Woodhouse Development v. Kogok Home Engineering CA2/4

CourtListener 10736494Calctapp14 de nov. de 2025

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Filed 11/13/25 Woodhouse Development v. Kogok Home Engineering CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

WOODHOUSE DEVELOPMENT, B341321
LLC,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21GDCV00406)

v.

KOGOK HOME ENGINEERING,
LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of David S. Lin and David S. Lin for Defendant
and Appellant.
Lo & Lo, Kelvin J. Lo, and Brendan T. Molloy for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Defendant Kogok Home Engineering, LLC appeals from the
trial court’s order enforcing a settlement agreement between
Kogok and plaintiff Woodhouse Development, LLC pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.1 Kogok contends that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
motion. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Woodhouse filed this unlawful detainer action against
Kogok in March 2021. In September 2021, the parties entered
into a written settlement agreement. The agreement stated in
part, “Landlord agrees to file a request for dismissal, explicitly
providing for the Court’s retained jurisdiction pursuant to this
paragraph, within a week of the full execution of this Agreement.
The Parties expressly agree that this Agreement is entered into
pursuant to [ ] Section 664.6, and that the Court in which the
Action is now pending may retain jurisdiction over the Parties
and the Action itself to enforce this Agreement and the terms of
this Agreement until performance in full of the terms of the
Agreement, including entry and enforcement of judgment for
damages and possession of the Property or any appropriate
orders upon motion of any Party pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement and [ ] Section 664.6.”
A week later, Woodhouse filed a request for dismissal on
Judicial Council form CIV-110 stating, “Dismissal with explicit
reservation of jurisdiction under C.C.P. Section 664.6” and
attaching a copy of the settlement agreement. A deputy clerk
entered the dismissal “as requested” on the same day.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
Woodhouse did not indicate on the form whether the dismissal
was to be with or without prejudice, but according to the case
information register of actions of the Los Angeles Superior Court,
the dismissal was entered without prejudice as to the entire
action.
In August 2024, Woodhouse filed its motion to enforce the
settlement agreement and enter judgment pursuant to
section 664.6. Woodhouse claimed Kogok breached the parties’
agreement. The trial court granted the motion. The court
ordered the dismissal set aside and entered judgment in favor of
Woodhouse, awarding it holdover damages, possession of the real
property at issue, and attorney fees and costs. Kogok appealed.

DISCUSSION
Kogok contends that, absent setting aside the dismissal
pursuant to section 473, the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement under
section 664.6. We disagree.
“‘[V]oluntary dismissal of an action or special proceeding
terminates the court’s jurisdiction over the matter.’” (Mesa RHF
Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913,
917.) However, section 664.6 “provides a summary procedure to
enforce a settlement agreement by entering judgment pursuant
to the terms of the settlement. [Citation.] Section 664.6 states
that if the parties to pending litigation enter into a settlement
either in a writing signed by the parties or orally before the court,
the court, upon a motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the
terms of the settlement. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce
a settlement under the statute even after a dismissal, but only if
the parties requested such a retention of jurisdiction before the

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dismissal.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182,
fn. omitted (Hines).) Legal questions, such as whether the
granting of a section 664.6 motion satisfied the statute’s
requirements, are reviewed de novo. (Greisman v. FCA US, LLC
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1322.)
Here, the parties apprised the trial court of their desire
that the court retain jurisdiction of the case notwithstanding the
dismissal. Woodhouse’s request for dismissal stated that the
dismissal was with the “explicit reservation of jurisdiction” under
section 664.6 and attached a copy of the parties’ settlement
agreement. The agreement provided that the court was to retain
jurisdiction over the parties and action to enforce the agreement
until full performance of its terms. The court entered the request
for dismissal “as requested.” Kogok does not show the request for
retention of jurisdiction was defective in any manner.
Kogok cites Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217
Cal.App.3d 200, in arguing that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. That
case is distinguishable. Viejo Bancorp held that a motion to enter
judgment under section 664.6 pursuant to the terms of a
settlement in a prior action could not be made in a separate
action. (Id. at p. 208.) And because the prior action had been
dismissed, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter judgment in that case. (Id. at pp. 206–207.) After Viejo
Bancorp was decided, the Legislature amended section 664.6 to
add the provision that, “‘[i]f requested by the parties [to a
stipulated settlement], the court may retain jurisdiction over the
parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the
terms of the settlement.’” (Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 429, 439.) The effect of the amendment was to

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“provide courts with continuing jurisdiction over parties and their
litigation, for the purpose of enforcing their settlement
agreement, despite a suit’s having been dismissed after the
execution of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 433.) The trial court here
was within its jurisdiction to enforce the settlement despite
Woodhouse’s dismissal.
Next, Kogok claims it’s not clear whether Woodhouse
dismissed with or without prejudice because Woodhouse did not
check that box on the Judicial Council form. Kogok contends the
dismissal should, therefore, have been entered with prejudice. It
makes no difference. Kogok fails to cite any authority holding
that a dismissal with prejudice prevents a court from enforcing a
settlement agreement under section 664.6 where the court
retained jurisdiction before the dismissal. In short, because the
parties requested the trial court retain jurisdiction prior to
dismissal, Woodhouse could properly seek to enforce the
settlement agreement under section 664.6 whether or not the
case was dismissed with prejudice. (Hines, supra, 167
Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.)
Finally, Woodhouse filed a motion to dismiss Kogok’s
appeal as frivolous and impose sanctions against Kogok and its
counsel. “We have the inherent power to dismiss a frivolous
appeal—that is, an appeal that indisputably has no merit or that
is prosecuted for an improper motive (e.g., harassment or delay).”
(Semprini v. Wedbush Securities Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 518,
525, fn. 3.) That power, however, “‘should not be used except in
the absolutely clearest cases.’” (Ibid.) Moreover, sanctions on
appeal “should be used most sparingly to deter only the most
egregious conduct.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d
637, 651.)

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Woodhouse’s first contention is that the appeal should be
dismissed because Kogok forfeited its argument that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Woodhouse’s
motion by failing to raise it in the trial court. But subject matter
jurisdiction “is not subject to forfeiture or waiver” (Kim v. Konad
USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347), and
cannot be conferred by “estoppel, consent, waiver, or agreement.”
(Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 481.)
Woodhouse also asserts the only apparent reason for the
appeal is to delay the effect of the judgment. However,
Woodhouse largely references conduct by Kogok for which there
is no evidentiary support. Woodhouse’s remaining contentions
are the same as its arguments for affirmance of the order.
Generally, when the “‘disposition of a motion to dismiss requires
a consideration of the appeal upon its merits, the motion must be
denied.’” (Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 282, 294.) We therefore exercise our discretion to
deny the motion and not impose sanctions.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Woodhouse is awarded costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

VAN ROOYEN, J.**
We concur:

COLLINS, acting P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

** Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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