People v. Brice CA2/1

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Filed 11/26/25 P. v. Brice CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B338385

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA504250)
v.

JONATHAN BRICE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
Maxine Weksler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
On March 29, 2022, Recara Snell1 suffered a fatal gunshot
wound to the head while standing at the front door of the
apartment she shared with her boyfriend, appellant Jonathan
Brice. Brice initially told responding officers that someone driving
by in a black car shot Recara. But after the officers discovered
a spent shell casing inside the apartment—evidence inconsistent
with a drive-by shooting—Brice claimed Recara accidentally
shot herself. Upon further questioning, Brice again changed his
description of the incident, claiming he and Recara were “playing”
with a gun and pulled the trigger together. Brice said he thought
the gun’s thumb safety was on when they pulled the trigger, and
Recara’s death was an accident.
The district attorney charged Brice with second degree
murder. At trial, the prosecution theorized Brice acted with
express malice, intentionally killing Recara because she recently
had attempted to evict him from the apartment after she caught
him cheating. The prosecution further theorized that, at a
minimum, Brice acted with implied malice by consciously
disregarding the risk to Recara’s life when he pulled the gun’s
trigger. The jury convicted Brice, and the trial court sentenced
him to 55 years to life in prison.
Brice now asks us to reverse his murder conviction. He
contends insufficient evidence supports the verdict and insists
the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the elements
of involuntary manslaughter committed during misdemeanor
brandishing of a firearm. Alternatively, he argues the court abused
its sentencing discretion by declining to strike his two prior “Three

1 Before the trial court, the parties referred to Recara by
her first name. We do the same to avoid confusion.

2
Strikes” law (Pen. Code,2 §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12) “strike”
convictions for armed robbery and by imposing the 10-year high
term on the firearm use enhancement charged against him.
We conclude, however, substantial evidence supports
the murder conviction, the court did not err in failing to instruct
on involuntary manslaughter because no substantial evidence
supports that Brice brandished the gun, and Brice fails to
demonstrate sentencing error. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

A. The Shooting and Brice’s Arrest
In March 2022, Brice and Recara, who had been dating for
several years, lived together in an apartment on Hyde Street in
Los Angeles. Mason, Recara’s then five-year-old son from a prior
relationship, and Dejanique Leavy, Mason’s godmother, also lived
at the apartment and shared a bedroom. Asia Collins, Leavy’s
godsister, was staying at the apartment temporarily.
Around 10:30 p.m. on March 29, Leavy was at the
laundromat, but Brice, Recara, Collins, and Mason were at the
apartment. Collins was supervising Mason in the bedroom he
shared with Leavy. The bedroom door was slightly ajar. Although
Collins could not see Brice or Recara, she heard Recara laugh and
say, “Stop, Jonathan [Brice]. Open the door.” Several minutes
later, Collins heard a gunshot. She ran out of Mason’s room to find
Recara lying on the ground, partially outside the front door of the

2 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

3
apartment, bleeding from a gunshot wound. Brice was standing
over Recara, and he appeared to be feeling for her pulse.
Collins immediately called 911, but handed the phone to Brice
so he could give the dispatcher the apartment’s address. Brice told
the 911 dispatcher that Recara had been the victim of a drive-by
shooting. Collins testified she also heard Brice say, once or twice,
“She made me do it.”
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officer Keoni Smith
responded to the scene. Officer Smith’s body-worn camera captured
Brice repeating his claim that someone in a passing car had fired
the shot at Recara. The camera also captured Officer Smith moving
a sofa to block Recara’s body from view, in the event Mason left his
room. When Officer Smith did so, he discovered a shell casing for a
spent round underneath the sofa, which suggested to him “that the
shooting or a shooting happened inside the apartment itself.” The
shell casing “change[d the] course” of Officer Smith’s investigation,
and after swabbing Brice’s hands for gunshot residue, police took
him into custody.
The day after the shooting, homicide detectives interviewed
Brice. Initially, Brice told detectives Recara accidentally shot
herself with a model 1911 firearm she had acquired on her own.
Brice said he knew it was a 1911 because he frequented firing
ranges (including on the day of the incident) and had some
familiarity with guns. He explained: “[W]ith this 1911, I’ve
seen it before, so I know it’s kind of tricky. And I showed [Recara]
that’s the safety that’s off. . . . [S]afety . . . down is live. So she kept
playing with it and playing with it and I told her to stop. You[’re]
going to accidentally shoot me or yourself. I kept on telling her
that.” Then, the gun went off, and “[s]he went straight down.”
When detectives asked where the gun was, Brice said he
hid it in his car before officers arrived on the scene because he was

