People v. Vaughn CA4/1

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Filed 11/18/25 P. v. Vaughn CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084678

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN401093)

DARYL VAUGHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Affirmed.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Daryl Vaughn appeals from a judgment after a jury found him guilty of
numerous sexual offenses against two victims, H.D. (counts 1–7) and A.R.
(counts 8–11).
With respect to H.D., the jury found Vaughn guilty of seven counts of
committing a lewd or lascivious act by force or fear on a child under the age of

14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1))1 (counts 1–7). With respect to counts 5, 6,
and 7, the jury also found true special allegations under the One Strike law

(§ 667.61)2 that Vaughn had been convicted of offenses against more than
one victim within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e).
With respect to A.R., the jury found Vaughn guilty of two additional
counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act by force or fear on a child under
the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) (counts 9, 11) and found true special
allegations that Vaughn had been convicted of offenses against more than
one victim within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e).
The jury also found Vaughn guilty of two counts of sexual intercourse with a
child ten years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)) (counts 8, 10).
With respect to each of the section 288, subdivision (b) counts (counts
1–7, 9, 11), the jury also found true the special allegation that Vaughn
engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the victim within the meaning of
section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8). The trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of 95 years to life plus 32 years.

1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2 The One Strike law “is an alternative sentencing scheme that applies
when the prosecution pleads and proves specific aggravating circumstances
in connection with certain sex offenses.” (In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th
706, 712.)
2
On appeal, Vaughn claims: (1) there is insufficient evidence of his use
of “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear” to support the jury’s verdicts on
count 2, 3, and 4 against H.D. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)); (2) the prosecutor
committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that Vaughn had failed to prove
why the victims would lie; (3) his sentence amounts to cruel and/or unusual
punishment under the state and federal constitutions; and (4) the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing a $300 restitution fine. With respect to
these final three claims, Vaughn argues, in the alternative, that his counsel
was ineffective in failing to raise an appropriate objection at trial. We affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The People’s evidence
1. Counts 1–7 (victim H.D.)
S.D. gave birth to H.D. in 2003 when S.D. was 16 years old. H.D. did
not live with S.D. when H.D. was a young child. When she was about nine
years old, H.D. began to live with S.D. and S.D.’s boyfriend, Vaughn, along
with Vaughn’s stepfather and H.D.’s three brothers.
According to H.D., at around this same time, Vaughn began to sexually
abuse her. H.D. stated that the abuse continued from the time when was
nine until she was 15.
As described in detail below, during the first incident, H.D. stated that
Vaughn took H.D. into the bathroom and touched H.D.’s vagina with his
hand and attempted to put his penis in her vagina. During another incident
when H.D. was nine, H.D. said that Vaughn placed his penis on her lips and
attempted to have her orally copulate him.
In 2015, after Vaughn attempted to sexually assault H.D. in a hotel
room, H.D. told S.D. that Vaughn had been touching her inappropriately.

3
According to H.D., S.D. became angry at her because H.D. had not disclosed
the abuse previously. S.D. angrily confronted Vaughn, and the family drove
to the police station. Although H.D. told the police that she had been having
sex with Vaughn, Vaughn was not arrested. Instead, according to H.D., the
family, including H.D. went back to the hotel and stayed there that same
night.
The family moved to a townhouse when H.D. was about 13. H.D.
testified that, during this period, Vaughn began to use his hand to touch her
vagina more often, doing so more than once a week. H.D. also said that
Vaughn put his penis into her vagina more than a total of five times.
H.D. recalled one such incident occurred while she was lying on a bed
between her mother and Vaughn. Her mother was asleep. H.D. was lying on
her stomach. Vaughn got on top of H.D. and put his penis inside her vagina.
Her mother remained asleep. H.D. did not try to wake her because she was
not sure if her mother would help her. H.D. said that she felt this way
because the first time she told her mother of the abuse, her mother “didn’t
listen,” and the abuse continued.
H.D. testified that on another occasion, her brother J.D. walked in on
Vaughn penetrating her. However, when H.D. tried to talk to J.D. about the
incident, J.D. claimed that he had not seen anything.
H.D. explained that she eventually ran away from home when
Vaughn’s behavior became erratic, leading her to become “terrified.”
2. Count 8–11 (victim A.R.)
A.R. is S.D.’s sister and H.D.’s aunt. A.R., however, is younger than
H.D. When A.R. was nine years old, and she lived out of town, she and her
family stayed with Vaughn and his family.

