CourtListener 10730535•People v. Graves CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 11/4/25 P. v. Graves CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B335691
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA097218)
v.
ALEX DEMETRIUS GRAVES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Alex Demetrius Graves
(defendant) appeals from the denial of his petition for vacatur
and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6), after an evidentiary hearing. Defendant
contends the superior court erred in denying his petition as to
two counts of attempted murder because there was insufficient
evidence that he had the requisite intent to kill the “unintended
victims.” We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Procedural background at trial
In a seven-count information, defendant and codefendants
Maurice Bennett and Robert Maxwell were charged in count 1
with the murder of Kyutza Herrera, in violation of Penal Code
section 187, subdivision (a). In counts 2 through 5, defendant,
Bennett, and Maxwell were charged with the willful, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder of Carlos Avila, Timothy
Ledford, Ronald Davis, and Marcello Martinez, in violation of
sections 187, subdivision (a) and 664. Defendant was charged in
count 6 with the discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent
manner, in violation of section 246.3, subdivision (a). In count 7,
defendant and Bennett were charged with carrying a concealed
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code,
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Because the trial court used the trial record in rendering its
decision, we adopt, with minor deletions, the facts relating to
defendant’s trial from the statement of facts in our nonpublished
opinion affirming defendant’s conviction in People v. Graves
(Aug. 30, 2012, B227100).
2
firearm in a vehicle, in violation of former section 12025,
subdivision (a)(1).
As to all counts, the information specially alleged pursuant
to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), that the crimes were
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members. The information specially alleged as to counts 1
through 5, for purposes of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c),
(d), and (e)(1), that a principal personally used and intentionally
discharged a handgun.
Defendant was tried jointly with Bennett and Maxwell.
Defendant shared one jury with Bennett while Maxwell had
another separate jury. Defendant was found guilty of count 1,
but as the jury could not reach agreement as to the degree of the
murder, it was deemed to be of the second degree. The jury found
defendant guilty as charged in the remaining counts and found
true all special allegations.
On August 13, 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to
a total prison term of 168 years to life plus two years eight
months.
Evidence at trial
Ace Liquor Store shooting
On the evening of August 4, 2007, Avila parked in front of
the Ace Liquor Store on Long Beach Boulevard in Lynwood to
buy snacks for Herrera, his girlfriend and passenger. Ace Liquor
Store was located in a neighborhood claimed by the Palm and
Oaks Crip gang, a rival of the MOB Piru gang. Members of the
Palm and Oaks Crip gang typically wore blue-colored clothing.
3
Davis and Ledford were also at Ace Liquor Store that
evening with their friends Bobby Patrick and Gregory Smith,
who entered the store while Davis and Ledford waited outside.
Ledford was wearing a blue shirt. After Avila and Herrera
returned to Avila’s car, there came the sound of squealing tires
and gunshots. Davis testified he heard 22 to 45 gunshots in all
and saw muzzle flashes coming from the front passenger seat of a
white Camaro moving south on Long Beach Boulevard. Davis
and Ledford ran into the store to the sound of flying bullets and
breaking glass.
Kassandra A., a minor, testified that she was across the
street from the liquor store when she heard gunshots and
breaking glass and saw two men run into the store as a Mustang
slowly moved south on Long Beach Boulevard. She saw bullets
strike the car parked in front of the store. It appeared to her that
the gunshots came from the Mustang, which sped up after the
shooting stopped. Jessie Reyes was also across the street from
the liquor store at the time of the shooting. He reported hearing
multiple gunshots and then saw a white Camaro and a gray
Mustang moving southbound on Long Beach Boulevard.
When the gunfire ended, it was discovered that Davis had
been shot in the foot and Ledford had suffered a grazing wound to
his hip. Herrera had been shot in the neck and died from the
wound a few days later. Bullet holes were later found in
Martinez’s car, which was parked in front of the liquor store.
There was a total of 16 surveillance cameras from inside
and outside the liquor store and the nearby gas station.
Investigators viewed the footage and portions were played for the
jury showing a gray or silver Mustang and a white Camaro pass
4
in front of the liquor store. Davis and Ledford can be seen
running into the store as gunfire erupts.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies
found multiple .30-caliber carbine (rifle) casings, as well as .40-
caliber casings, scattered along Long Beach Boulevard and the
front of the liquor store.
