CourtListener 10732104•Adham v. Edwards CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 11/6/25 Adham v. Edwards CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
DINA ADHAM et al.,
B340483 c/w B342461
Plaintiffs and
Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
v. 22STPB08269 &
22VECV01429)
CHRISTI EDWARDS et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephanie C. Santoro and Valerie Salkin, Judges.
Reversed.
Law Offices of Christopher G. Hook and Chrisopher G.
Hook for Defendants and Appellants.
Moravec, Varga & Mooney, Henry J. Moravec III; Gavrilov
& Brooks and Bradley E. Jewett for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
******
These consolidated appeals arise out of acrimonious
litigation between an elderly man’s adult children from his first
marriage on the one hand, and the man’s second wife and
business associate on the other. The children moved to disqualify
the lawyer who represented both the second wife and the
business associate in a conservatorship lawsuit and a civil
lawsuit, and the trial courts granted the motions. This was error,
as the children lacked standing to seek disqualification. We
accordingly reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
In 1980, Mohamed Adham (Mohamed)1 married Azza
Adham (Azza). They had two daughters together, Dina Adham
(Dina) and Ronda Adham Zulich (Ronda).
In October 2005, the couple created the Adham Family
Trust (the trust), and one of the trust’s assets is an investment
account held at TD Ameritrade (the investment account).
Mohamed also owns an individual retirement account at
TD Ameritrade (the IRA).
After Azza passed away in December 2005, Mohamed
married his childhood sweetheart, Mervat El Leissy (wife).
1 Because several of the individuals involved in these cases
share the same surname, we use their first names to avoid
confusion. We mean no disrespect.
2
B. Mohamed’s accounting business
For decades, Mohamed worked out of his home as an
accountant through his business, M. Adham CPA. Although the
business was operated by Mohamed and without wife’s
involvement, the couple’s 2019 and 2020 tax returns listed both
Mohamed and wife as the business’s “proprietors.”
In 2006, Mohamed hired Christi Edwards (Edwards) to
“assist” him with the business. Over the years, Edwards went
from being an employee to more of a “business partner” and,
eventually, Mohamed’s and Edwards’ relationship grew into more
of a father-daughter type relationship.
When Mohamed lost a significant amount of his personal
savings during the 2008 economic recession, Mohamed took
Edwards’ suggestion to invest in a certain stock and that stock
turned out to be lucrative. To express his gratitude and because
they both “enjoyed investing,” Mohamed and Edwards agreed
that Mohamed would invest a portion of Edwards’ employment
compensation and that Mohamed would manage Edwards’
investment in the investment account. In September 2015,
Mohamed executed a document stating that Edwards “can take . .
. out” the $125,000 she gained from her investment from
Mohamed’s “stock accounts” “whenever she decides to.”
By September 2020, Mohamed was planning to wind down
his accounting practice. Given Edwards’ “dedication” to the
practice and their “close personal friendship,” Mohamed decided
to hand over his practice to Edwards. Mohamed and wife signed
a document on September 12, 2020, stating that “should
[Mohamed] become incapacitated or upon [his] passing,” he
“wish[es] to give [his] Client book, goodwill, and all assets
relating to [his] business M. Adham CPA to [] Edwards.”
3
C. Mohamed’s deteriorating health
In 2016, Mohamed suffered two strokes that left him with
limited mobility. He suffered another stroke in 2018 that
resulted in “cognitive dysfunction and the inability to ambulate
without close supervision.” In 2021, he fell and needed a total hip
replacement. In November 2021, Mohamed was admitted to the
hospital “after choking and nearly dying.” The hospital’s
discharge notes stated that Mohamed displayed “cognitive
impairment and lack of decision making capability.”
By February 2023, Mohamed was experiencing “moderate
dementia,” appeared “foggy,” and had other conditions that
prevented him “from engaging in basic self-care or management
of his business and affairs.”
D. The financial transactions
Three sets of financial transactions relating to Mohamed’s
assets are pertinent here.
