People v. Simmons CA6

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Filed 10/30/25 P. v. Simmons CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052058
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2309736)

v.

JOSEPH SIMMONS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Two San Jose police officers detained defendant Joseph Simmons when they
observed his Ford Escape parked in the area of Selma Olinder Park at night. During a
search of the vehicle’s sunglasses compartment for Simmons’ identification, an officer
found pills recognized to be Xanax and a substance recognized as crystal
methamphetamine. A later search of the remainder of the vehicle revealed items
including more suspected crystal methamphetamine, marijuana, a firearm, and a loaded
magazine.
Simmons moved to suppress all evidence found in his vehicle. The trial court
denied the motion, concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Simmons,
Simmons consented to the initial search of the vehicle’s sunglasses compartment, and the
items found in the initial search provided probable cause for the later search of the entire
vehicle. Simmons then pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon and two
drug offenses.
Simmons argues the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. We
conclude that the trial court did not err in its ruling, and thus we will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Simmons moved to suppress all evidence found in searches of his vehicle,
asserting that San Jose police officers violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in the searches. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
the motion to suppress. Officer Elias Vargas was the sole witness at the hearing.
Officer Vargas had a little more than two years of experience as a San Jose Police
Department officer by the time of the hearing. He had been involved in “five to ten”
cases involving possession of drugs for sale.
Officer Vargas testified that he and his partner were on patrol at night on July 21,
2023, in the area of Selma Olinder Park. He had “come across multiple stolen vehicles
that have either been abandoned or have been occupied within that area” and he had
“encountered drug users that go to Selma Olinder Park to either b[uy] drugs or consume
drugs as well.” Officer Vargas and his partner “would patrol that area almost every
single night that we worked,” and Officer Vargas had made “approximately between
three to five arrests” in that area, with “two to three of those” being drug-related arrests.
Officer Vargas testified that he had seen vehicles parked in that area on other occasions
after the park closed for the day and that he would conduct stops of such vehicles a
“majority” of the time “if we have time.”
At 10:37 p.m. Officer Vargas and his partner saw a blue Ford Escape parked in “a
cut-through that connects South 22nd Street and Woodborough Place that cuts behind
some houses” and is “kind of like a trail.” As Officer Vargas and his partner “drove the
trail,” Officer Vargas noticed the Ford Escape “parked halfway onto the dirt and halfway
onto the cement portion of the trail and it was also illegally parked as well . . . .” Officer
Vargas testified that he also suspected the vehicle could have been abandoned or stolen.
Officer Vargas testified that the vehicle was parked outside a fence that bounded a grassy

2
area of the park, but that it was parked in an area he believed was part of a trail, and that
the trail was part of the park.
Officer Vargas testified that he suspected the vehicle was parked in violation of
Vehicle Code section 22500 because it was parked “horizontally” and “almost on top of
that cinderblock,” occupying multiple spaces. Officer Vargas testified that he also
suspected the driver violated a San Jose Municipal Code provision by entering or
remaining in a city park when the park was closed.
The trial court admitted and considered two defense exhibits showing the location
of the vehicle in relation to the park. A photograph shows the vehicle parked alongside a
fence and on dirt, near a tree and a sign. A short video clip of this area, taken at a
different time, shows that the area depicted in the photograph was set back from a street,
past a short concrete driveway and a concrete walkway.
Officers activated their lights and sirens, as well as a light for visibility. As
officers emerged from their car, Simmons came out from the Ford Escape. Officers
instructed Simmons to approach them and to set down a shaving razor he was carrying,
and Simmons complied. Officers also conducted a patdown of Simmons, which revealed
nothing of note.
Officer Vargas then asked if Simmons had any form of identification, and
Simmons responded that his identification was in his vehicle. Officer Vargas testified
that he did not want Simmons to go back into his vehicle because he did not know if
Simmons might have any weapons in the vehicle. Thus, Officer Vargas testified: “I
asked if it was okay if I could go grab his identification and [Simmons] said yeah. He
said yes.” Simmons told Officer Vargas that the identification was in the sunglasses
compartment in the ceiling of the vehicle’s interior.
When Officer Vargas opened the sunglasses compartment, he “saw a bunch of
cards,” so he “grabbed everything that was in the compartment, took it out.” The items
Officer Vargas removed from the compartment included not only Simmons’

