People v. Johnson CA4/2

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Filed 11/6/25 P. v. Johnson CA4/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084369

v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB05066)

DELANO JOHNSON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cheryl C. Kersey,

Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Michael D. Butera and

Eric Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Delano Johnson appeals from the trial court’s order

denying his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition for resentencing of his two counts of first

degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with special circumstances allegations following an

evidentiary hearing. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in

denying his section 1172.6 petition because the court did not act as an independent

factfinder and the court did not find that the People had proved beyond a reasonable

doubt defendant was guilty of the murders under current law. We conclude defendant

fails to demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its role or applied an incorrect

standard of proof. We further conclude that defendant forfeited any claim that the

assumed error was prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of defendant’s

resentencing relief.

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2

The main witness against defendants, Alan (“Cry Baby”) Marsh, admitted being a

former cocaine dealer, with two prior felony convictions for possession of cocaine for

sale.

Marsh testified that on February 4, 1993, between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., he went to

the home of Tony (“Kango”) Graves. Graves was in the front yard, along with

defendants Delano Johnson and Terry (“Robo”) Jordan. Victims Rickey (“Rickey Baby”)

Wooley and Kenneth Jones came driving up in a blue El Camino. They walked into the

yard.

Wooley had a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol in his left hand. In his right hand,

Wooley had a Fila shoe box containing “[l]ots of money,” which he showed to everyone

in the yard. At one point, Marsh told police there was about $24,000; another time, he

told them there was $30,000.

Graves said to Wooley and Jones, “Let’s go in the house.” Graves, Wooley and

Jones went into the house, along with defendant Jordan; Marsh and defendant Johnson

stayed out in the yard, drinking beer.

2 The factual background is taken verbatim from this court’s unpublished opinion
in defendant’s direct appeal, case No. E017220, which was attached to defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. (People v. Johnson, et al. (Apr. 22, 1997,
E017220) [nonpub. opn.].)

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Jordan came back out of the house and said to Johnson, “Tony say that we can

jack’em.” Jordan had a gun in his hand; Johnson also had a gun. Johnson looked at

Jordan; they both went back into the house.

About ten minutes later, Marsh went into the house and used the telephone to call

his wife. He talked to her for about five minutes. While inside, he heard Wooley ask

Graves if he could buy Graves’s Monte Carlo. He also saw a stack of money on the

kitchen table. Graves was sitting at the table; Wooley was leaning against a kitchen

cabinet; Johnson was sitting on the back of a couch by the door; and Jordan was leaning

against a wall by the kitchen door. Jordan had his gun in his hand.

Marsh left the house and went across the street, where he played dice with “a

couple of other guys.” After a while, he heard “a lot” of gunshots. In between shots, he

heard Wooley “hollering,” two or three times, “Don’t hit me no more.” Graves’s father,

who lived next door, came over to the house. Graves ran outside. Graves’s father asked

where the shots were coming from. Graves said, “[I]t’ s the Mexicans in the back

shooting.” Graves’s father asked if he could come in the house to use the phone; Graves

said no.

As Graves’s father walked away, Marsh saw Johnson and Jordan drag out one

body, and then a second body, out of the kitchen door of the house and into the back yard.

Johnson went to the front of the house, got into the El Camino, and drove it around to the

backyard. Johnson then drove the El Camino out of the backyard, followed by Jordan

driving the Monte Carlo.

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Graves asked Marsh to help him clean up. Marsh looked in through the front

door; he saw blood all over the kitchen floor, and blood spots on the carpet. He did not

help clean up; instead, he went back across the street. From there, he saw Graves, with a

hose, watering down the side of the house.

Six or seven minutes later, Johnson and Jordan returned. They were both in the

Monte Carlo. Graves told Marsh not to say anything about what had happened. He

added that Marsh should “get broke off,” i.e., paid for his silence. Graves, Johnson and

Jordan got into a Lincoln, which Graves got from his father’s house, and left. Marsh

testified that at this point, it was still light out. Thirty or forty-five minutes later, they

returned, still in the Lincoln; Johnson and Jordan had changed clothes. Marsh stood in

the front yard with them. Graves said “[h]e felt bad that Terry [Jordan] had shot Rick

Wooley . . . he didn’t know that Terry [Jordan] was going to get him.”