1. Movement of funds from inheritance
When Mohamed’s sister died in 2019, he inherited around
$1,314,430. Mohamed’s daughters, Dina and Ronda, contend
that wife diverted the inherited funds to bank accounts in
Australia, where wife’s daughter from wife’s earlier marriage
resides. Wife contends that she and Mohamed had agreed to use
the inheritance to retire to Australia, although wife has given
inconsistent accountings of the inherited funds.
2. Movement of funds out of the IRA
In November 2021, the address listed on Mohamed’s IRA at
TD Ameritrade “mysteriously” changed from Mohamed’s home
address to Edwards’ home address. Although wife initially
asserted Edwards had changed the address, wife later claimed
that she had done so. Edwards claimed that it was customary,
4
when Mohamed traveled overseas to Australia with wife, for the
couple’s bills to be sent to Edwards’ home address.
Two checks for distributions from the IRA totaling
$12,595.67 were sent to Edwards’ address on December 9, 2021
and February 9, 2022. Mohamed’s business stamp was used to
endorse both checks, the checks were then deposited into
Mohamed’s business checking account, and checks from that
account bearing Mohamed’s signature were subsequently issued
to Edwards’ then-boyfriend, now-husband Richard Day (Day).
3. Movement of funds out of the investment
account
From December 2021 through June 2022, Edwards
initiated five withdrawals by check totaling $126,000 from the
investment account. Mohamed’s business stamp was used to
endorse the checks, the checks were deposited in his business
checking account, and checks from that account were
subsequently issued to Edwards’ mother or to Day to pay off
Edwards’ credit cards and debts. Although wife originally
claimed she had no knowledge of these withdrawals, she later
claimed to have instructed Edwards to close out the investment
account. Edwards asserted that she decided to withdraw the
$125,000 investment that Mohamed had been holding for her so
she could pay for her wedding to Day.
II. Procedural Background2
Dina and Ronda initiated conservatorship and civil
proceedings almost simultaneously and although the proceedings
2 The proceedings we discussed are merely a subset of the
contentious and protracted litigation between the parties. We
summarize only those filings and proceedings necessary to
resolve the issues on appeal.
5
were litigated concurrently, we discuss them here separately.
Pertinent to these appeals is attorney Christopher Hook’s (Hook)
representation of wife, Edwards, and Day in the conservatorship
and civil proceedings.
A. Conservatorship litigation
1. Petition to appoint conservators
Upon discovering the financial transactions discussed
above, Dina filed a petition on August 19, 2022, to (1) have
herself and Ronda appointed as conservators of Mohamed’s
person and (2) have herself appointed as conservator of
Mohamed’s estate. The petition alleges that wife and Edwards
had been working “in conjunction . . . to deplete [Mohamed’s]
bank accounts” and that wife “was aware of [Edwards’] fraud.”
Wife and Edwards both objected to the petition, urging the
probate court to appoint wife as conservator instead.3 At that
time, Edwards was represented by attorney Hook. Wife was
initially represented by different counsel, but then Hook became
her co-counsel and, in August 2023, her sole counsel. Hook
ceased representing wife on October 19, 2023; at that time, wife
became self-represented. Hook has never represented Mohamed,
Dina, or Ronda.
In June 2023, the probate court appointed Dina temporary
conservator over Mohamed, and, in December 2023, issued an
order permanently appointing Dina and Ronda conservators over
Mohamed’s person and Dina conservator over Mohamed’s estate.
3 Wife had filed her own competing petition to be appointed
Mohamed’s conservator, but later abandoned that petition.