4
One day during their visit, A.R. was sitting on the top bunk of a bunk
bed watching a movie with J.D. Vaughn was on the bottom bunk. During
the movie, Vaughn asked A.R. to come to the bottom bunk. After she did so,
Vaughn asked her if she could keep a secret. Vaughn then pushed A.R.’s
shoulders down, laid her on the bed, pulled her pants and underwear down,
got on top of her, and placed his penis inside her vagina. J.D. remained on
the top bunk the entire time. A.R. did not think that J.D. saw what
happened.
A few days later, Vaughn grabbed A.R. and led her to a bathroom in his
residence and closed the door as they entered. Vaughn picked A.R. up and
put her on the bathroom counter. Vaughn then pulled their pants and
underwear down. Vaughn put his penis in A.R.’s vagina and again had
intercourse with her. A.R. recalled Vaughn putting his semen in a bowl after
he ejaculated.
B. The defense
J.D. testified that he had never seen Vaughn molesting H.D. and he
denied having “walk[ed] in” on any such molestation. J.D. also said that he
never recalled a time when he was on the top bunk of a bunk bed with A.R.
and Vaughn was on the bottom bunk, and that he never saw Vaughn abusing
or molesting A.R. Vaughn’s stepfather testified that he never saw Vaughn
abuse H.D. Vaughn denied having sexually abused either H.D. or A.R.
During his closing argument, defense counsel argued that “[l]ack of
evidence, lack of corroboration, and lies” were the reasons that Vaughn was
not guilty. Specifically, counsel argued that no one in the family witnessed
the abuse, there was no DNA or other physical evidence pointing to Vaughn’s
guilt, and the case depended on the testimony of “two people” who lacked
credibility and who had both lied. Counsel also emphasized that Vaughn had

5
“always maintained his innocence,” and had testified truthfully that he had
not committed any of the abuse.
DISCUSSION

A. There is sufficient evidence of Vaughn’s use of “duress” (§ 288,
subd. (b)(1)) to support the jury’s verdicts on counts 2, 3, and 4

Vaughn claims there is insufficient evidence of his use of “force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear” to support the jury’s verdicts on counts 2, 3,
and 4 involving victim H.D. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).) The People argue that there
is sufficient evidence in the record of Vaughn’s use of duress to support the

jury’s verdicts on these counts.3
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) “[T]he court must review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
“Section 288[, subdivision] (a) prohibits the commission of a lewd or
lascivious act on a child under age 14 done with the intent to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child. Section 288

3 The People also argue that there is sufficient evidence of Vaughn’s use
of force or fear in committing these offenses. For the reasons explained
below, we conclude that the jury’s verdicts on counts 2, 3, and 4 are supported
by sufficient evidence of Vaughn’s use of duress. Accordingly, we need not
consider the People’s additional arguments in support of the verdicts.
6
[subdivision] (b)(1) further prohibits the commission of such an act “by use of
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person. . . .” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th

229, 237, italics added (Soto).)4
“ ‘[D]uress,’ as used in section 288[, subdivision] (b)(1), means ‘ “a direct
or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient
to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act
which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to
which one otherwise would not have submitted.” ’ ” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th

at p. 246, italics omitted.)5
Duress is a form of “psychological coercion.” (People v. Cochran (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 8, 15 (Cochran).) For example, “[a] threat to a child of
adverse consequences, such as suggesting the child will be breaking up the
family or marriage if she reports or fails to acquiesce in the molestation, may

