People v. Parrish CA2/6

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Filed 10/31/25 P. v. Parrish CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335071
(Super. Ct. No. 22F04712)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

BRADLEY NORMAN
PARRISH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Bradley Norman Parrish appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of the willful and malicious arson of forest
land (Pen. Code,1 § 451, subd. (c); count 1). In a bifurcated trial,
Parrish admitted four prior felony arson convictions (§ 451.1,
subd. (a)(1)) and three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–

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Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). The trial court sentenced Parrish to
25 years to life.
Parrish contends the judgment should be conditionally
reversed because the court erred in not holding a hearing to
substitute new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2
Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). He also contends the court imposed an
unauthorized sentence when it imposed but stayed the
enhancements for a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and
prior felony arson convictions (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(1)). Parrish
further contends the abstract of judgment incorrectly includes
fines and fees the court struck because it found Parrish could not
pay. We strike the enhancements for prior convictions and
correct the errors in the abstract of judgment but otherwise
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At an October 4 pretrial hearing, defense counsel declared
a doubt about Parrish’s competence to stand trial. Counsel
believed Parrish was “in a manic phase.” Parrish interrupted,
stating, “[Y]ou’re not a psychiatrist,” and told the trial court, “I
don’t know why he’s going against my will. . . . I would like to
dismiss him as my lawyer if that’s possible.” The court said, “We
can potentially talk about that. At this point, though, he is your
attorney. And having declared a doubt about your competence, I
have very limited options.” Parrish countered, “Do I seem
incompetent to you?” The court said, “[Y]ou don’t—right now—
[¶] . . . [¶] other than you’re interrupting me constantly and I
need to make a record.”
The court continued, “So my options are limited. And as
you pointed out, we are not doctors, so I am going to appoint a
doctor to evaluate you.” Parrish interrupted the court, and it

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admonished him, stating, “Don’t interrupt me.” Parrish then
interrupted his lawyer, and the court remarked that Parrish
“seem[ed] a little agitated.”
Parrish then asked the court, “Will you at least read my
letter I wrote to you?” His counsel objected, and Parrish
interrupted, stating, “I don’t care what you want, Ray. Quit
talking for me.” The court noted that Parrish was “constantly
interrupting” but would “hear from [Parrish] briefly.” Parrish
said, “If you tell him to shut up,” referring to his lawyer. The
court said it would not, and Parrish stated, “He’s my lawyer. I
don’t want him screwing things up for me. [¶] . . . [¶] He’s a
terrible lawyer.”
The court said it was appointing a doctor to evaluate
Parrish because his lawyer had “declared a doubt.” (§§ 1368,
1369, subd. (a)(1).) Parrish responded, “No, he hasn’t. He’s fired.
I don’t want him in my corner anymore. He’s terrible.” The court
said, “Well, we can discuss that issue in the future.” It scheduled
a hearing for three weeks later to receive the doctor’s report.
Parrish again interrupted the court, stating he was not
“sitting in jail for another three weeks because my lawyer thinks
I am manic.” He continued to interrupt, stating, “I’m getting
angry.” The bailiff admonished Parrish to “[p]lease stop talking.”
Parrish said he was “sitting in jail for three months over a bogus
fucking arson charge.” He added, “I would like to fire, and I’m
getting really tired of the way you people are shoving me around
like an animal in a cage. I’m really getting sick of this bullshit.”
The court again admonished Parrish, stating, “Well, sir,
now it’s appearing to me that you may very well not be competent
to stand trial. You’re not able to follow the directives I’m giving
you, and if you continue to interrupt me, we’re going to have Mr.

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Parrish taken from the courtroom. Do you want to stay?”
Parrish said he did. The court suspended criminal proceedings
and said, “And we can—once we’ve dealt with that issue, we can
deal with the issue of whether [present counsel] will continue to
be your attorney, but I need to get the report before I do that.”
Parrish said he did not want to wait three weeks before
returning to court. He said the court could “ignore” what his
lawyer had said. The court said it could not “after the way you’ve
behaved today.” Parrish responded, “I’m behaving just fine. It’s
you people that are out of your fucking minds.” The court then
had Parrish removed from the courtroom, stating, “I’m sorry.
Don’t cuss in my courtroom. You’re being removed now.” Parrish
asked the court to read “this,” referring to his letter, and the
court said, “We’ll see you on the 25th. No, I’m not going to read it
now.” Parrish then referred to the court as a “pussy bitch.” A
case docket entry reflects, “The Court removes Defendant from
Courtroom due to outburst.”
The parties returned to court on October 25. Parrish did
not renew his request for a Marsden hearing. Instead, he read
his letter to the court. He also agreed to cooperate with meeting
a doctor for a competency evaluation. He thanked the court. At
the end of the hearing, Parrish said, “Good seeing you, Ray.”
The parties returned to court for receipt of the doctor’s
report, but the hearing was continued because Parrish was “not
cooperating in removal from his cell and appear[ed] to be
evidencing acute psychotic symptoms.” A few weeks later the
parties returned to court with Parrish present. The parties
submitted on the doctor’s report and the court committed Parrish

