CourtListener 10744961•In re W.C. CA2/4
Texto completo
Filed 11/26/25 In re W.C. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re W.C., B343242
a Person Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00715)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
V.N.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Gino de Solenni, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
V.N. (mother) previously appealed from a juvenile court order
terminating her parental rights to her minor child, W.C. In that appeal, a
different panel of this court conditionally affirmed the order terminating
mother’s parental rights but remanded the matter with directions for the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) to comply with the inquiry requirements under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).1 On remand, the Department conducted
an inquiry into claims of Native American heritage raised by W.C.’s parents.
At the conclusion of the Department’s investigation, the juvenile court
determined ICWA did not apply to this case and reinstated its previous order
terminating mother’s parental rights to W.C.
Mother now appeals from the order reinstating the termination of her
parental rights to W.C., arguing the Department failed to satisfy its duty of
inquiry under ICWA. We affirm, finding mother has forfeited her claim of
error by failing to raise it in the juvenile court below, and that the juvenile
court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence.
As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
presented on appeal.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prior Appeal
The case previously came before this court on appeal from the juvenile
court’s termination of parental rights to minor child W.C. (See In re W.C.
(Jan. 16, 2024, No. B329733) [nonpub. opn.].) In their prior appeal, W.C.’s
parents contested the merits of the juvenile court’s termination of their
parental rights and argued the Department had failed to fulfill its duty of
inquiry under ICWA to investigate the parents’ claims of potential Native
American ancestry.2 On appeal, the Department conceded that it failed to
fully discharge its duty of inquiry under ICWA. We therefore conditionally
affirmed the juvenile court’s order terminating the parents’ rights on the
merits but remanded the matter for the limited purpose of conducting the
required ICWA inquiry.
II. ICWA Investigation on Remand
Upon remand, the Department conducted extensive interviews with
both parents, their extended family members, and a family friend who grew
up in one of the parents’ family homes. Over the course of these discussions,
mother alternatively claimed she had family ties to the Cherokee, Navajo,
Apache, Mescalero Apache, “Mescalero and Apache,” and “Mascara Apache”
tribes. However, mother ultimately informed the juvenile court that she was
only claiming potential membership in the Mescalero Apache tribe.
Specifically, she identified W.C.’s maternal great-grandfather, Benjamin C.,
as a member of the Mescalero Apache tribe. Father claimed to have
2 Father was a party to the prior appeal but is not a party to the instant
appeal.
3
membership in the Chiricahua Apache tribe through W.C.’s paternal great-
grandfather, Geronimo C.
The Department investigated the parents’ assertions and spoke with
other members of the parents’ respective families. This included talking to
all the individuals identified by the parents as being the historians for their
respective families. These individuals were not able to corroborate any of the
parents’ assertions of Native American ancestry with additional information.
One paternal aunt told the Department that her grandfather would
sometimes claim to have “Native blood” when he was drinking tequila. The
family historian for mother’s side of the family similarly reported that any
claim of Native American ancestry was just a story that W.C.’s maternal
grandfather would tell when he was drunk.
In April 2024, the juvenile court ordered the parents to submit new
ICWA forms to the Department and directed the Department to investigate
the parents’ claims of Native American ancestry. The parents subsequently
submitted several forms detailing their claims of Native American ancestry
through Benjamin C. and Geronimo C. One of these forms—an ICWA Family
Background Information form—contained a typographical error. The form
provides boxes for parties to fill in information for various family relatives.
One such box is confusingly mislabeled as the area to provide the information
for “Mother’s Biological Grandfather (Child’s paternal Great-grandfather).”
This typographical error in the form makes it unclear whether the identifying
information entered there was for an individual on the maternal or paternal
side of the child’s family. In the form submitted by mother, she used that
space to provide the biographical information for paternal great-grandfather
Geronimo C.
4
In May 2024, the Department used the information submitted by the
parents to prepare an ICWA notice that it served on parents, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), and all federally registered Apache tribes, including the
Mescalero Apache tribe.3 In doing so, the Department made it clear that it
was serving the notice on the tribes as a precaution, and there was no reason
to know that W.C. was a member of any tribe.
