CourtListener 10741532•People v. Mai CA6
Texto completo
Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Mai CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051930
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. CC247793)
v.
NHAT DINH MAI,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2002, 17-year-old defendant Nhat Dinh Mai stabbed a teenager.
About one week later, Mai shot at three teenagers, killing one of them. In
2003, Mai pleaded guilty to murder, two counts of attempted murder, and
assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Mai to an aggregate
term of 40 years to life in prison.
In 2023, Mai filed a petition under Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)) seeking a recall of his sentence and
resentencing (petition). The trial court denied the petition on the ground that
Mai had not shown his sentence is the functional equivalent of life without
the possibility of parole (LWOP).
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Mai contends the trial court erred because his 40-years-to-
life sentence is “de facto” a “juvenile offender life without parole [] sentence”
and he is entitled to relief under People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608
(Heard).2 Mai asks this court to reverse the denial of his petition and remand
for recall and resentencing.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying Mai’s petition.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Offenses3
On April 29, 2002, Mai and his codefendant Nguyen Nguyen stabbed a
fellow teenager with knives after announcing their Asian Warrior gang
membership.4
About one week later (on the afternoon of May 7, 2002), Mai and
Nguyen followed three teenagers as they drove away from a park in San Jose.
Mai leaned out of a car (driven by Nguyen) and fired a gun, striking one of
the three teens in the head and causing their vehicle to crash. The police
investigation revealed that the shooting was the culmination of a series of
encounters between two groups of young people over the preceding weeks and
that Mai and Nugyen had “volunteered to kill” the deceased victim. The
investigation also revealed that Mai fired 13 rounds during the shooting.
2 The Heard court held that “denying juvenile offenders, who were
sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity
to petition for resentencing [under section 1170(d)(1)] violates the guarantee
of equal protection.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.)
3 Because the particulars of Mai’s offenses are not germane to the claim
raised in this appeal, we state the facts summarily. Further, like the parties,
we take the facts from the district attorney’s opposition to Mai’s petition,
which stated the facts based on the preliminary hearing evidence.
4 Like Mai (who was born in 1985), Nguyen was 17 years old at the
time of the crimes.
2
B. Charges, Plea, and Sentence
By information, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Mai
with first degree murder (§ 187) with an enhancement for personal discharge
of a weapon causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), two counts of attempted
premeditated murder (§§ 187, 664), each with an enhancement for personal
discharge of a weapon (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), shooting at an occupied vehicle
(§ 246), and assault with a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) with an enhancement for
personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) (GBI
enhancement). The information further alleged that Mai committed all the
counts for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) (gang
enhancement).
In August 2003, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Mai (then 18
years old) pleaded guilty to first degree murder, two counts of attempted
premeditated murder, and assault with a knife. In addition, he admitted
three firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), the GBI enhancement,
and the gang enhancements.
In October 2003, the trial court sentenced Mai to a total term of 40
years to life in prison, comprising 25 years to life for first degree murder plus
10 years for the attached firearm enhancement, concurrent with life terms
and firearm enhancements for the two attempted premeditated murders, and
consecutive to a determinate term of five years (i.e., two years for assault
with a knife consecutive to three years for the GBI enhancement).5
5 In 2013, Mai filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial
court, alleging that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 and People v. Caballero (2012) 55
Cal.4th 262 (Caballero). In December 2013, the court denied that petition.
3
C. Proceedings on the Section 1170(d)(1) Petition
In October 2023, Mai filed a petition under section 1170(d)(1) for recall
and resentencing. Mai asserted that he was eligible to petition for such relief
because he was under age 18 at the time of his crimes, he had been
“sentenced to 35 years to life consecutive to 5 years, which is a de facto LWOP
sentence,” he had already served 20 years in prison, and “none of the
disqualifying circumstances of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(B)” applied to
his case. Mai relied on Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, to argue that
“individuals sentenced to de facto LWOP as children are now eligible to
petition under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).” (Boldface omitted.) In
support of his petition, Mai submitted a statement of his remorse (see
§ 1170(d)(2)) and evidence of his efforts toward rehabilitation, including
laudatory statements and certificates from self-help and rehabilitation
programs (see § 1170(d)(2)(D)). Mai asserted that he did “ ‘not have juvenile
felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant
potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the
sentence is being recalled’ (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(B)).”6 Mai further noted that
upon recall of his sentence, he would be entitled to the benefits of Proposition
57.7
6 Mai acknowledged that in 2000, a juvenile court had sustained a
felony charge against him for first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)).
