CourtListener 10739978•Richardson v. Geater CA4/3
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Filed 11/20/25 Richardson v. Geater CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ROBERT RICHARDSON,
Cross-complainant and G064919
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
v. 01247955)
JASON GEATER, OPINION
Cross-complainant and
Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Scott Steiner, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Robert Knudsen, Attorney at Law and Robert E. Knudsen for
Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Law Offices of J. Luke Hendrix and J. Luke Hendrix for Cross-
complainant and Respondent.
* * *
Jason Geater sued Robert Richardson for conversion of a sports
car Geater had placed with a dealer on consignment. The trial court found
Richardson’s purchase of the sports car from the dealer was not completed
under the requirements of the Vehicle Code, and was not done in good faith
or in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the court found Richardson
had converted the sports car, ordered that title and possession be given to
Geater, and awarded damages to Geater.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Richardson was liable for conversion. However, the trial court
erred by awarding Geater both possession of the sports car and its value as
damages. It appears the parties failed to advise the trial court that such a
double recovery was not permitted under the relevant law. Therefore, we
reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court to enter a new
judgment consistent with the holding of this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves title to and possession of a 2020 McLaren 720S
car (the Vehicle). Car and Driver magazine described the McLaren 720S as a
“supercar” with “the performance of a Formula 1 race car and the body of a
fighter jet.” (Stafford, 2020 McLaren 720S, Car and Driver
<https://www.caranddriver.com/mclaren/720s-2020> [as of Nov. 10, 2025],
archived at <https://perma.cc/7NTD-AH7F>.) Geater purchased the Vehicle
in 2019 with financing from Ally Financial (Ally); Geater was the registered
owner and Ally held a lien against the Vehicle. Geater placed the Vehicle for
a consignment sale with Lotus of Upland (Lotus), a car dealership. The terms
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of the consignment sale agreement gave physical possession of the Vehicle to
Lotus, set $335,000 as the lowest price Geater would accept, and required
Lotus to notify Geater of all offers.
In December 2020, Richardson took possession of the Vehicle
from Lotus, without notice to or consent from Geater. Richardson contends he
purchased the Vehicle from Lotus for $375,785; rather than cash, Richardson
“paid” Lotus by trading in two other cars and an airplane. Title was never
transferred to Richardson and he never registered the Vehicle in his name.
Richardson paid no sales tax and did not file paperwork to avoid payment of
taxes for an out-of-state purchase. Neither Geater nor Ally received any
money from the alleged sale of the Vehicle. The parties stipulated that the
value of the Vehicle at the time Richardson took possession was $350,000.
In September 2021, a task force comprised of the California
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and local law enforcement took
possession of the Vehicle from Richardson and stowed it at a tow yard
pending resolution of the parties’ claims. Geater eventually paid off the loan
from Ally.
Ally initiated the instant litigation. Richardson filed a cross-
complaint against Geater to quiet title to the Vehicle. Geater then filed a
cross-complaint against Richardson to quiet title to the Vehicle and for
conversion. Other causes of action and other parties were dismissed before
trial. Ally and the DMV remained nominal parties but did not participate in
the trial. Ally agreed to deliver title to and the DMV agreed to deliver
possession of the Vehicle as directed by the court.
After a bench trial, the trial court found Geater was the owner of
the Vehicle and was entitled to title to and possession of the Vehicle. The
court also awarded Geater $485,000 in damages for conversion, consisting of
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$350,000 for the value of the Vehicle, $85,000 in interest, $35,000 for the cost
of the private investigator hired by Geater to locate the Vehicle, and $15,000
for insurance. The trial court issued a statement of decision and issued
judgment in Geater’s favor and against Richardson.
Richardson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the
ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an
appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the
entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If such substantial
evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other
evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a
contrary conclusion.’” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143.) It is the province of the trier of fact to make
credibility determinations. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972)
6 Cal.3d 920, 925–926.)
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF GEATER ON
THE CONVERSION CAUSE OF ACTION.
“‘“‘Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the
property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s
ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s
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conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and
(3) damages.’”’” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.) “‘“Conversion is
a strict liability tort. The foundation of the action rests neither in the
knowledge nor the intent of the defendant. Instead, the tort consists in the
breach of an absolute duty; the act of conversion itself is tortious. Therefore,
questions of the defendant’s good faith, lack of knowledge, and motive are
ordinarily immaterial. [Citations.]” [Citation.] The basis of a conversion
action “‘rests upon the unwarranted interference by defendant with the
dominion over the property of the plaintiff from which injury to the latter
results. Therefore, neither good nor bad faith, neither care nor negligence,
neither knowledge nor ignorance, are the gist of the action.’ [Citations.]”
