People v. Hall CA1/1

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Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Hall CA1/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165406
v.
GARY HALL, (Del Norte County
Super. Ct. No. CRF219022)
Defendant and Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Gary Hall pleaded no contest to two counts of committing
lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a)).1 Consistent with the negotiated disposition, the trial court
sentenced him to 10 years in state prison, which included the upper term on
one of the counts.
Defendant appealed asserting (1) the trial court (and the parties)
mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, (2) the
court erred in finding aggravating factors that had not been pled, and (3) the
court erred in finding these aggravating factors in the absence of his personal

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1

otherwise indicated.

1
waiver of his right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. We rejected
each of defendant’s arguments and affirmed the judgment.
As to his third assertion—that he did not personally waive his Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial2—we affirmed on two grounds. First, we held
defendant had, in fact, waived his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial on the
aggravating factors. Second, we held the trial court had, in any case, relied
on at least one permissibly established aggravating factor—defendant’s
multiple convictions3—and therefore, under People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th
799 (Black II),4 the aggravated sentence was not constitutionally infirm.
Defendant sought review by our Supreme Court of both grounds. The court
granted review and deferred further action “pending consideration and
disposition of a related issue in People v. Lynch, S274942 (see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court.” (People v.
Hall (Hall), S283530, Supreme Ct. Mins., Feb. 28, 2024.)
The high court subsequently issued its opinion in People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), the majority holding that the court’s analysis
in Black II is no longer apposite, given recent amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b). (Lynch, at pp. 756–757.) Rather, section 1170,
subdivision (b) now requires that “the facts supporting every aggravating
circumstance upon which the trial court relies to ‘justify’ imposition of the

2 He expressly disavowed any reliance on the then-recently enacted
statutory right to jury trial under section 1170, subdivision (b).
3 Known as the “recidivist factor,” it is set forth in California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) which states: “The defendant’s prior convictions as an
adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are
numerous or of increasing seriousness.” All further references to the “rules”
are to the California Rules of Court.
4 Overruled in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084 (Wiley).

2
upper term must be properly proven as the statute requires.” (Lynch, at
p. 757.) Accordingly, “under the current statute a Sixth Amendment
violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to
impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied
on have been properly established.” (Id. at p. 768.) And any such “violation
is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied
upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts
were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory
requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the
Chapman[5] standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing.” (Ibid.) The court went on to “disapprove People v. Hall
[(2023)] 97 Cal.App.5th [1101], 1104–1108, People v. Ruiz [(2023)]
97 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1076–1078, People v. Falcon [(2023)] 92 Cal.App.5th
911, 938–939, People v. Butler [(2023)] 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 960, People v.
Lewis [(2023)] 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, People v. Ross [(2022)] 86 Cal.App.5th
1346 . . . , People v. Dunn [(2022)] 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 407, People v. Zabelle
[(2022)] 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1110–1113, People v. Lopez [(2022)]
78 Cal.App.5th 459, 467, footnote 11, and People v. Flores [(2022)]
75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500, to the extent they are inconsistent with today’s
opinion.” (Id. at pp. 768–769.)
The high court thereafter transferred the instant case back to us “with
directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of” Lynch.
(Hall, supra, S283530, Supreme Ct. Mins., Feb. 28, 2024.) As the high court
did not grant review in Lynch on the issue of jury trial waiver, nor did the

5 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).

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court grant review on that issue in the instant case, we again affirm his
aggravated sentence, but on that ground, alone.
BACKGROUND6

Defendant, a registered sex offender, was friends, and resided, with the
two victims’ grandfather. The victims were under the age of 14 at the time of
the molestations. One recalled approximately 20 incidents of abuse,
including instances of defendant fondling his penis, masturbating him, and
orally copulating him. The last incident occurred when he was 12 or 13 years
old. The other victim recalled four instances where defendant molested him
when he was under or around 10 years old. Defendant variously sodomized
him, lay in bed with him and pulled down his underwear, and grabbed his
penis over his clothes.
In 2021, the People charged defendant with sodomy of a child 10 years
old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a
child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)); and failure to register as a sex offender (§ 290.018).
The continuous sexual abuse counts included an enhancement allegation of a
prior conviction of section 288 (§ 667.51, subd. (a)). Defendant faced a
potential sentence of 25 years to life on the sodomy count, 16 years each on
the continuous abuse counts plus five years each for the related
enhancements, and one year on the failure to register count—in sum, 68
years to life.
At the preliminary hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of a 1995
misdemeanor conviction for violation of section 288, subdivision (c)—lewd or

6 Our factual summary is based in part on the transcript of the
preliminary hearing, which the parties stipulated provided a factual basis for
defendant’s plea.

