CourtListener 10734233•People v. Lopez CA1/2
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Filed 11/10/25 P. v. Lopez CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171538
v.
ANTONIO LOPEZ, JR., (Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. 24CR03523)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Antonio Lopez, Jr., guilty of deterring an officer
with threats of violence, vehicle theft, driving under the influence of alcohol,
and failure to stop at the scene of an accident. Defendant argues his
conviction of deterring an officer must be reversed because his statement to
the officer did not constitute a “true threat” as required under the First
Amendment. He also claims insufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions of deterring an officer and vehicle theft and ineffective assistance
of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on
voluntary intoxication.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shawn Ciapusci owns a CAT excavator, which he estimates is worth at
least $30,000. On January 27, 2024, the excavator was parked in the
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backyard of his stepfather Gregory Hall’s house in Hopland in Mendocino
County.
That afternoon, Hall’s neighbors observed defendant operating
Ciapusci’s excavator. After hearing a horn beeping, Angela Myers went to
the road and saw defendant “hitting the ground with [the bucket of the
excavator] and making the excavator buck up and swing the bucket around”
near her RV. Robert Perotti described defendant “being loud and not
knowing what [he was] doing on such a piece of equipment.” Both witnesses
observed defendant back the excavator into a power pole and fence, damaging
the fence.
After backing into the pole and fence, defendant walked away from the
excavator, and Myers followed him by foot. According to Myers, defendant
walked into his apartment “and walked out like he was a different person
and said, ‘Why are you here? I just woke up. I don’t know what you’re
talking about.’ ”
Ciapusci did not know defendant and had not given him permission to
drive the excavator.
California Highway Patrol Officer Matthew Neisse was dispatched to
the area and found defendant in the parking lot of his apartment complex.
Defendant, who smelled of alcohol, “immediately became argumentative and
defensive with” Neisse. Defendant refused to answer questions and was
yelling. Because Neisse was alone, he detained defendant in handcuffs for
his safety. Neisse spoke with Myers, who reported that defendant had been
driving the excavator. Another officer, Officer Pierce, arrived, and Neisse
placed defendant under arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). In
defendant’s pocket, Neisse found a small black key with “Cat” printed on it.
2
Officer Neisse tried to place defendant in his patrol car, but defendant
“was being resistive and aggressive and was thrashing himself back and
forwards.” Defendant’s thrashing “jammed [Neisse’s] thumb, which bent . . .
back almost to the point where [Neisse] thought it was broken.” Officer
Pierce tried to assist Neisse in gaining control of defendant, but defendant
used his foot to brace himself against the door of the patrol car and “then
used his shoulder and his head to brace himself against the door frame of the
patrol vehicle to prevent [the officers] from putting him inside.”
Officer Neisse explained “implied consent” to defendant, but defendant
refused to take either a breath test or a blood test.1 Neisse obtained a search
warrant to conduct a blood draw. Because of the difficulty in getting
defendant into a patrol car, the officers requested an additional unit with “a
cage” to transport defendant to the hospital for the blood test.
Officer Scott Baker responded to the request for a caged patrol vehicle.
According to Baker, defendant was “very unruly” and “using profanities,
yelling,” his “behavior was erratic, irrational at times,” and he smelled
strongly of alcohol. Baker took defendant to the hospital for a blood draw,
and defendant was argumentative, loud, and abrasive during the drive.
Baker remained at the hospital with defendant for around two hours.
Defendant continued to yell and use profanities, and his “behavior
deteriorated to the point” he was placed in a hospital room because “[t]he
1 “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or
her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for
an offense allegedly committed in violation of” certain offenses involving
driving under the influence. (Veh. Code, § 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Officer
Neisse read to defendant verbatim the “chemical test admonition” of
Department of Motor Vehicles form DS 367.
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nurses’ station did not like him disturbing the general flow of business.”
Defendant “was verbally aggressive with just about everybody he contacted,
including the nurses, staff, and hospital security, and the doctors.”