4 Section 288 provides in relevant part:
“(a) . . . [A] person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or
lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a
child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the
child, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for three, six, or eight years.
“(b)(1) A person who commits an act described in subdivision (a) by use
of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person, is guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 10 years.”
5 The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1111 in relevant
part as follows: “Duress means the use of a direct or implied threat of force,
violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a reasonable
person to do or submit to something that he or she would not otherwise do or
submit to. [¶] When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress,
consider all the circumstances, including the age of the child and her
relationship to the defendant.”
7
constitute a threat of retribution and may be sufficient to establish duress,
particularly if the child is young and the defendant is her parent.” (Ibid.)
“In determining whether a sexual offense was accomplished by duress,
the trier of fact must consider the totality of the circumstances.” (People v.
Martinez (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 178, 189 (Martinez).) “The totality of the
circumstances includes the victim’s age, her relationship to the perpetrator,
threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim
attempts to resist, warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation
would result in jeopardizing the family, and the relative physical
vulnerability of the child.” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063,
1072 (Thomas).)
With respect to a victim’s “relationship to the perpetrator” (Thomas,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1072), evidence that the defendant is an “authority
figure” to the victim is among the circumstances a jury may consider in
determining whether duress is present. (People v. Senior (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 765, 775 (Senior).) For example, in People v. Veale (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 40 (Veale), the court noted that “ ‘[A]s a factual matter, when the
victim is as young as this victim and is molested by her father in the family
home, in all but the rarest cases duress will be present.’ ” (Id. at p. 49,
quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 16, fn. 6.) The Veale court
added, “Although in the instant case, defendant was [the victim’s] stepfather,
rather than her father, he held a similar position of authority in [the victim’s]
home, which would support a finding of duress, along with victim’s testimony
she feared defendant.” (Veale, at p. 49.)
According to the operative third amended information, the challenged
counts – counts 2, 3, and 4 – pertained to three instances in which Vaughn
touched H.D.’s vagina with his hand. The information further alleged that

8
counts 2, 3, and 4 pertained to the “first time,” “second time,” and “last time”
respectively that Vaughn committed such conduct. (Capitalization omitted.)
During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, “The next
three counts, so Counts 2, 3, and 4, the defendant put his hand on [H.D.’s]
vagina.” And, the prosecutor noted that although H.D. had testified that
“this happened a lot,” consistent with the operative third amended
information, the prosecutor explained Vaughn’s use of his hand to touch
H.D.’s vagina was “charged three times,” and that counts 2, 3, and 4
pertained to the “first time, second time, last time.”
With respect to count 2, “the first time” that Vaughn touched H.D.’s
vagina with her hand, H.D. testified that she was nine years old. Vaughn
was in his late 20s. The jury could reasonably find that H.D.’s young age, as
well as the difference between her age and Vaughn’s and the presumed
physical size differential between her and Vaughn at the time of the offense
all supported a finding of the use of duress. (See Veale, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 49; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 51 [“The
disparity in physical size between an eight-year-old and an adult also
contributes to a youngster’s sense of his relative physical vulnerability”].) In
addition, S.D. testified that H.D. referred to Vaughn as “dad,” which the jury
could reasonably find supported the inference that H.D. viewed Vaughn as a
parental and authority figure. The finding that H.D. viewed Vaughn as a
father figure, when combined with H.D.’s young age, further supports a
finding of the use of duress. (Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.)
The manner by which H.D. testified that Vaughn committed count 2
additionally supports a finding of the use of duress. H.D. testified that
Vaughn took her into a darkened bathroom and closed the door. While she
was sitting on a counter, Vaughn pulled down H.D.’s pants and underpants.

