In re F.S. CA4/2

CourtListener 10714046Calctapp29 de out. de 2025

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Texto completo

Filed 10/29/25 In re F.S. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re F.S., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085750

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400486)

v. OPINION

J.S. et al.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,

Judge. Reversed.

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant J.S.

Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant K.S.

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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

J.S. (Mother) and K.S. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional

finding and dependency disposition ordering family maintenance service to ensure F.S.

(Minor, a girl, born in December 2010) receives educational and related psychological

services to address her learning challenges, as well as regular, routine medical and dental

care. Minor had not attended school for four years, since May 2020, nor did her parents

arrange homeschooling or any services to address her autism or attention deficit

hyperactivity (ADHD) diagnoses. Before the outbreak of the global Covid-19 pandemic,

her parents regularly took Minor to medical and dental appointments. They did not do so

again, however, until social workers from the Riverside County Department of Social

Services (DPSS, or the Department) contacted the family. Before DPSS’s involvement,

they did take Minor to the emergency room for treatment of an eye infection that resolved

with the visit.

Mother and Father contend the juvenile court lacked statutory authorization to

assume dependency jurisdiction over Minor. They rely on the grounds DPSS asserted for

jurisdiction, each of which required “a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious

physical harm or illness” due to specified conduct or neglect. (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 300, subd. (b)(1).1) The Department concedes it is well-established that failure to

attend school does not by itself support jurisdiction based on a risk of serious physical

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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harm or illness. (In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999 (Destiny S.); In re Janet T.

(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377 (Janet T.).) The Department argues that three cavities

discovered and filled at dental appointments before the jurisdictional hearing sufficed to

show a substantial risk of serious future physical harm. No authority supports that

proposition. We therefore reverse the jurisdictional finding and remand the matter for

further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

In October 2024, DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect of Minor,

including that the home where she lived with Mother and Father (collectively, Parents)

smelled like a “dead animal.” The referral indicated that the residence was dark, the

windows were covered with bed sheets or loose clothes, and 13-year-old Minor was dirty,

had poor body hygiene and smelled foul, as did Mother. The referral arose after Father

said that Minor did not leave the home or go to school. He reportedly also said Minor

need not go outside because she would die before she turned 18, with the impending end

of the world.

A police welfare check arranged by DPSS disclosed no imminent safety concerns

for Minor. The home had sufficient food, no obvious safety hazards, and working

utilities. The responding officer found Parents to be “a little weird” and “off,” making no

eye contact during the visit. Minor, however, felt safe and perceived nothing wrong in

their care. Minor last attended school more than four years previously in May 2020,

when she was in elementary school. Someone had enrolled her to continue elementary

school in August 2020, but disenrolled her the same day. Parents never reenrolled her.

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Two social workers visited the home in November 2024. Upon their arrival,

Mother became upset and suspicious, wanted to “call the FBI on the neighbors,” and

presented as distracted and disengaged. She reiterated on random topics, was unable to

maintain the discussion, and stared into the distance, repeating statements.

The worker met with Minor, who disclosed she had been diagnosed with both

autism and ADHD. Father confirmed Minor did not receive treatment or services for

either condition since leaving school. Minor said her parents preferred home healthcare

methods but neither she nor her parents disclosed or elaborated on what they might be, if

any. Minor brushed her teeth, but had not seen a dentist “in a while.” Nor could she

recall the last time she had seen her doctor for a physical exam. An eye infection,

however, had progressed to requiring an emergency room visit within the last year. The

visit apparently resolved the issue, with no reoccurrence or need for further visits noted in

the record.

Minor, at age 13, claimed to still be enrolled in one of the elementary schools the

worker had checked. When asked why she was not attending classes during school

hours, Minor said she “ ‘logged off early today.’ ” She reported that she felt safe in the

home. She did not fear either of her parents, who sometimes had “ ‘screaming matches’ ”

over “ ‘things such as “the internet.” ’ ” Minor shared that she occasionally walked her

dog outside.

Mother claimed initially that Minor was homeschooled, but she was unable to

point to any supporting curriculum, textbooks, or resources. Mother confirmed Minor had

not been enrolled in school since 2020. In addition to “ ‘school shooters and the rest of

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the chaos in the world,’ ” she and Father worried that “LGBTQ” staff members at school

would “ ‘lure children [there] with candy to molest them.’ ” When Mother acknowledged

Minor’s autism diagnosis, Father interjected, yelling from the other room, “ ‘Stop

labeling [her]!’ ” Mother knew of services available from the Inland Regional Center, but

rejected aid there by stating that no one was allowed in her home. Mother claimed to be

administering “ ‘homeopathic’ ” remedies “ ‘to address [Minor’s] autism,’ ” but did not

say what they were.