3
identification but also a bag of what Officer Vargas suspected were Xanax pills. Officer
Vargas also noticed a bag containing what he believed was crystal methamphetamine in
the panel of the driver’s door. He testified that he “didn’t have to move or manipulate
anything” to see the bag in the driver’s door. Officer Vargas testified that this initial
search for Simmons’ identification lasted “less than a minute” and that his “whole goal
was just to go inside the car and grab his ID . . . .”
Officer Vargas then returned to where Simmons was and asked Simmons “for
consent to search his vehicle or if there was anything else inside his vehicle that we
should be aware of.” Simmons replied that there might be a “narcotics pipe” inside the
vehicle. Officer Vargas testified that Simmons “became hesitant and did not want to give
us consent” but when Officer Vargas told Simmons that officers would search the car
based on probable cause, Simmons “kind of told us we could search his car.”
Officers then searched the vehicle. In the center console, they found “a large
quantity of suspected crystal methamphetamine along with multiple empty baggies,” a
firearm, a loaded magazine, a digital scale, and $40. They found “a large amount of
marijuana” in the trunk, and another digital scale and cell phones elsewhere in the
vehicle.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court first found that
officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Simmons. The trial court stated it was “not
sure” if officers had reasonable suspicion that Simmons violated Vehicle Code
section 22500, but officers reasonably suspected Simmons violated the San Jose
Municipal Code by entering or remaining in a city park when the park was closed to the
public. The trial court concluded that Simmons voluntarily consented to Officer Vargas
searching the vehicle for Simmons’ identification, and that the contraband found while
searching for identification provided probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle.
Simmons pleaded no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a
firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); possession for sale of

4
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); and possession for sale of a synthetic
stimulant (id., § 11375.5, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of the sentence
and placed Simmons on probation for two years with various terms and conditions.
II. DISCUSSION
Simmons argues that officers did not reasonably suspect he violated the Vehicle
Code or the San Jose Municipal Code when they detained him, and that his consent for
Officer Vargas to search the vehicle for his identification was not valid. He thus asserts
that evidence obtained from the vehicle must be suppressed.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures.’ In general, a law enforcement officer is required to obtain a
warrant before conducting a search. [Citation.] Warrantless searches ‘are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lopez (2019)
8 Cal.5th 353, 359 (Lopez).)
“A traffic stop is a seizure subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. [Citation.] We evaluate the legality of the traffic stop
under the rubric of federal constitutional law [citation], which requires ‘only reasonable
suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.’ [Citation.] ‘Reasonable suspicion
a law has been violated can be based on less than probable cause to believe a violation
has occurred but it cannot be based on mere speculation or hunch.’ [Citations.]
Reasonable suspicion ‘ “ ‘requires specific, articulable facts which, together with
objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is
engaged in criminal conduct.’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘An officer is entitled to rely on his
training and experience in drawing inferences from the facts he observes, but those
inferences must also “be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational
explanation.” ’ [Citation.] Accordingly, a lawful traffic stop occurs when the facts and

5
circumstances known to the police officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the
driver has violated the Vehicle Code or another law. [Citations.]” (People v. Nice (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937-938.)
“The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention
is ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of
a citizen’s personal security.’ [Citations.] In making our determination, we examine ‘the
totality of the circumstances’ in each case. [Citations.]” (People v. Wells (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.)
One exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to
consent. “The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be
voluntary, and “voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances,’ [citation].” (Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 40.) “If the validity
of a consent is challenged, the prosecution must prove it was freely and voluntarily
given—i.e., ‘that it was [not] coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to
a claim of lawful authority.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 445-
446.) “If consent is induced by an illegal arrest or detention, the illegality vitiates the
consent and may require suppression of seized evidence unless attenuating circumstances
dissipate the taint. [Citation.]” (People v. Lujano (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 188.)
If a traffic stop is lawfully carried out, the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement may apply. “The automobile exception provides ‘police who have probable
cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or
contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in which the
evidence might be found.’ [Citations.]” (People v. McGee (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 796,
801.) “Once an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile
exception, they ‘may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within
the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.’ [Citation.] Probable cause to search
exists ‘where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of

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reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears
the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search. [Citation.] ‘The standard
of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established.
We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719 (Redd).)
B. Analysis
We conclude that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Simmons. Following
the lawful stop, Simmons’ consent to look for his identification justified the initial search
of the vehicle. The contraband found in that initial search provided probable cause to
search the remainder of the vehicle. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Simmons’
motion to suppress.

1. Officers reasonably suspected Simmons of violating a municipal code
provision.
Officer Vargas testified that they found Simmons’ vehicle at 10:37 p.m. Simmons
does not dispute that the park was closed by that point. Simmons was prohibited by
municipal ordinance from “enter[ing] or remain[ing] in” the park after it was closed to
the public.1 (San Jose Mun. Code, § 13.44.240(A)(1).)
The trial court concluded that “Mr. Simmons’s presence in the park’s parking lot
is contemplated by the municipal code section prohibiting presence after closing and
therefore would supply the officers with reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop.” The trial

1
On our own motion, this court takes judicial notice of the municipal code
provision. (See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 501, fn. 3; The
Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 841, 852.)

