People v. McClelland CA2/1

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Filed 11/18/25 P. v. McClelland CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B341128

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA032428)
v.

ROBERT JOHN
McCLELLAND,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maria A. Davalos, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan M. Kraus and Nancy Lii
Ladner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In July 1995, appellant Robert John McClelland pled guilty
to two counts of committing a lewd act with a child under 14.
The court imposed and suspended a six-year sentence and placed
McClelland on three years’ probation. On January 21, 1998,
McClelland’s probation officer filed a report with the court,
recommending revocation of probation due to McClelland’s failure
to report, and the court summarily revoked probation at a
hearing on the same date. In 2001, McClelland was convicted in
Arizona for molesting a child in September 1998 and sentenced to
24 years in prison. He was released in May 2024.
In October 2024, the court found McClelland violated
probation by not appearing at the January 1998 hearing, and by
molesting a child in September 1998. The court revoked
McClelland’s probation and sentenced him to six years in prison.
Because we conclude no substantial evidence supports a
finding that McClelland willfully failed to appear at the January
1998 hearing and because the September 1998 offense occurred
after McClelland’s probation had ended, we reverse.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Court Revokes Probation
In May 1995, a felony complaint charged McClelland with
seven counts of committing a lewd act with a child under 14. The
complaint was later reduced to four counts. In July 1995,
pursuant to a plea bargain, McClelland pled guilty to two counts,

1 The parties also dispute whether the court correctly

calculated McClelland’s custody credits. We need not resolve this
dispute because we conclude McClelland’s sentence must be
vacated.

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and the court dismissed the remaining two. The court sentenced
him to six years in prison but suspended the sentence, opting
instead to place him on three years’ probation, under the
condition that he serve 365 days in county jail. The court also
ordered him to “stay away from children under 14 years of age”
and “obey all laws and orders of the court.”
A January 21, 1998 minute order indicates McClelland’s
“CASE [was] CALLED FOR POSSIBLE VIOL. OF
PROBATION.” The Probation Officer’s Report filed that same
day stated McClelland “last reported” in September 1997, that an
“appointment letter” was sent to McClelland in early December
1997 with no response, and that a “check” on December 24, 1997
revealed McClelland was “not in local custody.” McClelland did
not appear at the hearing, and the court revoked his probation
and issued a bench warrant.
In February 2001, an Arizona court sentenced McClelland
to 24 years for molesting a child in September 1998. He was
released in May 2024.

B. The Court Sentences McClelland to Prison
At a June 2024 hearing, the court recalled the bench
warrant.
In October 2024, the court held a probation violation
hearing. A fingerprint technician testified that the fingerprints
taken in May 1995 on a “tenprint” card labeled Robert John
McClelland were identical to fingerprints taken in June 2024 on
a tenprint card labeled Robert John McClelland.2 Those

2 The parties stipulated the booking number associated

with the June 2024 tenprint card was the booking number under
which McClelland was currently booked.

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fingerprints were also identical to a set of fingerprints on a card
provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections labeled
Robert McClelland. The Arizona Department of Corrections
provided a picture of the defendant whom its court had sentenced
as Robert McClelland, and the superior court concluded the
person in the picture was defendant and appellant McClelland.
After the presentation of evidence, the prosecutor argued
that the person who was convicted in the Arizona case and the
probationer before the court were the same person (McClelland),
that McClelland’s Arizona conviction “served as a violation of his
probation,” and requested the court impose the suspended six-
year sentence. McClelland’s counsel did not dispute the Arizona
conviction, and submitted to the court’s determination as to
“whether the People have met their burden” to prove a violation
“during the term of [McClelland’s] probation.” Counsel
additionally objected to sentencing “under due process and 8th
Amendment grounds,” because McClelland had already served 24
years in Arizona.
The court took judicial notice that the court had previously
issued a warrant for McClelland’s arrest in January 1998
“because he failed to appear,” and noted McClelland “would
simply be in violation for failing to appear . . . on January 21st,
1998.” The court also remarked that, had McClelland appeared
in court after the January 1998 bench warrant, the court would
have extended probation for six months after it ended in July
1998, because “that was the law back then,” which would mean
McClelland committed the offense leading to his Arizona
conviction while still on probation in California. The court then
found McClelland violated probation on two grounds: “for failing
to appear for his probation set-on and for the technical violation