At about 11:20 p.m., the El Camino was found, on fire, in the backyard of a vacant

house. This was about one mile, or a four-minute drive, from Graves’s house. After

firefighters put out the fire, they found the burnt bodies of Wooley and Jones in the bed of

the El Camino. Nearby, there was a plastic bottle which smelled of gasoline.

The El Camino was not tested for fingerprints; it would have been impossible to

recover fingerprints from a vehicle which had been burned and then hosed down. An

autopsy revealed that Wooley had been shot five times, and Jones three times. Gunshot

wounds were the cause of death in both cases.

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One bullet, plus some bullet fragments and casings, were recovered from the bed

of the El Camino. The bullet was .45 caliber; the victims had been shot with either

.38 caliber or 9 millimeter bullets. Detective Jon Waterhouse testified that the bullet from

the El Camino had no rifling. He concluded that it had “cooked off,” i.e., gone off due to

the heat of the fire.

On March 1, 1993, Graves paid $7,200 in cash for a red 1990 Mustang

convertible.

On August 18, 1993, Detective Waterhouse, acting on a tip, interviewed Marsh.

Marsh was in jail on a drug-related charge. According to Detective Waterhouse, Marsh

asked him to arrange for him to be sentenced in certain unrelated matters concurrently

rather than consecutively. Detective Waterhouse also testified that Marsh initially told

him a story that was very different from his testimony at trial. At the end of the

interview, Detective Waterhouse showed Marsh photos of Wooley and Jones when they

were alive, plus photos of their burned bodies. Marsh was visibly shaken; at that point,

he agreed to tell Detective Waterhouse about the murders.

Detective Waterhouse interviewed Marsh two or three more times; during these

interviews, Marsh’s account of the murders again differed in various particulars from the

testimony he ultimately gave at trial. However at least after he was shown the

photographs of Wooley and Jones—Marsh’s story remained consistent with respect to

who was in the house, hearing shots, hearing Wooley say, “Don’t hit me no more,” seeing

defendants remove the bodies from the house, and seeing defendants drive the El Camino

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away. Detective Waterhouse also testified that Marsh lied at the preliminary hearing, by

denying that he had asked Detective Waterhouse to arrange for concurrent sentencing,

and by denying that he had given conflicting accounts.

Marsh denied having lied in this case “[a]t any time, at any place, anywhere.” At

first, Marsh denied he asked Detective Waterhouse to arrange concurrent sentencing for

him, or for any other help; ultimately, however, he admitted asking him “whether my

sentence could be concurrent.”

On August 20, 1993, Sheriff’s Deputy Katherine Cardwell interviewed Marsh. He

claimed he had told Eric (“Big E”) Wilson and Anthony (“Speedy”) Perkins, the vice-

president and president of his motorcycle club, about the murders. He also claimed

Maria Morris had warned him that, as a result of a murder which had occurred on

February 4, 1993, Johnson, Jordan and Graves were going to kill him. Maria Manis, Eric

Wilson, and Anthony Perkins all denied that Marsh ever told them about the murders.

Manis also denied ever telling Marsh someone was after him.

On August 31, 1993, police served a search warrant at Graves’s house. On the

carpet just outside the kitchen and on the padding underneath, they found blood stains.

The stains were diluted at the top of the padding, but more concentrated toward the

bottom, indicating someone had tried to clean them. Testing revealed that the blood

could not have come from Graves or Wooley. In fact, it could not have come from a

Caucasian, and it could have come from only 1 in 478 Hispanics, and 1 in 82 African

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Americans. Jones was in the 1-in-82 group. Thus, the blood could have come from

Jones.

Under the padding, police also found a single expended bullet. A criminalist

compared it to the bullet recovered from Jones’s body and concluded that both bullets

were “probably” fired from the same gun.

When Marsh was at court to testify at the preliminary hearing, Johnson said to

him, “I hope you’re not going out like that. If you is, it won’t be too long that you’re

going to die.” Once, somebody shot at Marsh but missed.

