CourtListener 10744962•In re Ryan K. CA4/1
Texto completo
Filed 11/26/25 In re Ryan K. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re Ryan K., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D083728
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J244778)
v.
RYAN K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Rohanee Zapanta, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Ryan K. was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition to have committed
five assaults and a murder based on his participation in a series of arbitrary,
unprovoked, group attacks on unsuspecting victims. He contends (1) the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s true finding he
committed implied malice murder, (2) the prosecution failed to establish
venue was proper in San Diego County, (3) the court erred when it committed
him to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) instead of a less restrictive
alternative, (4) the court erred when it set the baseline term of confinement
to five years, and (5) the court erred when it set his maximum term of
confinement to 25 years to life. We conclude Ryan’s contentions lack merit
with one exception: the court erred when it set the maximum term of
confinement.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
There were six attacks that led to the charges against Ryan. They took
place on six separate days over the course of five months. Each incident was
captured on video.
A. Attack on an Unidentified Bus Passenger
On August 27, 2022, at about 7:00 p.m., Ryan and a group of
companions spoke to an older man while they waited to board a bus. The
group included two of Ryan’s friends, Robert R. and Kamren P.
After boarding the bus, Ryan got out of his seat and struck the older
man twice in the back of his head. The victim moved to a seat at the front of
the bus. Ryan followed him and sat directly across from him. As the bus
approached the next stop, Ryan appeared to give a signal to Robert and
Kamren, who were still in the back of the bus. Robert and Kamren then ran
to the front of the bus, and Robert slapped the victim’s head. When the
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victim stood up, Ryan and Robert began punching him. As the bus came to a
stop, Robert and Kamren pushed and pulled the victim down the stairs
headfirst to the sidewalk.
As the victim lay on the ground, and as Ryan watched, Robert stomped
four times on the victim’s head and spit on him. An unidentified person
raised a large skateboard over his head and forcefully slammed it down,
hitting the victim. Robert then took the skateboard from the unidentified
person. Using two hands, he raised it high up over his head and swung it
down hard. The skateboard slammed the victim on his upper back near his
head. Ryan was standing right next to Robert when he did this. The victim
was “knocked unconscious” and taken by ambulance to the hospital.
B. Attack on an Unidentified Man in Unknown Park
On August 30, 2022, at approximately 12:37 a.m., a video on Ryan’s cell
phone records him attacking an unknown man. The video shows the man on
the ground near a park bench as Ryan and another minor drag, kick, and
beat him. The video shows Ryan kicking the victim’s head at least four times
as he begs him to stop, “Please! Please! Please! Please don’t!” Law
enforcement was unable to identify the person attacked, the location of the
attack, the reason for the fight, or the identity of the other individual
assisting Ryan with the beating.
C. Attack of Two Unidentified Persons at the Fashion Valley Trolley
Platform
On September 3, 2022, at about 8:00 p.m., Ryan participated in an
attack of two unidentified men at the Fashion Valley Transit Center. Ryan
was at the Transit Center with Robert and a group of other minors. Robert
walked up to a man who was sleeping on a bench near the trolley tracks and
punched or slapped him. After seeing this unprovoked attack, a second man
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approached Robert and spoke to him. As they were speaking, Ryan started a
fight by hitting the second man in the back of the head. Outnumbered, the
second victim eventually ran away.
D. Attack on a Trolley Passenger
Another video on Ryan’s cell phone records him attacking a San Diego
trolley passenger after dark at an unknown time on November 2, 2022. The
recording shows Kamren hanging from one of the upper handrails on the
trolley while repeatedly striking a trolley passenger’s head with his feet as
the passenger tries to protect himself. The video then shows Ryan climbing
into a seat next to the victim and punching him along with Kamren and a
group of other individuals. The person holding the cell phone can be heard
laughing and saying he has the victim’s hat while encouraging the beating,
with statements like, “Beat his ass! Yeah! Hey! Hey! Yeah! Beat his ass!
Ooh-hoo-hoo.” This fifth victim was also never identified.