9
The jury could reasonably find that such acts amounted to evidence that
Vaughn “attempt[ed] to isolate the victim and increase or maintain her
vulnerability.” (Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.)
H.D. further testified that, during the touching, Vaughn asked her if
her cousin “touch[ed] [her] like this.” The jury could reasonably find that this
comment amounted to a form of “psychological coercion” (Cochran, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 15), through which Vaughn attempted to increase H.D.’s
willingness to comply with his own inappropriate touching of her.
In addition, H.D. testified that, during the incident, she started to cry,
and she told Vaughn that she was afraid of the dark. And, while Vaughn
turned on the light, he did not stop molesting H.D., despite her obvious
distress. Worse yet, H.D. testified that Vaughn took out his penis and
attempted to penetrate her vagina with it. While H.D. stated that she was
able to resist Vaughn from penetrating her vagina by closing her legs,
Vaughn continued to “hump [her] inside [her] thighs.” Such acts further
support a finding of use of duress. (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072
[concluding that “physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts
to resist” supports a finding of use of duress]; Cochran, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 15 [concluding evidence of defendant’s continuation of
sexual abuse despite victim’s expression of reluctance to participate in sexual
acts supports finding of use of duress].)
Finally, H.D. described to the jury that, while Vaughn was touching
her vagina with his hand, she felt “scared” and she agreed with the
prosecutor that she felt like she “had to listen to [Vaughn].” H.D.’s testimony
as to her feelings of fear and her need to obey, given the circumstances
described above, additionally supports a finding of Vaughn’s use of duress.

10
(See Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48–49 [victim’s “testimony that she
feared defendant” supported finding of use of duress].)
With respect to the remaining counts, H.D. testified that Vaughn
used his hand to touch her vagina more times than she could remember, and
she explained that it happened more than five times and multiple times a
month. H.D. also testified that she told her mother that Vaughn was
“touching [her],” but that the molestations continued. Although not tied to a
specific count, H.D. also testified that, even when she would “say no” to
Vaughn’s molestations, the conduct “would still continue.” H.D. further
explained that, on these occasions when she would rebuff him, Vaughn would
be “mad and treat [her] different,” including preventing her from “go[ing]
outside.” While H.D.’s testimony did not contain detailed descriptions of the
manner by which Vaughn committed counts 3 and 4, the jury could
reasonably find the requisite use of duress as to these counts in light of H.D.’s
young age and relationship with Vaughn, Vaughn’s use of duress to commit
the first touching, and H.D.’s generic testimony as to the manner by which
Vaughn continued to engage in such conduct. (See Senior, supra, 3
Cal.App.4th at p. 776 [stating that evidence of a defendant’s use of duress in
committing sexual offenses on a child relevant in determining whether the
“later molestations were accomplished by duress”]; Martinez, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 189 [trier of fact “must consider the totality of the
circumstances” in determining whether duress was used].)
In sum, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence that
Vaughn “use[d] . . . duress” to commit the lewd and lascivious acts charged in
counts 2, 3, and 4. (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 237.)

11
B. Vaughn forfeited his claim that the prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument; the prosecutor did not
commit any misconduct in any event

Vaughn claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to
the jury that Vaughn had failed to prove why the victims would lie. Vaughn
maintains that, in so arguing, the prosecutor improperly attempted to reduce
the People’s burden of proof by suggesting to the jury that Vaughn had the
burden to produce evidence or prove his innocence.
While Vaughn does not contend that defense counsel raised an
objection to the prosecutor’s argument at trial, he urges this court to exercise
our discretion to consider the claim on the merits. He further claims that,
should we decline to do so, his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an
appropriate objection.
1. Background
Just before closing argument, the trial court instructed the jury that
“[a] defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent” and that “[t]his
presumption requires that the People prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The court also instructed the jury that the People had the
burden of proving the substantial sexual contact and One Strike allegations
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both the prosecutor and defense counsel also remarked during their
closing arguments that the People bore the burden of proving the elements of
the crimes. The prosecutor told the jury: “You heard many times the burden
of proof. I’m going to go over it very briefly. It’s explained quite well much
better than I can do in your jury instructions, but it’s proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. And what that means is what I told and what the defense
told you in voir dire, it’s on me.”