Cardel Johnson, the brother of victim Wooley, testified that the last time he saw

Wooley alive was on February 4, between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. However, he also told

police the last time he saw him was at 5:00 p.m. on February 3. Later, he told police he

last saw Wooley at 10:30 p.m. on February 4; he added that he saw Jones at 7:30 p.m. on

February 4.

Drucilla Wooley Malloy, victim Wooley’s mother, testified that Wooley lived with

her. On February 4, when she left the house at 10:30 a.m., he was home. She returned at

2:30 or 2:45 p.m. and remained home until 6:20 p.m.; he was not there at all during this

time. She returned home again a little after 10:00 p.m.; he still was not there. She also

testified that Wooley kept a Fila shoe box in his room.

Maria Zetina, who lived near where the bodies were found, testified that one

evening in February, between 11:15 and 11:20 p.m., she heard three gunshots; 15 or

20 minutes later, she heard either a fourth, louder gunshot or an explosion. A couple of

8
minutes later, firefighters arrived. She could see that something behind a nearby house

was burning.

Juanita Crum, who also lived near where the bodies were found, testified that at

10:00 p.m. on February 4, she saw a blue El Camino drive by and go behind a vacant

house. Five or ten minutes later, a big car, “like a Lincoln” drove up and parked. The

driver remained in the car.

After Crum went to bed, she heard two gunshots, and moments later, two

explosions. She looked outside and saw flames. She heard “shells being shot off.”

Firetrucks arrived immediately thereafter. The car that had been parked was gone.

Ronald Smith, who lived across the street from Graves’s house, testified that on

February 4, he was home “pretty much” the entire afternoon, and he did not hear any

gunshots.

B. Procedural History

In 1995, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder (§ 187,

subd. (a); counts 1 and 2) and one count of second degree robbery (§ 211; count 3). The

jury also found true that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the

offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022,

subd. (a)(1)) in the commission of all three counts. The jury also found true the special

circumstance allegations of multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that the murders

were committed during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A). The trial court sentenced

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defendant to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole, plus a

determinate term of four years.

On January 10, 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.6. The People filed an opposition to defendant’s petition on June 9, 2023.

The court appointed counsel for defendant on July 21, 2023.

On January 3, 2024, the trial court found a prima facie showing had been made

and issued an order to show cause.

The evidentiary hearing was held on April 12, 2024. Neither defendant nor the

People offered new evidence and only presented argument. Both parties requested that

the trial court take judicial notice of “the entire court file with respect to this case”

including the appellate records.

In support of defendant’s petition, his counsel highlighted the burden of proof

required of the prosecution at the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 and then

reaffirmed the prosecution’s burden multiple times thereafter. Throughout his argument,

defense counsel made clear that the prosecution bore the burden of establishing, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of murder under a legally valid theory.

Defense counsel noted three potential avenues for which the prosecution could

potentially meet his burden: that there was the existence of “evidence beyond a

reasonable doubt that suggests” defendant was an aider and abettor to the murder; that he

was somehow the direct perpetrator; or that he fell within the category of being a major

participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defense counsel then

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argued that the only witness that placed defendant at the scene and a gun in his hand was

Alan Marsh and that there was insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt defendant

either directly aided and abetted the murders or that he was a direct perpetrator. Counsel

noted that Marsh was not credible because his trial testimony was discredited and

inconsistent in numerous ways, as shown through cross-examination and other witnesses.

Defense counsel also pointed out that even if the trial court believed Marsh, the state of

the evidence failed to show what happened inside the home or “who shot who.”

Defense counsel then went through the Banks3 and Clark4 factors in arguing that

defendant was not a major participant acting with reckless indifference in the robbery.

Counsel suggested that there was no evidence defendant planned the crime, played any

role in supplying or using the weapons, or understood the particular dangers posed by the

nature of the crime or the violent propensity of his cohort. Counsel further noted that the

evidence was unclear whether defendant was at the scene of the murder or whether he

was in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder. Defense counsel claimed the

trial court would “struggle to come to the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt” that

defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference. Counsel

highlighted that the trial court had the ability to reexamine the evidence and hold the

prosecution to its burden of proving a viable theory that defendant was guilty of the

murders beyond a reasonable doubt. In conclusion, defense counsel reemphasized that

3 People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks).

4 People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).

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there was “no viable theory in existence to allow the People to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that” defendant was guilty of murder.