6
2. Petitions to recover property
a. Against Edwards and Day
In August 2023, Dina—acting as temporary conservator—
filed a petition against Edwards and Day to recover the
$12,595.67 transferred out of the IRA, and also sought a penalty
for the allegedly wrongful taking. Edwards and Day, represented
by attorney Hook, filed an objection to the petition on May 6,
2024. In July 2025 (and hence, while this appeal was pending),4
the probate court denied Dina’s petition after finding that she
had “fail[ed] to show that [Edwards’ and Day’s] taking of the
monies [from the IRA] was wrongful” because “it is just as
reasonable to infer” that Mohamed had “authorized [] Edwards to
take the monies and to use them in a manner she saw fit.”
b. Against wife
Dina—again, acting as temporary conservator—also filed a
petition against wife in October 2023 to recover the funds
Mohamed inherited, and sought a penalty for the allegedly
wrongful taking.5 When wife became self-represented, the
probate court granted her additional time to object to the
petition; she did not file any objection. In July 2024, the probate
court ruled that wife “took, concealed and disposed of” $739,990
of the inheritance funds while Mohamed was incapacitated, and
further imposed a penalty of double damages in the amount of
$1,479,980.
4 We grant Edwards’ and Day’s request to take judicial notice
of this order. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)
5 The probate court had previously issued an interim order
requiring wife to turn over the inheritance funds; wife appealed
that order, but her appeal was dismissed on default.
7
3. Motion to disqualify attorney Hook
a. Representation of wife
On September 1, 2023, just days after Hook become wife’s
sole counsel, Dina filed a motion to disqualify Hook from
representing wife in the conservatorship litigation. In her
motion, Dina alleged that Hook’s representation of Edwards and
wife posed an “irreconcilable conflict” because, as pertinent here,6
Hook had threatened to sue Mohamed’s business for wage and
hour violations, such that any verdict for Edwards would impose
liability upon wife as a co-proprietor of that business.
After Hook substituted out as counsel for wife in October
2023, wife represented herself in opposing the motion. In support
of wife’s opposition, both wife and Edwards declared that there
was no conflict between them. Specifically, wife stated that she
“do[es] not believe that [] Edwards stole any money from
Mohamed [], his business, or the [t]rust,” and Edwards stated
that she “do[es] not have any intention of filing an ‘employment
law’ or any other type of lawsuit against [Mohamed].” They also
both declared that, in March 2023, they had “signed a written
conflict of interest waiver regarding [attorney] Hook’s joint
representation” of wife, Edwards, and Day, although the copies of
the signed waiver attached to their declarations were completely
redacted except for their signatures and the title of the document
(“Disclosure Letter and Client Consent to Joint
Representations/Conflict Waiver”).
On March 14, 2024, the probate court granted Dina’s
motion to disqualify Hook from representing wife in the future.
6 We do not recount the other bases for Dina’s motion
because they were not cited by the probate court and are not
raised in these appeals.
8
The court stated, without explanation, that Dina “has standing to
bring” the disqualification motion. The court ruled that, even
though Hook no longer represents wife in the conservatorship
litigation, Hook “currently represents” Edwards in a parallel civil
lawsuit by Mohamed’s estate against Edwards (which is
discussed below). “Given Edwards’ direct conflict of interest in
the estate of [Mohamed], to which [wife] holds an interest in as a
spouse with community property interests,” the court reasoned,
“it is a direct conflict of interest for counsel Hook to represent
both Edwards and [wife].”
Wife did not appeal this disqualification ruling.
b. Representation of Edwards and Day
On June 6, 2024, after Hook filed Edwards’ and Day’s
objection to Dina’s petition for recovery of funds from the IRA,
Dina moved to disqualify Hook from representing Edwards and
Day in the conservatorship litigation. In her motion, Dina
alleged that Hook’s representation of Edwards/Day and wife
posed a conflict because, as pertinent here, (1) Edwards had
threatened to sue Mohamed’s business for wage and hour
violations (as noted above), and (2) Dina’s allegation that
Edwards and Day had stolen funds from the IRA put them at
odds with wife, because wife would benefit (as wife had implicitly
indicated she had an interest in that account)—but Edwards and
Day would be harmed—if those funds were found to be stolen and
ordered returned to the trust.