4
lascivious acts on a child 14 or 15 years old—which required defendant to
register as a sex offender.
In February 2022, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the People filed
an amended information, adding two felony counts of committing lewd acts
upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a))—one count for each
victim—to which defendant pleaded no contest. As summarized on the
change of plea form, the disposition provided that the trial court “could grant
probation with time in jail all the way up to 10 years in prison (base term
plus 1/3 the middle term for the 2nd count if ran [sic] consecutive).”
Defendant initialed the provision of the form that stated, “I understand that I
am not eligible for probation in this case. [P]resumptively ineligible.”
Defendant also initialed the provision of the change of plea form
stating, “I understand the Court will not decide whether to accept a plea or
sentence bargain or to impose sentence or extend probation: until a Probation
Officer makes an investigation and reports on my background, prior record (if
any) and the circumstances of the case.”
He additionally initialed the provisions of the form waiving his rights,
to among other things, a jury trial. These provisions stated, in pertinent
part, “10. I understand that, as to each charge I plead to and each special
allegation and/or sentence enhancement I admit to be true, I have the
following rights: [¶] . . . [¶] b. A speedy and public trial by jury.
c. Representation by an attorney at all times. d. See, hear, and question all
witnesses who testify against me. [¶] . . . [¶] 11. I understand that by this
plea and any admissions I am making, I give up all the rights which are
listed above except the continuing right to be represented by an attorney.”
At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor summarized the plea
agreement as follows: “A plea of no contest to Count 5 and a plea of no contest

5
to Count 6. All sentencing options would be open to the Court. The Court
could consider all aggravating factors. That’s the stipulation under
1170(b)”—a maximum potential exposure of 10 years. Defense counsel
agreed. Defendant, himself, also stated that was his understanding of the
negotiated disposition.
Prior to accepting defendant’s no contest pleas, the court reviewed the
plea form with him and defendant personally confirmed that he read and
understood it, and had given up all the rights as stated therein, including his
“right to have a jury trial.” Counsel then stipulated that the preliminary
hearing transcript could be used as a factual basis for the plea, with defense
counsel stating defendant was “not admitting guilt in any way.” The
prosecutor also asked that the record specifically reflect “the parties’
stipulation under Penal Code section 1170(b)(2) as to what the Court can
consider at sentencing,” and specifically “all aggravating factors” “in [r]ule
4.421.” Defense counsel concurred. The trial court then specifically asked
defendant whether he had heard the recited terms of the disposition,
including that the “Court could consider all aggravating factors,” and
defendant confirmed that he had and these were, indeed, the terms of the
proposed disposition. The trial court then proceeded to admonish defendant
that the disposition included his giving up his rights, including the right to
jury trial, and defendant expressly stated, “Yes,” he was giving up that right.
At the sentencing hearing, counsel confirmed the stipulation that the
trial court would consider all sentencing factors, both mitigating and
aggravating. Defense counsel agreed there was a “[s]tip to all aggravating
factors for the Court to be considered,” so “[t]he options open to the Court are
probation with jail time all the way up to the ten years. And that would be

