People v. Martinez CA5

CourtListener 10732016Calctapp6 de nov. de 2025

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Filed 11/6/25 P. v. Martinez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087933
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR070134)
v.

JORGE LUIS MARTINEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Michael J.
Jurkovich, Judge.
Moran Law Firm, Amanda K. Moran, and S. Eric Bishop II for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney, and Joseph
Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2023, a jury convicted appellant Jorge Luis Martinez of multiple sexual crimes
with a female who was younger than 10 years of age. Appellant was sentenced to prison
for an aggregate determinate term of 14 years 10 months, with a consecutive aggregate
indeterminate term of 80 years to life.
Appellant raises four claims on appeal. He contends substantial evidence does not
support his judgment. He argues that the prosecutor asked improper questions during
voir dire, which “preconditioned” the jury against him. He raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney’s alleged failure to object to certain
testimony from a witness. Finally, he argues the trial court abused its sentencing
discretion. We reject all of appellant’s contentions and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jane Doe was born in April 2011. She was in the sixth grade and 11 years old
when she testified at trial in this matter. When the sexual assaults occurred, appellant
was Doe’s stepfather. Appellant was born in October 1985. From May 2016 through
October 2018, appellant lived with Doe and her mother in a house in Madera, California.
During summer breaks, Doe lived with her biological father.
According to Doe’s trial testimony, she was about five or six when the sexual
assaults occurred. She defined a sexual assault as someone touching a person’s “private
part” who does not want to be touched. She said the assaults occurred when she lived
with her mom and appellant in their house in Madera. She believed the incidents all
happened when she was in the first or second grade. She believed the assaults stopped
when she was six or seven years old.
I. The Sexual Intercourse in Counts 1 and 2.
Doe testified that appellant put his “private part” inside her “private part” between
five and 10 times. At trial, she specifically recalled two incidents involving sex. There

2.
was a time when she was asleep and she woke up realizing his private part was inside her
private part. She also recounted a time on the couch when her legs were up and appellant
put his private part inside her.
In counts 1 and 2, the jury convicted appellant of two counts of sexual intercourse
of a minor under the age of 10 years (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)).1
II. The Oral Copulation in Counts 3 and 4.
At trial, Doe said that she put appellant’s penis in her mouth on multiple
occasions. She recalled two specific incidents. She orally copulated appellant in the
shower. On another occasion, she copulated him while on her mother’s bed.
In counts 3 and 4, the jury convicted appellant of two counts of oral copulation or
sexual penetration of a minor under the age of 10 years (§ 288.7, subd. (b)).
III. The Lewd and Lascivious Conduct in Counts Five Through Eight.
Doe testified that she used her hands to play with appellant’s penis about five to
10 times. She recalled specific incidents where she touched his penis on a couch. Doe
also told the jury that appellant kissed her mouth during the sexual assaults, he kissed her
chest on at least one occasion, and he “smacked” her butt after one incident in the
shower. She recalled a time when she sat in the passenger seat while appellant was
driving, and he touched her private part over her clothes.
In counts 5 through 8, the jury convicted appellant of four counts of lewd and
lascivious acts with a minor under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)).
IV. The Pornography in Count 9.
Doe told the jurors that on more than 10 occasions appellant showed her
pornographic videos. She clarified that “porn” is where “people have sex.” She said she
knew how to touch appellant’s penis with her hands because he had shown her videos of
people doing that. She recalled an incident where he played pornography on his phone