Following further briefing, the probate court ruled on July
2, 2024 that Hook was also disqualified from representing
Edwards and Day in the conservatorship litigation. The court
once again stated, without explanation, that Dina “has standing
to bring the motion.” The court found there to be “a direct
9
conflict of interest between” wife and Edwards/Day because wife,
“as a spouse of Mohamed [], has a community interest in his
estate from which [Edwards/Day] are alleged to have taken
funds.”7 Although Hook was no longer representing wife in the
conservatorship litigation, the court ruled that it would still “be a
conflict of interest for [] Hook to continue his representation of
[Edwards/Day] given his knowledge of and possession of”
communications with wife acquired during the window of time
when he represented her as well as during his current
representation of her in the civil litigation.
Edwards and Day appeal the disqualification ruling.
B. Civil litigation
1. Pleadings
On September 28, 2022, shortly after Dina filed the
conservatorship petition but before filing the petition for recovery
of property, Dina and Ronda—acting as co-trustees of the trust—
initiated a civil action. In the operative first amended complaint,
the trust sued wife, Edwards, Day, and Edwards’ mother; the
trust asserted causes of action for conversion, civil conspiracy,
and receipt of stolen property in violation of Penal Code section
496 based on Edwards’ alleged embezzlement of $126,000 from
the investment account. Edwards filed a cross-complaint against
Dina and Ronda, individually and as co-trustees, asserting causes
7 We grant Edwards’ and Day’s request for judicial notice of
the judgment of dissolution of marriage—initiated by Dina on
Mohamed’s behalf and entered in July 2025 while this appeal
was pending—in which Mohamed’s IRA was found to be his
separate property.
10
of action for various business torts based on Dina and Ronda
sending disparaging messages to Edwards’ accounting clients.8
Hook represented wife, as well as Edwards and Day, in the
civil litigation.9
2. Motions to disqualify attorney Hook
a. Initial motion to disqualify
On September 6, 2023, and just days after they moved to
disqualify Hook from representing wife in the conservatorship
litigation, Dina and Ronda filed a motion to disqualify Hook from
representing any party in the civil litigation. In their motion,
Dina and Ronda alleged that Hook’s joint representation of
Edwards and Day on the one hand, and wife on the other, posed
an “irreconcilable conflict” because (1) Hook had threatened to
sue Mohamed’s business for wage and hour law violations, such
that any verdict for Edwards would impose liability upon wife as
a co-proprietor of that business (as alleged in the disqualification
motion in the probate litigation), (2) Hook would be a witness in
any such wage and hour law litigation because, when Hook
helped wife (who is elderly) physically move Mohamed’s file
cabinets containing his accounting business records, Hook must
8 The operative complaint was filed after the parties litigated
an anti-SLAPP motion to the cross-complaint; the trial court
denied that motion.
The parties had also litigated a separate matter regarding
a petition for an elder abuse restraining order protecting
Mohamed from Edwards, but that petition was discharged when
the parties reached an informal agreement.
9 The record does not disclose whether Hook also represents
Edwards’ mother, although she is not a signatory to the conflict
waiver.
11
have rummaged through them and found documents pertinent to
wage-and-hour claims, (3) Hook unethically communicated with
wife before wife retained him as counsel and while wife was
represented by other counsel, and (4) wife previously
characterized Edwards as “dangerous.”10
Following further briefing, the trial court on February 15,
2024—which was months before any ruling on the
disqualification motions in the probate litigation—issued a
detailed ruling denying the motion.11 As a threshold matter, the
court ruled that Dina and Ronda did not have standing to seek
Hook’s disqualification because they, as persons who were not
Hook’s clients, did not themselves “stand to suffer harm” from
Hook’s joint representation of Edwards and Day as well as wife,
and because their “generalized concern regarding perceived
impropriety” was insufficient to confer standing. The trial court
went on to conclude that Hook’s representation of Edwards/Day
and wife did not present a conflict because (1) “[a]ny potential
conflict” between Edwards and wife was “at least partially
speculative” because Edwards had disclaimed any intent to
pursue employment-related litigation; (2) there were “insufficient
facts or reasoning to show that” Hook would be a witness in any
such litigation because “[t]here are many sources of information
from which [Edwards] and, by extension, [] Hook might have
10 The second and third grounds had also been raised in the
motion to disqualify Hook from representing wife in the
conservatorship litigation, but, as noted above, the probate court
did not address those grounds in its ruling and they are not at
issue in these appeals.