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 202, 208–209.)
Richardson contends the trial court erred in finding a conversion
because Geater voluntarily gave possession of the Vehicle to Lotus; Lotus sold
the Vehicle to Richardson; and, under the terms of the consignment
agreement between Geater and Lotus, Lotus was not required to pay Geater
for 20 days. Richardson claims his possession of the Vehicle was not tortious
because Lotus was authorized by Geater to sell the Vehicle. This ignores the
trial court’s findings that (1) there was no sale to Richardson pursuant to the
Vehicle Code, and (2) Richardson was not a good faith buyer who purchased
the Vehicle in the ordinary course of business.
The trial court concluded that the Vehicle Code, rather than the
Commercial Code, applies to the sale of vehicles. We agree. “Vehicles,
although goods, are excluded from the scope of division 2 of the California
Uniform Commercial Code because their sales are regulated by the Vehicle
Code. [Commercial Code s]ection 2102 provides that division 2 ‘does
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not . . . impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or
other specified classes of buyers.’ The California Code comment explains,
‘This section would also exclude certain special statutes pertaining to sales to
unique groups of buyers; for example, the provisions of the Vehicle Code
relating to sale of and recording of sale of motor vehicles.’ [Citation.] The
transfer of title to a vehicle registered in California is accomplished under
Vehicle Code section 5600: ‘No transfer of the title or any interest in or to a
vehicle registered under this code shall pass, and any attempted transfer
shall not be effective, until the parties thereto have fulfilled either of the
following requirements: [¶] (1) The transferor has made proper endorsement
and delivery of the certificate of ownership to the transferee . . . and the
transferee has delivered to the department . . . the certificate . . . ’; or ‘(2) The
transferor has delivered to the department . . . the appropriate documents for
the registration or transfer of registration of the vehicle . . . .’ [Citation.]”
(Quartz of Southern California, Inc. v. Mullen Bros., Inc. (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 901, 907–908.) Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that title was not transferred under the requirements of the
Vehicle Code. Geater never endorsed or delivered a certificate of title to
Richardson; neither Geater nor Richardson delivered documents to transfer
the Vehicle to the DMV or to the relevant Arizona department; no taxes were
paid for the sale of the Vehicle in Arizona or California.
The trial court also found that, even if the Commercial Code
applied, Richardson was not a good faith buyer and the alleged sale of the
Vehicle was not in the ordinary course of business. The Commercial Code
defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1201,
subd. (b)(20)), and defines a “buyer in ordinary course of business” as “a
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person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates
the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a
person . . . in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods
in the ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or
customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or
with the seller’s own usual or customary practices. . . . A buyer in ordinary
course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on
secured or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title
under a preexisting contract for sale” (id., § 1201, subd. (b)(9)).
Again, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
Richardson acquired the Vehicle from Lotus in exchange for trade-ins of a
1990 Ferrari Testarossa, a 2018 McLaren, and an airplane. At that time,
however, Richardson did not have title to the 2018 McLaren. Richardson
never tendered to Lotus the certificate of title to the Ferrari. Lotus credited
Richardson with $55,000 toward the purchase of the Vehicle based on the
value of the airplane. However, Richardson never transferred title or
possession of the airplane to Lotus; Lotus later said it did not want the
airplane; and Richardson could not prove he ever paid Lotus to make up for
the value of the airplane on the deal for the Vehicle. Richardson testified
Lotus promised he would receive title to the Vehicle within two days after the
purchase, but a certificate of title was never provided.
Geater’s expert witness testified it was outside the ordinary
course of business: (1) for a car dealership to allow a customer to retain
possession of title to a vehicle which they are trading in toward the purchase
of another vehicle; (2) for a car dealership to accept an airplane in trade for
an automobile; (3) for a car dealership to deliver a vehicle to another state
without a bill of lading, which was not in the documents provided to the
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expert; and (4) for a car purchaser to wait nine months to receive title to the
vehicle, or to fail to transfer title, register the vehicle, or otherwise submit
appropriate transfer paperwork to the DMV. All of the foregoing supports the
trial court’s finding Richardson was not a good faith buyer.