Mai, however, argued that juvenile adjudication did not involve a “a crime
‘with a significant potential for personal harm to victims.’ ”
7 Proposition 57 (which took effect in 2016) provides that a juvenile
may not be tried as an adult unless the juvenile court has conducted a
transfer hearing and determined that the juvenile should be transferred from
juvenile court to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1);
see also People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303–304; People
v. Castillero (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 393, 398; People v. Padilla (2022) 13
Cal.5th 152, 158.)
4
The district attorney opposed Mai’s petition. The district attorney
asserted that Heard was wrongly decided but acknowledged that the trial
court was bound by that decision. Additionally, the district attorney
contended Mai had failed to meet his burden to show that his sentence was
the functional equivalent of LWOP. The district attorney noted that “no case
has ever concluded a similar sentence was the functional equivalent of
LWOP” and argued, “Assuming no good time credits, which is not the law,
[Mai] would be eligible for parole at age 57. With a life expectancy of 75 to
76, [Mai] has just shy of two decades to live out a meaningful life.” (Fn.
omitted.) The district attorney further asserted that Mai had failed to set
forth the amount of conduct credits “he could earn[] or has earned” under
various programs that may affect his minimum parole eligibility date.
On March 5, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Mai’s petition.
During the parties’ arguments, the court stated, “I agree 40 to life is a long
time. But at 17 years of age, not considering credits or anything else, that’s
57 years old. And I don’t have anything before me to suggest that is the
functional equivalent of a life sentence.” The court ultimately denied the
petition, concluding that Mai had not met his burden to show his sentence
was the functional equivalent of a LWOP sentence. The court stated that its
denial was “without prejudice, with leave to re-file if there is supplemental
information that the defense thinks would change the [c]ourt’s position.”
II. DISCUSSION
Mai contends the trial court erred by failing to consider whether his 40-
years-to-life sentence is de facto LWOP. Mai further claims that his petition
adequately demonstrated his entitlement to relief under section 1170(d)(1)
and Heard precludes excluding de facto LWOP juvenile offenders from
obtaining such relief. Mai argues that if the court had used the test set forth
5
in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), it would have
concluded that his “40 years to life sentence is the functional equivalent of an
LWOP sentence.”8 Mai asserts that “one must consider the difficulty of
receiving a grant at a parole hearing” and “factor in the fact that people
incarcerated in California age faster than non-incarcerated people.” Relying
on Heard, People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 (Sorto), and People v.
Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 (Bagsby), Mai further contends that “a
defendant’s eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing [under section
3051] does not prevent a juvenile offender with LWOP or the functional
equivalent of LWOP from seeking relief under [section 1170,] subdivision
(d)(1).” He similarly claims that his “opportunity to earn credits” should not
be considered because it “is too speculative.”
The Attorney General contends the trial court correctly denied Mai’s
petition because Mai “was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP.” The Attorney General asserts that Mai “will have at least two
8 In Contreras, the California Supreme Court considered whether
sentences of 50 years to life and 58 years to life, imposed on two 16-year-old
juvenile nonhomicide offenders, violated the Eighth Amendment. (Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 356.) In concluding that those sentences were
unconstitutional, our Supreme Court explained that the United States
Supreme Court “did not define the maximum length of incarceration before
parole eligibility that would be permissible in light of the concerns it set forth
in [Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48]. But the high court made clear the
nature of its concerns: A lawful sentence must recognize ‘a juvenile
nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.’
[Citation.] A lawful sentence must offer ‘hope of restoration’ [citation], ‘a
chance to demonstrate maturity and reform’ [citation], a ‘chance for
fulfillment outside prison walls,’ and a ‘chance for reconciliation with society’
[citation]. A lawful sentence must offer ‘the opportunity to achieve maturity
of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential.’ [Citation.]