After the blood draw, defendant was placed in handcuffs, and Baker
and another officer attempted to walk him from the hospital room to Baker’s
patrol car to be taken to county jail. At that point, defendant “made a threat
to [Baker] that when these cuffs come off he was going to knock [him] out
onto a bed.”2 Defendant was “tensed up,” his voice was loud, and he looked
right at Baker when he made this statement. Baker understood defendant’s
statement as a threat of physical violence against him.3 Defendant “was
pulling back and forward and from side to side and did not want to be walked
out of the room. But given his erratic behavior, [the officers thought] it was
prudent to maintain control of him because [they] didn’t want him to run
down the hallway or try and run away.”
Test results of the blood sample taken at the hospital showed
defendant’s blood alcohol content was .23 percent, an amount that would
cause physical and mental impairment.
The Mendocino County District Attorney charged defendant with
resisting or deterring an officer (Pen. Code,4 § 69, subd. (a); count 1), taking a
vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 2),
misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (id., § 23152, subd. (a);
2 According to Officer Neisse, who was also present at the hospital,
defendant “looked at Officer Baker and told him, ‘Take these cuffs off and I’ll
knock you the fuck out on this bed.’ ”
3 Officer Neisse also interpreted defendant’s statement as a threat.
When defendant made the statement, his demeanor was hostile and “he was
actively resistive, trying to pull away from Officer Baker to walk on his own.”
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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count 3), and misdemeanor failure to stop at the scene of an accident (id.,
§ 20002, subd (a)(1); count 4). As to count 3, it was alleged, first, defendant
had a prior conviction of DUI and, second, he failed to submit to a chemical
test pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23577, subdivision (a)(1). Various
aggravating circumstances were also alleged.
Following a jury trial in May 2024, defendant was found guilty of all
four counts and the special allegation that he willfully refused to submit to a
chemical test was found to be true. In a subsequent court trial, the trial
court found defendant had a prior DUI conviction5 and found four
circumstances in aggravation.
The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of three years and eight
months, consisting of an upper term of three years for count 1 and a
consecutive eight months (one-third the middle term) for count 2.
DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional Claim
Defendant contends his conviction under section 69 (count 1) violates
the First Amendment because his statement to Officer Baker did not
constitute a “true threat.”
Under section 69, subdivision (a), it is a crime to “attempt[ ], by means
of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from
performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law.”
“The First Amendment states that ‘Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.’ (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) This
proscription, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause, likewise binds the states. [Citation.] The provision is not
5 Defendant agreed that the trial court could determine this allegation
and further stipulated that he had a prior conviction for a DUI from 2019.
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absolute, however. Not within the First Amendment’s protection are ‘certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech’ . . . [including] what the
United States Supreme Court has described as ‘true threats.’ ” (People v.
Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 423, quoting Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S.
343, 358, 359.)
“ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.
[Citations.] The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.
Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.’ ” (Virginia v. Black, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 359–360.)
Thus, to comport with the First Amendment, a conviction under section
69 based on threatening speech requires a “ ‘true threat.’ ” (People v. Smolkin
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 183, 188 (Smolkin).)
“We make ‘an independent examination of the record’ in determining
whether ‘the speech at issue is an unprotected true threat.’ [Citation.]
Nevertheless, ‘[b]ecause the trier of fact is in a superior position to observe
the demeanor of witnesses, credibility determinations are not subject to
independent review, nor are findings of fact that are not relevant to the First
Amendment issue.’ ” (Smolkin, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.) When the
material facts are not in dispute, “we must make an independent legal
determination whether a ‘reasonable listener would understand’ ” the
threatening statement “to constitute ‘ “a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence” ’ ‘in light of the context and surrounding
circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)
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After independently examining the record, we conclude a reasonable
listener would understand defendant’s threat to Officer Baker as a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence under the
circumstances of this case. When he was arrested, defendant was aggressive
and resisted being placed in a patrol car, “thrashing himself back and
forwards,” jamming Officer Neisse’s thumb and using his foot, shoulder, and
head to brace himself and keep the officers from putting him in the patrol
car. Over the course of hours, Baker observed defendant being very unruly,
erratic, argumentative, and abrasive. When defendant made the threat to
knock Baker out, he was “tensed up” and loud and looked directly at Baker.
Around that time, defendant was also “pulling back and forward and from
side to side and did not want to be walked out of the room” to be transported
to jail. Baker reasonably understood defendant’s statement as a threat of
unlawful physical violence.