Related shootings
On August 21, 2007, Earnest Grayson was shot multiple
times on Carlin Avenue in Lynwood, a few blocks from Ace
Liquor Store in an area also claimed by the Palm and Oaks gang.
Alejandra Guerrero saw a gray or silver Mustang traveling east
on Carlin Avenue with a second car following it shortly after the
shooting. Eight .40-caliber casings were found and collected from
the crime scene.
On August 24, 2007, Edward Lair, wearing a blue shirt and
a Dodger baseball cap, was with his friend Mac Richardson at
Tommy’s Mechanic Shop on Rosecrans Avenue in Compton,
waiting for a battery charge, when he heard multiple gunshots.
When the shooting stopped, Lair realized he had been hit by 13
bullets in both arms, a leg, and his abdomen. Richardson had
been shot four times. Lair did not see the shooter, but Rosalie
Bardwell observed the shooting and saw two cars accelerating to
a high speed away from the scene. One car was following the
other so closely that she thought the occupants were shooting at
each other. One was a white Mustang and the other was a dark
blue Honda. Ten .40-caliber casings were found on the ground
near Rosecrans Avenue.
On October 31, 2007, Heriberto Norori was shot in the
abdomen outside the Gaucho Grill restaurant on Beverly
Boulevard in Los Angeles. A black SUV approached the
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restaurant, and Norori saw an African-American man step out
and fire what appeared to be a semiautomatic handgun. Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers arrived shortly after
the shooting, and within minutes, they heard more gunshots. In
the direction from where the noise came, a gray Mustang and a
black SUV were seen speeding away. Officers pursued and
stopped the SUV and the Mustang.
The SUV’s occupants were identified as Warren Phillipus
and Andrew Haley. Haley’s address on Killen Court in Compton
was later determined to be defendant’s address, as well. The
officers searched the SUV and found a .380-caliber
semiautomatic handgun on the floorboard behind the driver’s
seat.
When other officers stopped the Mustang, which was later
determined to belong to defendant, codefendant Bennett was in
the driver’s seat and defendant was the front passenger. A
search of the car yielded an empty Springfield semiautomatic .40-
caliber handgun behind the back seat. The handgun was later
determined to be the same weapon that was used to kill Herrera.
Ballistics evidence
Firearms expert, retired LASD Deputy Dale Falicon,
determined that the handgun recovered from defendant’s car
after the Gaucho Grill shooting was the same .40-caliber weapon
that was used to shoot Herrera. He also examined the .40-caliber
shell casings recovered from the area of the Gaucho Grill, and
those recovered from the Grayson shooting, and determined that
they too had been fired from the murder weapon. Deputy Falicon
also concluded that the .30-caliber, M-1 carbine rifle seized from
defendant’s post office coworker, Sergio Moran, had fired seven of
6
the .30-caliber cartridge cases found at the Ace Liquor Store
shooting.
Visual and wiretap surveillance
Detective Brown suspected that members of the MOB Piru
gang had committed the liquor store shooting, in the territory
claimed by their rivals, the Palm and Oaks gang. After searching
the MOB Piru neighborhood he found a 1984 white Camaro
parked on Palm Avenue. He further identified the driver as
codefendant Maxwell and observed the Camaro as it was
approached by several young African-American men dressed in
gang attire.
In March and April 2008 after Detective Brown had
arranged for the California Department of Justice (DOJ) to
conduct visual and wiretap surveillance, he produced and
distributed a flier with the hope of stimulating telephone
conversations about the shooting. The flier contained
photographs of Herrera, a Mustang, and a Camaro. The fliers
were passed out in the suspects’ neighborhood, and one was left
at defendant’s Killen Court residence. Detective Brown also
made a short video clip of the shooting, which was aired during
several newscasts.
During visual surveillance outside the Killen Court
residence, DOJ agents saw defendant driving the silver Mustang
and saw him associating with Haley, Phillipus, and others. On
March 20, 2008, agents observed defendant as he appeared to
purchase a .40-caliber handgun from the occupants of a dark-
colored Honda parked near defendant’s Mustang outside his
residence.
7
Agents conducted wire surveillance of four “target”
telephone numbers, including one belonging to defendant. The
conversations were recorded and portions played for the jury.
In March 2008, defendant spoke to his coworker, Moran.
Moran inquired about “the gun,” and they discussed a price.
Moran said he would get the money and pick it up. A few days
later, Moran telephoned to tell defendant he was going to take
the gun to the Azusa Canyon shooting range the following day.