12
Defense counsel stated, “It is not my job to prove his innocence to
you. It is the prosecutor’s job to prove that Mr. Vaughn is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We discussed, I think with [the prosecutor] as well, that I
can sit there and do nothing. And if at the end of the day he does not prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find him not guilty.” Shortly
thereafter, defense counsel reiterated, “Mr. Vaughn, is innocent until proven
guilty. And the [prosecutor] . . . must prove that he’s guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
Vaughn maintains that the prosecutor committed misconduct during
his closing argument by making the following statements about the victims:
“That’s something you’ve got to ask yourself. What’s their reason to lie?
What’s the motive to lie? [¶] The defendant has one and he testified. We
know what his is. We know what [Vaughn’s stepfather’s] is. We know what
[S.D.’s] is. She may not know what it is, but we know what hers is. [¶]
What’s [H.D.’s] and [A.R.’s] motive to lie?”
Vaughn also argues that this portion of the prosecutor’s closing
argument was improper: “Again, burden of proof is simple. What’s
reasonable? And that’s what you have to ask yourself when you’re back
there. Is it reasonable to think that [H.D.] was lying when she was up
there?”
Vaughn further contends that the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing
argument was improper insofar as he argued the following: “W-H-Y? Why?
Burden of proof, presumption of innocence; those are the two most important
things in this case. This is the next: Why? Why would [H.D.] come in here
and lie? Why would [A.R.] come in here and lie? [¶] We know why the
defendant would. We know why [S.D.] would. And we know why [Vaughn’s
stepfather] would. [¶] Why would the victims? Ask yourselves that

13
question. The defense talked about lies.[6] What lies? Where has there been
any proof that there are lies? There hasn’t been. There is no proof of lies. [¶]
[A.R.] was proven to lie? By who[m]? [J.D.] said he didn’t see anything.
Because there were other people in the house, that means [A.R.’s] is lying?
There was no proof that she lied.”
2. Governing law
“The general rule is that a defendant may not complain on appeal of
prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same
ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested
that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.” (People v. Aguirre
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 705 (Aguirre), internal quotation marks omitted.)
Notwithstanding the lack of such objection, a reviewing court may exercise its
discretion to reach the merits of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for
various reasons, including to forestall a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 (Crittenden).)
“Wrongful conduct by a prosecutor ‘violates the federal Constitution
when it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial
with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.
[Citation.] Prosecutorial misbehavior that falls short of this threshold
violates state law when it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.” (Aguirre, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 706, internal quotation marks omitted.) In considering
whether the prosecutor’s remarks amount to misconduct, a reviewing court
does “not lightly infer that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the
least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v.

6 As noted above, at trial, defense counsel argued to the jury that the
victims had lied.
14
Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1129 (Ramirez), internal quotation marks
omitted.)
In addressing claims of misconduct involving statements made during
closing argument, [the California Supreme Court has] recognized that “ ‘ “it
is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law.” ’ ” (Aguirre, supra, 18
Cal.5th at p. 707.) In particular, it is improper for a prosecutor “ ‘to attempt
to absolve the prosecution from its prima facie obligation to overcome
reasonable doubt on all elements [citation].’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63
Cal.4th 101, 130.)
A prosecutor, however, does not improperly attempt to shift the burden
of proof merely by commenting on the state of the evidence, even when the
prosecutor’s argument refers to the defendant’s failure to contradict evidence
offered by the prosecution. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229,
1338–1339 (Bradford); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1077 [“It was
not misconduct to observe that defense counsel had failed to explain how this
evidence could be reconciled with the conclusion that anyone other than
defendant had committed the charged offenses”].)
For example, in Bradford, the Supreme Court noted that, during his
closing argument, the prosecutor had argued that the defense failed to
present evidence on numerous issues in the case. (Bradford, supra, 15
Cal.4th at pp. 1338–1339.) The Bradford court explained, “[T]he prosecutor,
in arguing that the victims had been killed for pleasure, noted ‘there is no
evidence to the contrary.’ In commenting on a stain that possibly was blood,
found on a mat inside the trunk of defendant’s vehicle, the prosecutor pointed
out to the jury that ‘no evidence has been introduced by [the defense] on that
issue.’ The prosecutor also observed that the defense did not call an expert
witness to testify contrary to the conclusions reached by the coroner with