The prosecutor responded by noting defendant’s own petition contradicted defense

counsel’s arguments. Although defense counsel argued that Marsh was the only witness

that placed defendant at the scene of the murder and with a gun in his hand, the People

explained that defendant’s section 1172.6 petition conceded that defendant had stipulated

to the fact he was armed the day of the murders and that it was uncontested defendant

assisted the killer, or killers, in removing the victims’ bodies from the residence in which

they were killed. The prosecutor then addressed the Banks and Clark factors. The

prosecutor noted defendant’s participation in removing the victims’ bodies, his role in

waiting outside the home with a gun at the ready, his role in waiting for Jordan to confirm

the robbery would proceed, his awareness that Jordan had a gun in his hand prior to the

robbery and the dangers posed therefrom, his presence in the room while the victims

were killed and for an extended period of time, his flight from the scene after the

murders, and his failure to minimize the possibility of violence during the robbery. Based

on the totality of the circumstances, the prosecutor argued that the trial court could easily

find the likelihood of firearms being used to rob the victims was extremely high, which

indicated a reckless indifference to human life, and which was sufficient to convict

defendant of murder as required by section 1172.6. After hearing argument, the trial

court stated it needed time to review the record and took the matter under submission.

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On June 7, 2024, after explaining it had reviewed all of the documents in the case,

the trial records, and in particular, the testimony of Marsh, the trial court denied

defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. As to Marsh’s testimony, the court stated: “[H]e was

a critical witness in the trial. All three defense attorneys outlined and argued and

bickered over his credibility, statements that he made to Detective Waterhouse and others,

along with his criminal history. So his credibility was definitely at issue and placed at

issue before the jury. So that was well brought before the jury to make a decision as to

whether or not they believed Mr. Marsh’s testimony. [¶] I know, [defense counsel], the

bulk of your argument was that Mr. Marsh, as defense counsel prior to you, couldn’t be

trusted for his statements. But the Court noticed that his testimony and credibility were

weighed by the jury. And in his direct and cross examination, the Court didn’t find really

any reason to disbelieve his statement of facts in his testimony. I know he had prior

inconsistent facts, but very little of that was brought out in the trial before the jury.”

The court noted that at the evidentiary hearing, the parties argued the factors set

forth in Banks and Clark, and that the court reviewed these factors. Thereafter, the court

stated it was denying the petition for the following reasons: “The Court finds that the

defendant could be found guilty of murder under any of the three possible theories, either

aiding and abetting, a robbery and murder, as multiple victims, two people were killed,

and multiple shots were fired. The defendant could have been found by the jury and

could—as a perpetrator of the crime by his presence at the scene. The discussion

regarding the robbery and use of a firearm, which he’s—he admitted in his petition, and it

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really wasn’t in dispute. And, also, he could be found guilty as a major participant with

reckless indifference to human life. [¶] Although, [defense counsel], your argument was

persuasive, the problem always goes back to the facts of the case. What your argument

is, is that your client is okay with the robbery, and he admits to that. He’s okay with

using a gun and going inside the house, and he’s okay with the theft of the money that

was in the shoe box, and he’s good with the body disposal, theft of the vehicle, and

burning the bodies later that evening. But he’s claiming that he’s not an actual shooter

when he admittedly, and other witnesses, have him and the co-defendant Jordan entering

the house with handguns. Initially, victim Wooley had a handgun. That was in the

testimony. So several guns were in the house and multiple shots, that was consistent in

the testimony, were fired inside the house. So your client, I don’t think that he can now

argue that he wasn’t a major participant in the murder. [¶] So you have different

ballistics, different ammunition found, not only in the house, but in the bodies, and then a

different kind, sounded like from the testimony, that was unidentified in the vehicle. So

your argument that your client somehow went in the house with a gun to do a robbery,

didn’t fire that gun, is not credible to the Court. And the Court can infer, I think as well

the jury did, that he was a major participant and perpetrator by their finding of not only

first-degree murder, but also the firearm use to be true. [¶] So in examining your

arguments that you made during the hearing, both of you said that the defendant was—

played a role in the planning. He agreed in front of others to do the robbery. He went

inside when asked by Tony, Mr. Graves, and he had permission to enter the house. The

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weapons were supplied, and he had a weapon when he arrived at the house. [¶] The

participants acted in concert by going into the house after Mr. Wooley to get his money

that he had previously shown to all of the participants. He had knowledge of the money.