11 Dina and Ronda appealed the denial, but their appeal was
dismissed on default.
12
obtained basic information . . . that could support potential wage
and hour claims”; (3) Hook did not improperly communicate with
wife because the evidence showed any communication between
Hook and wife came after Hook had wife’s and her former
counsel’s permission for such communication; and (4) wife’s
description of Edwards as “dangerous” had been taken “out of
context.” Finally, the court ruled that even if Hook’s dual
representation had presented a conflict, Edwards, Day and wife
had each executed a valid conflict waiver.
b. Renewed motion to disqualify
After the probate court issued its disqualification rulings,
Dina and Ronda on July 15, 2024, filed a second motion to
disqualify Hook in the civil litigation “based on a new conflict”—
namely, that Hook was representing Edwards/Day against the
petition to recover funds from the IRA in the conservatorship
litigation, which allegedly put him in a conflict with wife, who
held a community property interest in the IRA.
Following further briefing, the trial court issued an order
on September 12, 2024 reversing its prior order and disqualifying
Hook as counsel to Edwards, Day and wife in the civil litigation.
As a threshold matter, the court ruled that the renewed motion
was not an improper request for reconsideration because it
sought disqualification “based on facts and circumstances which
were not available to [Dina and Ronda] until after the court
considered and ruled on their earlier disqualification motion.”
The court ruled that the renewed motion “will not be denied for
lack of standing” because Hook represented Edwards/Day in the
probate litigation against accusations they stole from the IRA
while also having represented wife, who has a “potential
community property interest” in the IRA, and because wife may
13
be a “key witness” in that litigation. The court reversed its prior
ruling regarding the efficacy of the conflict waiver, reasoning now
that the waiver was too heavily redacted to “know whether [it]
anticipated and accounted for probate litigation where [wife’s]
and [Edwards’] interests would be directly adverse.” The court
went on to find in any event that there was a “direct and
unwaivable conflict” because wife and Edwards/Day have
“directly oppositional” interests in the conservatorship litigation
vis-à-vis the funds in the IRA, and Hook “could use confidential
information obtained during his representation of [wife] to
benefit his client [Edwards] in ways that prejudice the [t]rust and
Mohamed” by, for example, counseling wife to “act in ways that
benefit [Edwards’] interests but harm [wife’s] own interests (such
as disavowing her community property interest).”
Edwards and Day (but not wife) appeal this disqualification
ruling.
C. Consolidation of appeals
We consolidated the appeals filed by Edwards and Day
from the rulings disqualifying attorney Hook from representing
them in the probate litigation and the civil litigation.
DISCUSSION
Edwards and Day argue that the probate court and the
trial order erred in disqualifying Hook from representing them in
the conservatorship litigation and the civil litigation,
respectively. We generally review orders disqualifying counsel
for abuse of discretion (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v.
SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1143
(SpeeDee); City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions,
Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 848 (Cobra Solutions)), but review de
novo the threshold legal question of standing (Great Lakes
14
Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1354
(Great Lakes); Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 425, 435 (Moreci)) and review for substantial
evidence the trial court’s subsidiary factual findings (SpeeDee, at
p. 1143; Cobra Solutions, at p. 848). (See generally, Geringer v.
Blue Rider Finance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 813, 821 & fn. 4
(Geringer).)
I. Law Governing Disqualification of Counsel
Trial courts possess the power to disqualify counsel as part
of their inherent and statutory authority to control the
proceedings before them. (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1145;
Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846; In re Charlisse C.