15
regard to the time frame of [one victim’s] death, although defendant ‘certainly
is free to call his own witness to testify to those facts.’ In discussing the time
period during which [a second victim] had been killed, the prosecutor noted
that defendant ‘presented no alibi witnesses for that time period,’ nor
‘photographs to prove where he was.’ ” (Ibid.)
In rejecting the defendant’s argument that such argument amounted to
an effort to lessen the People’s burden of proof, the Bradford court reasoned:
“A distinction clearly exists between the permissible comment that a
defendant has not produced any evidence, and on the other hand an improper
statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a
duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.” (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th
at p. 1340; accord People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 159 (Nadey)
[referring to “long-standing case law allowing . . . commentary on the
defense’s failure to introduce material evidence or call logical witnesses”].)
Nor is it improper for a prosecutor to argue from the evidence that a
witness lacks a motive to lie. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th
474, 480 (Rodriguez) [concluding that “the prosecutor’s argument generally
asking, ‘what motive would [witness] have to lie?’ [citation], was proper
because it did not ‘suggest the prosecutor had personal knowledge of facts
outside the record showing [witness] was telling the truth’ or ‘invite[] the jury
to abdicate its responsibility to independently evaluate for itself whether
[witness] should be believed’ ”]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433
(Boyette) [rejecting defendant’s argument that prosecutor improperly argued
that witnesses “had no motive to lie,” since the argument was “based on
inferences from the evidence presented”].)

16
3. Application
At trial, Vaughn failed to raise any objection to the portions of the
prosecutor’s opening or rebuttal closing argument to which he objects on
appeal. Thus, we conclude that he has forfeited his appellate claim
pertaining to these remarks. (Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal. 5th at p. 704.)
Notwithstanding Vaughn’s forfeiture, we exercise our discretion to consider
the merits of his claim to forestall consideration of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 146.)
The bulk of the prosecutor’s remarks referred to by Vaughn in his brief
and quoted above pertain to the lack of any reason for the victims to lie and,
as such, constituted appropriate comment on the evidence. (See Rodriguez,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 480; Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 433.) In presenting
this argument, the prosecutor did not vouch for the victims or suggest that he
was privy to evidence outside of the record that proved their testimony was
true.
Nor did the prosecutor commit misconduct by arguing that the defense
had failed to present any evidence demonstrating that the victims had a
reason to lie. As noted above, it is well established that a prosecutor may
comment on “the defense’s failure to introduce material evidence or call
logical witnesses,” (Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 159) and the prosecutor’s
argument that the defense had failed to substantiate its contention that the
victims were lying was proper under this case law. Finally, the prosecutor
never stated that Vaughn carried a burden of proof or that the defense had a
duty to present evidence. The prosecutor’s remarks suggesting that the
defense had failed to contradict evidence demonstrating that the victims
would not lie was not reasonably likely to be understood by the jury as
suggesting that the prosecutor had a lessened burden of proof, particularly in