He had permission to commit the robbery, he had a gun and shots were fired. So he was

present at the scene and also assisted in the cleanup. [¶] So the argument that he didn't

have anything to do with the actual murder is not a credible argument once you look at all

the different factors under Clark and Banks. So the Court denies your request for

resentencing for those reasons.”

Defendant timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof in denying

his section 1172.6 petition. In defendant’s view, the court did not act as an independent

factfinder to determine whether the People had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant could be convicted of murder under current law, but rather, applied a more

lenient substantial evidence test in deference to the jury’s findings. As we shall explain,

we are satisfied that the court understood and fulfilled its role as an independent

factfinder and applied the correct standard of proof. We further conclude that any

assumed error was harmless.

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A. Governing Law

Prior to the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice could be imputed to a person who did not personally

harbor it who under two theories: (1) the felony-murder rule, and (2) the natural and

probable consequences doctrine. Under the felony-murder rule, a defendant could be

liable for first or second degree murder if the defendant or an accomplice killed someone

during the commission or attempted commission of an inherently dangerous felony.

(People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942.) Under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor could be found “guilty not only of the

intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target crime

actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of the

target crime.” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the statutes defining malice (§ 188) and felony

murder (§ 189, subd. (e)) to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for

murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder

rule.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) It also added former

section 1170.95, “which creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be

convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, at p. 957.)

Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,

ch. 551, § 2) amended section 1170.95 to extend the resentencing procedures to a person

convicted under any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based

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solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Former section 1170.95 has since been

renumbered as section 1172.6, with no substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

If a section 1172.6 petition contains all required information (e.g., declaration of

eligibility, case information, any request for appointed counsel), the trial court “must

‘review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that

the petitioner falls within the provisions of [section 1172.6].’ [Citation.] If the petitioner

has made this initial prima facie showing, he or she is entitled to appointed counsel, if

requested, and the prosecutor must file a response, and the petitioner may file a reply.

[Citation.] The court then reviews the petition a second time. If it concludes in light of

this briefing that the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it

must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether

to vacate the murder conviction and recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on

any remaining counts.” (People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1003.) The

prosecutor and the petitioner may offer “new or additional” evidence at the evidentiary

hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

B. Standard of Proof

We begin with the general principle that “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we

presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) Here, the governing statute explicitly provides that on a

petition for resentencing, the prosecution must “prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

the petitioner is guilty of murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The statute

17
also makes clear that “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction

for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (Ibid.)

Nothing in the record affirmatively suggests the trial court misapplied the standard

of proof or mistook its role in the manner urged by defendant. In the briefing and

arguments below, defendant’s counsel repeatedly argued that the trial court’s role was to

determine whether defendant could be guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt under

existing law. The prosecutor did not argue to the contrary, and neither side suggested that

the court was tasked with simply determining whether substantial evidence supported the

jury’s findings. Although the court did not explicitly state the prosecution had proven

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could be convicted of murder under a currently

valid theory, section 1172.6 did not require the court to make express findings or state the

standard it employed.

Defendant nevertheless insists that various remarks by the trial court revealed its

confusion over its role and the appropriate standard of proof. For instance, defendant

cites the court’s statement that Marsh’s “ ‘credibility was definitely at issue and placed at

issue before the jury’ ”; that it “ ‘was well brought before the jury to make a decision as

to whether or not they believed Mr. Marsh’s testimony’ ”; and that “the court relied

heavily on inferences drawn by the jury rather than making independent findings.”

Defendant also highlights the court’s remarks that defendant “ ‘could be found guilty of

murder under any of the three possible theories’ and that he ‘could have been found by

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the jury’ to be a perpetrator.” Defendant further insists that “the court appeared to shift

the burden of proof” to defendant when it stated “ ‘your client, I don’t think that he can

now argue that he wasn’t a major participant in the murder’ and that [defendant]’s

argument about not firing his gun was ‘not credible.’ ” We are not convinced that these

statements, when read in context, demonstrate the court’s error.