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159 (Charlisse C.); Code Civ. Proc., § 128,
subd. (a)(5).) “Ultimately, disqualification . . . involve[s] a conflict
between,” on the one hand, “the clients’ right to counsel of their
choice” and, on the other, “the need to maintain ethical standards
of professional responsibility” and “to preserve public trust in the
scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the
bar”—with the latter being the “paramount concern.” (SpeeDee,
at p. 1145.) Because “disqualification is a drastic course of
action” (Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 210, 219), it is to be exercised sparingly—not to
“punish [a] lawyer’s mistakes or even bad behavior,” but instead
as a “prophylactic” tool for preventing a lawyer from obtaining an
unfair advantage from continued representation in the ongoing
judicial proceedings. (City of San Diego v. Superior Court (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 457, 470-472; In re Marriage of Murchison (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 847, 852 (Murchison) [inherent authority to
15
disqualify exercised only where misconduct “‘will have a
continuing effect on the judicial proceedings’”].)
To blunt the “tactical abuse” and “strategic exploitation” of
disqualification motions, anyone moving to disqualify counsel
from representing a party in a matter must establish both a basis
for disqualification12 and standing to request disqualification.
12 Although a lawyer’s violation of the rules of professional
conduct does not, by itself, “‘necessarily compel disqualification’”
(Murchison, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 853), two potential
bases for disqualification are implicated by the probate and trial
courts’ rulings in this case. First, disqualification may be
warranted, as a consequence of an attorney’s duty of
confidentiality, “[w]here an attorney successively represents
clients with [potentially] adverse interests, and where the
subjects of the two representations are substantially related.”
(SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1146; Flatt v. Superior Court
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283 (Flatt); Charlisee C., supra, 45 Cal.4th
at p. 159.) Second, disqualification may be warranted, as a
consequence of an attorney’s duty of loyalty, “where an attorney
seeks to represent in a single action [and concurrently] multiple
parties with potentially adverse interests.” (Charlisse C., at p.
159; Flatt, at pp. 284-285.) These two bases for disqualification
exist only when the clients represented have “adverse interests”:
This standard is met only when the clients’ interests are “hostile,
opposed, antagonistic, . . . detrimental, [or] unfavorable” to one
another (Ames v. State Bar (1973) 8 Cal.3d 910, 917), such as
when the lawyer’s duty to one client “requires” or “obligates”
acting adversely to the other (Coldren v. Hart, King & Coldren,
Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 237, 248; Havasu Lakeshore
Investments, LLC v. Fleming (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 770, 778;
Beachcomber Management Crystal Cove, LLC v. Superior Court
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1116); it is not enough to show an
appearance of impropriety (DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 829, 832 (DCH Health); Federal Home
16
(Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356; A.F. v. Jeffrey F.
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 737, 745 (A.F.).) A movant has standing if
they have a “legally protected” or otherwise “sufficient” interest
that would be adversely affected if the attorney at issue was not
disqualified. (Great Lakes, at p. 1356, citing Angelucci v. Century
Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 175.) Decisional law has
identified four general situations in which a movant has the
requisite “legally protected” interest to move for disqualification.
Such an interest exists when:
-- There is or was an attorney-client relationship
between the movant and the lawyer to be disqualified, typically
because the movant is a current or former client. (Moreci, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 432; Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1356; Woods v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931,
934.)
-- The lawyer owes the movant a duty of confidentiality,
even if that duty does not arise from a past or present attorney-
client relationship. (DCH Health, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p.
832; Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356; Kennedy v.
Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 (Kennedy); Morrison
Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 223, 227-230.)
Loan Mortg. Corp. v. La Conchita Ranch Co. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 856, 862) or that the clients have a “hypothetical” or
“speculative” “possibility” of a “conflict” (Walker v. Apple, Inc.
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1110-1111; Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 302; Bridgepoint
Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Newton (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 966, 971;
Gong v. RFG Oil, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 209, 215; DCH
Health, at pp. 832-833).
17
-- The movant otherwise “establish[es] a ‘personal
stake’ in the motion . . . that is sufficient to satisfy the standing
requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution”
(Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357, quoting Colyer v.
Smith (C.D. Cal. 1999) 50 F.Supp.2d 966, 971; Murchison, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 851-852; A.F., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p.