Defendant argues his statement that he would knock Baker out when
his cuffs were off was “intrinsically unachievable and, therefore,
meaningless.” We are not persuaded. First, “ ‘present ability to carry out
threats is not required if . . . the target of the threat could reasonably fear
retaliatory action on some future occasion.’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3
Cal.5th 151, 195.) Second, Officer Baker already knew that two officers had
requested a caged patrol car for defendant because he physically resisted
getting in a regular patrol car, and Baker had observed defendant’s erratic
and aggressive behavior at the site of arrest, during transport to the hospital,
and at the hospital. Defendant claims he was “merely express[ing] his view
that if he were not handcuffed, he would be capable of physically
overmatching the officer.” We agree with the Attorney General, however,
that a reasonable listener in this circumstance would have understood
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defendant’s threat as a serious expression of an intent to commit violence and
would have “reasonably feared [defendant] might go beyond his attempt to
pull away and kick, headbutt, or body slam the officer.”
Next, defendant points out that he had been uncuffed during the blood
draw and argues the fact he did not make the threat until after he was placed
in handcuffs again shows he was not serious in making his threat.
Defendant claims he “was more likely tired, frustrated, and behaving like a
rude intoxicated person rather than earnestly planning to commit an act of
violence against Baker.” But the fact defendant did not make the threat
earlier does not undermine the conclusion a reasonable listener would
understand the statement as a serious expression of intent to commit
violence. Defendant made the threat as he was being escorted out of the
hospital for further detention, when, as the Attorney General suggests, “the
reality of his imminently being taken to jail arose.” We also find no
inconsistency between defendant making a “true threat” and defendant also
being rude, intoxicated, and frustrated.
Defendant further argues his movement of pulling back and forth and
side to side when he made the threat was likely the result of impairment
from intoxication, not an effort to resist. We do not find this explanation for
his conduct convincing given that his ongoing physical resistance and
disruptive behavior over the course of his detention had previously prevented
two officers from placing him in a regular patrol car—requiring transport by
a caged patrol car—and then required his placement in a private hospital
room.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant’s constitutional
challenge to his conviction under section 69.
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B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Apart from his constitutional claim, defendant argues the prosecution
failed to present substantial evidence supporting his felony convictions for
deterring an officer and vehicle theft.
Our standard of review is well established. (See People v. Nishi (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 954, 966 [absent a First Amendment claim, a challenge to
the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction of violation of section 69 is
assessed under the substantial evidence test].) “ ‘[W]e review the whole
record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e.,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence. . . . A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58
Cal.4th 40, 87 (Manibusan).)
When a crime requires proof of specific intent, “ ‘[e]vidence of a
defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but
circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a
conviction.’ [Citation.] Moreover, the standard of review that applies to
insufficient evidence claims involving circumstantial evidence is the same as
the standard of review that applies to claims involving direct evidence. ‘We
“must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
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circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “Although it is the jury’s
duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible
of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other
innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” [Citation.] Where
the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing
court’s conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with
a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.’ ” (Manibusan,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 87.)
1. Count 1: Deterring an Officer from Performing Duties
Defendant claims no substantial evidence showed his statement to
Officer Baker was an attempt to deter the officer from performing his legal
duties. We disagree.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence
showed defendant’s behavior was argumentative, aggressive, and erratic
from the time he was first detained until he was escorted to a patrol car to be
taken to jail a few hours later. At the site of his arrest, defendant physically
resisted being placed in a patrol car to be taken to the hospital for a blood
draw, and his thrashing was so forceful, he caused injury to Officer Neisse’s
thumb. Later, when he made the threatening statement at issue, defendant
looked directly at Officer Baker, he was loud and tensed up, and he was
physically “pulling back and forward and from side to side.” From these
circumstances, a trier of fact reasonably could infer that defendant’s threat
was an attempt to deter Baker from performing his legal duty of taking
defendant to a patrol car and then to jail following arrest.
In support of his claim, defendant argues his statement, “Take these
cuffs off and I’ll knock you the fuck out on this bed,” merely expressed his
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opinion that he could overpower Officer Baker if his handcuffs were removed
and was not an actual attempt to deter the officer. But a trier of fact could
reasonably determine the threat was more than a mere statement of opinion
based on the circumstances that defendant had been combative with officers
and hospital staff over the course of hours, his prior thrashing had injured an
officer, and his physical movements around the time of the threat appeared to
impede the officers in transporting defendant to jail.