17
light of the repeated references by the court and both counsel at trial
reminding the jury that the prosecutor bore the burden of proof. (See, e.g.,
Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1340 [drawing distinction between a
prosecutor’s comment of defendant’s failure to present evidence and
argument that defendant has a duty to prove his innocence]; Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1129 [courts will “not lightly infer” most damaging meaning
from prosecutor’s comments (internal quotation marks omitted)].)
Nor were the prosecutor’s comments in this case anything like the
comments made in the principal cases on which Vaughn relies. In People v.
Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152, the prosecutor told “the jury that the
presumption of innocence is in place ‘only when the charges are read’ and
that the ‘presumption is gone’ thereafter.” (Id. at p. 1159.) Here, in contrast,
the prosecutor made no such statements, and in fact reminded the jury that
the burden of proof was “on [him].”
In People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, the prosecutor argued
to the jury that “defense counsel was ‘obligated’ to put on evidence,” (id. at
p. 113) and the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection that “she was
‘not obligated to do anything.’ ” (Id. at p. 112.) The prosecutor also vouched
for a witness by suggesting to the jury that the prosecutor had “actual
knowledge” that the witness had never engaged in any misconduct. (Id. at
p. 113.) In contrast, in this case, the prosecutor did not state that the defense
bore an obligation to present evidence and defense counsel reminded the jury,
“I can sit there and do nothing.” Moreover, as noted above, the prosecutor did
not engage in any improper vouching for the victims.
Finally, in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, the prosecutor stated,
“ ‘There has to be some evidence on which to base a doubt.’ ” (Id. at p. 831,
italics omitted.) The prosecutor made no comparable comment in this case.

18
Accordingly, we conclude that Vaughn forfeited his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct. Alternatively, upon exercising our discretion to
consider the merits of his forfeited claim, we conclude the prosecutor did not
commit misconduct in arguing to the jury that the defense had presented no

evidence demonstrating the victims had a reason to lie.7
C. Vaughn forfeited his claim that his sentence amounts to cruel and/or
unusual punishment; his claim is without merit in any event

Vaughn claims that his sentence of 95 years to life plus 32 years
amounts to cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and/or federal
constitutions. Vaughn argues in the alternative that, to the extent we
conclude that Vaughn’s cruel and/or unusual punishment claim is forfeited,
we should “reach the merits of this claim” given his counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness in failing to raise it in the trial court.
Vaughn properly acknowledges in his brief that courts have frequently
concluded that “a defendant’s failure to contemporaneously object that his
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forfeits the claim on
appellate review.” (Citing, e.g., People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1247; see ibid. [collecting cases].) Vaughn also properly concedes that
his counsel did not raise any such objection in this case. Accordingly, we
conclude that Vaughn forfeited his claim that his sentence constitutes cruel
and/or unusual punishment. Notwithstanding Vaughn’s forfeiture, however,
we exercise such discretion and consider the merits of Vaughn’s cruel and/or
unusual punishment claim in order to obviate consideration of his related

7 In light of our consideration of Vaughn’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct on the merits, we need not consider his alternative ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.

19
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 146.)
Vaughn claims that his aggregate sentence of 95 years to life plus 32
years constitutes cruel or unusual punishment because, as a sentence that
exceeds his life expectancy, it serves no legitimate penal purpose. (Citing
Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 584; see id. at p. 592 [“[A] punishment is
‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it . . . makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”].) Vaughn argues
further, “Because there is no possible way that appellant will outlive his
sentence of 95 years to life, plus 32 years, this Court should strike that
sentence and remand so that the trial court may impose a sentence consistent
with the federal constitution.”
As the People note, however, the mere fact that a sentence exceeds a
defendant’s life expectancy does not render it unconstitutionally cruel or
unusual, since such sentence is, in effect, a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. (People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382–1383
(Byrd).) As the Byrd court explained: “[I]t is immaterial that defendant
cannot serve his sentence during his lifetime. In practical effect, he is in no
different position than a defendant who has received a sentence of life
without possibility of parole: he will be in prison all his life. However,
imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole in an appropriate
case does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under either our state
Constitution [citation] or the federal Constitution.” (Byrd, at p. 1383.)
Further, numerous courts have rejected cruel and/or unusual
punishment claims involving sentences exceeding any human’s life
expectancy. (See, e.g., People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231