E. Attack of F.A. at the El Cajon Transit Center
F.A., a San Diego deputy city attorney, was Ryan’s next victim. On
December 12, 2022, at about 6:00 p.m., F.A. encountered Ryan, Robert, and a
group of about 8 or 9 other teenagers while taking the trolley home from
work. They were all in the same trolley car. After F.A. got off at the El Cajon
Transit Center, Robert started “spitting at [him] and smiling at [him] while
staring at [him].” Robert advanced to “about 18 inches away from where
[F.A. was] standing.”
F.A. thought he was about to get hit. F.A. put his hands up defensively
as he saw the other teenagers get off the trolley behind Robert. F.A. told the
group, “Back up, back up, back up, back up, or I’ll knock you out.” When they
continued to advance, he went into “panic mode” and punched one of them in
the nose.
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Robert responded by repeatedly punching F.A. The first punch was to
F.A.’s left temple and it “knocked out [his] vision, so [he] couldn’t see because
[he is] predominantly left-eyed.” Four of the other teenagers quickly joined in
the fight. They punched F.A. with closed fists that “felt like punches that a
teenager would throw, if they were throwing a punch as hard as possible.”
F.A. thought, “[I]f I fall, I’m going to die. If I stumble, they’ll just start
stomping on me.”
F.A. grabbed one of the teenagers by his jacket collar, pulled him down
to the pavement, and started dragging him toward a railing near the edge of
the trolley platform. The group stopped the beating to pull the teenager
away from F.A. and retreated to the trolley before it left the station. F.A. was
“almost completely blind at this point.”
F.A. estimated he was struck at least 30 times. He sustained a
detached iris and lost his vision for 48 hours. He experienced severe pain in
his ribs and has been diagnosed with post-concussion syndrome. He recalled
Ryan hitting him and kicking him in his “right rib area.”
F. Attack and Murder of Vinson Austin
On January 10, 2023, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Ryan, Robert,
Kamren, Kristopher W., and four of their female friends were at a bus stop in
Lemon Grove. They tried to board a bus but got kicked off because some of
them were “drunk” and others did not have bus fare. As the group headed to
the trolley station, they crossed paths with Vinson Austin, 49 years old, and
his friend. Robert started “cussing at them for no reason.” The group
followed the two men along the trolley tracks toward a nearby apartment
complex.
After reaching a cul-de-sac, Robert, who had already tried to start
another fight that night, asked the men where they were from and spit at
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Austin. Austin spit back, swung his fist at Robert, and the two “immediately”
began fighting. Ryan “jumped in on the fight” and began punching Austin, as
did Kamren. Austin fell to the ground. Witnesses observed “a group of
people kicking and punching and a man that was standing there,” and then,
“[a] whole bunch of juveniles . . . beating this man that was laying on the
ground.”
Austin managed to stand up and tried to get away. But Ryan followed
him, pushed him down again, and kicked him. Then, as Ryan kicked him
again, Austin managed to pull Ryan to the ground and get on top of him.
When this happened, Robert and Kamren ran toward Ryan and Austin.
Kamren then repeatedly punched Austin in the head. Robert stabbed
him twice in his upper body with a knife. Kamren and Robert then stepped
back and each took a turn running toward Austin and kicking him in the
head. The attack continued until Austin’s friend, James, pulled Austin away
from Ryan and defended him by trying to hit Kamren with a small boombox
he had been carrying.
Austin fell to the pavement and lay in a pool of blood. Everyone else
scattered. When Lemon Grove Sheriff’s deputies arrived, Austin was in pain
and a “stream of blood” from his body was “flowing down the gutter.” One of
the deputies applied a tourniquet to a stab wound to his upper right thigh,
but he died shortly after arriving at the hospital. He had been stabbed five
times—in his hip, torso, forearm, left leg, and right thigh—and he died from
those wounds. His upper torso, head, hands, and forearms were covered with
blunt-force injuries.
Kamren was arrested near the apartment complex trying to jump over
a fence to the trolley line. He had a black and orange folding knife with an
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eight centimeter blade in his pocket. It was a hunting knife with a gut hook
at the end of it. The knife tested negative for Austin’s DNA.