746) because the movant would suffer “cognizable injury” if the
attorney’s representation continued (Kennedy, supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at p. 1205). (See also Jarvis v. Jarvis (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 113, 132 [general partner in a partnership had a
sufficient “personal stake” to move to disqualify a lawyer who
was acting on the partnership’s behalf but whom the general
partner asserted did not have the authority to do so]; Kennedy, at
p. 1205 [mother in a custody dispute had sufficient “personal
stake” to move to disqualify the lawyer who was representing the
father in the dispute, who would likely be a witness in that
dispute (because the lawyer was the child’s paternal
grandfather), and who had represented the mother’s relatives in
an earlier lawsuit and thus obtained confidential information
from mother].)
-- The lawyer’s continued participation in the case
“would undermine the integrity of the judicial process” because
that participation would permit an “ethical breach” so “manifest
and glaring” that it would “impact[] the mov[ant’s] interest in a
just and lawful determination of [the movant’s] claims” (Kennedy,
supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1204-1205; Conservatorship of Lee
C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1083; Great Lakes, supra, 184
Cal.App.4th at p. 1357), as established through “an adequate
factual record” in that “particular case” rather than through
“overarching statements of policy or conclusory allegations.”
18
(Geringer, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 826; In re Jasmine S.
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 843-844; see A.F., supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at p. 746 [“assum[ing] without deciding” that
standing exists where a father sought to disqualify the lawyer
representing his child in a restraining order proceeding when
that lawyer had represented the mother in a prior dissolution
matter against the father and thus may have acquired
confidential information].)
II. Analysis
We need not examine whether there is a basis to disqualify
Hook as counsel in the probate or civil litigation because, as
explained below, Dina and Ronda—in their capacities as
conservators or trustees—did not have standing to move to
disqualify Hook as counsel for Edwards/Day or for wife.
It is undisputed there was no attorney-client relationship
running between Hook and the movants—whether we
characterize the movants as Mohamed, his business, the trust, or
Dina or Ronda as individuals.
It is also undisputed that Hook did not owe the movants—
again, whether we characterize them as Mohamed, his business,
the trust, or Dina or Ronda as individuals—any duty of
confidentiality, as Hook has had no prior interaction or
involvement with any of them prior to the probate and civil
litigation at issue in this appeal.
The movants did not establish any personal stake in Hook’s
disqualification because they did not demonstrate how Hook’s
continued representation of Edwards and Day in the probate or
civil litigation would cause cognizable injury to Mohamed, his
business, the trust, or Dina or Ronda as individuals. The probate
court and trial court accepted the movants’ assertion that
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Edwards/Day and wife had necessarily adverse interests (and
might use confidential information or act as witnesses for one
another)—thereby precluding Hook from representing all of
them—on the theory that the litigation effectively presents a
“zero-sum game.” Under this theory, Edwards’ and Day’s success
in establishing that they did not wrongfully take money from the
IRA (in the probate litigation) or from the investment account (in
the civil litigation) means that the amount of money in
Mohamed’s trust or estate—in which wife would share—would
necessarily be smaller. But this does not establish that the
movants are thereby harmed by this potential conflict. If
Edwards and Day prevail in their position (because wife
corroborates their position that they had authorization to
withdraw the money), then there may be less money for wife, but
there would be no adverse interest between Edwards/Day on the
one hand, and wife on the other. In this scenario, the movants
would not suffer cognizable injury due to any alleged conflict
because there is no conflict. Conversely, if Edwards and Day do
not prevail in their position (because wife contests their position
that they had authorization to withdraw the money), then there
would be adverse interests between Edwards/Day and wife—but
Mohamed’s estate and the trust would prevail. In this scenario,
the movants would not suffer cognizable injury due to the any
alleged conflict because, while there might be a conflict, the
movants are not harmed by it (and, to the contrary, benefit from
it).