Richardson argues he is not liable for conversion because Geater
never demanded possession of the Vehicle from him. Richardson cites
Cerra v. Blackstone (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 604 for the proposition that his
original lawful possession of the Vehicle could not become a conversion until
Geater made a demand for possession and Richardson refused to turn over
possession without justification: “Unjustified refusal to turn over possession
on demand constitutes conversion even where possession by the withholder
was originally obtained lawfully [citations] and of course so does
unauthorized sale.” (Id. at p. 609.) This argument presupposes that the
original possession by Richardson was not a conversion. However, as
discussed ante, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
there was a conversion at the time Richardson took possession of the Vehicle,
so there was no need for Geater to make such a demand.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING GEATER TITLE TO AND POSSESSION OF
THE VEHICLE AS WELL AS THE VALUE OF THE VEHICLE.
The judgment in this case quieted title to the Vehicle in Geater,
and awarded damages to Geater in the amount of $485,000, including
$350,000 for the (stipulated) value of the Vehicle at the time Richardson
acquired possession. The trial court erred by awarding Geater both
possession of the Vehicle and the value of the Vehicle in damages.
There are two statutes that set out the available damages for a
conversion claim: “The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of
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personal property is presumed to be: [¶] First—The value of the property at
the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, an amount
sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural,
reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of and which
a proper degree of prudence on his part would not have averted; and [¶]
Second—A fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in
pursuit of the property.” (Civ. Code, § 3336.) “In an action to recover the
possession of personal property, judgment for the plaintiff may be for the
possession or the value thereof, in case a delivery cannot be had, and
damages for the detention. If the property has been delivered to the plaintiff,
and the defendant claim[s] a return thereof judgment for the defendant may
be for a return of the property or the value thereof, in case a return cannot be
had, and damages for taking and withholding the same.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 667.)
A party suing for conversion may recover possession of the
converted property or the value of the converted property, but not both.
(National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 410,
418–419 [party may recover property or value, but not both]; Krusi v. Bear,
Stearns & Co. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 664, 673 [double recovery barred;
conversion damages must be reduced if the plaintiff recovers the property];
Allstate Leasing Corp. v. Smith (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 128, 132 [remedies for
wrongful exercise of dominion of property “include specific recovery of the
property, or its present value, plus damages for the period of its detention”
(italics added)]; Ross v. Sweeters (1932) 119 Cal.App. 716, 721 [damages
under Civ. Code, § 3336 may be recovered “‘only where the property is not
returned or recovered’”]; Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club (1930)
109 Cal.App. 715, 722 [“Where, however, one recovers his property which had
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been unlawfully taken from him, he is considered as having received it in
mitigation of damages, and the measure of damage, in the absence of special
damage, is the expense of procuring its return with interest”].) It appears
that neither party brought this rule of law to the attention of the trial court.
Geater argues Richardson forfeited this issue by failing to raise it
in the trial court. “‘“As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court
cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere
to the theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried.”’” (Daneshmand v.
City of San Juan Capistrano (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 923, 936.) “The general
rule against new issues is subject to an exception that grants appellate courts
the discretion to address questions not raised in the trial court when the
theory presented for the first time on appeal involves only a legal question
determinable from facts that are (1) uncontroverted in the record and
(2) could not have been altered by the presentation of additional evidence.
[Citations.]” (Esparza v. KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228,
1237–1238.)
This case presents a question of election of remedies, which meets
the Esparza v. KS Industries, L.P. criteria for consideration on appeal. Geater
had every right to request both possession of the Vehicle and its value, but
could not obtain both. “‘Broadly speaking, election of remedies is the act of
choosing between two or more concurrent but inconsistent remedies based
upon the same state of facts. Ordinarily a plaintiff need not elect, and cannot
be compelled to elect, between inconsistent remedies during the course of
trial prior to judgment.’” (Baker v. Superior Court (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 140,
144.) The issue of a potential double recovery by Geater did not technically
arise until after the judgment was entered, and Richardson’s failure to
address it before that time did not cause a forfeiture.
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Geater also contends the determination whether the trial court
erred by granting a double recovery requires “the production of additional
evidence regarding the current value of the [Vehicle].” We disagree. Whether
the trier of fact can award a double recovery is a legal issue, not a factual one.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with instructions to enter a new judgment awarding Respondent Geater
title to and possession of the Vehicle, as well as damages consisting of
interest, money expended in pursuit of the Vehicle, and any other damages
permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 667 and/or Civil Code
section 3336, other than the value of the Vehicle at the time of the
conversion. Because each party prevailed in part on appeal, in the interests of
justice, neither side shall recover costs on appeal.
BANCROFT, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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