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

3.
while they were in the shower together. She also recalled that he played pornography on
a different occasion while they had sex, but she only heard the pornography on that
occasion and did not see the screen.
In count 9, the jury convicted appellant of distributing or showing pornography to
a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2)).
V. Appellant was Often Not Home.
During the time appellant lived with Doe and her mother in the Madera house
appellant was often not home due to recurring criminal arrests. From 2016 until 2018, he
was incarcerated multiple times. Doe’s mother told the jury that appellant would be out
of custody “for a month or two or three” then he would go back into custody so it “was
very sporadic.” She also complained that when appellant was out of custody, he would
often disappear for multiple days at a time.
In 2018, appellant was arrested, and he was eventually sentenced to prison for first
degree burglary. Doe’s mother filed for divorce, which was finalized in or about
December 2020.
The mother informed the jurors that, even when they were separated, she still
loved appellant. She stayed in contact with him while he was in custody until the sexual
abuse was finally disclosed to her. At that point, she cut off all contact with him.
The mother confirmed to the jurors that, when appellant was home, he would
sometimes watch Doe alone.
VI. Doe Confided the Abuse First to Her Stepbrother and Then to Her Mother.
Doe first disclosed the sexual abuse to her stepbrother, who was 12 years old when
he testified in this trial. Doe made this disclosure when she was about nine years old.
She told him that she knew about sex and “would do it with my mom’s ex-husband.” She
told her stepbrother not to tell anyone.

4.
At trial, the stepbrother corroborated Doe’s testimony. She reported to him that
she had been “raped” or “fucked” by her stepfather, who had touched her inappropriately
in places that she did not like. The stepbrother confirmed that Doe had told him not to
tell anyone.
In February 2021, when Doe was nine years old, she disclosed the sexual abuse to
her mother. She stated that appellant had touched her vagina, but she denied having sex
with him. She told her mother that appellant would shower with her, and he would have
her touch him, too.
The next day, February 20, 2021, the mother contacted law enforcement. On or
about March 4, 2021, Doe underwent a forensic interview, which law enforcement
arranged. The interview was recorded and played for the jury.
VII. The Forensic Interview.
During the forensic interview in 2021, Doe reported prior sexual incidents with
appellant that were consistent with her trial testimony. She said the abuse occurred when
she was five or six years old, and in their house in Madera.
Doe stated that appellant repeatedly played pornography for her to view. He
forced her to touch his penis, and he touched her “private part” both with his hands and
with his private part. On at least two occasions, he put his penis inside her. He also had
her orally copulate him.
Consistent with her trial testimony, Doe told the interviewer that, before she
disclosed the abuse to her mother, she first told her stepbrother about appellant’s actions
with her.
During her forensic interview, Doe made some claims that were not repeated at
trial. For instance, she claimed that appellant’s sexual abuse had happened “every
month.” She also claimed that the abuse had been going on for six years. She said
incidents happened “[m]ostly every day” when she was five, six and seven years old.

5.
On anatomical drawings, Doe circled where appellant had touched her. She
indicated her mouth, breasts, “private part” and her buttocks.
VIII. Appellant’s Testimony.
Appellant testified at trial. He admitted to a long list of prior felony convictions
for the illegal possession of firearms, the possession for sale and transportation of
controlled substances, first-degree burglary, vehicle theft, and evading a police officer.
At all relevant times, appellant was on parole, and later on county probation.
During his testimony, appellant never directly addressed any of Doe’s allegations
against him, neither denying nor confirming the alleged behavior. Instead, appellant
claimed to the jury that he was in custody “in and out” the “whole time” he was with
Doe’s mother. He also claimed that, when he was not in custody, he was “never really a
law-abiding citizen” and he would often leave town to avoid problems with parole. He
would be gone for a few days or up to 10 days depending on the situation.
In 2017, appellant had four separate violations of probation that resulted in
separate periods of confinement in county jail. There was a violation in January, two
separate violations in May, and then a final violation in October.
During his trial testimony, appellant admitted that he resided at the Madera home
from 2016 until October 2018. He admitted that he would sometimes watch Doe when
her mother worked in Fresno, and he would occasionally pick up Doe from school.
IX. The Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence.
During rebuttal, a detective testified that she had interviewed appellant about
Doe’s allegations. During that interview, appellant referred to Doe as his daughter. He
said he was Doe’s primary caregiver when her mother was at work. He said there were
times he would have to pick up the mother from work. Doe would go with him to pick
up and drop off the mother.