A lawful sentence must offer the juvenile offender an ‘incentive to become a
responsible individual.’ ” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 367.)
6
parole hearings while in his forties and fifties”—the first in 2027, under the
youth offender parole scheme (§ 3051, subd. (b)(3)), and the second in 2035,
under the elderly parole program (§ 3055, subd. (a)). The Attorney General
further asserts that regardless of these parole opportunities, Mai will be
eligible for parole at age 57 (after serving 40 years of his aggregate sentence),
which is “before the line established in Contreras.” Additionally, the
Attorney General notes that the reports on which Mai relies to show the low
rate of grants of parole were not presented to the trial court and, regardless,
case law “makes clear that a defendant must only be offered the opportunity
for release, not a guarantee of release at a certain age.” The Attorney
General also observes that the Contreras court rejected reliance on the effects
of incarceration on aging. Lastly, the Attorney General contends that Mai’s
citation to publications of the United States Sentencing Commission and out-
of-state authority do not support his claim of error.
With permission from this court, the California District Attorneys
Association and the Sacramento County District Attorney (amici) filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of affirmance of the trial court’s order. Amici
contend, inter alia, that section 1170(d) “passes rational basis scrutiny. The
statute was intended to provide a mechanism to convert some LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders to ‘terms that include an opportunity for
parole.’ [Citation.] [Mai]’s sentence already provides numerous opportunities
for youth offender parole, elder parole, and the opportunity to accrue good
conduct credits. [Mai] therefore already received what the Legislature
intended the statute to provide.” Amici also contend that Heard, Sorto, and
Bagsby were wrongly decided.
7
A. Legal Principles
Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides: “When a defendant who was under 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the
defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit
to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
Although section 1170(d)(1)(A) applies, by its terms, only to those
juvenile offenders sentenced to “imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole,” California Courts of Appeal have held that juvenile offenders who
have been sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP are also entitled
to relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A). (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 633 [identifying no “rational basis for making juveniles sentenced to an
explicitly designated life without parole term, but not juveniles sentenced to
the functional equivalent of life without parole, eligible to petition for
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)”]; Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 454 [agreeing with Heard that section 1170, subdivision (d)
violates equal protection “by denying relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to
functionally equivalent LWOP terms” and “that parole eligibility under
section 3051 does not render an offender ineligible for [such] relief”]; Bagsby,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046 [reaffirming Heard].)
In the wake of Heard, Courts of Appeal have reached differing
conclusions about whether a 50-years-to-life sentence is functionally
equivalent to an LWOP sentence for purposes of equal protection analysis,
and our Supreme Court has granted review of the issue. (Compare People v.
Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 507–512, review granted June 25, 2025,
S290828 [distinguishing Heard and holding that a 50-years-to-life sentence
for a juvenile homicide offender is not the functional equivalent of LWOP],
8
People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1081, review granted Sept.
24, 2025, S292540 [concluding the defendant failed to show that section
1170(d)(1)’s limitation on eligibility to juvenile defendants sentenced to
LWOP “has no rational basis, and is therefore unconstitutional, as applied to
juvenile homicide offenders who were sentenced to serve 50 years to life”],
and People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1127, review granted Nov.
12, 2025, S292860 [disagreeing with Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby and
concluding that because defendant is eligible for a youth offender parole
hearing at age 42, his 50-years-to-life sentence “is not the functional
equivalent of LWOP”] with People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653
(Cabrera) [agreeing with Heard and concluding that a 50-years-to-life
sentence for a juvenile homicide offender is the functional equivalent of
LWOP]; see also People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 280 [holding that
because section 3051 entitles the defendant to a youth offender parole
hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, defendant’s 50-years-to-life
sentence “is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent” and thus does not
give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim under Miller].)
Moreover, three Courts of Appeal that have addressed cases involving
sentences shorter than 50-years-to-life have concluded that those juvenile
defendants were not eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1). (See People v.
Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 (Olmos) [accepting Heard arguendo
and holding that a 33-years-to-life sentence for a juvenile homicide defendant
is not the functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Baldwin (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 978, 985 (Baldwin) [agreeing with Thompson’s equal protection-
based functional equivalency formulation and concluding that the defendant
“failed to demonstrate—as is his burden—that section 1170(d)’s limitation on
eligibility to those sentenced to LWOP has no rational basis, and is therefore
9
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to juvenile
nonhomicide offenders sentenced to 44 years to life”]; People v. Ortega (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1262–1265, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070
(Ortega) [disagreeing with Heard (deeming it inconsistent with Franklin)]; id.
at p. 1265 [and concluding the homicide defendant’s equal protection claim
regarding his 42-years-to-life sentence “is moot because under clear and
binding precedent he was not sentenced to a prison term that currently
violates the constitution (i.e., a sentence that is the functional equivalent of
life in prison without the possibility of parole)” (italics & underscoring
omitted)].)
B. Standard of Review
“The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de
novo review. [Citation.] When the trial court applies its factual findings
under a statute, we review the factual findings for substantial evidence; but
the interpretation and application of the statute to those factual findings is a
question of law subject to de novo review.” (People v. Harring (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 483, 495; see also Ortega, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1257,
review granted [issues of statutory interpretation and constitutionality are
reviewed de novo]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 622–623.)
C. Analysis
The Attorney General does not argue that Heard and the cases
following it were wrongly decided (although amici make such an assertion).
Rather, the parties dispute whether Mai’s 40-years-to-life sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP for the purposes of Mai’s equal protection-
based claim. Given the position of the parties, we will assume arguendo that
juvenile defendants who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of an
LWOP sentence are entitled to submit a petition for recall and resentencing
10
under section 1170(d)(1)(A). Using this assumption as a starting point, we
must then decide whether Mai’s 40-years-to-life sentence for murder, two
counts of attempted murder, and assault with a deadly weapon is
functionally equivalent to LWOP.
The Sorto court stated that “a sentence is the functional equivalent of
LWOP if it includes a ‘term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls
outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy.’ ” (Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 443, quoting Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 268.) The
court also stated that “a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence provides no
meaningful possibility of parole and effectively condemns the offender to die
in prison.” (Sorto, at p. 451; see also Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 372
[rejecting proposed rule that “a sentence provides a meaningful opportunity
for release if it allows for parole eligibility within a defendant’s life
expectancy”]; id. at p. 373 [and holding appropriate metric is “whether the
parole eligibility date of a lengthy sentence offers a juvenile offender a
realistic hope of release and a genuine opportunity to reintegrate into
society”].)
Pending further guidance from our high court in Munoz, we are not
persuaded that Mai’s 40-years-to-life sentence is the functional equivalent of
a LWOP sentence. Mai cites no published case reaching this conclusion, and
Mai’s sentence is shorter than the sentences that were at issue in Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at page 614 (23 years plus 80 years to life), Sorto,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at page 440 (10 years plus 130 years to life), Bagsby,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at page 1047 (67 years plus 40 years to life), and
Cabrera, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at page 652 (50 years to life).
Regardless of any eligibility for parole under the youth offender parole
scheme (§ 3051) and the elderly parole program (§ 3055) or deductions based
11
on conduct credits, Mai will have the opportunity for release on parole at age
57. Should Mai be granted parole at that age, he will have the opportunity to
rejoin society for a sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a productive
and respected member of the citizenry. The possibility of release at 57 also
provides Mai an incentive to rehabilitate in custody and takes into account
culpability-related concerns applicable to juvenile homicide offenders. (See
generally People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 855–856 [discussing
penological considerations applicable to juvenile homicide offenders].)
We conclude that Mai has not shown error in the trial court’s
conclusion that he failed to meet his burden to show his 40-years-to-life
sentence is functionally equivalent to LWOP. As Mai has not established
that his sentence is functionally equivalent to LWOP, he is not eligible for
relief under section 1170(d)(1) through application of equal protection
principles, as construed by Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at page 612.9 (See
Olmos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 583; Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1006; Ortega, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1262, review granted.)
III. DISPOSITION
The March 5, 2024 order denying Mai’s petition under Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) is affirmed.
9 Given this conclusion, we need not consider amici’s various
contentions for affirming the trial court’s order on other grounds.
12
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H051930
People v. Mai
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