LASD personnel notified the Azusa City Police
Department, which sent officers to the shooting range to wait for
Moran. The officers detained Moran and seized the rifle, an M-1
.30-caliber carbine. After it was confiscated, a deputy sheriff
telephoned Moran to determine where he had obtained the rifle.
In turn, Moran telephoned defendant who told Moran not to tell
the police Moran had obtained the gun from him.
In late April 2008, agents recorded conversations between
defendant and his girlfriend Markia Tyree. Tyree testified
regarding those conversations. She confirmed defendant was
upset about some fliers in which his car appeared. He told Tyree
he had to get a new car “quick,” but he would not tell her the
reason over the telephone. Later, defendant twice telephoned
Tyree from a car dealership and told her he had to “get rid” of his
car.
Tyree testified defendant was very upset about the fliers
and told her “they had done something.” He said he had to get
rid of his car because of what happened, and someone had bad
aim and an innocent person had been hit. Because Tyree worked
for the Manhattan Beach Police Department, defendant asked
her to run his license plate number through the police database.
She searched but found nothing recent.
8
Defendant’s telephone conversations with others were also
played for the jury with gang expert Detective Richard Sanchez
translating some of the gang jargon used in the conversations.
“Blood” meant a member of the Blood gang. In one conversation,
Haley referred to defendant as “Blood” and to himself as a “P
homie,” meaning they were both members of the MOB Piru gang,
a Blood gang. Haley said he was going to dress in red and black,
which were the colors of the MOB Piru gang. Defendant’s
statement, “I’m going to pop if you don’t put that on Piru,” meant
that Haley could trust defendant due to his MOB Piru gang
membership—the equivalent of the expression, “Scout’s honor.”
When defendant spoke to Bennett, he said, “I’m in the hood,
Blood,” meaning he was in his gang’s territory. Defendant also
said he was “outside Blood gang banging,” which meant he was
associating with the gang, standing outside wearing the gang’s
colors and “flashing” or “throwing” gang signs. Detective Sanchez
explained that “180” was gang slang for Penal Code section 187
and thus meant murder.
In one recorded conversation, defendant told MOB Piru
gang member “Whitey” that defendant was at a dealership to buy
a car. In another, defendant spoke to Haley and told him
defendant had “already seen that shit” and was going to get “get
rid of” it that week. Defendant also spoke to “Keith,” identifying
him as a gang member by calling him “Blood.” Defendant told
Keith he was “too upside down” and had to “get rid of that mother
fucker.” Defendant asked whether Keith knew someone who
could do it for him. In a conversation with his sister, Alexis
Graves (Alexis), defendant told her he was going to come and stay
with her because the police were harassing everybody. The next
day, defendant called Bennett, told him it would be costly to get
9
rid of the “gray thing” and that defendant would buy the Impala
as soon as he received his tax refund. Defendant also complained
to Bennett someone was “running their mouth” to the police and
said if anyone “goes down . . . everybody will eat their shit.”
On April 26, 2008, defendant telephoned the L.A. Autoplex
car dealership on Firestone Boulevard to inform “Joey” defendant
would be there that day to buy the car they had discussed. That
evening, defendant telephoned Tyree and Haley to tell them he
had purchased the new car. Wiretap investigators notified LASD,
and Detective Joe Espino recovered defendant’s Mustang from
the dealership.
Reactions to Bennett’s arrest
Detectives Brown, Sanchez, and Espino spoke to Bennett at
his residence on May 7, 2008. Detective Brown told him they
were investigating the murder of the young woman at the Ace
Liquor Store, which was shown on the news, and asked him to
come to the station for an interview. Although Bennett initially
denied involvement, he agreed to go with them to the station.
After the interview, Bennett was arrested.
Bennett’s arrest resulted in a flurry of telephone calls. At
3:43 p.m. on the same day, defendant told his sister that Bennett
had been taken to jail and he did not know why. Alexis looked on
the Internet and found that Bennett was expected to be released
that day. A few minutes later, defendant received a call from
Miguel Brandon, who asked for “Mo’s” real name. Defendant
replied, “Maurice Bennett” and told Brandon that he had checked
the Internet and could not find out why Bennett had been
arrested.
A minute after the call from Brandon, defendant
telephoned “E” and asked what had happened. E said Bennett
10
had been picked up by the homicide bureau and that his bail had
been set at a million dollars, but E did not know whether the
district attorney was trying to “bring that case back on him.”