Deputies found Ryan and Robert at the Lemon Grove trolley station
platform. Ryan had blood on his pants, two cuts on his left hand, a cut on his
upper lip, and appeared to be walking with a limp. Robert had a circular
wound on his right hand that “had an open flap that appeared to be fresh and
was bleeding.” DNA testing showed that 99 percent of the blood on Ryan’s
jacket was 1.5 x 1032 times more likely to have originated from Austin than
an unknown person. DNA testing also provided strong support that Austin
contributed to the mixture of blood found on Robert’s clothing.
G. Trial Court Proceedings
In September 2023, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a
sixth amended juvenile wardship petition alleging Ryan committed six
felonies: one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and five counts of
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245,
subd. (a)(4)). Following an adjudication hearing in September 2023, the
juvenile court found the murder allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt on
a theory of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. The court also
found true all five allegations of assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury.
After a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered Ryan
to remain a ward of the court and placed him in a SYTF for a five-year
baseline term and a maximum term of confinement of 25 years to life for the
murder count, plus a determinate term of seven years for the remaining five
counts.
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DISCUSSION
I.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Second Degree Murder True Finding
Ryan contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
true finding he committed implied malice murder. He contends the scienter
element of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder was unsatisfied
because “the prosecution presented no evidence [he] was aware Robert was
armed with a knife” the night Austin was killed. Ryan asserts that “[w]hile
[he] had been engaged in incidents with Robert, and others, in the past, none
of those incidents involved the use of a knife, or any other deadly weapon.
They consisted of punches and kicks, after which all the minors fled.” (Italics
added.) He further asserts “[t]he incidents in the past never went [so] far [as]
to culminate in death since the minors never appeared to be armed with
deadly weapons during those past events. Therefore, there would be no
reason for [him] to assume otherwise that evening.” We disagree.
Our review is for substantial evidence. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1020, 1026.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Our role on appeal is a limited one.
Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence. Thus, if the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding
does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (Ibid., italics omitted [cleaned
up].)
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We begin with the elements of implied malice murder. Murder is
committed with implied malice when “the killing is proximately caused by an
act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. To be
considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the defendant’s act
must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than
insignificant or merely theoretical.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988 (Reyes) [cleaned up].) To suffice for implied malice murder, the
defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or
speculative sense; it must “involve a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.” (Id. at p. 989 [cleaned up].)
We turn next to the elements required to establish an implied malice
murder on an aiding and abetting theory. “Direct aiding and abetting is
based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and
abettor’s own mens rea. In the context of implied malice, the actus reus
required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For
the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute
aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an
implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or
conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that
act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider
and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act,
intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the
act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human
life.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991 [cleaned up].) “ ‘[A] finding of
implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually
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appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.’ ” (People v.
Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 502 (Valenzuela),
italics omitted.)
Here, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to
conclude Ryan had the mens rea required to support implied malice murder
on an aiding and abetting theory based on (1) his act of aiding and abetting
Robert in a life-threatening group attack on Austin, and (2) substantial
evidence he knew and shared Robert’s specific intent to engage in a beating
during the attack that posed a high probability of death.
Starting with the life-endangering act, Ryan ignores the People’s actual
theory for culpability. He focuses in isolation on Robert’s act of stabbing
Austin. He argues, “there was no evidence [Ryan] knew Robert had a knife
that evening and intended to use it.” As a consequence, he argues, “there was
never a showing that [Ryan] knew his conduct that night endangered the life
of [Austin] and that he acted with conscious disregard for life.” Ryan misses
the mark with his focus on whether the evidence demonstrated he knew
Robert was carrying a knife.
The People here founded their theory for implied malice murder on
Ryan’s act of participating in the group attack when he knew “how dangerous
his friends [were],” not the more specific act of stabbing Austin. The People’s
theory was a valid one. (See Valenzuela, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 503
[concluding culpability for aiding and abetting an implied malice murder may
exist when a “confrontation was not merely a challenge to fisticuffs, but
rather a show of force and threat of deadly force”]; People v. Didyavong (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 85, 99 [“Although the cause of death was gunshot wounds,
[the defendant] aided the commission of the life-endangering act of the
violent life-threatening [group] retaliation”].) The evidence here that Ryan
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participated in the vicious group beating is virtually indisputable.