6
the eight years with one-third the middle term of two if the Court decided to
run it consecutive.”
Victim statements were given by a close friend of the victims’
grandmother, who had known the victims all their lives, and one of the
victims appeared.
The prosecution urged the court to impose the upper term, pointing out
“[i]t only takes one factor [in aggravation] under the case law to—for the
Court to do an aggravated sentence.” He then urged the court to find
applicable all the factors in aggravation recommended in the probation
report, as well as several additional aggravating factors. The probation
officer emphasized the “long-term emotional, mental, and psychological
ramifications” for the victims.
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s presentation, defendant spoke,
stating “The kids are lying. I have said that from the beginning, and I still
say it. . . . [T]heir behavior isn’t from anything I have done. They have been
rotten behavior from the get-go. . . . [¶] . . . They didn’t like the way I
disciplined. . . . [¶] It’s not me that didn’t show remorse. I didn’t do it. . . .”
Defense counsel agreed her client had maintained he was innocent from “day
one,” and acknowledged “he is angry; he is upset.” She also acknowledged
that his prior section 288 conviction “made this a very difficult case,” and
stated the only reason he agreed to a negotiated disposition was to avoid the
risk of a potential life sentence. Counsel asked the court to consider a
midterm and not impose consecutive sentences; “[a]gain, my client is
adamant that he’s been falsely accused.”
The probation officer then provided further testimony, stating when he
asked defendant about his prior section 288 conviction, he said that case “was
all lies, and he was railroaded in that case.” “[F]or some reason the young

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men in this case as well as the counselors in that [prior case] were out to get
him for some reason.”
The court found defendant ineligible for probation and further found no
mitigating factors and seven aggravating factors set forth in rule 4.421.
Commenting that the aggravating circumstances “far, far outweigh” the
circumstances in mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to a 10-year
prison term, comprised of the upper term of eight years for count 5 and two
years (one-third of the six-year middle term) for count 6. The remaining
counts were dismissed.
III. DISCUSSION
Ineligibility for Probation
On appeal, defendant maintained the trial court (and counsel) erred in
assuming he was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203,
subdivision (e)(5), as stated in the sentencing report. Defendant pointed out
section 1203, subdivision (e)(5) provides such a presumption only where there
has been a prior conviction of section 288 as a felony, and he was convicted of
violating section 288 as a misdemeanor. On remand, defendant makes no
new challenge to this issue, and our opinion remains unchanged on this
point.
Accordingly, while defendant is correct that his misdemeanor
conviction did not give rise to a presumption of ineligibility for probation, he
made no objection at the time of sentencing to the court’s invocation of such
presumption and had therefore waived the issue on appeal. (See People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) Recognizing this was likely the case,
defendant alternatively advances a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
well established. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance

8
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687.) However, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” (Id. at p. 697.) Indeed, it is
often easier to dispose of such a claim based on lack of sufficient prejudice
alone. (Ibid.) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the
petitioner must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable
reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of
counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937, quoting People v.
Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 661.)
We agree with the Attorney General that defendant cannot show
prejudice attributable to the asserted ineffectiveness of counsel. “The
standard for analyzing prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
mirrors the state standard for prejudicial error. (Richardson v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050–1051.) That is, ‘a “miscarriage of justice”
should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.)” (People v. Lepere (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 727, 738.)
There is no reasonable probability a result more favorable to defendant
would have ensued had counsel urged that defendant was eligible, and not
presumptively ineligible, for probation. First, defendant was, in fact, wholly
ineligible, not merely presumptively ineligible, for probation pursuant to

9
section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(5) and (7). These provisions state,
“Notwithstanding Section 1203 or any other law, probation shall not be
granted to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (5) A person who is convicted of committing a
violation of Section 288 or 288.5 and who has been previously convicted of a
violation of Section 261, 264.1, 266, 266c, 267, 285, 286, 287, 288, 288.5, or
289, or former Section 262 or 288a . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [or] (7) A person who is
convicted of committing a violation of Section 288 or 288.5 against more than
one victim.” (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(5), (7).) Second, even if defendant was
fully eligible, there was no reasonable probability the court would have
granted probation, given the court’s statements at the sentencing hearing
and its imposition of the maximum allowable sentence under the terms of the
plea agreement.
“Pleading” Aggravating Factors
On appeal, defendant maintained the then-recent amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–2021 Reg
Sess.) require that the prosecution “plead” any aggravating factors it intends
to urge at sentencing. After defendant filed his opening brief, the Court of
Appeal in People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932, 939–941
(Pantaleon),7 addressed and rejected this same contention. We agreed, and
continue to agree, with the analysis in Pantaleon, which points out there is a
significant distinction between “enhancements,” which section 1170.1,
subdivision (e) requires “shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading”
(§ 1170.1, subd. (e)) and “ ‘circumstances in aggravation’ ” addressed by
section 1170, subdivision (b), which does not contain a like mandate.