The Department’s ICWA notice was prepared using the ICWA-030 form
approved by the Judicial Council of California. The ICWA notice and ICWA
Family Background forms were formatted similarly, with nearly identical
boxes provided to fill in information about specific relatives. The form used
for the notice does not include the same typographical error that was present
in the family background form where one box was confusingly mislabeled.
Instead, the notice form properly labeled the relevant box as containing the
information for “Mother’s Biological Grandfather (Child’s Maternal Great-
grandfather).” However, in filling in the box, the Department provided the
biographical information for Geronimo C. taken from mother’s background
form. As a result, the notice gave the erroneous impression that Geronimo C.
was W.C.’s maternal relative rather than his paternal relative.
III. ICWA Hearing
After several continuances to allow the tribes additional time to
respond to the Department’s ICWA notice, the juvenile court held a hearing
in November 2024 to determine whether the Department had satisfied its
3 In addition to the Mescalero Apache tribe, the notice was also served on
the Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, the
Jicarilla Apache tribe, the San Carlos Apache tribe, the Tonto Apache tribe,
the Apache Nation, and the White Mountain Apache Tribe of the Fort Apache
Reservation.
5
obligations under ICWA and whether ICWA applied to the case. The court
noted that all but two tribes responded to the Department’s notices with
statements that W.C. was not eligible for enrollment or otherwise an “Indian
child based on their records.” The two remaining tribes—the Jicarilla Apache
and the San Carlos Apache—did not respond despite the Department’s
repeated efforts.4 The juvenile court acknowledged that the San Carlos
Apache tribe said it did not have enough information to process the
Department’s notice, but stated there was “not any additional information
available” that could be provided to the tribe.
The Department asked the juvenile court to find that ICWA does not
apply. The Department argued that it “has made more than reasonable
efforts . . . to try to get responses and at this time there’s no reason to believe
that ICWA applies in this case.”
Mother disagreed, arguing that “The ICWA inquiry is not complete as
there are still two outstanding ICWA responses as noted in the addendum
report, and I believe that the Department can possibly assist the tribe—the
outstanding tribes by giving the contact information to the mother and
maybe they can speak to them directly. [¶] Thus, we are objecting to the
court finding that the Department made all efforts to comply with the ICWA
reversal and objecting to the court maintaining the order of termination of
parental rights for mother.” Father joined in mother’s argument without
raising any additional objections. No party claimed the notices sent to the
4 The Department’s report to the juvenile court noted that the San
Carlos Apache tribe stated they would not process the Department’s ICWA
notice “because the notice[] only went as far as the paternal grandparents.”
The tribe informed the Department that they would “need more information
that extends to the paternal great grandparents in order to process the
inquiry.”
6
tribes were deficient, erroneous, or otherwise fell short of satisfying the
Department’s burden of inquiry under ICWA.
The juvenile court determined the Department “made reasonable and
diligent efforts to identify if [ICWA] applies” and “there’s nothing more that
can be done by the Department to force tribes to provide responses.” The
court also gave the parents permission to contact the tribes, stating “If the
parents had any information or wanted to reach out to the tribes themselves,
they can do that, but the Department has contacted these tribes several
times, received overwhelming response from the majority of the tribes
contacted that the minor is not an Indian child pursuant to [ICWA].” The
court concluded there was no reason to know or believe that ICWA applied to
this case and reinstated its previous order terminating mother’s parental
rights to W.C.
Mother timely appealed. On appeal, mother contends the Department’s
ICWA inquiry was deficient because the notice it sent to the BIA and various
tribes incorrectly identified Geronimo C. as W.C.’s maternal relative.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
Congress enacted ICWA “to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian
children from their families and placement of such children ‘in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’” (In re
Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) “ICWA
established minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing
Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or
adoptive homes. [Citations.] In 2006, California adopted various procedural
7
and substantive provisions of ICWA.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1048.) “ICWA also describes a preference for placement of Indian children
with their extended families, members of their tribe, or other Indian families.
[Citations.]” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1098 (Kenneth D.).)
Under California law, the juvenile court and the Department have “an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a
petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9,
11–12.) “The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an
Indian child ‘can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the
duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re
Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.)
The duty of initial inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse
or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(b)(2).)
If the Department has “reason to believe” that an Indian child5 is
involved, “further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status” of the child is
required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This further inquiry includes contacting the
relevant tribe or tribes and “sharing information identified by the tribe as
5 An “Indian child” is a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe. (§ 224.1, subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
“[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or
‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
8
necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as
well as information on the current status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(2)(C).)