Surveillance video from a nearby apartment complex captured him pushing,
punching, and kicking Austin during the beatdown.
Turning to the mens rea element, the evidence Ryan participated in the
beating with the requisite mental state of implied malice is more than
adequate to support the trial court’s true finding. Ryan took part in at least
two prior life-threatening group attacks with Robert and Kamren before the
attack on Austin. MTS video surveillance camaras recorded him attacking a
bus passenger with Robert, Kamren, and a group of unidentified minors. The
video shows Ryan signaling to Robert and Kamren right before he personally
instigated the beating. After Robert and Kamren drag the victim to the
sidewalk and incapacitate him, the video shows Ryan watching as Robert
stomps four times on the victim’s head and an unidentified person forcefully
slams a large skateboard on or near his head. The video then captures Ryan
standing right next to Robert as Robert slams the prone and motionless
victim with the skateboard again.1 Beating a victim senseless to the point of
unconsciousness and then hitting him on or near his head with a large
skateboard undoubtedly presents a high probability of death.
Based on this prior incident alone, the trial court could reasonably infer
Ryan intended the group attack on Austin to be far more than a “simple
fistfight,” and that he and Robert harbored the shared intent to engage in a
life-endangering beating. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 511.) But
there’s more. On December 12, 2022, Robert and Ryan and a group of other
1 Ryan’s contention that “the minors never appeared to be armed with
deadly weapons during . . . past events” is belied by this recorded evidence.
His contention, accordingly, is not well taken.
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teenagers attacked F.A. and punched him in the head with closed fists to the
point where he thought he would be killed if he fell down. In the victim’s
words, “[I]f I fall, I’m going to die.” Although F.A. managed to stay upright
and fight off his attackers, the beating was so severe his iris detached, he was
blind for 48 hours, and he suffered a concussion.
Ryan’s active participation during Austin’s beating provides further
evidence he harbored implied malice. He personally battered Austin with his
friends after Austin fell down for the first time. Then, when Austin managed
to crawl away and stand up, Ryan followed him, pushed him down again, and
repeatedly kicked him until Austin briefly turned the tables and pulled Ryan
to the ground as well.
From this evidence, the trial court could readily infer Ryan subjectively
appreciated and consciously disregarded the high probability of death posed
by his act of participating in a group attack with Robert and Kamren.
Substantial evidence therefore supports the court’s conclusion he had the
required mental state to support a true finding he aided and abetted the
implied malice murder of Austin.
II.
Ryan’s Challenge to Venue Is Forfeited
For the first time on appeal, Ryan challenges venue with respect to
count 3, the attack on an unidentified man that was recorded on his cell
phone on August 30, 2022. Ryan did not object to venue before trial; his
argument on appeal is therefore forfeited.
After the close of evidence, Ryan made a brief, oral motion to dismiss
count 3 on the ground the court lacked territorial subject matter jurisdiction
because there was insufficient evidence to prove the offense took place in
California. His defense counsel asserted, “There’s no evidence before the
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[c]ourt that this incident occurred in the state of California, so I’m asking the
Court to dismiss [c]ount 3 based on the lack of evidence that this incident
occurred in California.” The trial court sustained a true finding on count 3
without directly addressing Ryan’s motion, thereby implicitly denying it.
Ryan did not object or otherwise claim venue in San Diego was improper.
To preserve an objection to venue, the defendant is required to raise the
issue before trial. (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103 (Simon).) In
general, “ ‘the proper venue for the prosecution of a criminal offense is in the
superior court of the county where the crime was committed.’ ” (People v.
Dawkins (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 698, 704; Pen. Code, § 777.) The question of
venue, however, constitutes “a nonfundamental aspect of jurisdiction which
may be waived either by [a] defendant’s consent or by failure to object.”
(People v. Gbadebo-Soda (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 160, 170.) As explained by
our high court, “the question of venue does not involve a matter of a court’s
fundamental authority or subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding.