7Disapproved on another ground in Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pages 1077–1078, 1085–1086.

10
(Pantaleon, at pp. 939–940; see Chavez-Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 65, 96–97 & fn. 8 (Chavez Zepeda) [amended statute does not
require prosecutor to present evidence supporting aggravating factors at
preliminary hearing].) In short, as Pantaleon held, defendant’s sentence was
not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing
factors in aggravation.
Defendant then filed a petition for rehearing in which he urged we had
misperceived his argument as one based solely on recent amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), but his argument was, in fact, based “on a
line of California cases” like People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, and
therefore Pantaleon was inapposite. In Mancebo, our Supreme Court
reiterated that “a defendant has a cognizable due process right to fair notice
of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be invoked to
increase punishment for his crimes.” (Id. at p. 747, italics added.) But as the
court in Pantaleon explained, there is a long-recognized distinction between
sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors. (Pantaleon, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 939, 941.) Pantaleon therefore rejected the defendant’s
“constitutional theory of error” that he had not only a statutory right to
pleading notice of aggravating factors, but also a “fair notice” due process
right to pleading notice of factors in aggravation. (Id. at p. 941.) Indeed, the
court observed the “defendant’s constitutional theory of error [was] foreclosed
by binding [Supreme Court] authority.” (Ibid., citing In re Varnell (2003)
30 Cal.4th 1132, 1135, 1141–1142.)
In his supplemental brief on remand, defendant acknowledges Lynch
did not address the issue of “pleading and notice” of aggravating factors. (See
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 769.) Nevertheless, defendant urges us to

11
revisit the issue in light of “subsequent developments” in several other cases.
We decline to do so.
To begin with, although defendant sought review of the pleading issue,
the high court did not take it up in either Lynch, or more significantly, the
instant case. Our charge on remand is to reconsider the matter only as
ordered by the Supreme Court—that is in light of Lynch. “When a case is
transferred or remanded to the court of appeal for further proceedings, the
scope of the court of appeal’s jurisdiction is determined by the supreme
court’s decision or order.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group December 2024 Updated) ¶13:202.2,
citing Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701 [the
order of the reviewing court contained in its remittitur “defines the scope of
the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned,” and the “ ‘
“lower court cannot reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of amended
or supplemental pleadings, nor retry the case” ’ ”]; see Boermeester v. Carry
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 [Supreme Court remanded matter with
“clear instructions,” and “[w]e are bound by these instructions”].) The high
court transferred this matter back to us to us with “directions to vacate” our
decision “and reconsider the cause in light” of Lynch. Nothing in the court’s
order suggests we should revisit our conclusion that defendant’s sentence is
not constitutionally infirm due to lack of pleading aggravating factors.
In any case, in Lynch, the high court commented briefly on the
defendant’s “notice” argument advanced in opposing any prejudice analysis
(under either Chapman or Watson) on “due process” grounds, and rejected it

12
for reasons that suggest there is no constitutionally mandated pleading
requirement.8
Additionally, none of the cases defendant now cites reached a
conclusion different than did Pantaleon as to pleading aggravating factors.
While subsequent cases have criticized and parted company with Pantaleon
on the issues decided to the contrary in Lynch, no case has disagreed with
Pantaleon’s holding as to pleading aggravating factors. (See Wiley, supra,