4
on parole. And he said he reported the incident as a drive-by
shooting because he “[knew] how it was going to look[,] and . . .
didn’t want to report it as a suicide because that’s not really what
it was. It was really an accident.”
Later in the interview, however, Brice changed his description
of the shooting. First, he admitted he “grabbed” the gun at some
point during the incident, although he maintained Recara alone
pulled the trigger. Then, upon further questioning, Brice told
detectives he and Recara were “playing” with the gun and they both
pulled the trigger:
“[Brice]: So like I said, I had closed the door on [Recara]. And
she came and knocked. And I was like, ‘[w]e’re not buying nothing
you[’re] selling,’ and we were sitting there laughing. So I opened
the door for her. She was standing in the doorway and we were still
playing, and I still had [the gun] in my hand. And it accidentally
went off.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Detective]: And were you upset? I mean, what happened?
“[Brice]: It was just shock. We shouldn’t have even been
playing with it.
“[Detective]: I mean, I want you to break it down. Because
you say, ‘[p]laying,’ and playing means a plethora of things, right? I
want to know what happened right before the gun went off. Where
was she standing? What were you guys doing? Were you guys
tugging on the door? Were you guys exchanging words? What
happened before that gun went off?
“[Brice]: So she was standing in there and we were tugging
on each other.
“[Detective]: She was pulling on you, you were pulling on
her?
“[Brice]: Yeah, but we were playing.

5
“[Detective]: Arms, shirts, hair, what was it?
“[Brice]: No, a shirt and then her dress. So we were just
sitting there playing. And in my mind, I thought the safety was on.
It wasn’t.
“[Detective]: So you pressed the trigger to scare her?
“[Brice]: No, we kind of did it at the same time.
“[Detective]: What do you mean?
“[Brice]: So it was pointed at her and she was like, ‘Oh, it’s
not going to shoot me, it’s not going to shoot me.’ And I said, ‘I
know,’ because the safety was on. So we both pushed it at the same
time and it went off. And it was just shock after that.
“[Detective]: So she pushed the trigger too?
“[Brice]: Along with me.”
Finally, Brice claimed he had not cheated on Recara within
the last year and denied saying, “She made me do it,” in the
aftermath of the shooting.

B. The Trial
The district attorney charged Brice with second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) (count 1), willful discharge of a firearm
in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3, subd. (a)) (count 2), and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1) (count 3)).
The operative information further alleged enhancements for
firearm use (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) on counts 1 and 2, inflicting
great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) on count 2, and being “armed” with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) on count 3. The information also alleged that
Brice had suffered two prior strike convictions for armed robbery.
At the April 2024 trial, the prosecution argued Brice
committed the murder with both express malice (i.e., the intent

6
to kill) and implied malice (i.e., a conscious disregard for life).
(See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith).)
In support of the express malice theory, Collins, Leavy,
and Margo McClodden, Recara’s sister, each testified that Recara
had caught Brice cheating a week or two before the shooting.
Recara then “tried to get the police to come” to evict Brice from the
apartment, which Recara held in her name. According to Leavy,
Brice said that if anyone attempted to “clear his belongings out
[of] the house[, . . . ] he was going to shoot the house up.” Leavy
testified on cross-examination that, notwithstanding the threat, she
attempted to remove Brice’s belongings from the apartment. Leavy
also testified that she heard Brice and Recara engage in physical
and oral fights once a week, although she had never seen Recara
with any resulting injuries. Finally, Collins testified concerning her
observations of the immediate aftermath of the shooting, including
that she heard Brice say, “She made me do it.” The prosecution
argued this evidence, along with the circumstances of the shooting
and Brice’s inconsistent descriptions of the incident, demonstrated
he intended to kill Recara.
In support of its implied malice theory, the prosecution
offered several categories of evidence supporting that (1) Brice
pulled the trigger of the loaded 1911 firearm while it was pressed
against Recara’s chin, and (2) in doing so, Brice consciously
disregarded the risk to Recara’s life. To prove Brice participated
in firing the fatal shot, a criminalist testified that both of Brice’s
hands (along with Recara’s hands and face) tested positive for
gunshot residue. In addition, Officer Smith testified about his
discovery of the spent shell casing inside the apartment, and the
prosecution played footage of the incident scene from his body-worn
camera. The prosecution also played the video of Brice’s interview,
in which he admitted to pulling the gun’s trigger. And the medical