Defendant replied, “It wasn’t no homicide.” Five minutes later,
defendant called Brandon, gave him the spelling of Bennett’s last
name so that he could search for information, and told him to find
Whitey.
Defendant then called Michael Washington, who was also
known as Keith, and they discussed the arrest. Defendant
repeated that Bennett had been arrested by the homicide
division, and his bail had been set at $1 million; they agreed this
meant that Bennett had been charged with murder. Washington
then asked defendant, “Was Mo with ya’ll?” When defendant
asked, “When?” Washington said, “You know what I’m talking
about.” Defendant replied, “Uhhh . . . I think, yeah.”
Washington then said that Haley had “said something.” A
moment later, defendant discovered that Phillipus had been
arrested by DOJ, but he did not know on what charge. After
more conversation about Bennett, Washington explained he had
just been in the car with “Murder” and “that’s why [he] was
speaking in code.” Washington had taken Murder to “get an
estimate, on his shit, but yeah, that’s crazy man! For that shit
just to be happening like that. That’s what I’m saying. But
see . . . what I was thinking that they get license plates, but I
doubt that because if they did they would’ve been came, you know
what I mean?”
After another call from defendant’s sister about Bennett’s
bail, defendant telephoned Tyree to tell her that “the police got
Mo.” Defendant said Mo’s father had money for bail and that he
did not believe the police had evidence to charge him. Later that
11
evening, someone named Brown called defendant and was told
that “Mo is in jail.” Brown asked, “For?” Defendant replied, “For
the one eighty.”
Bennett’s confession
Bennett’s interview with the detectives was secretly
recorded. The redacted recording was played for the jury.3
Bennett told the detectives he had been in Maxwell’s white
Camaro at the time of the Ace Liquor Store shooting. Bennett
had gone with Maxwell to the “Killen Quarters” cul-de-sac, where
they met the other participants in the shooting. The Killen
meeting place was their “hang out spot place.” Someone handed
Bennett the rifle, but he could not remember who.
They then went patrolling the Palm and Oaks
neighborhood and targeted the men standing outside the liquor
store because they were “more than likely” Palm and Oaks gang
members. Bennett did not know the men. Only Bennett and
Maxwell were in the white Camaro. Bennett was in the
passenger seat when “the [redacted] car started shooting so
[Bennett] just started shooting in the air” with the M-1 rifle and
fired until the ammunition ran out. Bennett claimed he did not
aim at anyone but just shot because “they were shooting.”
3 The recording was reviewed and redacted “per [defense
counsel’s] agreement and stipulation.” Before it was played to
the jury the trial court admonished them: “You may consider this
evidence only against Mr. Bennett and not against Mr. Graves.
In other words, do not consider Bennett’s statements to
investigators in assessing Graves’s guilt. Also, certain irrelevant
material is deleted and redacted from the interview by agreement
of the parties, the attorneys. Do not speculate as to what the
material might have been or why it was deemed irrelevant.
Redacted just means removed.”
12
Bennett explained the reason he fired the weapon was “if you be
in a gang you want recognition for . . . doin’ shit.” Afterward,
Bennett picked up his car and drove home. He left the rifle in the
Camaro.
One of the participants in the liquor store shooting was
Lindsey, nicknamed “Lizard.” Bennett claimed that Phillipus
was not there and did not participate in the shooting. When the
detectives asked him to identify persons depicted in a
photographic lineup, he refused, concerned that giving
information to the police would show “on [his] paperwork” in jail,
which “could be real bad.” Bennett denied knowing about the
shooting at the mechanic’s shop on Rosecrans Avenue.
Tyree interview and jailhouse recording
Detectives Brown and Espino interviewed Tyree at her
place of employment and described the wiretapped calls for her.
She told them she had seen the shooting video on the Internet,
and she recognized defendant’s car. When defendant learned
about the interview, he was upset she had spoken to the
detectives. In September 2008, after defendant’s arrest, he called
her from jail. Defendant said he could not understand why she
would tell the police the truth, and they argued. Tyree explained,
because the detectives showed her the evidence, she could not
“deny it”; and if she withheld information, she would be an
accessory.