6.
X. Appellant’s Closing Argument.
During closing argument, the defense took the position that Doe was lying, and
these alleged events never happened. According to the defense, appellant was never
home because he was often in custody and, when he was out of custody, he would often
disappear. The defense noted that Doe stayed with her biological father during summer
breaks.
The defense asked the jurors to discredit Doe’s trial testimony because it had
inconsistencies. The defense noted that Doe had potential access to pornographic videos
through her own cellular phone, which she could have used to learn about sex and the
appropriate terminology.2
The defense noted that Doe had claimed that the abuse happened once a month,
but that was impossible because appellant was never home that much. The defense
pointed out the absence of blood ever spotted on Doe’s clothes or the furniture in the
house.3 The defense also highlighted that Doe never complained during her forensic
interview that the sex had hurt.
The defense contended that, if the jurors looked carefully at the timeline of events,
they should find appellant not guilty of all charges.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports Appellant’s Judgment.
Appellant argues that his judgment should be reversed for insufficiency of the
evidence. He claims Doe’s testimony was riddled with contradictions, and some of her
claims were physically impossible because he was not around her for much of the
charged period. According to appellant, no rational jury could have credited her account.
These arguments lack merit.

2 Doe received her first cellular phone in the second grade.
3 Doe’s mother testified that she did the laundry. She never saw any discharge, and
Doe never complained to her about any pain or discomfort.

7.
A. The standard of review.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and decide
whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could
make the necessary finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must be
reasonable, credible and of solid value. We presume every inference in support of the
judgment that the finder of fact could reasonably have made. We do not reweigh the
evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. We cannot reverse the judgment merely
because the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. D’Arcy
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293.)
In child molestation cases, the victim’s testimony need not supply precise dates or
other particulars. It is sufficient if the child describes the kind of act committed, the
number of acts with enough certainty to support the counts alleged, and the general time
period showing the conduct fell within the charging allegations. (People v. Jones (1990)
51 Cal.3d 294, 316.)
B. The record amply supports the verdicts.
Doe described conduct that satisfied the elements of each count alleged against
appellant. She testified that appellant had sexual intercourse with her at least twice, she
orally copulated him at least twice, and they touched each other for sexual purposes on at
least four occasions. She further testified that he showed her pornographic videos. She
claimed that these events occurred when she was five or six years old.
Doe’s statements before trial and her testimony in court were compelling and
consistent regarding appellant’s repeated sexual contact with her. Her stepbrother
reinforced her claims by confirming she had confided in him that appellant had touched
her inappropriately. Doe’s testimony by itself was sufficient to convict appellant. (See
People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608–609 [the direct testimony of a single witness
is sufficient to support a finding].) Her testimony placed appellant’s conduct within the

8.
period alleged in the second amended information and satisfied the elements of each
charged count.
The jury was free to reject some portions of Doe’s statements—like her claim
during the forensic interview that the assaults occurred daily—while also crediting other
portions of her testimony. (See People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 364 [jury may
credit some portions of a witness's testimony, and reject others].) Indeed, the jurors were
instructed with CALCRIM No. 226 and told that they could believe all, part, or none of
any witness’s testimony.
At trial, defense counsel urged the jury to reject Doe’s account based on the same
arguments appellant now presses on appeal: that he was in custody during much of the
relevant period, that Doe stayed with her biological father in the summers, and that she
was inconsistent regarding the frequency and timing. The jury considered these concerns
but nevertheless returned guilty verdicts. We will not reweigh Doe’s credibility on
appeal. (See People v. D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 293; People v. Cudjo, supra, 6
Cal.4th at p. 609.)
Appellant’s contention that the sexual assaults were impossible or inherently
improbable is without merit. The mother told the jury, which was corroborated by
appellant’s own testimony, that appellant was sometimes alone with Doe. Thus, the
evidence amply established his opportunity to commit the charged conduct. Although
Doe’s pretrial statements were sometimes in conflict with her trial testimony, those were
issues for the jury to resolve. Testimony is inherently improbable only if it is physically
impossible, or its falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences. (People v. Ennis
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728–729.) The discrepancies here do not meet that standard
and, therefore, cannot render Doe’s account impossible or inherently improbable.
Based on this record, a reasonable jury could make the necessary findings beyond
a reasonable doubt to find appellant guilty in counts one through nine. The jury credited
Doe’s testimony, and we will not reweigh that determination. The evidence was