Instead, the right to be tried in a statutorily designated venue is intended,
from the perspective of an accused, as a safeguard against being required to
stand trial in an unrelated and potentially burdensome distant location. This
protection can be meaningfully afforded to a defendant only if he or she
objects to venue before being required to proceed to trial in the allegedly
improper locale.” (Simon, at p. 1103.) Therefore, “taking into account the
nature and purpose of the venue safeguard and the substantial state interest
in protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging,’ . . . a
defendant who fails to raise a timely objection to venue in a felony proceeding
forfeits the right to object to venue—either at trial or on appeal.” (Id. at
p. 1104.)
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Ryan does not dispute he failed to object before trial to San Diego as a
venue for adjudicating count 3. He did not respond in his reply brief to the
Attorney General’s contention he forfeited his challenge to venue on appeal.
His objection is accordingly forfeited as a matter of settled law.
In an abundance of caution, we consider sua sponte whether the
evidence was sufficient under a preponderance of the evidence standard to
support a finding that count 3 took place in California. We do so because this
question implicates our fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. (See
generally, People v. Betts (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1039; People v. Joseph (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 1058, 1068–1072.) We conclude there is sufficient evidence in
the record to conclude Ryan committed the count 3 assault in California.
Ryan was 14 years old when the six charged offenses took place. He
was in San Diego on August 27, 2022 when he committed the first charged
assault on the unidentified bus passenger. Three days later, on August 30,
2022, he committed the count 3 assault. Four days after that, on September
3, 2022, he committed another assault in San Diego.
On these facts, it is reasonable to infer Ryan did not travel to a public
transit system somewhere outside of California to commit the count 3
assault. Commission of the offense in Arizona or Nevada, for example, would
require at least six to eight hours travel by car or plane there and at least
another six to eight hours travel back to San Diego. Given that Ryan was 14
years old and not a legally licensed driver—and given that the three assaults
occurred within the space of a week—these logistics are more than adequate
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Ryan committed the
August 30 assault in California. The trial court’s true finding on count 3 is
accordingly affirmed.
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III.
No Error Committing Ryan to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility
Ryan contends the trial court abused its discretion when it committed
him to a SYTF instead of a less restrictive alternative, the Healing
Opportunities for Personal Empowerment (HOPE 480) program. His specific
claim, as we understand it, is founded on the principle that a court abuses its
discretion when factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
record. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154.) He contends the
People’s evidence was too generic to allow the court to fairly assess whether
the programming, treatment, and education offered and provided at the
Secure Track Youth Facility Youth Development Academy (YDA) would be
appropriate to meet his treatment needs. Because the court was required to
take Ryan’s treatment needs into consideration when selecting an
appropriate program, he seeks a remand for more evidence to be adduced on
this point so the court can appropriately weigh this consideration when
deciding whether commitment to YDA was warranted. We are not
persuaded.
Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 875, subdivision (a), authorizes
trial courts to commit a ward who is 14 years of age or older to a SYTF if
certain criteria are satisfied. The criteria are as follows: (1) “The juvenile is
adjudicated and found to be a ward of the court based on an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of [s]ection 707 that was committed when the juvenile was 14
years of age or older,” (2) “[t]he adjudication . . . is the most recent offense for
which the juvenile has been adjudicated,” and (3) “[t]he court has made a
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the
ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
When assessing potential less restrictive means, the trial court must
“consider all relevant and material evidence, including the recommendations
of counsel, the probation department, and any other agency or individual
designated by the court to advise on the appropriate disposition of the case.”
(§ 875, subd. (a)(3).) In addition, the court is required to base its decision on
five criteria: (1) “The severity of the offense or offenses for which the ward
has been most recently adjudicated, including the ward’s role in the offense,
the ward’s behavior, and harm done to victims,” (2) “[t]he ward’s previous
delinquent history, including the adequacy and success of previous attempts
by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward,” (3) “[w]hether the
programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a [SYTF] is
appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward,”
(4) “[w]hether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by
assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is
available to the court,” and (5) “[t]he ward’s age, developmental maturity,
mental and emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting the safety or
suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a [SYTF].”
(§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E), italics added.)
Ryan’s focus here is on the third criterium and the general
requirement, set forth in section 875, subdivision (a)(3), that the trial court
must make a “finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative
disposition for the ward is unsuitable” before committing a minor to a SYTF.