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to the state hospital for competency restoration. Parrish again
thanked the court.
Parrish was later found competent to stand trial and the
court reinstated criminal proceedings. He waived his speedy trial
rights. The parties then appeared in court on 19 separate
occasions, including March 14, April 4, May 9, May 23, and June
13; on July 6 when Parrish agreed to withdraw his plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity; on July 11 when he agreed to
bifurcate trial on his prior arson convictions; on July 13 when he
agreed with his lawyer’s decision to not object to a 20-page
transcript of a statement made by Parrish to a law enforcement
officer; a five-day jury trial held on July 14, 17, 18, 19, and 20; on
July 21, when Parrish admitted the alleged prior arson and
strike convictions; and additional posttrial hearings, including
sentencing, on September 19, November 7, December 12, January
23, and January 25. At no point did Parrish renew his request
for a Marsden hearing. And at no time did Parrish express
dissatisfaction with his lawyer.
The jury convicted Parrish of the willful and malicious
arson of forest land (§ 451, subd. (c); count 1) and acquitted him
of recklessly burning forest land (§ 452, subd. (c); count 2). In a
bifurcated trial, Parrish admitted four prior felony arson
convictions (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(1)) and three prior strike
convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). The
court denied a motion to strike the priors pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. It imposed but
stayed the enhancements for a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd.
(a)) and prior felony arson convictions (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(1)). It
stayed the punishment for these enhancements because of the
“overarching mitigating character of the mental illness that I

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think is at play here.” It sentenced Parrish to 25 years to life,
which it found “more than adequate punishment.”
DISCUSSION
Abandonment of Marsden request
Parrish contends we should conditionally reverse the
judgment because the trial court did not conduct a Marsden
hearing on October 4. He requests we direct the trial court to
conduct a Marsden hearing and order a retrial if the Marsden
motion is granted. We decline to do so.
A criminal defendant is “entitled to competent
representation.” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690). A
defendant may move to substitute appointed counsel pursuant to
Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 either pre- or postconviction.
(Smith, at p. 694.) The decision whether to grant the defendant’s
motion “ ‘is within the [sound] discretion of the trial court.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 690–691.) Before exercising that discretion the court “must
give the defendant the opportunity to explain the reasons for
desiring a new attorney,” and “ ‘must consider any specific
examples of counsel’s [alleged] inadequate representation . . . the
defendant wishes to enumerate.’ ” (Id. at p. 690.) A “defendant is
entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.)
A formal Marsden motion is not required. A defendant
need only “clearly indicate to the trial court ‘in some manner’ that
he or she is requesting the discharge and replacement of the
appointed counsel.’ ” (People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1171, 1178 (Armijo ).) “[O]nce the defendant clearly indicates to

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the trial court a request for the discharge and replacement of
appointed counsel, the court must hold a hearing to allow the
defendant to explain the basis for the request.” (Id. at p. 1179.)
Denial of a Marsden hearing “is legal error that compels
reversal of the defendant’s conviction unless the record shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.”
(Armijo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1179.) A Marsden hearing is
required even when counsel declares a doubt about the
defendant’s mental competency and the trial court suspends
criminal proceedings. (People v. Govea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
57, 61.) “Hearing a Marsden motion during a competency
hearing does not reinstate criminal proceedings against the
defendant.” (People v. Solorzano (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1063,
1069.)
However, a defendant who makes a timely Marsden motion
may abandon their request by their postmotion conduct. (People
v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 981–982 (Vera); People v.
Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 355, 361 (Jones ).
In Vera, the defendant made a Marsden motion and began
listing some of the reasons he believed his counsel was
ineffective. (Vera, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.) The trial
court heard several of the defendant’s concerns but concluded the
hearing and denied the motion without prejudice because a jury
in another matter was waiting to enter the courtroom. (Id. at p.
976.) “[T]he trial court offered defendant the opportunity for a
further hearing,” but the defendant did not renew his Marsden
motion. (Vera, at pp. 977, 981.) The Court of Appeal concluded
the defendant abandoned his Marsden motion, reasoning, “While
we are aware of no precedent finding abandonment of a Marsden
motion, it is established that a defendant’s conduct may amount

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to abandonment of a request to represent himself under Faretta
v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. [Citations.] If a defendant can
abandon his request to substitute himself for counsel, a
defendant can abandon his request to substitute another counsel.
We conclude that defendant abandoned his unstated complaints
about counsel by not accepting the court’s invitation to present
them at a later hearing.” (Vera, at pp. 981–982.)
In Jones, the defendant filed a Marsden motion on April 15,
and the court stated it would hear the motion on April 27. The
trial and Marsden motion were then continued several times.
(Jones, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 360.) But the defendant
“never again brought the matter to the trial court’s attention
despite having been present in court a dozen times before his
trial began.” (Id. at p. 362.) The Court of Appeal rejected the
defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in not conducting
a Marsden hearing because the defendant “had the duty of
bringing his motion to the trial court’s attention at a time when
the oversight could have been rectified. [Citation.] We conclude
defendant’s failure to raise the issue before the matter proceeded
to trial constituted abandonment of his claim.” (Jones, at p. 362.)
Jones relied on the forfeiture rule discussed in People v. Braxton
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 814, which held that a defendant could
forfeit a motion for a new trial “by failing to press for a hearing or
by acquiescing in the court’s failure to hear the new trial motion.”
“[A] party may not challenge on appeal a procedural error or
omission if the party acquiesced by failing to object or protest
under circumstances indicating that the error or omission
probably was inadvertent.” (Id. at pp. 813–814.)
Here, Parrish “clearly” indicated on October 4 that he
wanted to discharge his attorney after he declared a doubt.

