CourtListener 10742266•People v. Reid CA3
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Filed 11/25/25 P. v. Reid CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101432
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE007473)
v.
CRAIG LAMAR REID,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Craig Lamar Reid pled no contest to criminal threats. On appeal, Reid
contends the trial court abused its discretion because (1) the court did not apply the
correct legal standard when it denied his application for mental health diversion and
(2) insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding Reid posed an unreasonable
risk to public safety. We will affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2019, Reid was convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury (Pen. Code,
§ 273.5, subd. (a))1 and negligent discharge of a firearm (§ 246.3). During the 2019
incident, Reid came to the home of his on-and-off-again girlfriend C.D.,2 and said, “Bitch
get up, I caught you,” before slamming her head into a wall, punching and kicking her
until she lost consciousness, and firing a gun in her vicinity.
In 2022, while on parole for the 2019 case, Reid contacted C.D. in violation of a
criminal protective order listing C.D. as the protected party. Reid sent C.D. numerous
messages in which he threatened to kill her. One message said that he would “blow her
brains out” and another showed a photo of what appeared to be a handgun resting in his
lap. Upon seeing the messages, C.D. called 911 and the police arrested Reid at his home.
The People charged Reid with criminal threats (§ 422) and alleged three prior
strike offenses (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).
In November 2023, Reid filed an application for mental health diversion
(§ 1001.36). To support his claim, he submitted an assessment from behavioral health
services. The assessment stated Reid suffered from major depressive disorder with
anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, cocaine use disorder, alcohol use disorder, and
cannabis use disorder. The assessment described that during childhood Reid witnessed
his mother suffer from domestic and drug abuse; experienced physical and emotional
abuse from his stepfather; was sexually molested by a counselor in a group home; and
was shot in the eye at age 17, which left him blind in one eye. Reid suffered from
hypervigilance due to past violent experiences while in prison, including being stabbed in
2008. Reid was also homeless for five years and involved in a gun fight in 2019. Reid
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 To protect her privacy, we refer to the victim by her initials. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).)
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admitted to using cocaine, methamphetamine, and alcohol and had previously
participated in a substance abuse program.
The assessment indicated that Reid met the criteria for specialty mental health
services and indicated Reid agreed to participate in outpatient or residential treatment.
The assessment concluded Reid had “[n]o recent history of elevated risk factors, yet [did]
have a history of suicide attempts, violence, or threats.” It further concluded Reid was
“at risk of further incarceration without mental health services.”
The trial court read and considered information submitted by the parties and held a
mental health diversion hearing. Defense counsel asserted the underlying charges for
criminal threats were made via text message and were more akin to Reid “just mouthing
off.” Counsel also argued that the gun in the picture Reid sent to C.D. was only a pellet
gun, that Reid never acted on his threats, and with medication and treatment Reid would
learn to control his words.
The People asserted Reid was not suitable for diversion because he previously beat
the victim, shot a handgun near her, and then sent her messages showing her a gun and
threatening to kill her soon after being released from prison, which demonstrated an
unreasonable risk to public safety. The People claimed Reid had been in prison for most
of his life and had the opportunity to participate in mental health treatment. The People
further argued against diversion by asserting Reid was in an outpatient program to
address his substance use in 2022 at the time he made the criminal threats.
The trial court recited the facts of the 2019 and 2022 incidents involving Reid and
the victim and considered Reid’s criminal history, including his prior strike convictions.
The court noted Reid was on parole when he made the threats and had some ability to
receive treatment prior to the 2022 incident. It found it “very concerning” that Reid’s
past criminal conduct involved shooting a gun. The trial court denied diversion, finding
Reid was not suitable because he presented an unreasonable risk to public safety if
granted mental health diversion. The trial court found: “[Reid is] 52 years old. I’ve
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gone through his criminal history, and I believe he poses an unreasonable risk to commit
a super strike, particularly a homicide, given the robbery and domestic violence
convictions[,] . . . the firing of the gun . . . in 2019, and the threats to kill in this case.”
In May 2024, the People filed an amended information, which further alleged an
aggravating factor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and a serious felony five-year
sentencing enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)). Reid pled no contest to criminal threats and
admitted one prior strike conviction, the prior serious felony enhancement, and the
aggravating factor. The court imposed an 11-year prison sentence.
Reid timely appealed, and the trial court granted his request for a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
I
Applicable Law
Reid argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding he was
not suitable for mental health diversion and the court did not apply the correct legal
standard because it did not consider the primary purpose of mental health diversion. The
People argue the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Reid was not suitable
for mental health diversion. We conclude Reid has not met his burden to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion.
Section 1001.36 “authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with
qualifying mental health disorders.” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147.) The purpose of mental health diversion is to “mitigate the individuals’ entry and
reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety,” allow “local
discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of
diversion for individuals with mental disorders,” and “meet[] the unique mental health
treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds.
(a), (b), (c).)
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Section 1001.36 prescribes a two-step analysis. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b), (c).) First,
the trial court considers whether the defendant is eligible for mental health diversion.