7
examiner testified Recara had sustained a fatal “contact gunshot
wound” to her chin, “mean[ing] that the muzzle of the weapon was
in contact with [Recara’s] skin when the weapon was discharged.”
To prove Brice understood and consciously disregarded
the risk to Recara’s life posed by his conduct, the prosecution
relied on the portions of Brice’s interview in which he described
his familiarity with the 1911 and claimed he repeatedly warned
Recara of the dangers of mishandling it. In addition, LAPD
Homicide Detective Louis Garcia testified to several facts
supporting that Brice was the owner of the gun and thus
presumably familiar with its operation: Analysis of the gun’s serial
number revealed it was stolen, video footage captured Brice
purchasing a holster molded specifically to fit a 1911 firearm, a
photograph depicted Brice wearing a holster, and officers recovered
the gun, the holster, and the receipt for the holster from Brice’s car.
The gun, photograph, holster, and receipt all were admitted into
evidence.3 Finally, Detective Garcia testified the 1911 had three
safety features designed to prevent accidental discharge: (1) the
gun can fire only when the hammer is back, (2) the gun can fire only
when the thumb safety is flipped down, and (3) the gun is equipped
with a grip safety and therefore “will not shoot even if the safety is
off and the hammer is back,” unless a person holds the gun “in the
proper shooting position.” He further testified that “all [Brice] had
to do to determine if the safety was on was just to look at the gun.”
In response, the defense argued Recara’s death was “an
extremely foolish, possibly preventable, but nonetheless veritable
accident.” The defense called only one witness: a crime scene

3 Certain trial exhibits are missing from our record on appeal.
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)(1), we take
judicial notice of all the trial exhibits on our own motion.

8
reconstruction expert who testified “the 1911’s are known for, if
you drop the gun, it can go off.” The expert further testified that
if two people were pulling the 1911’s trigger, the force required to
shoot would be “very, very minimal.” In addition, he opined that
a person could avoid the need to manually cock the gun’s hammer
before firing by activating its chamber. But he agreed on cross-
examination there are “three safety mechanisms on the 1911—the
hammer, the thumb safety, and the grip safety,” and “all three have
to be in the correct position for the gun to fire.”
At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on
the elements of both express and implied malice murder using
form instruction CALCRIM No. 520. Brice did not request, and the
court did not provide, any instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
The jury convicted Brice on all counts and found true all charged
enhancements.

C. Sentencing
At the May 20, 2024 sentencing, Brice made a Romero
motion (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497) requesting that the court strike his two prior strike convictions
for armed robbery. After noting it “ha[d] read and considered
[Brice’s] prior criminal history, the charges and the two prior
strike convictions, . . . [and Brice’s] age at the time the prior strikes
were . . . committed,” the court denied the motion. It concluded
Brice fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law “based on [his]
criminal history” and because “[a]ttempts at rehabilitation had
failed.”
The court likewise declined to strike the section 12022.5
firearm enhancement on count 1, electing to impose the 10-year
high term “based on the nature of the offense, the testimony that
the court heard during trial[, and Brice’s] prior criminal record.”

