In re H.T.

CourtListener 10715023Calctapp30 de out. de 2025

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Filed 10/2/25; Certified for Publication 10/28/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

In re H.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C102265
Law.

THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No. JV140490)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

The juvenile court ordered H.T. discharged from a secure youth
treatment facility to a period of probation supervision in the community,
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 875. 1 After the probation
department struggled to find housing for H.T. that would comply with the
terms of his probation, H.T. asked the court to order the County of
Sacramento to pay for his housing at a transitional housing facility. The
court initially granted this request, but then refused to order further
payments because it believed it lacked the statutory authority to do so.
On appeal, H.T. contends the juvenile court misunderstood the scope
its discretion. We agree that the court had discretion to grant H.T.’s request
under section 900, subdivision (b). Accordingly, we will vacate the court’s
order and remand the matter for the court to exercise that discretion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
H.T. admitted committing a crime, and the juvenile court adjudged
him a ward of the court pursuant to section 725, subdivision (b). The court
committed H.T. to a secure youth treatment facility pursuant to section 875.
When H.T.’s baseline term of confinement ended, he was 21 years
old. The juvenile court held a series of probation discharge hearings
pursuant to section 875, subdivision (e)(3) to discuss a reentry plan prior to
discharging him to a period of probation supervision in the community.
The parties struggled to find housing for H.T. because of the confluence of
three unusual constraints. First, the proposed terms of his probation
prevented him from living at home with his mother. Second, H.T. could

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.

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not live at a community organization housing facility because it did not
accept people required to register under Penal Code section 290. Third, the
probation department could not place H.T. at its normal housing facility
because it was too close to a high school, which would violate the proposed
terms of his probation.
Given these constraints, H.T. requested the juvenile court order the
County of Sacramento to pay for him to live at a transitional housing
facility, at a cost of $500 for the security deposit and $850 for monthly rent.
The probation department objected, arguing that it could not pay for
transitional housing without a contract and that the property did not have
sufficient insurance to meet the contracting requirements. While
“exploring additional options” and “funding streams,” the probation
department suggested providing three days of hotel vouchers and then
helping H.T. get on a waiting list for a spot at an emergency shelter.
Counsel for the County of Sacramento objected that the juvenile court was
not authorized to make an order requiring the County to pay to house H.T.
Over these objections, the court ordered H.T. placed at the transitional
housing facility for 30 days and ordered the probation department to ensure
the security deposit and monthly rent were paid.
At the next hearing 30 days later, the probation department proposed
providing two weeks’ worth of hotel vouchers to H.T. plus gift cards for
food purchases and paying for a ride share service for transportation instead
of continuing to pay H.T.’s rent at the transitional housing facility. The
probation department also asserted that H.T. did not need housing because

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the emergency shelter program “is the County’s plan for dealing with
homelessness.” The counsel for the County of Sacramento reiterated and
expanded upon its prior objection that no statute explicitly authorized the
juvenile court to require the County to pay for H.T.’s housing. County
counsel also objected that the court could not order the County to pay for
something that violated its contracting regulations. H.T. continued to
request that the court order the County to pay his rent at the transitional
housing facility.
The juvenile court explained that it did not feel that it had “a clear
basis to grant the request.” Accordingly, the court ordered the probation
department to provide two weeks of hotel vouchers to H.T. plus
transportation and food support; the court scheduled another hearing in two
weeks.
At the next hearing, the parties agreed to continue the hearing for a
week with the probation department providing additional hotel vouchers for
the interim. At the continued hearing, held on September 11, 2024, H.T.’s
counsel informed the court that H.T. had secured employment and would
receive his first paycheck in approximately 24 days. H.T. again asked the
court to order the County to pay for his housing in the transitional housing
facility for that time period, at which point he would be able to pay for his
own housing. County counsel again objected and asserted that the court
lacked authority to make such an order. The court agreed and denied
H.T.’s request, explaining: “[T]he Court finds it doesn’t have any further

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authority to direct the county or the probation department to use -- to direct
them to use resources to address the housing needs of [H.T.]”
After the juvenile court denied H.T.’s request, the owner of the
transitional housing facility informed the court that H.T. was planning to
move back to her facility in seven days in order to avoid the unsafe
conditions around the hotel where he had been living and that they had a
“financial arrangement.” The court noted that H.T.’s mother had offered to
cover six days in a hotel for him and that the probation department had
offered to provide vouchers to cover a small number of additional days if
necessary. The owner of the transitional housing facility also offered to
provide an extra night or two for free if necessary.
H.T. filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s two orders
denying his requests to have the County pay for his housing at the
transitional housing facility.
DISCUSSION
H.T. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
incorrectly determined that it lacked discretion to order the County to pay
for his rent at the transitional housing facility for the period of
approximately 24 days between the final hearing and his receipt of his first
paycheck. The People respond that the issue is moot and, in any event, the
court correctly determined that it lacked discretion to issue such an order.
We agree with H.T.
I
Mootness

