CourtListener 10740389•In re D.G. CA2/6
Texto completo
Filed 11/21/25 In re D.G. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re D.G. et al., Persons Coming 2d Juv. Nos. B344613, B344617
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. Nos. 23JD-00221,
24JD-00091)
(San Luis Obispo County)
SAN LUIS OBISPO DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
R.D. (Mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court declaring
that her minor children, D.G. and K.S., are adoptable, and
terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388,
366.26, subd. (c)(1).)1 Among other things, we conclude that the
court did not err by failing to state that no exceptions to adoption
applied. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother has four children, including D.G. and K.S., who are
dependents of the juvenile court. On August 18, 2022, law
enforcement and San Luis Obispo County Department of Social
Services (DSS) responded to the home where Mother, D.G., D.G.’s
father G.G. (Father), and two older children (L.L. and L.L.)
resided. Law enforcement found images of child pornography on
Father’s cell phone and arrested Father. Mother agreed to
participate in drug screening and reside with the children’s
maternal grandmother. Mother’s drug test results were positive
for amphetamine and benzodiazepine.
On May 2, 2023, Father was convicted of possession of child
pornography and declared a lifetime registered sex offender.
Despite probation terms prohibiting Father from being alone
with D.G., his probation officer found him alone in a motel room
with D.G. The probation officer also found a methamphetamine
pipe and a bag of marijuana in the room. Father’s cell phone
contained child pornography, and he was arrested again. When
Mother arrived at the motel room, she agreed to participate in
drug testing. Laboratory results later revealed that Mother had
positive test results for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
D.G. was placed in protective custody. On August 24, 2023,
DSS filed a dependency petition regarding D.G. pursuant to
section 300, subdivision (b) (child at substantial risk of harm due
to parents’ conduct). The juvenile court later held a combined
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, sustained the allegations of
the dependency petition, ordered Mother to participate in family
reunification services, and ordered D.G. to remain in the custody
and care of DSS. The court bypassed reunification services to
Father due to his conviction for possession of child pornography
and resulting sex offender registration.
The juvenile court held an interim review hearing on
February 1, 2024. Mother was then pregnant with K.S. During
the prior three months, Mother had positive opiate and
marijuana tests, failed to participate in some drug tests, and did
not participate in mental health assessment.
On May 29, 2024, the juvenile court held a six-month
review hearing. The DSS status review report indicated that
Mother had positive drug test results on 10 occasions, and she did
not participate in mental health assessment and treatment.
Based upon the recommendation of DSS, the court terminated
family reunification services to Mother and set a permanent plan
hearing. Mother challenged this decision by extraordinary writ.
We denied her writ petition. (R.D. v. Superior Court of San Luis
Obispo County (Sept. 17, 2024, B338134) [nonpub. opn.].)
In May 2024, K.S. was born and detained at birth by DSS
because the infant tested positive for fentanyl. DSS filed a
dependency petition regarding K.S. pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b), (g), and (j). DSS also recommended that Mother
and Father not receive family reunification services. (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(10), (16).) The juvenile court sustained the allegations
of the dependency petition, bypassed reunification services to
Mother and Father, and set a permanency plan hearing.
3
Mother challenged the juvenile court’s orders concerning
K.S. by extraordinary writ. We denied the writ petition. (R.D. v.
Superior Court (Nov. 21, 2024, B339559) [nonpub. opn.].)
DSS placed Mother’s two sons, L.L. and L.L., with their
paternal grandmother who was unable to also care for D.G. and
K.S. DSS placed K.S. in a foster home prepared to care for
infants exposed to illegal drugs. D.G. was placed in a foster
home.
In July 2024, DSS began the process of permanently
placing D.G. and K.S. together with maternal relatives in Ohio.
The juvenile court approved this placement over Mother’s
objection, and on November 2, 2024, D.G. and K.S. were placed in
Ohio. The maternal relatives intended to adopt D.G. and K.S.
and were receptive to continued contact with Mother. DSS
planned for monthly FaceTime visits between the four children
and in-person visits every three months.
On November 27, 2024, Mother filed a section 388 petition
requesting that the juvenile court order reunification services for
six months. Specifically, Mother requested a change in previous
court orders due to her continued sobriety, mental health
assessment, planned mental health therapy, and employment.
Mother asserted that she could now provide a safe and loving
home for K.S. and D.G.
DSS contested Mother’s section 388 petition due to its
concerns that her efforts at sobriety and treatment services were
nascent. DSS stated that it was in K.S.’s best interests to achieve
permanency through adoption and noted that the infant had lived
her entire life in foster care; D.G. also had lived a significant part
of her young life in foster care.
4
Combined Sections 388 and 366.26 Hearing
DSS filed a section 366.26 report recommending that
Mother’s parental rights be terminated and D.G. and K.S. found
adoptable. On February 5 and March 5, 2025, the juvenile court
held a combined sections 388 and 366.26 hearing.2 At the
hearing, Mother and two DSS social workers testified, among
others.
DSS social worker Adrian Candido testified that he was the
case worker for L.L. and L.L. He stated that Mother participated
in housing support and completed a residential treatment
program. She sometimes missed drug tests or had positive test
results from November 1, 2024, through January 27, 2025,
however, after completing the program.