7
court’s conclusion that Simmons’ vehicle was within a city park and therefore covered by
the municipal code provision constitutes a factual finding, and we defer to this factual
finding if supported by substantial evidence. (Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 719.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s factual finding that Simmons was on
park property after the park was closed. Officer Vargas testified both on direct and cross-
examination that Simmons’ vehicle was parked on what he believed was park property
with the vehicle at least partially resting on a park trail. He had experience with Selma
Olinder Park, and had encountered stolen vehicles and drug activity in the area. He
patrolled the area most nights he worked, and had previously conducted investigatory
stops on cars parked in that area. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer
Vargas about the park’s perimeter. Officer Vargas testified that while Simmons was
parked outside a fence, he was parked on a trail that connects Woodborough Place and
South 22nd Street and that this trail is considered park property according to a city Web
site he had reviewed. When shown the brief video clip of the area in question, Officer
Vargas reiterated his belief that the vehicle was parked on the trail.
Defense counsel then asked Officer Vargas: “Where he was located is a parking
spot, not the trail. Correct?” Officer Vargas responded: “Sure, I guess you could say
that,” before noting his belief that Simmons was parked incorrectly. On redirect, Officer
Vargas again testified that the trail on which he believed Simmons was parked constitutes
part of Selma Olinder Park, and that Simmons was prohibited from being on the trail after
the park closed.
The two defense exhibits from the motion hearing do not contradict Officer
Vargas’s testimony or the trial court’s finding that the vehicle was on park property. The
photograph shows the Ford Escape parked in a dirt area. This conflicts with Officer
Vargas’s testimony that the vehicle was partially parked on a concrete trail, but this
discrepancy does not benefit Simmons. The video shows that the area in which Simmons
was parked was well off the road, past a concrete driveway and inside the concrete trail

8
or walkway that runs along the park fence by which the vehicle was parked. Officer
Vargas testified that the trail is considered part of the park, and the exhibits show
Simmons was parked inside the trail. Officer Vargas’s testimony provided evidence that
supported the trial court’s factual finding that Simmons was located on park property
after hours in violation of the city municipal code.
Simmons asks this court to take judicial notice of two maps from the City of San
Jose’s Web site. The Attorney General did not respond to this request. We deny the
request for judicial notice, as Simmons does not demonstrate that the maps are a proper
subject for judicial notice. The maps were not submitted to the trial court, and
“[r]eviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the
trial court.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444,
fn. 3.) Simmons asserts that these maps are noticeable under Evidence Code section 452,
subdivisions (c) and (h). Subdivision (c) does not apply, as the maps are not “[o]fficial
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of” the state. Subdivision (h)
states that judicial notice may be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are not
reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by
resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” The maps do not fall within this
provision. The geography and boundaries of Selma Olinder Park are reasonably subject
to dispute; indeed, these matters are central to the parties’ disagreement on appeal. And
the maps are not “sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” merely because they
appear on a city Web site. (See Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 872, 889 [“we know of no ‘official Web site’ provision for judicial
notice in California”]; Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1586, 1605, fn. 10 [denying request for judicial notice of information contained on

9
various Web sites not introduced at trial, stating: “Simply because information is on the
Internet does not mean that it is not reasonably subject to dispute”].)
Even if we granted the judicial notice request, however, the maps do not assist
Simmons. Simmons argues that the maps show “a small portion of unmarked road
extending from the dead end of Woodborough Place to the border of the Five Wounds
Trail.” (Fn. omitted.) Simmons is correct: the maps depict a small, unmarked road
(what appears on the video to be a driveway) connecting the street to the park. However,
the maps do not demonstrate that this driveway is outside park property. In addition,
Simmons’ vehicle was not parked on the driveway, but past the driveway and the
concrete trail or walkway, on a dirt area directly next to a fence and a tree. The maps
depict the area inside the concrete trail or walkway as park property. Thus, the maps do
not demonstrate that the trial court’s factual finding was not supported by substantial
evidence.
Simmons argues that officers were mistaken that the vehicle was on park property
in violation of the ordinance. He does not demonstrate how the officers erred. However,
even if officers were mistaken about the precise boundaries of the park, this error was a
mistake of fact, not one of law, and officers reasonably suspected Simmons of a
municipal code violation despite any such factual mistake.
Had the officers been mistaken about the municipal code itself—for example, had
they believed the code prohibited entering a park between certain hours when the code
did not prohibit such conduct—this mistaken belief might render their suspicion
unreasonable. (See People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 862 [officer’s mistaken
belief that single out-of-state license plate on vehicle violated California law resulted in
lack of reasonable suspicion because “a pure mistake of law cannot provide objectively
reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop”]; People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th
636, 643-644 [officer’s mistaken belief that car with only one Arizona license plate
affixed violated Vehicle Code did not supply reasonable suspicion because “we do not