9.
reasonable, credible and of solid value. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports
appellant’s judgment, and this claim is without merit.
II. Appellant’s Voir Dire Claim Fails from a Failure to Provide an Adequate
Record; In Any Event, this Claim Fails on the Merits and Any Presumed
Error is Harmless.
Appellant contends the prosecutor improperly “preconditioned” prospective jurors
during voir dire by discussing facts about the case. According to appellant the prosecutor
asked potential jurors whether they could convict based on a single witness’s testimony.
The prosecutor also asked how potential jurors might view a victim’s delayed reporting, a
victim’s emotional demeanor and inconsistent statements, and whether a traumatic story
is necessarily credible. Appellant asserts that, before hearing any evidence, the jurors
knew that a child would testify to alleged sexual assaults, the child did not report the
alleged assaults for years, the child made inconsistent statements, the child may not be
emotional while testifying, and no evidence corroborated the testimony. Appellant also
maintains that the prosecutor improperly conducted voir dire to exercise peremptory
challenges and not to exercise challenges for cause. He argues that the prosecutor simply
tried to find and excuse any potential jurors that did not answer these questions in the
manner the prosecutor wanted.
We reject appellant’s various arguments. As an initial matter, appellant has not
provided this court with a copy of the voir dire transcript. As such, this claim must be
rejected due to a failure to provide an adequate record. In any event, even when we
review the limited record, this claim fails on its merits and any presumed error is
harmless.
A. This claim fails due to an inadequate appellate record.
Although he claims the prosecutor asked inappropriate questions during voir dire,
appellant has not provided this court with the reporter’s transcript of the voir dire

10.
proceedings. Instead, he relies on his own selective summary of voir dire taken from a
motion he filed in the superior court seeking a new trial.
Appellant bears the burden of furnishing an appellate record adequate for review.
Any deficiency in the record is resolved against him. (See People v. Prince (2007)
40 Cal.4th 1179, 1284; People v. Siegenthaler (1972) 7 Cal.3d 465, 469 [absence of
preliminary hearing transcript from appellate record precluded review of denial of § 995
motion]; People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 866 [defendant bears burden to
provide appellate record which affirmatively shows error]; People v. Chubbuck (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [appellate claim deemed forfeited from inadequate record].)
The absence of the voir dire transcript makes meaningful review of this claim
impossible. Without the transcript, we cannot verify the precise wording of the
prosecutor’s questions or determine whether appellant’s characterization of them is
accurate or complete. Nor can we assess the context in which the questions were posed,
whether they were isolated or part of a broader pattern of permissible inquiry. We cannot
evaluate the responses of prospective jurors, whether any expressed bias, or whether they
were excused for cause or by peremptory strike.
Moreover, the missing transcript would reveal what objections defense counsel
raised contemporaneously, how the court addressed them, and whether other questioning
by the court or defense counsel clarified or counterbalanced the prosecutor’s inquiries.
We do not have a complete showing of the trial court’s rulings or interventions, including
whether any objections were sustained, overruled, or followed by curative instructions.
Finally, because we lack any account of which jurors were ultimately seated, we
cannot determine whether the challenged questions had any effect on the composition of
the jury. In short, the missing transcript prevents us from assessing either error or
prejudice. Consequently, based on the failure to provide an adequate record, we reject
this claim.