He does not challenge the court’s findings with respect to the other criteria,
such as the severity of the offense and community safety, so we do not discuss
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in detail the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings with respect to
those criteria. Ryan specifically contends “[b]ecause the record does not
contain sufficient evidence of [his] needs or the programs and services at the
SYTF that may benefit him and serve those needs, it is impossible . . . to
assess whether the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion.” Ryan’s
contention that the record is underdeveloped on this point lacks merit.
Starting with evidence of Ryan’s treatment and security needs, the
record before the trial court includes a confidential psychological evaluation
report prepared by a clinical psychologist. The psychologist tested and
interviewed Ryan after reviewing key documents in his criminal case file. In
the psychologist’s opinion, Ryan exhibited no barrier to understanding social
rules and demands. His disregard of such conventions was “connected with a
disorder of attention,” and “very likely compounded by the negative influence
of his peers and his use of drugs.” In the psychologist’s view, Ryan also likely
experienced trauma and emotional distress in response to the crime. The
interventions and treatment services recommended by the psychologist
included (1) “intervention for his drug and alcohol abuse,” (2) “the close
monitoring of his associations,” and (3) an evaluation to determine whether
“psychopharmacological intervention” is needed to address his impulsive
behavior and apparent attention disorder.
The record before the trial court also included a probation social study
report prepared by Ryan’s probation officer. The probation officer agreed
with the psychologist’s recommendations and further identified two
treatment “[g]oals” based on Ryan’s “primary needs.” (Capitalization and
boldface omitted.) Those goals were the development of “enhanced decision-
making skills,” and the “develop[ment] [of] pro-social peer relationships.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.)
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The appropriateness of a YDA commitment and unsuitability of less
restrictive options were also squarely addressed by evidence adduced at the
disposition hearing. Ryan’s probation officer and the supervising probation
officer in charge of YDA recommended commitment to YDA instead of HOPE
480 for several reasons relating to Ryan’s treatment and security needs.
The YDA supervisor personally reviewed Ryan’s file and opined that
“[his] reports are in line with the individuals that we house and are in line
with the programming that we offer for rehabilitative services.” Among other
programs, YDA offers “Trauma Focused Cognitive Behavior Therapy,”
“Dialectical Behavior Therapy,” behavior health education, and substance
abuse disorder education. For individuals like Ryan, the YDA supervisor
explained “the benefits are the structure and the programming that is
available.” In his view, the programming “is primarily trauma focused and
culturally responsive care” and would be of “substantial benefit” to Ryan if he
bought in to the program. In addition, at YDA, a multi-disciplinary team,
which may include attorneys, “parents, support services, [and] community
supervision officers,” ensures minors “are able to receive really individualized
programming opportunities.” The probation officer also believed YDA would
be “very beneficial” to Ryan.
By contrast, the probation officer and YDA supervisor explained that
commitment to the HOPE 480 program is limited to a maximum of 480 days.
This timeframe, in their view, was inadequate because Ryan needed
“extensive programming and rehabilitation in order to modify his behavior.”
They acknowledged that there is overlap in the programs available at YDA
and those available at the HOPE 480 program. But, they explained, if Ryan
was committed to the HOPE 480 program, the 480-day limitation would
mean he could only complete one, two, or possibly three programs while
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there. By contrast, if committed to YDA, he could complete “a good
percentage” of the programs and potentially even all of them within four
years.
The foundation created by this evidence was more than adequate for
the trial court to comply with its statutory obligation to “consider,” as
required by section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(C), “[w]hether the programming,
treatment, and education offered and provided in a [SYTF was] appropriate
to meet [Ryan’s] treatment and security needs,” and whether “a less
restrictive, alternative disposition for [him was] unsuitable.” The court’s
ruling indicates it did exactly this. After reviewing the relevant documents
and considering the testimony of both witnesses, the trial court concluded
commitment to YDA was most strongly warranted based on “the multiple
true findings of Ryan committing separate, random acts of violence upon
different random victims, who had . . . no prior association with the youth.”
The court further found “[t]he Instant Offense was exceedingly serious,
displays a threat to the community and the youth himself, and as a result, he
is in need of the structure and services that . . . SYTF . . . can provide.” In
addition, and precisely relevant to the challenged criterium here, the court
concluded Ryan was “not amenable to a HOPE 480 commit [because] [h]is
needs are best addressed in a highly controlled environment [with]
structured programming [he] can rely on for stability and predictability for
an extended period of time.”
