renewal of orders under those statutes. But unlike the procedural posture of
Garcia and Priscila N., a civil harassment restraining order is subject to renewal in the
same civil court. Further, the Legislature’s intended purpose that “the Family Code and
Welfare and Institutions Code be construed to work together to provide the best
protection for domestic violence victims,” so as to prevent retraumatization of victims by
requiring them “to apply twice for what is essentially the same order” is not implicated
9
George refers to the “Domestic Violence Restraining Order Act,” but it seems his
intention was to refer to the “Domestic Violence Prevention Act.”
14
here. (See Priscila N., supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1214.) Moreover, neither Garcia nor
Priscila N. concerned a peremptory challenge or the issue of whether the renewal in
family court would constitute a new proceeding requiring a second challenge under
section 170.6, and they are neither controlling nor persuasive in this instance. (See
People v. Hatt (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 321, 326 [“A case is not authority for a proposition
not considered.”].)
George also argues that “a peremptory challenge does not contest all actions for all
things,” and that there was no assignment in this case to a particular judge for all
purposes. He cites Stone v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1144 (Stone) for the
proposition that a new peremptory challenge is required every time a judge is assigned to
hear a subsequent matter. But Stone concerned a coordination proceeding and the
holding turned on the distinction between a “coordination motion judge” and a
“coordination trial judge,” with the court noting that “the statutory scheme for
coordination and the rules of court implementing that scheme provide for two separate
assignments . . . [and] . . . the rules contemplate the possibility these two assignments will
be of two different judges.” (Id. at p. 1147.) To determine the proper interpretation of
the term “assigned judge,” the court relied on Code of Civil Procedure sections 404 and
404.3, and former rule 1515 (now 3.516) of the California Rules of Court, all of which
specifically apply to coordination proceedings. The instant matter is not a coordination
proceeding and Stone is inapposite.
George cites several cases as examples in which two proceedings were considered
separate for purposes of a peremptory challenge: NutraGenetics, LLC v. Superior Court
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 243 (NutraGenetics), Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 887, and
Bravo v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1489 (Bravo). These cases do not
compel a different conclusion. NutraGenetics was “a suit against a different defendant
with different causes of action and different bases of liability.” (NutraGenetics, supra,
179 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) The NutraGenetics court acknowledged that the continuation
15
rule would apply to a second proceeding with “the same parties at a later stage of their
litigation with each other, or [ ] aris[ing] out of conduct in or orders made during the
earlier proceeding.” (Ibid, boldface added.)
Pickett is also distinguishable. It involved two separate actions under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 200410 with different named plaintiffs, one case
seeking injunctive relief and the other not. (Pickett, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 895.)
Like NutraGenetics, the Pickett court noted that one action would be a continuation of
another when there is “a subsequent proceeding, the gravamen of which is rooted in, or
supplementary to, the initial proceeding.” (Id. at p. 893.)
Bravo involved two lawsuits filed by the same plaintiff stemming from his
employment with the County of Los Angeles. (Bravo, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1491-1492.) In the first action, the plaintiff alleged specific incidents occurring in
three separate years that were directly related to his sexual orientation. (Id. at p. 1491.)
He alleged that after he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the defendants retaliated by discipline, reprimand, denial of
accommodations, and surveillance. (Ibid.) A demurrer to the third amended complaint
was sustained without leave to amend, and judgment was entered in April 2006. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in May 2006, alleging claims for employment
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. (Id. at p. 1492.) The new complaint alleged
additional facts of ongoing harassment and retaliation, including that the plaintiff was
falsely accused of making death threats, which led to a 30-day suspension pending
investigation. (Ibid.) In 2006, the cases were found to be related and the second case
was assigned to the same judge who had been assigned to the first case. (Id. at pp. 1492-
1493.) Plaintiff then made a peremptory challenge to that judge. (Id. at p. 1493.) The
trial court struck the challenge as untimely. (Ibid.)
10
California Labor Code section 2698, et seq.
16
The Bravo court stated that “[t]he fact that the cases are related does not resolve
the issue of whether the second case is a continuation of the first case for purposes of []
section 170.6.” (Bravo, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th. at p. 1494.) It concluded that the new
action was not a continuation of the previous action because, “although the two cases
involve the same employee and the same employer, the current action arises out of later
events distinct from those in the previous action.” (Ibid.)
The two cases in Bravo may have involved similar issues, enough to qualify as
related cases, but they were still separately-filed actions with the second case following a
judgment in the first, and involving “events distinct from those in the previous action.”
(Bravo, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494.) Here, even if later events may have arisen
that George presented at the renewal hearing, the nature of the renewal hearing and
procedure in relation to the original restraining order hearing is such that the second
hearing inevitably “ ‘involves “substantially the same issues” ’ and ‘ “matters necessarily
relevant and material to the issues” ’ in the original case.” (See Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 979.) Were it otherwise, it would make little sense to give the trial court discretion to
rely exclusively on facts adduced at the original hearing in ruling on the renewal request.
Hartman filed a peremptory challenge to Judge Overton in connection with the
original request for a civil harassment restraining order, which the judge accepted. For
the reasons discussed, we conclude the proceeding for renewal of the restraining order
was not a new proceeding requiring another peremptory challenge. Because Judge
Overton was disqualified, in issuing the order on the renewal request the court acted in
excess of jurisdiction. As a result of the court’s action and without ruling on the merits of
the request for the renewal, we will reverse and remand the matter for a new hearing
before a different judge.
III. DISPOSITION
The order granting the renewal of the civil harassment restraining order is reversed
and remanded for a new hearing on the matter. The Presiding Judge of Santa Clara
17
County Superior Court is directed to assign the matter to a different judge. (§§ 170.1,
subd. (c),187; see also In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 295.)
Costs on appeal are awarded to Hartman. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
18
RODRIGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
GREENWOOD, P. J.
DANNER, J.
George v. Hartman
H051697
Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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