9
The court further commented: “The court is aware of its discretion
to strike the gun enhancement. The court chooses not to exercise
any discretion to strike the gun enhancement.”
Accordingly, the court imposed a total term of 55 years to
life on the second degree murder charge in count 1. On count 2,
the court imposed a 21-year prison term, but stayed imposition of
the sentence under section 654. Finally, the court sentenced Brice
to seven years in prison on count 3, but ordered the term to run
concurrently to the term on count 1.
Brice timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Murder
Conviction
Brice contends we must overturn his murder conviction
because the trial evidence does not support that he acted with
express or implied malice. He urges “substantial evidence supports
only an accidental or negligent killing.” (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.) We are not persuaded.
“When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we ask ‘ “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citations.] Because the sufficiency of the
evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record
independently for ‘ “substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ that would support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788, 804 (Banks).)
Substantial evidence supports that Brice acted with express
malice—i.e., the intent to kill. (See Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th

10
at p. 739 [“[i]ntent to unlawfully kill and express malice are,
in essence, ‘one and the same’ ”].) Although Brice insists he
“had no motive,” the prosecution offered substantial evidence
of motive: Collins, McClodden, and Leavy testified Recara recently
had attempted to evict Brice from her apartment after she caught
him cheating. Leavy further testified Brice threatened “to shoot . . .
up” the apartment if anyone tried to remove his belongings.
And Collins testified she heard Brice say, “She made me do it,”
immediately following the shooting.
In addition, evidence concerning the 1911 firearm’s three
safety features (the hammer, the thumb safety, and the grip safety)
supports that Brice discharged the weapon intentionally. Detective
Garcia and the defense crime scene reconstruction expert agreed
the gun could fire only with all three safety mechanisms in the
correct position. Detective Garcia further testified a person need
only visually inspect the gun to determine whether the thumb
safety was engaged. Finally, the evidence—in particular, the
holster and Brice’s statements to detectives—supports that Brice
owned the 1911 and was aware of its safety features.
Substantial evidence also supports the prosecution’s
alternative theory that Brice acted with implied malice—i.e., “a
conscious disregard for life.” (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739.)
Brice’s own statements support that he understood the risk
involved in pointing a loaded firearm at a person’s face and pulling
the trigger. Brice told detectives he was familiar with firearms
generally and visited firing ranges. And he claimed he warned
Recara repeatedly not to “play” with the 1911. On appeal,
Brice insists the jury should have afforded greater weight to his
statement to detectives that he believed the gun’s thumb safety
was on when he pulled the trigger. But “[w]e do not reweigh
the evidence” when assessing whether it sufficiently supports a

11
criminal conviction. (People v. Icke (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 138, 147.)
Rather, “we ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.)
Accordingly, we reject Brice’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction for second degree murder.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to
Instruct on Involuntary Manslaughter
We likewise reject Brice’s argument that the court erred by
failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense
of involuntary manslaughter.
“The unlawful killing of a human being without malice . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony” is involuntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (b).) Brice
insists that “[h]ad [the jury] been instructed on the misdemeanor
theory of involuntary manslaughter, [it] could have easily and
reasonably concluded that [Brice] killed Recara unintentionally in
the course of committing, under circumstances dangerous to human
life, the misdemeanor of brandishing a firearm.”
“Under California law, trial courts must instruct the jury on
lesser included offenses of the charged crime if substantial evidence
supports the conclusion that the defendant committed the lesser
included offense and not the greater offense.” (People v. Gonzalez
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196.) “But ‘the existence of “any evidence, no
matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser included
offense . . . . ’ [Citation.] ‘[S]uch instructions are required whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is
“substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury,’ i.e.,
‘ “ ‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons]
could . . . conclude[ ]’ ” that the lesser offense, but not the greater,
was committed.’ ” (People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598,
606 (Gana); see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142,