The record clearly shows the trial court reviewed the case itself very carefully to

reach its own inferences and conclusions. Immediately following the arguments

presented by both parties, the trial court indicated it needed to take the matter under

submission to allow it to independently review the record, including the case’s transcripts

and Marsh’s testimony, before rendering any decision. After about two months, the

parties reconvened and the court noted that it had reviewed all of the documents

associated with the case and, “as promised,” specifically read Marsh’s trial testimony

because he was a critical witness. After confirming it had independently reviewed the

record, the trial court proceed with providing its reasoning for denying defendant’s

petition.

The trial court explained that the primary issue raised by defendant was Marsh’s

credibility and it “didn’t find really any reason to disbelieve his statement of facts in his

testimony.” The court observed that Marsh’s testimony contained inconsistent facts, but

“very little of that was brought out” at trial. The court again informed the parties that it

had reviewed the matter “quite carefully” and concluded that it would deny defendant’s

petition because it found that defendant could be guilty of murder under any of the case’s

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three possible theories of murder. The trial court then specifically addressed various

factual bases from the record for why it believed defendant could be found guilty of

murder under theories of aiding and abetting, direct perpetrator, or as a major participant

with reckless indifference to human life.

Specifically, the court stated, “So your argument that your client somehow went in

the house with a gun to do a robbery, didn’t fire that gun, is not credible to the Court.

And the Court can infer, I think as well the jury did, that he was a major participant and

perpetrator by their finding of not only first-degree murder, but also the firearm use to be

true. [¶] So in examining your arguments that you made during the hearing, both of you

said that the defendant was—played a role in the planning. He agreed in front of others

to do the robbery. He went inside when asked by Tony, Mr. Graves, and he had

permission to enter the house. The weapons were supplied, and he had a weapon when

he arrived at the house. [¶] The participants acted in concert by going into the house

after Mr. Wooley to get his money that he had previously shown to all of the participants.

He had knowledge of the money. He had permission to commit the robbery, he had a gun

and shots were fired. So he was present at the scene and also assisted in the cleanup. [¶]

So the argument that he didn't have anything to do with the actual murder is not a

credible argument once you look at all the different factors under Clark and Banks.”

Although defendant emphasizes the court’s statements to the credibility findings made by

the jury, the trial court’s remarks do not demonstrate the court’s failure to act as an

independent factfinder on matters material to resentencing of the first degree murder

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charges. The court’s acknowledgment that its inferences and conclusions could also

mirror those reached by the jury does not equate to any improper deference to the jury’s

determinations.

As for the trial court’s remarks that defendant “could” be found guilty of murder

under theories of aiding and abetting, direct perpetrator, or as a major participant with

reckless indifference to human life, we acknowledge the statements on its face could be

viewed as applying a deferential standard of review. However, when read in context, it

reasonably appears the court was emphasizing the strength of the incriminating evidence

that supported defendant’s role in the robbery, and thus, his culpability for murder under

current law. Nothing that the trial court stated at the hearing showed that it was unaware

of the correct standard of review, nor did the court ever state that it was applying any

standard other than that of beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the court demonstrated its

recognition that it was tasked with determining whether defendant remained guilty of

murder beyond a reasonable doubt under a currently correct legal theory. Indeed,

defendant’s counsel repeatedly and clearly stated the correct standard of review during

his argument at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, defendant’s counsel repeatedly

emphasized the People’s burden at the evidentiary hearing by reminding the trial court

that it’s role was to determine whether defendant remained guilty of murder beyond a

reasonable doubt under a correct theory of liability. When responding to the arguments

raised by defendant’s counsel, the prosecutor never contested or rejected this burden.

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Instead, the prosecutor further acknowledged that the trial court needed to determine

defendant’s guilt pursuant to the requirements of section 1172.6.

The record does not support the conclusion that the trial court did not understand

or apply the correct legal standard or shift the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing.