8 The high court first observed, “When a statute includes specific
pleading and proof requirements, ‘the People’s failure to include a multiple-
victim-circumstance allegation must be deemed a discretionary charging
decision’ which ‘restrict[s] the trial court to this application.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 752.) It went on to explain, “Because Lynch was tried and
sentenced under the 2007 version of section 1170, this case does not directly
present issues of pleading and notice. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us
to decide exactly what the statute and the federal Constitution demand in
this context. But to the extent pleading and notice issues bear on whether a
prejudice analysis is appropriate, we find the situation different from [the
due process cases cited by the defendant], rendering them distinguishable.
[¶] Each of the substantive offenses of which Lynch was convicted was
charged in the information. The Penal Code gave notice of the applicable
sentencing range for each offense. The statutory structure, case law, and
California Rules of Court set out the contours of the hearing process. The
probation report and the People’s statement in aggravation advised Lynch of
all the aggravating circumstances that the court could rely upon to impose
the upper sentence. All the aggravating circumstances actually relied on by
the court have long been set out in the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421.) Parties regularly discuss their presence or absence during plea
negotiations and consider them in preparation for a sentencing hearing. In
short, Lynch had notice of potentially aggravating circumstances, had the
opportunity to contest them at the sentencing hearing, and actually did
contest three of the factors. Moreover, because the previous sentencing
structure did not require that aggravating circumstances be set out in the
charging document, the People’s failure to plead and prove them cannot be
‘deemed a discretionary charging decision.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 752–753.)

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17 Cal.5th at pp. 1085–1086 [disapproving Pantaleon to the extent it is
inconsistent with the high court’s holding in Lynch that “a defendant is
entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a
prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a
sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm” (fn. omitted)];
Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 92–97 [recognizing distinction
between enhancements and aggravating factors, and holding aggravating
circumstances need not be supported by evidence at the preliminary hearing];
Lovelace v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1081,1105 [holding
“residual clause” (rule 4.421(c)) exceeds legislative delegation of authority to
the Judicial Council under section 1170.3 and thus violates the separation of
powers clause of the California Constitution].)9 In re Vaquera (2024)
15 Cal.5th 706, 725, which defendant also cites, does not take issue with any
of these cases. Rather, the court in that case addressed the specifics of the
One Strike law, holding the prosecution must include allegations informing

9 Defendant points to the following language in Justice Goldman’s
concurring opinion in Lovelace: “[S]ubdivision (b)(2) of section 1170 provides
that, ‘upon request of the defendant, trial on the circumstances in
aggravation alleged in the indictment or information shall be bifurcated from
the trial of charges and enhancements.’ As noted above, the People contend
that this language establishes a pleading requirement for aggravating
factors, including enumerated ones. Although at least one court has found
the language ambiguous on that score (see [Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
at p.] 940 . . .), it seems to me that the People’s reading is correct; while the
statute does not expressly say that circumstances in aggravation must be
alleged, it would defeat the Legislature’s purpose in requiring bifurcation if
the prosecution could avoid it simply by declining to plead them.” (Lovelace,
supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118, conc. opn. by Goldman, J.)
However, this was not an issue addressed by the majority opinion.
And, unlike in Lovelace, the People make no such concession here.

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the defendant of its intent to invoke that sentencing scheme and the basis for
doing so. (Id. at pp. 723–725.)
In sum, in the absence of any case holding that constitutional due
process requires that factors in aggravation be pleaded, we follow established
precedent to the contrary.
Constitutional Right to Jury Trial on Aggravating Factors
Defendant’s principal claim on appeal was that the aggravated term
imposed by the court was unlawful because he did not, himself and in open
court, waive his constitutional right to a jury trial on the facts underlying the
aggravated factors, as required by Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.
270 (Cunningham) and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296
(Blakely).10 (See generally Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th 799, 816; Couzens et
al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 10:1 et seq.)
Federal constitutional precedent establishes that “ ‘[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Apprendi [v. New Jersey (2000)] 530 U.S. [466,]
490 . . . [(Apprendi)].)” (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 814.) The “relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum [the judge] may impose without
any additional findings.” (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 303–304.)
There are two exceptions to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial on aggravating facts—facts admitted by the defendant and the fact

10 At oral argument, counsel reiterated that defendant was advancing
only a constitutional claim under the Sixth Amendment and was not
challenging his aggravated sentence under section 1170, as amended by
Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.).