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As an initial matter, the People contend H.T.’s claim is moot
because he “secured housing at [the transitional housing facility] without
additional assistance from [the] probation [department],” which means “any
ruling from this [c]ourt would have no practical effect on [H.T.]’s claim.”
The People miss the point, which centers on payment as opposed to merely
housing.
“ ‘A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical
impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.’ ” (In re Stephon
L. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1231.) In this case, our review can have a
practical impact if we decide in H.T.’s favor and the juvenile court
exercises its discretion to require the County to pay for H.T.’s housing as
he requested. Because H.T. made a “financial arrangement” to pay for at
least some portion of his housing himself, a ruling in his favor on this
appeal can provide him with effective relief. (Cf. In re M.W. (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 586, 590 [holding minor and his family not liable for costs
of probation treatment program and ordering appropriate agency to
reimburse them for amounts they had paid].) We therefore consider the
merits of the appeal.
II
Discretion to Order a County to Pay for a Ward’s Housing
The parties disagree about the scope of the juvenile court’s
discretion to order the County to pay for housing for a ward of the court
who is being discharged to a period of probation supervision in the
community, pursuant to section 875, subdivision (e)(3). H.T. contends that

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section 900, subdivision (b) and section 727 authorize the court to order
such payments, in accordance with the aims of juvenile court law, as
outlined in section 202, subdivision (d). The People argue that these
sections are not specific enough to authorize the court to order payments for
housing and that section 900 does not apply to H.T. H.T. has the better
argument.
Section 900, subdivision (b) provides: “If it is necessary that
provision be made for the expense of support and maintenance of a ward of
the juvenile court or of a minor person concerning whom a petition has
been filed to declare the person a ward of the juvenile court in accordance
with this chapter, the order providing for the care and custody of the ward
or other minor person shall direct that the whole expense of support and
maintenance of the ward or other minor person be paid from the county
treasury. All orders made pursuant to this subdivision shall state the
amounts to be paid from the county treasury, and those amounts shall
constitute legal charges against the county.”
We review a juvenile court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. (In
re D.H. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 44, 51; accord Haraguchi v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 [trial court’s conclusions of law in
exercising its discretion are reviewed de novo].) “We start with the
statute’s words, which are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.”
(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 627.) “ ‘We interpret relevant terms in
light of their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related
provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine

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what interpretation best advances the Legislature’s underlying purpose.’ ”
(Ibid.) “When, however, a term has developed a particular meaning in the
law, we generally presume the legislative body used the term in that sense
rather than relying on ordinary usage.” (In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th
720, 730.) “[C]ourts do not construe statutory provisions ‘so as to render
them superfluous.’ ” (In re J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 210.) Rather, we
give statutes “ ‘a reasonable and common sense construction which
will render them valid and operative rather than defeat them’ ” (ibid.), and
“harmonize statutory provisions to avoid absurd results” (John v. Superior
Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 96).
The plain language of section 900, subdivision (b) authorizes the
juvenile court to order a county to pay “for the expense of support and
maintenance of a ward of the juvenile court” when “necessary.” The
People’s objections fail to create any ambiguity.
First, the objection that the statute is not specific enough to authorize
expenditures for housing ignores the meaning of the term “maintenance” in
this context, which has always included the cost of lodging, among other
necessities. (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1139, col. 2 [defining
“child maintenance” as “furnishing of necessaries . . . including food,
clothes, lodging, and school supplies” or as a “regular monetary
contribution sufficient to furnish such necessaries, esp. when made in
accordance with a court order”]; accord Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed. 1957) p.
1106, col. 1 [defining “maintenance” as “[t]he furnishing by one person to
another, for his support, of the means of living, or food, clothing, shelter,

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etc., particularly where the legal relation of the parties is such that one is
bound to support the other, as between father and child”]; County of San
Mateo v. Dell J. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1236, 1249 [discussing “ ‘costs incurred
in supporting and maintaining the juvenile’ ” as including “ ‘the necessaries
of life—food, clothing, shelter’ ”].) In other words, section 900 does
specifically authorize the court to order the County to pay for a ward’s
housing. 2
Second, section 900 has long been considered legislative
authorization for courts to mandate payments from public funds. (In re
Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 935 [citing § 900, among other authorities,
for the proposition that juvenile courts may order wards placed in private or
public facilities and given psychiatric treatment at public expense]; 64
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 567 (1981) [determining that ”[§] 900 gives the juvenile
court the authority to order the county in which a juvenile proceeding takes
place [(as opposed to the county where the juvenile resides)] to pay for the
support and maintenance of a minor in a court-ordered placement”].) This
means such an order does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or
make an improper gift of public funds. (See Payne v. Superior

2 Because section 900 authorizes such payments, we decline to reach
H.T.’s contention that section 727 also authorizes the juvenile court to
order the County to pay his rent at the transitional housing facility. Section
727 also authorizes orders for the maintenance and support of a ward of the
court but is not as specific as section 900 regarding whom the court can
order to make such payments.