“The sharing of information with tribes at this inquiry stage is distinct
from formal ICWA notice, which requires a ‘reason to know’—rather than a
‘reason to believe’—that the child is an Indian child.” (In re D.S., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 1049.) “If the inquiry establishes a reason to know an
Indian child is involved, notice must be provided to the pertinent tribes.[6]
(§ 224.3, subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The notice must include enough
information for the tribe to ‘conduct a meaningful review of its records to
determine the child’s eligibility for membership’ [citation], including the
identifying information for the child's biological parents, grandparents, and
great-grandparents, to the extent known [citations].” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1112, 1133 (Dezi C.).) Alternatively, the juvenile court may “make a
finding that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and
adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an
Indian child, so ICWA does not apply.” (Id. at p. 1134.)
6 By statute, a “reason to know” exists when one of the following
conditions are met: “(1) A person having an interest in the child, including
the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian organization, a public or
private agency, or a member of the child’s extended family informs the court
that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the
child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an
Alaska Native village . . . [;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, officer
of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court
that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian
child[;] [¶] (4) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court
reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The court is
informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[;] [¶] (6) The
court is informed that either parent or the child possess an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d).)
9
Our California Supreme Court has said that a juvenile court’s “fact-
specific” determination that an ICWA inquiry “is adequate, proper, and duly
diligent” is “‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed record, the
court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the
case.”’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
“If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was
adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by
sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by California law
[citation], there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted
even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the
child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) However, “‘the less developed
the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes. When . . .
the court’s implied finding that the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent rests on a cursory record and a patently insufficient inquiry
that is conceded, the only viable conclusion is that the finding is unsupported
by substantial evidence and the court’s conclusion to the contrary constitutes
a clear abuse of discretion.’” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–
1102.)
II. Forfeiture
On appeal, mother contends the Department failed to satisfy its duty of
inquiry under ICWA because the notice it mailed to the tribes and BIA
incorrectly identified Geronimo C. as W.C.’s maternal relative rather than his
paternal relative. The Department argues mother forfeited this claim of
10
error by failing to raise it in the juvenile court below. We agree that mother
has forfeited this issue.
“[T]he forfeiture doctrine applies in dependency cases.” (In re Anthony
Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 345 (Anthony Q.).) Under the forfeiture rule,
arguments that were not raised below may not be asserted for the first time
on appeal. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) As a result,
we “ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could
have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293.) “The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors
to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) Although an appellate court has the discretion to excuse forfeiture,
this discretion “should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an
important legal issue.” (Ibid.)
Under ordinary circumstances, the “forfeiture doctrine does not bar
consideration of ICWA notice issues on appeal.” (In re Alice M. (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1189, 1195.) However, courts have recognized that the forfeiture
rule applies to claims of ICWA error in a parent’s second appeal where the
first appeal resulted in a remand for ICWA compliance. (See In re X.V.
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 804–805 [holding mother forfeited challenge to
inaccuracies in ICWA notice by failing to object to notices following previous
remand for ICWA compliance]; In re Amber F. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1152,
1155–1156 (Amber F.) [same]; In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 269
[same].)
Mother attempts to distinguish In re X.V. and Amber F., arguing that,
unlike the parents in those cases, her counsel below did object to the juvenile
court’s ICWA finding on remand. We are not persuaded. As set forth above,
the only objection raised to the juvenile court’s ICWA finding on remand was
11
that it was premature to determine that ICWA does not apply because two of
the tribes contacted did not provide a formal response to the notices sent by
the Department. There is no question that mother preserved this argument
regarding the two outstanding responses for appellate review. However,
mother chose to abandon this argument on appeal by failing to raise it in her
opening brief. (Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [a party “effectively concedes” an issue by failing to
address it in briefing]; People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480 [an
argument is conceded by failure to address it on appeal].)
Instead, the only claim of error raised on appeal is the typographical
error in identifying Geronimo as a maternal relative rather than a paternal
relative. This purported error was never raised by the parties below or
otherwise brought to the juvenile court’s attention.