10
believe a suspicion founded on a mistake of law can constitute the reasonable basis
required for a lawful traffic stop”].)
However, “a mere mistake of fact will not render a stop illegal, if the objective
facts known to the officer gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot. [Citation.]” (United States v. Mariscal (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3d 1127, 1131.)
“[A]n officer’s correct understanding of the law, together with a good-faith error
regarding the facts, can establish reasonable suspicion. [Citation.]” (United States v.
King (9th Cir. 2001) 244 F.3d 736, 739 (King).)
Even assuming Simmons’ vehicle was outside the precise boundaries of the park,
based on their experience with the park and its boundaries, the officers had a reasonable
suspicion that Simmons violated the municipal code provision. The officers did not rely
on mere speculation or hunch. Officer Vargas testified that he had confirmed this
location was contained within the park’s boundaries from the city’s Web site. Nothing in
the record contradicts this conclusion. Officers stopped Simmons based on a correct
understanding of the municipal code, i.e., that it is unlawful to occupy the park after
certain hours. Here, the underlying municipal code provision prohibiting after-hours
occupancy of park property provided the legal justification for the stop, and the officers’
error, if any, was one of fact, i.e., the correct location of the park boundary. The record
evidence supports the conclusion that if the officers erred, it was “a good-faith error
regarding the facts” that established “reasonable suspicion” they were witnessing
criminal activity. (King, supra, 244 F.3d at p. 739.) The officers reasonably suspected
Simmons violated a municipal code provision, and they were permitted to detain
Simmons on this basis.2

2
Simmons also argues that he did not violate Vehicle Code section 22500 because
that section only prohibits parking in certain areas, none of which are implicated here.
While the trial court stated that “arguably” Simmons violated subdivision (a) of this
section, its ruling was based on the suspected municipal code violation. Thus, we do not

11
2. The ensuing searches of Simmons’ vehicle were lawful.
Following the lawful traffic stop, Simmons’ consent permitted officers to search
the vehicle for his identification. Simmons argues that his consent to search the vehicle
for his identification was “vitiated” by the alleged illegal detention. Because officers’
decision to detain Simmons was supported by reasonable suspicion, Simmons’ argument
necessarily fails.
Simmons also argues that his consent to search the vehicle for his identification
was invalid even if the stop was lawful because “a reasonable person would not have felt
free to refuse the officers’ request under the totality of the circumstances.” But the record
demonstrates that Simmons’ initial consent to search the vehicle for his identification was
voluntary. Nothing about Officer Vargas’s testimony indicated the stop was particularly
coercive. Simmons was able to leave his vehicle and approach officers. Officer Vargas
testified that “I asked if it was okay if I could go grab his identification,” and Simmons
replied affirmatively with no equivocation. Simmons told Officer Vargas where to find
the identification, further evincing his voluntary consent to this limited search.
Simmons cites People v. Shelton (1964) 60 Cal.2d 740 to assert that his initial
consent to search the vehicle’s interior for his identification was coerced. However,
Shelton does not support his argument. In Shelton, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant’s consent to search an apartment was not voluntary because
he was under arrest when he gave his consent and because he later refused to assist the
officers in gaining access to the apartment. (Id. at p. 745.) Here, Simmons was not under
arrest when he gave consent to retrieve his identification and he did not subsequently
refuse to cooperate.3

address the Attorney General’s argument that this Vehicle Code provision provided
reasonable suspicion to detain Simmons.
3
Because we conclude that Simmons voluntarily consented to the search of the
vehicle for his identification, we need not address the Attorney General’s alternative
argument that Officer Vargas had an independent right to enter the vehicle to retrieve
Simmons’ identification. However, as Simmons’ reply brief observes, the California

12
The discovery of pills suspected to be Xanax in the sunglasses compartment and
pills suspected to be crystal methamphetamine in the panel compartment of the driver’s
door supplied probable cause for officers to search the remainder of the vehicle.
Simmons does not contest this point.
Police officers reasonably suspected that Simmons violated a municipal code
provision, and thus they lawfully detained Simmons. Simmons’ consent permitted
Officer Vargas to conduct a limited search of the vehicle’s sunglasses compartment for
Simmons’ identification. The evidence found in this initial search provided probable
cause for officers to search the remainder of the vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in denying Simmons’ motion to suppress evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

Supreme Court has held that “the desire to obtain a driver’s identification following a
traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.” (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 357.)

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

________________________________
Danner, J.

________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H052058 People v. Simmons

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