Gang evidence
Based upon his experience and the information collected by
law enforcement, Detective Sanchez opined defendant, Bennett,
and Maxwell were active members of the MOB Piru gang, a
criminal street gang that claimed the northeast portion of
Compton as its territory. Gang members “put in work” for their
13
gang by committing violent crimes, which serves to maintain and
enhance their reputations within the gang. More violent crimes
earned greater status for the member. The gang’s primary
activities consisted of murder, assault, possession and selling of
firearms, robbery, burglary, narcotic sales, vandalism, and petty
theft.
Gangs usually defended their territory with graffiti and by
committing violent crimes against rivals inside and outside their
territory. The MOB Piru gang’s primary rival was the Palm and
Oaks Crips gang, which claimed the area that encompassed the
Ace Liquor Store. The store was known as a “hang out” for Palm
and Oaks Crip gang members. In response to a hypothetical
question based on the facts of this case, Deputy Sanchez opined
that the crimes were committed for the benefit of the MOB Piru
gang.
Defendant presented no evidence.
Defendant’s section 1172.6 petition
In January 2019, defendant filed a petition for vacatur and
resentencing under now-section 1172.6. Counsel was appointed.
Despite the jury being instructed regarding natural and probable
consequences, the trial court denied the petition on November 10,
2020, without issuing an order to show cause. On appeal, the
parties agreed the denial should be reversed. Accordingly, this
court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter
for the issuance of an order to show cause and an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
On remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause.
On October 6, 2023, the court held an evidentiary hearing at
which defendant argued, and the court agreed, due to the
intervening passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
14
Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), he was eligible for resentencing on both
his murder and attempted murder convictions. Relying on the
evidence adduced at trial, the People argued defendant remains
“guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt of murder and attempted
murder as a direct aider and abettor with malice aforethought.”
Defendant argued there was no evidence establishing he knew
what the shooter intended to do or he intended to aid the
commission of the act. Instead, he argued, there was only
evidence of his actions after the shooting.
After reviewing the trial record and entertaining the
parties’ arguments, the court denied defendant’s petition.
Specifically, the court pointed to defendant’s role as “the driver of
the gray automobile where shots were fired,” the gang-related
motive and evidence demonstrating it was a “planned attack,”
defendant’s statement “that the shooter had bad aim,” along with
his other statements captured “through wiretaps acknowledging
the crime, speaking to others about the crime, [and] never
denying the crime or that he knew the crime was going to
occur . . . .” Ultimately, the court found beyond a reasonable
doubt, based on the evidence presented at trial, defendant was
guilty of the crimes of murder and attempted murder as a direct
aider and abettor.
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
15
murder (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984) and narrowed
the felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel)). Section
188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based
solely on one’s participation in a crime and requires proof of
malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised
felony-murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e). The latter
provision now requires the People to prove the defendant was the
actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder
who had the intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or a major
participant in an underlying felony listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), who acted with reckless indifference to human
life as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2 (§ 189, subd.
(e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448).
Senate Bill 775, effective January 1, 2022, subsequently
clarified the amendments to sections 188 and 189 also applied to
attempted murder convictions. (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 544 (Coley).) As a result, under section 1172.6
“[a] person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine” may petition the superior
court to vacate their conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts if the petitioner could not now be convicted of
attempted murder because of the changes to sections 188 and
189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
“‘Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of
a petition declaring that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3).) The trial court then reviews the petition to determine
whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner
16
is entitled to relief. (Id., subd. (c).)’” (People v. Oyler (2025) 17
Cal.5th 756, 836, as modified July 16, 2025.) If the petition
states a prima facie case for relief, the trial court must issue an
order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to
vacate the conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At that
hearing, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The prosecution therefore must prove that the defendant
personally harbored an intent to kill. (People v. Das (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 954, 960.) And if the prosecution contends the
defendant is guilty as an aider and abettor, it must also prove
that the defendant “‘aid[ed] the commission of th[e] offense with
“knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with]
an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”’” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
B. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence.
(People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Under this
standard, “‘[w]e “‘examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
[Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job
in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the
relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
17
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
(People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 509.)
C. Aider and abettor versus natural and probable
consequences
An aider and abettor may be held criminally liable for the
same crime as the direct perpetrator. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 843 (Gentile), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in People v. Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th 756;
People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) “Because aiders
and abettors may be criminally liable for acts not their own, cases
have described their liability as ‘vicarious.’” (McCoy, at p. 1117.)