(Id., subd. (b).) The trial court must find eligibility if (1) the defendant has been
diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified
mental health expert, and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in
the commission of the charged offense. (Ibid.) “If the defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
Second, if a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, the court also must find
that the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following
criteria: “(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal
behavior would respond to mental health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to
diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant
agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . . [¶] [and] (4) The
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
Under section 1170.18, an unreasonable danger to public safety is an unreasonable
risk that the petitioner will commit a “super strike,” which includes any homicide or
attempted homicide offense, any serious or violent felony punishable by life
imprisonment or death, and sexually violent offenses. (§§ 1170.18, subd. (c), 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for mental health diversion for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; People v. Moine
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449.) We review the trial court’s factual findings as to
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the enumerated statutory criteria for substantial evidence. (People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or
capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision
on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.”
(Moine, at p. 449.) Under this deferential standard of review, “ ‘we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’ ” (Gerson, at p. 1079.)
II
Eligibility for Mental Health Diversion
As an initial matter, Reid devotes a good portion of his brief to the argument that
the trial court abused its discretion when it issued its ruling without addressing whether or
not Reid was eligible for mental health diversion. Indeed, the reporter’s transcript is
silent on Reid’s eligibility, but the record is not. As detailed above, the court was in
receipt of Reid’s application for mental health diversion, which included an assessment
from a qualified mental health professional. The assessment included diagnoses which
arguably make Reid eligible for mental health diversion. We do not construe the trial
court’s silence regarding the section 1001.36, subdivision (b) eligibility factors as an
indication it somehow deemed Reid ineligible. On this record, we presume the court to
have properly followed the applicable law. (People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
1345, 1355.) We thus conclude the trial court implicitly determined Reid eligible for
pretrial diversion and Reid fails to convince us that the trial court’s failure to articulate
such was error.
III
Suitability for Mental Health Diversion
Reid next argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding
Reid posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community. We
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disagree. The court made its decision to deny mental health diversion “based on the
information presented,” which included Reid’s application for diversion and the
assessment from behavioral health services. It based its finding on Reid’s criminal
history, which included two robbery convictions, a domestic violence conviction, and the
underlying charges. “[T]here is nothing in section 1001.36, with respect to either
eligibility or suitability, that preclude[d] [the] trial court from relying primarily, or even
entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in denying a motion for
diversion.” (People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862.) In fact, the statute
permits the trial court to consider “the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the
current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) It was thus reasonable for the trial court to find Reid posed an
unreasonable risk to commit homicide because there was evidence Reid violently
attacked and fired a gun in the vicinity of the victim, his on-and-off-again girlfriend, in
2019 and then threatened to kill the same victim with a gun within five months of being
released on parole in 2022. (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 535 [repeated
instances of domestic violence “ ‘usually escalate[] in frequency and severity’ ”]; accord,
United States v. Castleman (2014) 572 U.S. 157, 160 [“[d]omestic violence often
escalates in severity over time”].) Homicide is “ ‘the ultimate form of domestic
violence.’ ” (People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1225 [admitting acts of past
domestic violence as propensity evidence under Evid. Code, § 1109].)
Nor are we persuaded by Reid’s citations to Moine and Sarmiento v. Superior
Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882 in support of his contention that insufficient evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that he was not suitable for mental health diversion. In
Moine, the defendant threatened two different medical care providers that he would shoot
and kill them. (People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 444-445.) However, after
making the threats he immediately and profusely apologized. (Id. at p. 445.) The court
in Moine concluded the trial court abused its discretion because “there [was] nothing in
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the record to indicate the prosecution presented evidence to suggest [the defendant] was
likely to commit such an offense in the future, and the circumstances of the pending
charges did not support such an inference.” (Id. at pp. 450-451.)
In Sarmiento, the defendant was charged with attempted robbery. The trial court
found the defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety on the grounds the
defendant had not previously remained drug-free after receiving treatment and that the
defendant would not respond well to mental health treatment. (Sarmiento v. Superior
Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 890.) The appellate court concluded substantial
evidence did not support the trial court’s finding. (Id. at pp. 897-898.)
As detailed above, the facts of this case are quite different from the facts in Moine
and Sarmiento. Although Reid minimizes the conduct in this case and concludes it fails
to establish risk, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Reid
was not suitable for mental health diversion and, where substantial evidence supports the
findings of the fact finder, “ ‘reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ”
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)
Lastly, we reject Reid’s assertion the trial court did not consider the primary
purpose of mental health diversion in determining Reid’s suitability. Other than
disagreeing with the trial court’s determination, Reid points to nothing that demonstrates
that the trial court failed to follow the law. Absent a contrary showing, “the trial court is
presumed to have known and followed the applicable law and to have properly exercised
its discretion.” (People v. Bradford, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.)
On this record, Reid has not met his burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
________/s/__________________
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
_________/s/_________________
RENNER, J.
_________/s/_________________
FEINBERG, J.
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