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Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 919-920, 924 & fn. 6 [Legislature must
authorize expenditure of public funds before court can order such
payments]; In re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 580, 592-595
[no separation of powers violation or improper gift of public funds when
juvenile court ordered social services agency to expend funds to provide
discovery free of charge].)
Finally, the People’s apparent argument that subdivision (c) of
section 900 makes subdivision (b) inapplicable to H.T. evidences a lack of
understanding of the statutory scheme. Each subdivision of section 900
governs distinct categories under the juvenile law. Subdivision (a) governs
payments for “support and maintenance of a dependent child of the juvenile
court or of a minor person concerning whom a petition has been filed to
declare the person a dependent child of the juvenile court.” Subdivision (b)
governs payments for “support and maintenance of a ward of the juvenile
court or of a minor person concerning whom a petition has been filed to
declare the person a ward of the juvenile court.” And subdivision (c) of
section 900 governs children who are placed under supervision pursuant to
section 301 “in lieu of filing a petition or subsequent to dismissal of a
petition already filed,” as well as children who are under supervision under
section 654, subdivision (a) “in lieu of filing a petition to declare a minor a
ward of the court under Section 601 or requesting that a petition be filed by
the prosecuting attorney to declare a minor a ward of the court under
subdivision (e) of Section 601.3 or Section 602.” Thus, as the juvenile
court recognized when the People made this argument below, subdivision

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(c) expands the application of section 900 to additional categories under the
juvenile law rather than restricts its application. The People’s position--that
a ward must fit in one of the categories in subdivision (c) to be eligible for
maintenance--would render subdivision (b) mere surplusage because the
category is mutually exclusive with the categories covered by subdivision
(c). Our construction harmonizes the subdivisions instead.
The amendment history of section 900 further corroborates the
conjunctive purpose of subdivision (c). When the Legislature first moved
provisions relating to expenditures by counties for the support of wards to
section 900 in 1961, the section lacked subdivisions and governed only
wards and dependents. (Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, p. 3499; cf. Stats. 1943,
ch. 676, § 1, p. 2431.) In 1972, the Legislature added former subdivision
(b), which expanded the section to cover minors under supervision pursuant
to section 654. (Stats. 1972, ch. 924, § 1, p. 1651.) In 1976, the
Legislature expanded former subdivision (b) to cover minors under
supervision pursuant to former section 330. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1068, § 77, p.
4798.) Finally, in 2017, the Legislature split former subdivision (a) into
subdivision (a), governing dependents, and subdivision (b), governing
wards, moving former subdivision (b) to subdivision (c). (Stats. 2017, ch.
678, § 17.) This expanded the juvenile court’s discretion to order payments
for the support and maintenance of wards of the court because the
Legislature did not include the statutory cap on the amount of monthly
payments in subdivision (a) in the new subdivision (b). The amendment
also removed the ability of the county boards of supervisors to control the

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amount of the cap for wards, instead entrusting the determination of the
amount necessary to the discretion of the juvenile court. This history
demonstrates that the Legislature intended to expand, not limit, the juvenile
court’s power to order payments for the support and maintenance of wards
when it added subdivision (b) to the statute.
As evidenced by both the plain language and the history of section
900, subdivision (b), the Legislature has authorized juvenile courts to order
counties to pay for housing for wards of the court when necessary. Thus,
the juvenile court erred when it concluded it had no “further authority to
direct the county or the probation department to use . . . resources to
address the housing needs of [H.T.]” A “court abuses its discretion when it
misinterprets or misapplies the law.” (In re M.W. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
921, 931.) “Alternatively stated, if a trial court’s decision is influenced by
an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of
the full scope of its discretion, it cannot be said the court has properly
exercised its discretion under the law.” (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) In such a situation, “remand to the trial court is
required to permit that court to exercise informed discretion with awareness
of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.” (Id. at p. 16.)
Accordingly, we will vacate the juvenile court’s order denying
H.T.’s request to direct the County to pay for his rent at the transitional
housing facility for the period of approximately 24 days between the final
hearing and his receipt of his first paycheck. On remand, the juvenile court
must consider, under section 900, whether it was “necessary that provision

12
be made for the expense of support and maintenance of” H.T., in the form
of rent, at the time of the September 11, 2024, hearing. If so, the court shall
direct the County to pay the necessary expense or reimburse whoever
already paid the expense. If not, the court may again deny the request for
rent.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s September 11, 2024, order denying H.T.’s
request to have the County pay his rent at the transitional housing facility is
vacated. The matter is remanded for further consideration consistent with
this opinion.

/s/
Duarte, J.

We concur:

/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

/s/
Renner, J.

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Filed 10/28/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

In re H.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C102265
Law.

THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No. JV140490)

Plaintiff and Respondent, ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION FOR
v. PUBLICATION

H.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento
County, Joginder S. Dhillon, Judge. Order vacated and remanded.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donahue, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and
Caitlin Franzen, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October 2, 2025,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it
now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports
and it is so ordered.

BY THE COURT:

/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

/s/
Duarte, J.

/s/
Renner, J.

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