12
162, disapproved on another ground in People v. Schuller (2023)
15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7 (Schuller).)
“To support an instruction on involuntary manslaughter
based on brandishing a firearm there [must] be evidence [the]
defendant ‘dr[e]w or exhibit[ed] a[ ] firearm . . . in a rude, angry,
or threatening manner.’ ” (Gana, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 606-607, citing § 417, subd. (a)(2).) And as relevant here,
“[c]ases holding the evidence supported a brandishing charge
involve scenarios where the crime was preceded by a quarrel or
confrontation between the participants.” (Gana, supra, at p. 607;
see People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 61 [trial court erred in failing
to instruct on misdemeanor manslaughter form of involuntary
manslaughter where the “defendant used his gun in the quarrel”
with his wife that resulted in her death], implicitly disapproved on
another ground in Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260, fn. 7.)
Providing no record citations, Brice makes the conclusory
assertion that his “interaction” with “Recara involved their
quarreling over [his] infidelity” in addition to “their playfulness
shortly before the shooting.” Nothing in the record, however,
supports that Brice and Recara argued immediately before the
incident. To the contrary, Collins testified she heard Recara
laughing several minutes before the shooting. And Brice himself
told detectives he and Recara were “playing” when the gun
discharged. Thus, no substantial evidence supports that Brice
“brandished” the weapon.
Nor does any substantial evidence support that Brice acted
“without malice.” (§ 192.) Rather, overwhelming evidence supports
that Brice acted with at least implied malice by consciously
disregarding the risk to Recara’s life. As set forth, ante, Brice’s
own statements to detectives evidenced his familiarity with guns in
general and the 1911 firearm in particular. Indeed, he claimed he

13
warned Recara repeatedly of the dangers of mishandling the loaded
gun immediately prior to the incident. And he told detectives he
nonetheless aided Recara in pulling the gun’s trigger with its
barrel pointed at her. Although Brice told detectives he mistakenly
believed the gun’s thumb safety was on, he also claimed he
explained to Recara how to determine whether the safety was
engaged: “I showed [Recara] that’s the safety that’s off. . . .
[S]afety . . . down is live.” Finally, the defense offered no evidence
rebutting Detective Garcia’s testimony that “all [Brice] had to do
to determine if the safety was on was just to look at the gun.”
We therefore conclude Brice fails to demonstrate the court
erred by not instructing on involuntary manslaughter.

C. Brice Fails to Demonstrate Sentencing Error
Alternatively, Brice contends “the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing a third strike term and an upper term
firearm enhancement without considering public policy and
legislation intended to ameliorate lengthy sentences and whether
[he] would remain a public safety risk far into the future.”
Although Brice fails in his appellant’s brief4 to separate his
sentencing challenge into its constituent parts, we understand his
challenge as raising three distinct arguments. We address, and
reject, each in turn.
First, Brice contends the court abused its discretion under
section 1385 by refusing to strike the 10-year firearm enhancement
or impose a lesser enhancement. Section 1385, subdivision (c)
provides, in relevant part, that the presence of certain enumerated
mitigating circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
[a sentencing] enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal

4 Brice filed no reply brief on appeal.

14
of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).)
Brice contends four such mitigating circumstances are
present in his case: (1) “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior
conviction”—here, Brice’s two prior strike convictions—“that
is over five years old” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)), (2) “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in [Brice’s] case” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B))—
namely, the prior strike convictions and the firearm
enhancement,5 (3) “[a]pplication of the enhancement would
result in a discriminatory racial impact” (id., subd. (c)(2)(A)), and
(4) “application of [the] enhancement could result in a sentence
of over 20 years” (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)). Although Brice failed to
raise any of these mitigating circumstances before the trial court,
we exercise our discretion to consider them now. (See People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 227, fn. 9 [appellate court
has discretion to review forfeited sentencing-related claims].)
The first two mitigating circumstances Brice identifies
are not present because, contrary to Brice’s contention, prior
strikes are not “enhancements” for purposes of section 1385,
subdivision (c). (See People v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 9
[“[i]t is well established . . . that section 1385, subdivision (c) applies
by its terms to a sentence ‘enhancement,’ but not to a sentence
derived from the alternative scheme of the Three Strikes law”];
People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244 [“[t]he plain
language of subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an
‘enhancement,’ and the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement”];

5 Brice does not argue we should consider the enhancements
charged on counts 2 and 3 for purposes of our analysis here.
As set forth, ante, the court stayed the term on one of those
enhancements and ordered the term for the other enhancement
to run concurrently to Brice’s 55-year-to-life sentence on count 1.