Candido stated that D.G. had a strong bond with her
brothers, L.L. and L.L. The children visited monthly and
maintained contact outside of the in-person visits.
DSS social worker Stacia Burton also testified. She stated
that Mother consistently attended all supervised visits with her
children who enjoyed the visits but transitioned easily when the
visits terminated. Mother had a bond with D.G. but newborn
K.S. had not yet developed a bond with Mother.
Mother testified regarding her sobriety, her commitment to
remaining sober, and her hoped-for housing. She explained a
positive drug test as caused by touching an item in a sober-living
home. Mother admitted to using hydrocodone and marijuana,
however. She counted June 3, 2024, as her sobriety date from
methamphetamine. Mother also described her visits with D.G.
and K.S. as joyful and loving and stated that she and the children
2
Father had been released from prison and was placed on
probation. He attended the section 366.26 hearing.
5
had a strong bond. By the second day of the hearing, Mother had
secured housing and received her first therapy appointment.
Following the receipt of evidence, the juvenile court heard
extensive argument regarding the legal preference for adoption,
the exceptions to that preference, and the concepts discussed in
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614. The court then took a
recess to review its notes and deliberate. Following deliberation,
the court stated its ruling, noting that Mother’s credibility
suffered when testifying regarding her sobriety. The court
referenced the minors’ best interests and adopted DSS’s and the
minors’ attorney recommendation that D.G. and K.S. were likely
to be adopted. The court then terminated parental rights. It left
unmarked the boxes in the written findings and orders that
indicated that exceptions to adoption applied.
Mother appeals and challenges the juvenile court’s
termination order. Father is not a party to this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by not
engaging in the requisite analysis whether the beneficial
parental relationship or sibling relationship exceptions to
adoption applied. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.)
Mother also asserts that the court failed to make findings that
the minors were adoptable by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) requires the juvenile
court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted, unless the
court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination
would be detrimental to the child due to an enumerated statutory
exception. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, 629.) The
beneficial parental relationship exception of section 366.26,
6
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) requires a showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the parent has regularly visited the child, that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and that
terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child.
“[T]he exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a
parent’s custody but where severing the child’s relationship with
the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new
adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., at
p. 630.)
Application of the beneficial parental relationship exception
rests upon factual determinations and is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.) The
“ultimate decision” that termination would be harmful, however,
is discretionary and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
The parent bears the burden of establishing the three elements of
the exception: 1) regular visitation and contact as permitted; 2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child;
and 3) termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the
child. (Id. at pp. 631, 636.) Ultimately, the juvenile court must
decide “whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship
with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in
a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632.) What the court must
determine “is how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship – in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
(Id. at p. 633.) There is no requirement that the juvenile court
make specific findings regarding each element of the exception.
(In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)
A second exception to the statutory preference for adoption
exists where adoption and termination of parental rights would
7
substantially interfere with an important sibling relationship.
This exception considers the nature and extent of the sibling
relationship, including whether the child was raised with a
sibling in the same home, the existence of close and strong bonds
with the sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s
best interests. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) In considering the
exception, the juvenile court must balance the beneficial interest
of the child in maintaining the sibling relationship against the
security and belonging adoption and a new home would provide.
(In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 783.)
Here the juvenile court terminated parental rights and
ordered adoption as the permanent plan. This decision
necessarily means that the court did not find any exceptions to
adoption applicable. The parental benefit and sibling
relationship exceptions were argued by counsel. The court then
recessed before returning and announcing its decision. There is
no requirement that the juvenile court in deciding that the
exceptions are inapplicable must recite specific findings relative
to its conclusions. (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)
We presume that the court considered all the pertinent matters
presented to it. (Ibid.) “Thus, although a statement by the trial
court of its findings (or reasons) for its decision is helpful in
conducting appellate review, it was not a legal requirement in
this instance.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, Mother did not meet her evidentiary burden to
establish that her relationship with D.G. and K.S. was
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the legal preference for
adoption. Although Mother had positive, appropriate, and loving
visits with the children, K.S. was an infant who had never lived
with Mother. D.G. had also lived in foster care for one-third of
8
her life. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, 632.) K.S. was
receiving specialized care to deal with in utero drug exposure.
She also easily separated from Mother following visits. To
overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of
parental rights, the parent must show that severing the natural
parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment such that the child would be
greatly harmed. (In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.) The
emotional bond here is not the substantial, positive, emotional
attachment establishing the exception to adoption.
Moreover, substantial evidence exists that the sibling
exception to adoption was inapplicable. Newborn K.S. never
lived with L.L. and L.L. D.G. lived a significant part of her young
life in a foster home. The foster parents and DSS facilitated in-
person visits and video contact with L.L. and L.L. to continue the
siblings’ relationship.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would
not be detrimental to K.S. and D.G. The “exceptional
circumstances” that would allow the juvenile court to circumvent
adoption were not present here. (In re Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th 614, 631.)
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J. CODY, J.
9
Matthew G. Guerrero, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, Vincent M. Uberti,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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