Ryan points to no authority that required the trial court to discuss its
reasoning in more detail. The court, accordingly, did not abuse its discretion
when it committed Ryan to a SYTF.
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IV.
No Error Setting the Baseline Term to Five Years
Ryan contends the trial court abused its discretion when it set his
baseline term of confinement to YDA to five years. Focusing on a single
consideration, he contends the five-year commitment falls “ ‘outside the
bounds of reason’ under applicable law and relevant facts” because the
supervising probation officer for YDA testified that it was possible to
complete all of the rehabilitative programs at YDA in four years. We are
again not persuaded. The record amply supports a finding that Ryan will
need more than four years to complete the rehabilitative programs available
to him at YDA, and other considerations, in addition to the time needed for
his potential rehabilitation, warranted imposition of a five-year baseline
term.3
“The abuse of discretion standard of review asks in substance whether
the ruling in question falls outside the bounds of reason under the applicable
law and the relevant facts. We indulge all reasonable inferences to support
the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there
is substantial evidence to support them.” (In re Tony R. (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 395, 414 [cleaned up].)
Here, the trial court was required to set Ryan’s baseline term using the
“offense-based classification matrix” set forth in rule 5.806(d). The matrix
3 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.806(b), the trial court was
required to “state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular
[baseline] term, referencing each of the criteria and any factors the court
deemed relevant.” We do not consider whether the court complied with this
directive because Ryan does not assert the court erred in this regard.
Further undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
20
authorizes a baseline term of four to seven years. (Ibid.) The term must be
selected based on four criteria: (1) “[t]he severity and statutory degree of the
offense for which the youth has been committed to the [SYTF],” (2) “[t]he
youth’s prior history in the juvenile justice system,” (3) “[t]he confinement
time considered reasonable and necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of the
youth,” and (4) “[t]he youth’s developmental history.” (Rule 5.806(b).) “The
court must select a baseline term that is no longer than necessary to meet the
developmental needs of the youth and to prepare the youth for discharge to a
period of probation supervision in the community.” (Ibid.)
Applying these criteria, the trial court reasonably found that the
multiple true findings that Ryan committed random assaults on random
victims culminating in the murder of Austin presented a strong argument for
a SYFT commitment with a baseline of seven years. The court found further
support for an extended commitment based on Ryan’s failure to follow
directions and involvement in numerous assaults while detained at juvenile
hall pending the disposition hearing. Based on these considerations, the
court reasonably found he needed “structured programming . . . for an
extended period of time.”
Nevertheless, taking into account Ryan’s honesty in conveying his
history to the psychologist and his probation officer, and the psychologist’s
assessment that he has the “ability to understand and cognitively process
information,” the trial court imposed a baseline term of five years instead of
the seven years sought by the prosecutor. We find no irrationality in this
determination nor lack of evidence to support it. Although a minor could
“[p]otentially” complete all available programs in four years, Ryan’s probation
officer estimated in general that minors can only complete “a good
percentage” of the programs in a four to seven year timeframe. The officer
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further opined that Ryan needed “extensive programming and rehabilitation
in order to modify his behavior.” In addition, as recounted, the court
reasonably determined the other criteria in rule 5.806 weighed in favor of a
longer, seven-year baseline term. On these facts, the court’s selection of a
baseline term of five years instead of four years was not an abuse of
discretion.
V.
Correction to the Maximum Term of Confinement
The parties agree the trial court erred when setting Ryan’s maximum
term of confinement at 25 years to life for the murder count, plus a
determinate term of seven years for the remaining five counts. We agree as
well. When a court removes a minor from the physical custody of his parent
or guardian, the court must set a maximum term of confinement equal to “the
middle term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult
convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 726,
subd. (d)(1) & (2), 875, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The term of imprisonment for second
degree murder is 15 years to life, not 25 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 190,
subd. (a).)
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DISPOSITION
The disposition order is modified to state that Ryan’s maximum term of
confinement is 15 years to life, plus a determinate term of seven years. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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