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of having committed an offense when his probation would have
been extended for that period of time.” The court sentenced
McClelland to six years with 374 days of custody credit.
McClelland timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
McClelland argues the court erred in finding he violated
probation because “the basis for revoking appellant’s probation
. . . was based on conduct occurring after his probationary term
had ended” and there was no evidence presented that McClelland
“knew he had been ordered to appear in court on that day [in
January 1998] or why he had been ordered to appear.”

A. McClelland’s Arizona Crime Cannot Be the
Basis of a Probation Violation
When a court summarily revokes a defendant’s probation,
“[t]he revocation, summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the
running of the period of supervision.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd.
(a).) However, the “tolling provision preserves the trial court’s
authority to adjudicate, in a subsequent formal probation
violation hearing, whether the probationer violated probation
during, but not after, the court-imposed probationary period.”
(People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 502.) In other words,
because McClelland’s three-year probation term ended in July
1998, the court could adjudicate after July 1998 whether acts
McClelland committed between July 1995 and July 1998 violated
his probation, but could not adjudicate whether acts committed
after July 1998 violated his probation.
It is undisputed that the act of molestation McClelland was
convicted of in Arizona occurred in September 1998, after

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McClelland’s probation ended. Therefore, that act cannot be the
basis of finding McClelland violated probation.
The Attorney General does not dispute this. The Attorney
General offers no authority, and we are aware of none, that
permits a superior court to find a probation violation based on a
belief that the court would have extended the length of probation
had the probationer appeared before the court, when this did not
actually occur. Instead, the Attorney General argues “[e]ven if
the court improperly relied on the crime occurring outside of the
probationary period, such error was harmless because the court
also independently relied on a violation occurring within the
probationary period.” We address that contention next.

B. No Evidence Supports a Finding of a Willful
Violation for a Failure to Appear
“ ‘Revocation [of probation] rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Although that discretion is very broad, the court may
not act arbitrarily or capriciously; its determination must be
based upon the facts before it.’ ” (People v. Zaring (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 362, 378.) A court abuses its discretion in finding a
defendant violated a condition of probation unless “the evidence
supports the conclusion that the conduct . . . constituted a willful
violation of that condition.” (Id. at p. 379; see also People v.
Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [“ ‘[T]he facts supporting
revocation of probation may be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.’ (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 439 [272
Cal.Rptr. 613, 795 P.2d 783].) However, the evidence must
support a conclusion the probationer’s conduct constituted a
willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation”]; People
v. Sem (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1188 [“a willful violation is a
prerequisite to revoking probation”].)

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The only evidence adduced at the probation violation
hearing was that the person before the court was the same
person placed on probation in July 1995, and the same person
sentenced in Arizona for child molestation. This person was
McClelland. On its own motion, the court took judicial notice of a
minute order showing that McClelland did not appear at a
January 1998 probation violation hearing, but neither the minute
order nor anything else at the hearing demonstrated the
existence of any court order to appear. Even assuming the
existence of any such order, no evidence demonstrated
McClelland was aware of any order to appear. Finally, even
assuming McClelland’s awareness of any such order to appear, no
evidence demonstrated any willful failure to appear. Therefore,
McClelland’s failure to appear at the January 1998 hearing also
cannot serve as the basis for finding he violated probation.
Because neither basis articulated by the superior court for
finding McClelland violated probation can actually be a basis for
a probation violation under the facts of this case, we must reverse
the judgment and vacate his sentence.

DISPOSITION
We reverse the court’s finding that McClelland violated his
probation in case VA032428. The six-year sentence imposed on
McClelland in case VA032428 is vacated. On remand, the
superior court shall prepare a new abstract of judgment
evidencing the vacating of the six-year sentence and shall

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forward the new abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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