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B. The limited record shows that the prosecutor’s questions were proper.
Even if we review the merits of this claim, it nevertheless fails on the limited
record before us.4
A trial court has broad discretion to permit liberal and probing examination during
voir dire to uncover bias or prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (b)(1); People v.
Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 143.) Voir dire questions are improper only if their
“dominant purpose” is to indoctrinate the jury to a particular result. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 223, subd. (b)(3); People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1178.)
Here, our understanding of the prosecutor’s disputed questions is summarized in a
motion for new trial that was filed in the superior court. The prosecutor’s questions
presented to us do not run afoul of the applicable statute.
It is apparent that these questions sought to identify jurors who might (1) demand
corroboration despite the law that a single witness’s testimony may suffice; (2) unfairly
discredit a child for delayed reporting; (3) impose rigid expectations about emotional
demeanor or inconsistencies; or (4) automatically credit trauma narratives. Each inquiry
reasonably probed for potential bias rather than preconditioning jurors to convict. The
questions did not describe the specific facts of this case, argue how any witness should be
believed, or seek commitments on how jurors should vote. Rather, they asked only about
general attitudes that might reveal bias. Because the questions were aimed at uncovering
bias rather than preconditioning the jurors to a verdict, they do not violate the applicable
statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subds. (b)(1) & (3).)
Likewise, we reject appellant’s contention that the prosecutor improperly used
void dire to exercise peremptory challenges rather than challenges for cause. (See Code

4 Respondent alternatively urges us to find forfeiture due to appellant’s alleged
failure to object sufficiently during voir dire to preserve these issues for appeal. We need
not resolve whether or not appellant preserved this claim by objecting adequately below.
This claim fails due to an inadequate record, and, in any event, it also fails on the merits
based on the limited record before us.

12.
Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (d) [“Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only
in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause”].) Contrary to appellant’s assertion, it
appears that the prosecutor probed for potential bias in the potential jurors, which was
permitted. The prosecutor’s questions could support a challenge for cause, and nothing
in appellant’s summary of those questions suggests the prosecutor exceeded the
permissible scope of voir dire. This concern is meritless
C. Any presumed error is harmless.
Even assuming some of the prosecutor’s voir dire questions exceeded proper
bounds, reversal is unwarranted. Voir dire error requires reversal only if it results in a
“miscarriage of justice” under the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (g).) We ask whether it is reasonably
probable appellant would have received a more favorable result absent the alleged errors.
(Watson, at p. 836.)
Appellant contends the prosecutor’s questions biased the jury before any evidence
was heard. He asserts that this effectively eliminated his strongest defense—that Doe
was not credible. Appellant argues the jury disregarded Doe’s inconsistencies between
her pretrial statements and her trial testimony—such as when, where and/or how the
sexual acts occurred. He claims these inconsistencies show he was prejudiced.
These arguments are unpersuasive. Appellant does not identify a single juror who
expressed bias, refused to follow the court’s instructions, or was seated despite cause for
disqualification. His claims rests entirely on speculation that the panel, as a whole, was
“preconditioned” to convict. That speculation cannot establish prejudice because the
defense was not precluded from challenging credibility. Defense counsel cross-examined
Doe and urged the jury to disregard her claims.
With CALCRIM Nos. 200 and 222, the jury was properly instructed to follow the
law as explained by the court, and that attorney questions and statements are not