15
see also People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, fn. 2
(Walker) [declining to address the issue, but noting that several
appellate courts “have concluded that section 1385, subdivision (c),
by its terms, only applies to enhancements and not the ‘Three
Strikes’ law, which is an alternative sentencing scheme”].)
As to the third mitigating circumstance, discriminatory racial
impact, Brice cites no evidence or specific authority supporting its
presence here. Rather, Brice merely asserts “it appears” he
received “a longer and more severe sentence” than “other similarly
situated recidivist offenders” because of his “African American
race.” Brice therefore has forfeited this argument. (See In re A.C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 [“[i]f an argument in an appellate
brief is supported by only an opinion or argument of appellant’s
counsel without ‘citation to any recognized legal authority,’ that
argument may be deemed waived”].)
Finally, as to the fourth mitigating circumstance, Brice makes
no attempt to distinguish People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
88, which held that subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385 does not
apply where, as here, a defendant’s sentence “already exceed[s]
20 years without any enhancement.” (Torres, supra, at p. 93,
review den. Oct. 1, 2025, S292624.) Moreover, even if we disregard
Torres and assume the mitigating circumstance is present, the
circumstance does not “weigh[ ] greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement” if the court finds that dismissal would endanger
public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); see also Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 157.) And as set forth, post, to the extent the court
made such an implicit finding in this case, the record supports that
finding.
We therefore conclude Brice fails to demonstrate the court
abused its discretion by declining to strike the 10-year firearm
enhancement or impose a lesser enhancement.

16
Second, Brice contends any implicit finding by the court that
dismissing the firearm enhancement would endanger public safety
“is unsupported by the evidence.” Brice does not dispute that the
circumstances of Recara’s murder (committed while Brice still was
on parole and formal probation for other offenses), as well as his
prior armed robbery convictions, provide support for such a finding.
Rather, he contends the court erred “by relying solely upon the
immutable facts of [his] current crime and his two prior robberies
to speculate or ‘predict’ that he would remain dangerous for a
minimum of 55 years, without considering any other facts in the
record, such as the possibility of his rehabilitation and good conduct
in prison, and most significantly, the current research showing
that lengthy sentences do not improve public safety and recent
legislation disfavoring imposition of enhancements resulting in
excessive sentencing and prison overcrowding.”
Brice, however, ignores the court’s express finding that his
prior “[a]ttempts at rehabilitation had failed”—a finding Brice does
not challenge on appeal. Brice likewise ignores that (1) he failed to
raise any argument concerning current research on sentence length
before the trial court, and (2) absent an affirmative indication to the
contrary, we generally presume a trial court was aware of recent
legislation and followed applicable law. (People v. Coleman (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725 [“[w]e assume the trial court was aware of
and followed applicable law”]; see also People v. Gonzalez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 227 [“[S]ection 1385, subdivision (c)(2) ‘does
not require the trial court to consider any particular factors in
determining whether “there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” ’ [Citation.]”)

17
Therefore, to the extent the court made an implicit finding
that dismissing Brice’s firearm enhancement would endanger public
safety, we conclude the record supports the finding.
Third, and finally, Brice contends the court abused its
discretion by “arbitrar[il]y” denying his Romero motion. (See People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371 [appellate court reviews
denial of Romero motion “under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard”].) In support of this contention, Brice argues the court
failed to consider “the research guiding [former Los Angeles County
District Attorney George] Gascón’s and the Legislature’s sentencing
reform policies intended to alleviate extreme sentences, prison
overcrowding, and the attendant crushing costs to the state.” But
Brice identifies nothing affirmative in the record demonstrating
the court disregarded this legislative intent or relevant law. And
“[w]here the record in silent” in “ ‘a post-Romero case,’ ” we presume
the court correctly applied the law. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 378.) Moreover, Brice ignores that in December 2024, newly
elected Los Angeles County District Attorney Nathan Hochman
issued special directives rescinding certain directives implementing
former District Attorney Gascón’s sentencing reform policies.6
Brice identifies no relief this court may provide based on a now
revoked policy of the former Los Angeles District Attorney.
We therefore conclude Brice fails to demonstrate sentencing
error.
Accordingly, we affirm.

6 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of Los Angeles
County District Attorney Nathan Hochman’s Special Directives
24-04 and 24-05. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [authorizing
judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments . . . of any state”].)

18
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

19

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