However, their liability is “not entirely vicarious.” (Ibid.) Their
“guilt is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts
and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.”
(Ibid.)
The Supreme Court has identified the three mental states
and acts defining direct aiding and abetting as follows: “‘(a) the
direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct
perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of
the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s
actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists
the achievement of the crime.’” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49
Cal.4th 79, 117.)
On the other hand, “under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the
offense he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target
offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of
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the crime the accomplice aided and abetted . . . .” (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 843; see People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401,
441.) Culpability for the direct perpetrator’s crime is therefore
imputed to the accomplice based solely on the accomplice’s
participation in the separate target crime. (Gentile, at pp. 843–
844.)
D. Attempted murder and “kill zone” theory
“To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution
must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ [Citation.] When a single act is charged as an attempt
on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element
must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted
murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one
attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent
doctrine.” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 591, 602.) With
regard to attempted murder, however, there the Supreme Court
has “expressly embraced the concept of a concurrent intent to kill
as a permissible theory for establishing the specific intent
requirement of attempted murder.” (Ibid.) This concurrent
intent theory is referred to as the “kill zone.” (Id. at p. 603.)
The kill zone theory is an express malice theory of
culpability and a “theory for establishing the specific intent to kill
required for conviction of attempted murder.” (People v.
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) Under the kill zone theory,
“a defendant may be convicted of the attempted murder of an
individual who was not the defendant’s primary target.” (Id. at
p. 596.) “The kill zone theory permits a jury to infer a
defendant’s intent to kill an alleged attempted murder victim
from circumstantial evidence (the circumstances of the
19
defendant’s attack on a primary target).” (Id. at p. 597; see
People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 193 (Mumin) [“a kill zone
is an area which a defendant intentionally creates in order to kill
all those within it to ensure the primary target’s death”].)
Thus, concurrent intent is simply a reasonable inference
the jury or trier of fact may draw in a given case based on the
circumstances of the attack. (Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 193.) To convict a defendant under the kill zone theory, the
jury must find the “defendant intended to kill everyone in the kill
zone as a means of killing the primary target.” (Canizales, supra,
7 Cal.5th at pp. 607–608, fn. 5.) Accordingly, the kill zone theory
does not dispose of the requirement that the jury find an intent to
kill and instead allow the jury to impute malice.
II. Analysis
As discussed, Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill 775
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to attempted murder. (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 191, 193 [Senate Bill 775 “clarified Senate Bill 1437
by amending section [1172.6] to make clear the natural and
probable consequences doctrine no longer supplies accomplice
liability to attempted murder”].) Thus, section 1172.6 “applies by
its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (§ [1172.6], subd. (a) [‘A person
convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition’].)” (Coley,
supra, 77 Cal. App.5th at p. 548.)
Defendant’s jury was instructed on both direct aiding and
abetting and natural and probable consequences. As a result,
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d), at which the prosecution had to prove
20
defendant harbored intent to kill and is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under the current law. The record
demonstrates, during the hearing, the trial court weighed the
evidence and found beyond a reasonable doubt defendant was a
direct aider and abettor who had the intent to kill Ledford and
Davis.
On appeal, defendant does not attack the trial court’s
finding he was a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill.
Defendant agrees the specific intent to kill Ledford and Davis
supplied the requisite intent to kill Herrera under the
transferred intent doctrine. He argues, instead, the attempted
murder convictions in counts 2 and 5 (Avila and Martinez) should
be vacated because the circumstances of the shooting “do not
support the inference that the shooters specifically intended to
kill everyone present,” as required by the kill zone theory, and
thus there was no intent to kill Avila and Martinez.
Alternatively, defendant argues, “to the extent those factors . . .
prove the requisite intent for the shooters, they do not support
concluding that Mr. Graves harbored that same broad intent.”
We disagree.
A. Defendant was a direct aider and abettor
Though defendant’s jury was instructed on both natural
and probable consequences and direct aiding and abetting, during
closing arguments, the People focused on a theory of direct aiding
and abetting. Specifically, the People said, “for [defendant] as to
[the attempted murder counts] . . . you do need to go into whether
or not he aided and abetted in the shooting of those four victims.
[¶] And the reason why natural and probable consequences
shouldn’t even be applied to these two is the following. . . . [¶] So
for [defendant] the question would be: did he aid and abet in the
21
murder of Kyutza Herrera; and did he aid and abet in the
attempted murders of the four other victims?” The prosecutor
then went through each required finding under aiding and
abetting: did defendant know what the shooter intended to do,
did defendant intend to aid the shooter before or during the
crime, and did defendant’s “words and conduct . . . , in fact, aid
and abet the commission” of the offense.