This case is therefore akin to the scenarios presented in
Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 1347 and DCH Health,
supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 829. In Great Lakes, the movant (which
was a construction company) and the homeowners sued each
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other. The movant also sued a subcontractor for breach of an
indemnity clause. The homeowners and subcontractor hired the
same lawyer, and the movant sought to disqualify that lawyer on
the theory that a win by the homeowner against the movant
necessarily meant the subcontractor (who had to indemnify the
homeowner) would lose. (Great Lakes, at p. 1358.) The court
ruled that the movant did not have standing to seek
disqualification because the “potential adversarial” relationship
between the homeowners and the subcontractor was “of no
concern to [the movant].” (Ibid.) In DCH Health, the movants
were foundation officers who, along with the hospital foundation
and hospital, sued a doctor for defamation. The doctor was
represented by an attorney whose wife served on the foundation’s
board. The movants sought to disqualify the lawyer on the
theory that the lawyer’s wife would pass along confidential
information to the doctor. The court noted the potential
confidentiality issue, but ruled that the movants did not have
standing to raise an objection that belonged to the foundation.
(DCH Health, at p. 832.) The same dynamic presented in Great
Lakes and DCH Health is present here: While Edwards/Day or
wife would have standing to seek disqualification of Hook, Dina
and Ronda—in any of their capacities—do not.
The movants lastly failed to demonstrate how, on the facts
of this case, Hook’s continued participation constituted an ethical
breach so manifest and glaring as to impact Dina and Ronda’s
interest in a just and lawful determination of their claims.
Instead, the movants presented overarching statements of policy
and conclusory allegations. They point to Kennedy, supra, 201
Cal.App.4th 1197 as dictating a result in their favor, but it does
not. By its own terms, Kennedy entailed a situation where “[a]
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plethora of family entanglements, potential misuse of confidential
information, a conflict posed by the near-certain prospect that
counsel will have to testify, and the preservation of the integrity
of the judicial system all coalesce[d] to support” standing and
disqualification. (Id. at p. 1200.) In that case, the movant was a
mother who was in the midst of a custody dispute with the father.
She moved to disqualify father’s lawyer because that lawyer was
the child’s paternal grandfather, was likely to be a witness in the
custody dispute, and had represented the mother’s family
members in a prior lawsuit where the lawyer likely acquired
confidential information relevant to the custody dispute. (Id. at
pp. 1197-1200.) Although Kennedy contains broad verbiage that
could be read to confer standing based solely on the need to
preserve the integrity of the judicial system, Kennedy’s ruling is
tied to its facts and subsequent decisions have declined to de-
couple Kennedy’s broad verbiage from its facts. (E.g., Moreci,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 434-435 [“despite the broad
language in Kennedy . . ., it was ultimately the attorney’s
possession of information the nonclient had shared confidentially,
as well as the close relationship between the nonclient and the
attorney’s former client, that justified disqualification”]; Acacia
Patent Acquisition, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
1091, 1100 [also noting that Kennedy’s “holding was tethered to
messy interfamilial squabbles”].) The facts of this case are
nothing like those in Kennedy.
Dina and Ronda respond with one further argument—
namely, that Dina stands in Mohamed’s shoes as his conservator
and the trust’s trustee. This is true, but does not aid in
conferring standing because neither Mohamed nor the trust have
22
any “dog” in the proverbial fight that might arise between
Edwards/Day and wife.
In light of our conclusion that Dina and Ronda lack
standing to move for disqualification, we have no occasion to
address whether there was any basis for disqualifying Hook. We
also have no occasion to address Edwards’/Day’s argument that
the trial court procedurally erred in entertaining the renewed
motion for disqualification in the civil litigation: If that motion
was procedurally improper, the prior order in the civil litigation
finding that Dina and Ronda lacked standing remains in force
(and is correct); if that motion was procedurally proper, the
subsequent order finding that Dina and Ronda had standing is
procedurally valid but incorrect for the reasons we have stated.
DISPOSITION
The orders are reversed. Edwards and Day are entitled to
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
_________________________, J.
KUMAR*
* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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