Defendant asserts, “[S]ubstantial evidence showed [his] threat was not
an attempt to deter Baker from performing his legal duties when he made
this threat.” However, showing the evidence may reasonably be reconciled
with a finding of not guilty does establish there was no substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s finding of guilt. (See Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 87.) We do not reverse a conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence
unless defendant shows “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (Ibid.)
Next, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence he had the
requisite specific intent when he threatened Officer Baker. (See People v.
Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153 [“a violation of section 69 requires a
specific intent to interfere with the executive officer’s performance of his
duties”].) He argues that, given his high level of intoxication, his statement
could only be interpreted as “a foolish remark while three sheets into the
wind.” Again, we disagree.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence
supported a determination that defendant did not want to be arrested, did
not want to submit to a blood test, and did not want to be transported to jail.
These circumstances, in turn, support the reasonable inference that, when he
made the threat to Officer Baker, defendant harbored a specific intent to
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deter the officer from performing his legal duty to transport defendant from
the hospital to jail.
2. Count 2: Vehicle Theft
Under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), “Any person who
drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner
thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the
owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with
or without intent to steal the vehicle” is guilty of a crime. “A violation of this
section requires proof of a specific intent to deprive the owner of the car of
possession or title for either a temporary or permanent period. [Citation.] . . .
[T]he People [must] show by direct or circumstantial evidence the defendant
lacked the consent of the owner. [Citation.] Mere possession of a stolen car
under suspicious circumstances is sufficient to sustain a conviction of
unlawful taking.” (People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 199.)
Here, the testimony of two witnesses who observed defendant operating
the excavator, together with the owner’s testimony that he did not give
defendant permission to drive his excavator, provided substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict that defendant committed vehicle theft.6
Defendant argues the evidence that his blood alcohol content was .23
percent and a criminalist’s testimony that a person with this level of
intoxication “would have a hard time listening to instructions and following
instructions” negates any inference that defendant harbored specific intent to
deprive the owner of possession of his vehicle. But, again, the fact that a
reasonable jury could have reached “ ‘a contrary finding does not warrant the
judgment’s reversal.’ ” (Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 87.) The test is
6 There is no dispute the excavator qualifies as a vehicle.
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whether “ ‘ “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (Ibid.) Defendant has
not met this standard. The record contains substantial evidence supporting
his conviction of vehicle theft even if a reasonable trier of fact could have
reached a different conclusion.
C. Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Section 29.4, subdivision (a), provides: “No act committed by a person
while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or
her having been in that condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall
not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the
crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge,
premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused
committed the act.”
Subdivision (b) of the statute provides that “evidence of voluntary
intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant
actually formed a required specific intent.” As we have seen, deterring an
officer and vehicle theft are specific intent crimes. (People v. Gutierrez,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1153; People v. Clifton, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p.
199.) A jury may be instructed on voluntary intoxication when there is
“evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude defendant’s mental
capacity was so reduced or impaired as to negate the required criminal
intent.” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 848.)
Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must “show
counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” and
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“resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) In assessing a claim
of ineffective assistance, we defer “to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions,
and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. It is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate
claim of ineffective assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed
for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2)
counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance
are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
Here, the record does not disclose why trial counsel did not request an
instruction on voluntary intoxication. The Attorney General suggests at least
two plausible explanations for counsel’s choice. First, trial counsel
reasonably may have believed the instruction was unwarranted because the
evidence did not show “defendant’s mental capacity was so reduced or
impaired as to negate the required criminal intent” (People v. Marshall,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 848). Second, “defense counsel could have made a
tactical decision to refrain from requesting the instruction because his goal
was to obtain acquittal on all counts,” including driving under the influence,
and he “may reasonably have feared that an instruction on voluntary
intoxication could focus the jury’s attention on [his] high level of intoxication
. . . .”
Defendant did not file a reply brief in this appeal and therefore offers
no response to these suggestions. On this record, we cannot say there could
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be no rational tactical purpose for trial counsel’s conduct. Accordingly,
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails on direct appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A171538, People v. Lopez
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