We note that In re N.M. rejected a similar attempt to avoid a finding of
forfeiture. There, the appellate court determined that the parents forfeited
any objection to the adequacy of ICWA notices because they “objected only to
the timing of the hearing without objecting to the adequacy of the ICWA
notices.” (In re N.M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) Indeed, it is settled
that to properly preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must state the
specific “ground or grounds upon which the objection is based.” (In re E.A.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790; accord Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
p. 345 [the failure to object “on a specific ground generally forfeits a parent’s
right to pursue that issue on appeal”].) Applying these principles, we
conclude that mother’s objection to the sufficiency of the tribes’ responses to
the Department’s notice was inadequate to preserve any and all potential
claims of error in the Department’s ICWA inquiry. Mother has therefore
12
forfeited any claim of error with respect to the sufficiency of the Department’s
notice.
Mother’s counsel was in possession of the Department’s notice for
approximately six months before the juvenile court determined that ICWA
did not apply. In that time, the parties appeared in the juvenile court at least
three times to address the issue of ICWA compliance. Mother had multiple
opportunities to bring any deficiencies in the notice to the juvenile court’s
attention. If she had done so, the juvenile court could have promptly dealt
with the issue. “[W]e do not believe Congress envisioned or intended
successive or serial appeals on ICWA notice issues when, given a proper
objection, they could easily be resolved during proceedings on remand for the
specific purpose of determining whether proper notice was given.” (In re X.V.,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.)
As mother has forfeited the only claim of error she now raises on
appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights.
III. Juvenile Court’s Determination Was Supported by Sufficient Evidence
The same result would follow if we were to reach the merits of mother’s
argument. It is true that the ICWA notices sent by the Department
incorrectly identified Geronimo C. as W.C.’s maternal relative rather than his
paternal relative. However, the standard for ICWA inquiry is not perfection.
Instead, the question is whether the juvenile court reasonably concluded that
the Department’s ICWA inquiry was adequate, and whether substantial
evidence supported the finding that W.C. is not an Indian child under the
statutory framework. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.) The record here amply supports the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to this case.
13
It is undisputed that, following remand from our previous decision, the
Department made repeated efforts to question W.C.’s immediate and
extended family in an effort to gather information about W.C.’s possible
Native American heritage. Mother does not identify any individuals whom
the Department failed to interview. It is also undisputed that all of the
information provided by those family members was included in the notice the
Department sent to the BIA and registered Apache tribes.
On appeal, mother does not explain how the misidentification of
Geronimo C. as a maternal relative of W.C., rather than a paternal relative,
could have impacted the tribes’ search for records relating to W.C. or
Geronimo C. Mother does not suggest that certain tribes only acknowledge
tribal membership if a child has tribal ancestry through the paternal side of
the family. We have before us no basis to suspect that any tribe’s eligibility
determination as to W.C. turned on whether Geronimo C. was identified as
W.C.’s maternal or paternal great-grandparent.
Mother accurately notes that the San Carlos Apache tribe stated it
would not perform a search without more information regarding the paternal
side of the family. However, mother has failed to show that the Department
or juvenile court had a “reason to believe” or “reason to know” that W.C. was
a member of the San Carlos Apache tribe. As set forth above, the
Department’s obligation to contact tribes is triggered only by such a reason to
believe that the child may be a member of that tribe. (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(C).) Similarly, the Department’s obligation to provide a formal ICWA
notice to a tribe is only triggered where there is a “reason to know” the child
may be a member of that tribe. (§ 224.3, subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
On appeal, mother has not shown there was any reason to believe or know
that W.C. was a member of the San Carlos Apache tribe. Absent such a
14
reason to believe or know, the Department was under no obligation to contact
the San Carlos Apache tribe or provide the tribe with a formal ICWA notice.
Here, the juvenile court’s determination that the Department’s ICWA
inquiry was adequate is supported by the Department’s detailed reports
documenting the inquiry the Department made of mother, father, and all
relevant extended family members. Similarly, the juvenile court’s conclusion
that ICWA does not apply to this case was supported by substantial evidence.
As the juvenile court’s determinations were supported by sufficient
evidence and record documentation, we would nonetheless affirm the
termination of mother’s parental rights even if she had not forfeited this
issue on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother’s parental rights to W.C. is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
COLLINS, J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
15
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.