15
of a prior conviction. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 836–837
(Sandoval),11 citing Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 301, 303; Apprendi, supra,
530 U.S. at p. 490; see Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086 [“a defendant is
entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a
prior conviction and its elements”].) Otherwise, the defendant must
personally waive his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in order for the trial
court to find aggravating circumstances that increase the defendant’s
sentence beyond the statutory maximum. (Wiley, at p. 1086; Black II, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 816; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47–48 (French).)
In our now-vacated opinion, we firstly held, that under well-established
precedent, including controlling authority by our Supreme Court, defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to a jury trial,
including as to aggravating factors, and his aggravated sentence is
constitutionally permissible for that reason, alone. We secondly held, as an
additional ground for affirmance, that even if defendant did not sufficiently
waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one
aggravating factor—recidivism pursuant to rule 4.421(b)(2)—on a basis
consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore, under Black II, his
aggravated sentence was not constitutionally infirm.
Although, our Supreme Court in Lynch rejected our second holding
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 761), our first ground for upholding the
aggravated sentence—that defendant did waive his Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial—remains unimpeached by Lynch.12

11 Superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at page 757.
12 In fact, the high court observed in Lynch that the defendant had
neither been asked “to expressly waive jury trial on aggravating

16
Defendant nevertheless asks us to reconsider our threshold
determination that he waived his constitutional right to jury trial on the
aggravating circumstances. We decline to do so. Rather, as we have stated,
we will reconsider the matter as ordered by the Supreme Court—that is in
light of Lynch. (See discussion, ante, at p. 12.) We therefore adopt and set
forth again here our prior discussion of defendant’s waiver of his
constitutional right to jury trial.
As we have recited, in his change of plea form, defendant expressly
waived his right to jury trial not only as to each charge but also to any
“special allegation and/or sentence enhancement I admit to be true.” And in
open court, he expressly confirmed that the terms of the disposition included
that the court would consider all aggravating factors set forth in rule 4.421,
and after that confirmation, he went on to expressly confirm he was giving up
various rights, including, specifically, his right to jury trial.
As our high court has explained, there is a distinction between what is
constitutionally required for a valid jury waiver and what may be statutorily
required under state law. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 171
(Sivongxxay). In Sivongxxay, the defendant claimed his jury trial waiver did
not encompass a waiver of his right to jury trial on a special circumstance
allegation. (Ibid.) The court rejected his claim, stating “[d]efendant demands
more than the federal and state Constitutions require for a valid waiver of
the jury trial right. As discussed, a knowing and intelligent jury waiver
requires an appreciation of the nature of the jury trial right and the

circumstances” nor to “stipulate to facts underlying any of the aggravating
circumstances listed by the trial court in support of its upper term sentence,”
and thus the court had “no occasion . . . to address the conditions applicable
to waiver and stipulation.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 769.)

17
consequences of forgoing this right. [Citation.] There is no additional
constitutional requirement that a defendant be specifically advised of the
specific charges, enhancements, allegations, or other issues to which a
general jury waiver will apply. On the contrary, with a comprehensive jury
waiver such as the one entered below, absent unusual circumstances not
present here ‘ “[i]t is settled that where a defendant waives a jury trial he is
deemed to have consented to a trial of all of the issues in the case before the
court sitting without a jury.” ’ (People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84, 94 . . . ,
quoting People v. Russell (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 529, 532. . . .)” (Id. at
pp. 171–172, italic omitted.)
The majority reiterated the point in responding to the dissent’s
conclusion to the contrary, stating “The dissenting justices apparently read
the trial judge’s advisements differently, perceiving the failure to expressly
refer to the special circumstance allegation as somehow implicitly excluding
that allegation from a counseled and otherwise comprehensive jury waiver.
(See conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 203–206; conc. & dis. opn. of
Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 218–219.) We respectfully disagree with this
interpretation of the colloquy, for the reasons we have previously given. The
dissenting justices’ position boils down to the proposition that the judge was
constitutionally bound to utter the phrase ‘special circumstance’ at some
point in the waiver colloquy with defendant, even if the judge never went on
to explain what this phrase meant. But our waiver jurisprudence rejects the
notion that a knowing and intelligent waiver hinges on the recitation of a
‘ “talismanic phrase.” ’ [Citations.] The fact of the matter is that the
dissenting justices, like defendant, would require a degree of elaboration and
specificity in a jury waiver colloquy that has never been demanded for a jury
waiver to be considered knowing and intelligent under constitutional

18
standards.”13 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 175–176, fn. & italics
omitted.)