Next, the prosecutor went through all the evidence pointing
to defendant’s role as a direct aider and abettor—defendant was a
member of MOB Piru, he along with three other members went
into rival gang territory to commit the shooting, defendant along
with others committed three other shootings with the same
modus operandi, the guns and one of the cars used in the
shooting belonged to defendant, and the two cars used in the
shooting caravanned in a “military-like” operation with
defendant “leading the pack.” She argued the “undisputed
evidence clearly illustrate[d] beyond a reasonable doubt every
element that you have to find in finding [defendant] guilty as an
aider and abettor.” During her rebuttal, the prosecutor again
argued “[defendant] is guilty as an aider and abettor to all the
charges because of the several things that he did.”
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
pointed to defendant’s behavior before, during and after the
offense in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant was
guilty as a direct aider and abettor. The court found the evidence
established defendant was the driver of the Mustang and his
statement that the shooter had “bad aim” demonstrated his
intent to kill alleged rival gang members, Ledford and Davis.
Substantial evidence supports these findings. Moreover, there is
evidence the guns used in the attack belonged to and were
22
supplied by defendant. This, along with the level of coordination
involved where two cars were used in tandem to complete the
shooting, provides further support for the court’s ruling.
B. Defendant had concurrent intent to kill Avila
and Martinez
As discussed, defendant does not dispute he harbored
specific intent to kill Ledford and Davis. Instead, he argues the
evidence of concurrent intent to kill Avila and Martinez is
insufficient.
During trial, the theory of guilt for the attempted murder of
Avila and Martinez was concurrent intent to kill everyone in the
zone around the primary targets, Ledford and Davis—the kill
zone theory. The prosecutor argued the evidence demonstrated
the shooters had the intent to kill Ledford and Davis and created
a kill zone around them based on the number rounds fired,
placement of the bullets, and the coordinated “military-like
operation.”
The kill zone instruction given to defendant’s jury provided:
“A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at
the same time intend to kill anyone in a particular zone of harm
or ‘kill zone.’ [¶] In order to convict the defendant of the
attempted murder of Carols Avila, Count 2, or Marcello Martinez,
Count 5, or both, the People must prove that the defendant not
only intended to kill Timthy Ledford, Count 3, or Ronald Davis,
Count 5 or both, but also either intended to kill Carlos Avila
and/or Marcello Martinez, or intended to kill anyone within the
kill zone. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt whether the
defendant intended to kill Avila or Martinez or intended to kill
Ledford or Davis by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you
23
must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of
Avila or Martinez.” (Former CALCIM No. 600.)
In this regard, the jury was not instructed it need not find
defendant harbored malice toward a particular victim. On the
contrary, the kill zone instruction provided the jury could only
find defendant guilty of attempted murder if it found either he
had the specific intent to kill Martinez and Avila as the primary
targets, or he intended to kill Martinez and Avila because they
were in the kill zone created around the primary targets (Ledford
and Davis).
At the hearing on defendant’s petition, the trial court found
beyond a reasonable doubt defendant was a direct aider and
abettor with the intent to kill all of the victims. Nothing in the
use of a concurrent intent theory of liability changes the
requirement that defendant harbor malice and an intent to kill.
We find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling.
To the extent defendant challenges whether the jury should
have been instructed on the kill zone or the validity of kill zone
instruction given in his case, any perceived error “has nothing to
do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that gave rise to
section 1172.6’s petition process.”4 (People v. Burns (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 862, 865; see also People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936–937.) Neither Senate Bill 1437 nor
4 Defendant may raise any claim of instructional error under
Canizales in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See In re
Sambrano (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 724, 731–732, disapproved on
other grounds in Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 209, fn. 11
[considering habeas petition seeking reversal of attempted
murder convictions due to erroneous kill zone instruction].) We
express no opinion on the merits of such a petition.
24
Senate Bill 775 made changes to the law to limit liability for
attempted murder on a concurrent intent theory. Therefore,
defendant has not established he “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189” as a result of Senate Bill 1437 and Senate
Bill 775. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding defendant is guilty as a direct aider and abettor, and,
consequently, the court properly denied his petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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