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evidence. With CALCRIM No. 301, the jurors were properly informed that a single
witness’s testimony can be sufficient to convict if believed beyond a reasonable doubt.
With CALCRIM Nos. 226 and 302, the jury was properly instructed that it alone must
evaluate witness credibility, including inconsistencies and demeanor. We presume the
jurors followed these instructions, which directly counter appellant’s speculative
assertion that voir dire eliminated appellant’s credibility defense. (See People v. Sanchez
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 [jury presumed to follow instructions].)
The trial evidence further undermines any claim of prejudice. The testimony
against appellant was strong and compelling. While Doe made inconsistent statements,
she consistently described multiple sexual acts committed by appellant. Her account was
corroborated by appellant’s own trial admission that he was alone with her on multiple
occasions. Her account was further corroborated by her stepbrother, who confirmed that
she confided in him about the abuse before law enforcement became involved.
Finally, appellant’s assertion of prejudice is also undermined by the state of the
record. Without the voir dire transcript, we cannot evaluate how many prospective jurors
were questioned, how they responded, or whether any were seated despite apparent or
actual bias. In the absence of such a record, we must presume no miscarriage of justice
occurred. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (g); People v. Chubbuck, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 13 [defendant bears burden to affirmatively show error and, absent
an adequate record, we presume the judgment is correct].)
Based on this record, there is no reasonable probability the outcome would have
been different in the absence of the alleged errors. Appellant has not demonstrated either
a miscarriage of justice or prejudice under Watson. Accordingly, any possible error in
the conduct of voir dire was harmless, and this claim lacks any merit.

14.
III. Appellant Does Not Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
During trial, Doe’s mother testified that she was shocked and in disbelief when
Doe disclosed the abuse to her. Without prompting, she stated, “Children don’t lie about
these things.” Defense counsel did not object to this last statement.
In the present claim, appellant argues that the mother gave an inadmissible opinion
regarding credibility. He contends that a competent attorney would have objected. He
further asserts that the remark prejudiced him because credibility was the central issue in
this case.
We reject appellant’s position. He does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel.
A. The governing law.
To establish ineffective assistance, appellant must show both that his counsel’s
performance was objectively unreasonable and that a reasonable probability exists of a
more favorable outcome absent the error. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687–688; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) When the record is silent as
to counsel’s reasoning, such claims ordinarily fail on direct appeal unless there could be
no satisfactory tactical explanation for counsel’s alleged error. (People v. Mendoza Tello
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) For this reason, ineffective assistance claims are more
appropriately raised by habeas corpus, where evidence outside the record, such as a
declaration from trial counsel, can be provided. (Ibid.)
B. This record discloses a possible tactical basis for a failure to object.
The failure to object at trial rarely establishes ineffective assistance of counsel.
(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197.)
Here, the mother’s comment was unsolicited, isolated, and not repeated. Defense
counsel could reasonably have concluded that objecting would draw needless attention to
it. Thus, the record itself suggests a plausible tactical choice. Accordingly, this claim

15.
must fail on direct appeal. (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266–
267.)
C. Appellant does not demonstrate prejudice.
Even if we assume a reasonable attorney would have objected, appellant fails to
show prejudice. The jury was instructed that it alone must assess credibility. The
defense cross-examined Doe, and, during closing argument, her inconsistent statements
were highlighted. The issue of credibility remained a contested issue. Nothing in the
record suggests the jury disregarded the court’s instruction or placed any weight on the
mother’s fleeting remark.
Moreover, the prosecution’s evidence against appellant was substantial. Doe
testified in detail about repeated sexual acts. While inconsistencies exist, her pretrial
statements and trial testimony were consistent regarding a pattern of ongoing abuse. Her
account was corroborated by surrounding circumstances—most notably her opportunity
to be alone with appellant—and by her stepbrother’s corroboration that she disclosed the
abuse to him before law enforcement became involved. Doe’s testimony was credible
and compelling.
Based on this record, it is not reasonably probable the verdicts would have been
different had counsel objected to the mother’s isolated remark. Appellant neither shows
that his trial attorney acted in an objectively unreasonable way nor that he suffered
prejudice. Accordingly, appellant fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel
and this claim lacks merit.
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion.
Appellant received the maximum possible sentence. Consecutive life sentences
were imposed for the sexual penetration and oral copulation convictions (counts 1–4),
which resulted in an aggregate indeterminate term of 80 years to life. For the lewd