13 We note that in French, the high court concluded the defendant had
not forfeited his constitutional claim that he was entitled to a jury trial of
aggravating facts, stating “At the time that defendant entered his plea of no
contest, he expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the substantive
offenses, but this waiver did not encompass his right to a jury trial on any
aggravating circumstances. The absence of such an explicit waiver is not
surprising. When defendant entered his plea, Blakely had not yet been
decided, and prior to that decision ‘it was widely assumed that for the
purposes of the rule established in Apprendi, the maximum term authorized
by the jury’s verdict was the upper term.’ [Citation.] . . . Defendant’s waiver
of jury trial on the offenses in connection with his no contest plea cannot
reasonably be interpreted to extend to proof of aggravating circumstances
when, at the time of the plea, no right to a jury trial on such circumstances
had been recognized. Defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right
by failing to request a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances, and his
claim must be addressed on the merits.” (French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 48,
fn. omitted.)
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Sivongxxay make clear
this statement in French applies where no jury trial right has yet been
recognized. The majority’s discussion is set forth above. In his dissent,
Justice Cuéllar stated, “The gist of defendant’s claim is that the record fails
to show he was aware of his right to a jury trial on this phase of the trial or
that he waived it. State v. Williams (2005) 197 Ore.App. 21, presents an
analogous situation. Williams similarly was unaware that he had the right
to a jury finding of the facts that could trigger an enhanced sentence; his trial
had predated Blakely[,supra,] 542 U.S. 296, which held that a criminal
defendant has a federal constitutional right to have a jury find the facts that
could subject him to a sentence greater than the statutory maximum. The
Williams court reasoned that no waiver could be implied in those
circumstances unless the record showed that the defendant was aware both
of ‘ “the right to have a jury determine the aggravating factors” ’ and that
‘ “he was waiving that right.” ’ (Williams, at p. 1152; accord, People v.
French[, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p.] 48 . . . [because the defendant entered his
plea pre-Blakely, his jury waiver on the substantive offense ‘did not
encompass his right to a jury trial on any aggravating circumstances’]; State
v. Schofield (2005) 2005 ME 82 . . . .) Unlike the majority, I see no
meaningful distinction in the fact that Williams was unaware of his jury trial

19
The court reached a different conclusion with respect to the defendant’s
statutory right to jury trial on a special circumstance allegation as elucidated
by the court in its prior decision in People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658
(Memro), overruled on another ground as stated in People v. Gaines (2009)
46 Cal.4th 172, 181, footnote 2.14 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 176–
178.) In Sivongxxay, “[t]here was no specific reference in the waiver colloquy
to the need to adjudicate the special circumstance allegation; the term
‘special circumstance’ was never mentioned at all. Although such precision
[was] not required for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, [the high
court believed] that Memro’s requirement of a ‘separate waiver,’ ” even as
that rule was clarified in subsequent cases, “demand[ed] at least that much
specificity.” (Id. at pp. 177–178.) Thus, although the court recognized the
line it was drawing was “a narrow one,” it held the defendant’s “purported
waiver as to the special circumstance determination was deficient, as a
matter of state law.” (Id. at p. 178.)
Given the clarity of the record here that defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to jury trial generally and did so fully advised
and personally agreeing in open court that the negotiated disposition

right because of an intervening change in the law, while defendant was
unaware of his jury trial right because it was never mentioned anywhere in
the colloquy. (Cf. maj. opn., ante, at pp. 172–173, fn. 7.)” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 222–223 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
Here, in contrast, at the time defendant pleaded no contest, the
constitutional right to jury trial on facts in aggravation was well established.
14 “Memro construed the [then-applicable] statutes (as enacted by the
Legislature in 1977, see Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §§ 7, 12, pp. 1257, 1260), read
together, as requiring a ‘separate, personal waiver’ of the right to a jury for a
special circumstance allegation, above and beyond the standard guilt phase
and penalty phase waiver.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 176.)

20
included that the court would consider all aggravating circumstances, we
conclude defendant’s jury waiver was constitutionally sufficient. And on that
basis, we uphold the aggravated sentence imposed by the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is AFFIRMED.

21
_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

A165406, People v. Hall

22

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