At most, the trial court’s imprecise language that it “could” find defendant guilty on

multiple theories of murder and rejection of defendant’s arguments merely reflected

shorthand for its conclusion that the People met its burden in establishing defendant was

guilty of murder as an aider and abettor, a direct perpetrator, or a major participant with

reckless indifference to human life.

In sum, we are satisfied that the trial court properly understood and performed its

role of independently considering and weighing the evidence to determine that defendant

could, beyond a reasonable doubt, be convicted of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6,

subd. (d)(3).)

C. Prejudice

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court applied an incorrect

standard of proof at the evidentiary hearing, we conclude the purported error was

harmless.

In People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 (Vance), we held that a trial court’s

application of the incorrect burden at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 was not

structural error. (Vance, at pp. 715-716.) We further held that the harmless error test

articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) applied. As we

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explained, because a petition under section 1172.6 is not a criminal prosecution, most of

the federal protections that attend a criminal conviction (e.g., right against double

jeopardy, right against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury) do not apply. (Vance, at

p. 716; see People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 746-747.) And because the

requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in resentencing proceedings under

section 1172.6 is merely a statutory right provided by the Legislature, “a violation of the

right is subject to the state law harmless error standard.” (Vance, at pp. 716-717; accord,

People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 459 [“Even if the trial court erred in

describing its role or applying the burden of proof, the error was harmless because it is

not reasonably probable that absent the error appellant would have achieved a more

favorable result.”].) The error is harmless unless there is a reasonable probability that the

trial court would have granted defendant’s resentencing petition had it properly applied

the reasonable doubt standard. (Vance, at p. 716; Watson, at p. 837 [error harmless unless

there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome absent the error].)

Even assuming arguendo that the trial court applied the wrong standard, any error

was harmless because there is no reasonable probability that the trial court would have

granted defendant’s resentencing petition had it applied the beyond the reasonable doubt

standard. Under the revised version of section 189, a defendant can still be convicted of

felony murder if he was “the actual killer,” or “with intent to kill, aided, abetted . . . the

actual killer,” or he “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with

reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subds. (e)(1)-(3).)

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Here, the evidence in the record supports defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt under all three theories of murder, as the trial court correctly determined at the

evidentiary hearing. There was strong evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that both

defendant and Jordan shot the victims. Marsh testified that Jordan confirmed with

defendant that they obtained permission to rob and kill, the victims for the cash. Both

defendant and Jordan had armed themselves with guns and then entered the home before

multiple gunshots were heard. Two different types of bullets were recovered from the

victims’ bodies and inside the home. The evidence indicated that only one other party

possessed a firearm, but that firearm belonged to one of the victims and was ruled out as

a murder weapon. Both victims suffered multiple gunshot wounds and died therefrom.

From the two types of bullets found in the victim’s bodies, and from the fact that

defendant and Jordan had the two guns that could have fired those bullets, the evidence

strongly supports that both defendant and Jordan shot the victims. Though it could not be

determined whose bullet caused the victims’ death, the law provides that when multiple

shooters concurrently engage in gunfire and a victim is killed by a single bullet, each

shooter may be liable for murder even though the evidence does not establish who fired

the fatal shot. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 337; People v. Sanchez (2001) 26

Cal.4th 834, 845; People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 333.) Senate Bill

No. 1437 did not impact this theory of substantial concurrent causation. (People v.

Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1145-1147.)

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Furthermore, defendant’s actions immediately following the shooting also support

defendant’s involvement with the robbery and murder. Defendant dragged the victims’

bodies out of the home, stole one of the victim’s vehicles, loaded the victims’ bodies into

the vehicle, drove away from the scene of the murder, and lit the vehicle and victims’

bodies on fire. Based on the record here, the evidence strongly indicates that defendant

was either a direct perpetrator, or aided and abetted his cohort, in the robbery and murder.

Nonetheless, at the very least, the evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life to

the robbery and murder.

Because there was strong evidence supporting a finding beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant either expressly intended to kill the victims, or that he deliberately

and with conscious disregard for human life performed an act that was dangerous to

human life—and because the evidence fails to support a contrary finding—we see no

reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent

any assumed error by the trial court.

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IV.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

FIELDS
J.

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