20
[sentence of 135 years to life did not constitute cruel and/or unusual
punishment]; Byrd, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1382–1383 [upholding
sentence of 115 years plus 444 years to life against claim of cruel and/or
unusual punishment]; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1130,
1135–1136 [upholding sentence of 375 years to life plus 53 years].) Vaughn
has not demonstrated why we should decline to follow such authority.
Accordingly, we conclude that Vaughn forfeited his claim that his
sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment. Alternatively, we
exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Vaughn’s claim and conclude

his sentence does not amount to cruel and/or unusual punishment.8
D. The trial court did not commit reversible error in imposing a $300
restitution fine

Vaughn claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
$300 restitution fine.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)(1)) as well as two assessments and a fee. Defense counsel asked the
trial court to “stay the balance of any fines or fees based on his . . . inability to
pay.”
The trial court responded by ruling as follows: “So what I’m going
to do with the fines is any fines that this court can strike for an inability
to pay, I will. My understanding is that the restitution fine, pursuant to
[section] 1202.4[, subdivision] (b), requires compelling and extraordinary
circumstances for this court to strike that fine. And inability to pay is not
considered a compelling and extraordinary circumstance. [¶] So[,] I will
impose the $300 for the restitution fine, finding that there isn’t sufficient

8 In light of our consideration of Vaughn’s cruel and/or unusual
punishment claim on the merits, we need not consider his alternative
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
21
evidence of a compelling and extraordinary circumstance. [¶] I do
understand that Mr. Vaughn does not have the ability to pay.”
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b) mandates that, “In every case where a
person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and
additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary
reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.” The statute
further provides that “[i]f the person is convicted of a felony, the fine shall not
be less than three hundred dollars ($300),” (id., subd. (b)(1)) and expressly
directs that, “[a] defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a
compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine.” (Id.,
subd. (c).)
In People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), the Court of
Appeal “h[e]ld that although the trial court is required by . . . section 1202.4
to impose a restitution fine, the court must stay the execution of the fine until
and unless the People demonstrate that the defendant has the ability to pay
the fine.” (Id. at p. 1172.) The Dueñas court reached this holding based on
its assessment of considerations of due process and the principle that courts
must “interpret statutes to avoid serious constitutional questions when such

interpretations are fairly possible.” (Ibid.)9
Assuming without deciding that Dueñas was correctly decided, any
error committed by the trial court in imposing the $300 fine is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24)
because Vaughn will have “ample time to pay” the $300 fine through prison
wages earned during his life sentence. (People v. Johnson (2019) 35

9 Other courts have disagreed with Dueñas (see, e.g., People v. Allen
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 326 [reviewing cases]), and the issue is currently
pending before our Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47,
review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
22
Cal.App.5th 134, 139–140; id. at p. 139 [Dueñas error harmless: “The idea
that [defendant] cannot afford to pay $370 while serving an eight-year prison
sentence is unsustainable”]; see People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028,
1035 [Dueñas error harmless: “Given that the restitution fine is $300 and the
assessments are $70, [defendant] will have sufficient time to earn these
amounts during his [six-year] sentence, even assuming [he] earns nothing
more than the minimum.”].) While Vaughn speculates in his reply brief that
“it is extremely unlikely that [he] will be able to procure a job while he is
incarcerated,” he fails to point to any evidence in the record suggesting he is
unable to work or will not be able to earn enough during his long
incarceration to pay the restitution fine.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible

error in imposing the $300 restitution fine.10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

10 Vaughn also argues that “[a]ssuming [his] claim is forfeited on appeal
because counsel did not object to the imposition of the state restitution fine
pursuant to Dueñas, counsel was ineffective in failing to do so.” We have not
concluded that Vaughn’s claim is forfeited. Thus, we need not consider his
alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
23

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