16.
conduct in count 5, the court imposed an upper term, and all remaining convictions were
imposed as consecutive subordinate determinate terms.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred or abused its sentencing discretion by
imposing consecutive sentences. He contends that at least one conviction for oral
copulation (§ 288.7, subd. (b)) should run concurrently with a conviction for sexual
intercourse (id., at subd. (a)) because, during her forensic interview, Doe described a
single incident where both acts occurred. He further maintains the court improperly
relied on aggravating factors to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences.
A. Background facts.
A bifurcated bench trial occurred wherein the court found true four factors in
aggravation: (1) Doe was particularly vulnerable; (2) appellant took advantage of a
position of trust and confidence; (3) appellant’s prior convictions are numerous and/or
increasing in seriousness; and (4) appellant served a prior prison term.
At sentencing, the defense argued that the crimes were not predominantly
independent of each other, and concurrent sentences were requested. The court
disagreed. The court expressly found that these crimes were independent of each other;
the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; and the crimes were
committed at different times or separate places rather than being committed closely in
time and place as to indicate a single period of abhorrent behavior. The court noted its
belief it could consider the factors in aggravation in deciding whether to impose
consecutive sentences.
B. The standard of review.
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to impose consecutive
rather than concurrent sentences.5 (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20.)

5 Citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, appellant contends that the trial
court’s sentencing choices are reviewed de novo. We disagree. In Waidla, the California
Supreme Court held that a de novo standard of review is applied to a ruling on a motion

17.
Consecutive terms may be imposed when crimes are independent of one another, involve
separate acts of violence, or occur at different times or in separate places. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.425(a).) The court may also consider aggravating factors, except where
they are elements of the crime or have already been used to impose an upper term. (Id.,
at subd. (b).) Only one valid factor is necessary to support consecutive sentences.
(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728–729.)
C. Our analysis.
This record fully supports the trial court’s sentencing decisions. Although Doe’s
pretrial forensic interview described one occasion of intercourse followed by oral
copulation, her trial testimony established that appellant committed multiple separate acts
of intercourse and oral copulation on different occasions. She recounted incidents where
she awoke to find appellant penetrating her, another episode of intercourse on a couch,
and incidents of oral copulation both in her shower and on her mother’s bed.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the trial court was not required to accept Doe’s
inconsistent pretrial statements but could instead rely on her trial testimony in imposing
consecutive sentences. We will not reweigh the court’s determination. (See People v.
Bradford, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 20.) Doe’s trial testimony amply supports the findings
that the convictions for sexual intercourse and oral copulation were based on distinct
criminal episodes committed at different times and places. The evidence demonstrates
that appellant’s crimes and objectives were predominantly independent of each other.
The court’s findings more than justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a).)

to suppress a statement, the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense, an order
excluding the defendant from the trial, and a ruling on an application to modify the
verdict. (Id. at pp. 730, 733, 741, 748.) Waidla does not establish a de novo review of
sentencing choices.

18.
Appellant also points to the court’s comment that it believed it could consider the
aggravating factors when considering whether to impose consecutive sentences. While
the court made such a remark, the transcript makes it abundantly clear the court imposed
consecutive sentences based on the separate nature of the offenses. Indeed, the court
expressly adopted the findings from the probation report that appellant’s crimes were
independent of each other, involved separate acts of violence, and occurred at different
times or separate places. Thus, appellant’s concern is without merit because the court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences rested on the distinct and independent nature of the
offenses, not on any improper reliance on aggravating factors.
On this record, the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences did not
exceed the bounds of reason, nor was it arbitrary or capricious. The court identified valid
sentencing factors, and substantial evidence supports those findings. Consequently, an
abuse of discretion has not been shown, and this claim fails.6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

MEEHAN, J.

6 Because this claim fails on its merits, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute
regarding whether or not appellant failed to preserve this claim for appellate review.

19.

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