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Parrish stated, “I would like to dismiss him as my lawyer if that’s
possible.” The trial court did not expressly decline to hold such a
hearing. Nor did the court expressly deny Parrish’s request. The
court said, “We can potentially talk about that,” and said that it
had “very limited options.” It set a date three weeks later for
receipt of the doctor’s report.
The parties returned to court on October 25. But rather
than request a Marsden hearing, Parrish asked the court to let
him read the letter he referred to on October 4. While criminal
proceedings had been suspended, the trial court allowed Parrish
to read his letter out loud.
The letter did not suggest Parrish wanted to fire his
attorney. Nor did the letter suggest Parrish was dissatisfied with
his lawyer. By all accounts, Parrish had jettisoned his request
for a Marsden hearing.
Nor did Parrish request a Marsden hearing during the next
20 court appearances when he was personally present with his
lawyer. Rather than request a Marsden hearing or express any
dissatisfaction with his lawyer, Parrish waived time for a speedy
trial, withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, agreed
to bifurcate trial on his prior arson and strike convictions, agreed
with his lawyer’s strategy to not object to evidence, attended his
entire trial, did not object to his lawyer waiving an opening
statement, admitted the alleged prior arson and strike prior
convictions, and did not object to numerous continuances of his
sentencing hearing. Parrish’s conduct reflects a knowing
acquiescence to his lawyer’s assistance.
Here, the trial court’s decision to wait for the doctor’s
report before holding a formal Marsden hearing had the same
effect as denying the Marsden motion without prejudice, as in

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Vera. And like the defendants in Vera, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at
pages 981–982 and Jones, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pages 361–
362, Parrish’s failure to renew his request constituted
abandonment. (See also People v. Skaggs (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
1, 7 [defendant abandoned purported request for self-
representation by failing to raise it in subsequent proceedings
and silently acquiescing to representation by appointed counsel].)
Because we affirm the judgment on this basis, we do not reach
the Attorney General’s contention that any error was harmless.
Reversal is not warranted.
Sentencing errors
Parrish contends the trial court erred when it imposed but
stayed the enhancement for a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd.
(a)) that was not alleged, and when it imposed but stayed an
enhancement for prior felony arson convictions (§ 451.1, subd.
(a)(1)). The Attorney General correctly concedes and additionally
contends we can modify the judgment without a remand. We
agree.
“A claim that a sentence is unauthorized . . . may be raised
for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction
whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.”
(People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6, citing People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17.) A sentence is
unauthorized when it includes punishment for a prior serious
felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)) that was not alleged.
(§ 1170.1, subd. (e); People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 953.)
It is also improper to stay the punishment for an enhancement,
as opposed to striking it. (Scott, at p. 354, fn. 17; People v. Lopez
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364.)
Here, the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by

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staying the punishment for a prior serious felony enhancement
that was not alleged in the information. The court also erred in
staying, as opposed to striking, the enhancement for Parrish’s
prior arson convictions. But the court stated a sentence of 25
years to life was “more than adequate punishment” and “more
than [it] would care to hand down” because of the “overarching
mitigating character” of Parrish’s mental illness. Because the
court “ ‘ “clearly indicate[d]” ’ ” it would not impose these
enhancements, remand is not required. (People v. Salazar (2023)
15 Cal.5th 416, 431.) We modify the judgment and strike the
enhancements. (§ 1260.)
Fines and fees in abstract of judgment
Parrish contends the abstract of judgment incorrectly
reflects the trial court imposed but stayed a $7,500 restitution
fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), $7,500 parole revocation restitution fine
(§ 1202.45), $40 court security fee (§ 1465.8), and $30 criminal
conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373). The Attorney General again
correctly concedes. The trial court struck these fines and fees
because it found Parrish did not have the ability to pay. Because
the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the abstract of
judgment (People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–
938), we order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.
DISPOSITION
We modify the judgment (§ 1260) and strike the stayed
punishments for the enhancements for a prior serious felony
(§ 667, subd. (a)) and prior felony arson convictions (§ 451.1,
subd. (a)(1)). We also strike the $7,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)), $7,500 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45),
$40 court security fee (§ 1465.8), and $30 criminal conviction fee
(Gov. Code, § 70373). The clerk of the superior court shall

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prepare an amended abstract of judgment striking these
enhancements and fines and fees and send a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

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Jesse J. Marino, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kim Aarons and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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