Mother also confirmed that Minor had not seen a doctor since 2020. Mother said

Minor’s physician at that time required that she “ ‘be vaccinated,’ ” which Mother

refused. Mother did not seek substitute, regular medical care or checkups for Minor, nor

did Father, and neither ensured any dental care for Minor. Mother became defensive,

hostile, and loud when the worker raised the topic of schooling. Mother insisted it was

“ ‘her right not to have [Minor] in school.’ ” She also said she did not care if Minor “

‘drops dead and dies,’ ” made statements that she thought the world was ending, and

reiterated several times that she intended to move from the home. She did not say when

the move might take place or whether she would take Minor. Mother agreed to schedule

a physical for Minor. She also said she would call the school district “[that] week” to

inquire about “online school” for Minor, but “ ‘only once and that’s it.’ ”

When Father began yelling about the social workers “sinning,” Minor had to

intervene as if she were the parent. She requested that the social workers leave. As they

departed, Mother continued to talk about moving away. Shortly thereafter, Mother called

one of the workers and left several lengthy voicemails, which included complaints about

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Mother’s social security income being too high. She affirmed she was “willing” to

contact both a primary care physician for Minor and the school district. Mother later also

said she would contact Inland Regional Center regarding autism services.

Mother did not respond to the social worker’s subsequent follow-up phone call

and voicemail the next week. The worker made a trip to the home two days later but,

despite evident movement inside, no one answered the door. Nor did Mother answer her

phone.

On a home visit the next week, Minor answered the door. Father was home and

agreed to be interviewed. He confirmed Minor had not seen a doctor or dentist nor

received any schooling or services since 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic at that time.

He acknowledged Minor previously had been diagnosed with autism. He did not,

however, agree with the autism “ ‘label.’ ” Father was on dialysis, for which he received

treatment at home 10 hours a day. Father denied that he or Mother suffered from any

mental health conditions. Nothing indicated any steps had been taken to enroll Minor in

school or to see a doctor or a dentist. Father admitted Minor “has not seen a doctor or

dentist since 2020,” but “was unable to provide an explanation,” according to the social

worker.

DPSS filed a dependency petition seeking juvenile court supervision of Minor

(§ 300, subd. (b) [failure to protect]), with a recommendation for family maintenance

services. The court found a prima facie basis for the petition and ordered that Minor

remain in her parents’ custody as DPSS recommended.

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Later that month, Mother told the social worker that she took Minor to the doctor

and the dentist for checkups, stating that neither visit indicated any concerns. Minor, in

contrast, disclosed that the dentist found multiple cavities that the dentist wanted to fill,

but Mother had not made the appointment. Minor told the social worker she would

remind Mother to do so. Mother told the worker that in the years before the pandemic,

she scheduled regular doctor and dentist visits for Minor. In speaking with the social

worker, Mother continued to refer to the global outbreak of the Covid-19 virus as if it

“had just occurred.” Her discussion with the social worker suggested to the worker other

indications of paranoia, but Mother said she only “ha[d] anxiety and depression.”

Parents both acknowledged Minor received special education resources when she

had been enrolled in school. They knew an “Individualized Education Program” (IEP)

had been developed for Minor, but Father could not recall any of its specifics, and Mother

gave no indication she knew either.

Mother provided follow-up information regarding Minor’s medical and dental

appointments at the social worker’s request. The social worker’s report reflected the

information as follows: “On November 27, 2024, [Mother] went to neighborhood

healthcare. In the notes, it indicates [Minor] passed the hearing and vison test, the parent

declined vaccinations, diet and exercise was discussed, and the family was advised of

dental care every six months and yearly vision exams.” The social worker thanked

Mother for the information. She also noted Mother’s update that Minor had a dental

appointment scheduled approximately seven weeks later, in mid-February 2025, about 10

days before the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.

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Further updates for the hearing reflected that, as of the end of December 2024, a

referral for Minor for mental health services had gone unfulfilled. The intake manager

made multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact Minor’s parents to schedule services for

Minor. Parents claimed in December 2024 that they were “working on” enrolling Minor

in school. As of mid-January 2025, Minor was not enrolled in any public school, and her

parents provided no information on whether they arranged private schooling or

homeschooling for Minor.

At the jurisdiction hearing in late February 2025, counsel for Father represented

that Parents were still “currently working with the Department on trying to get [Minor] an

IEP, as well as working with the Regional Center.” Counsel for DPSS stated in contrast

that Parents had been “minimally cooperative.” No mental health services had been

arranged for Minor, nor school enrollment, nor any IEP or substitute measures. To the

contrary, DPSS summarized that “almost nothing has been done,” a situation exacerbated

by “a very difficult time having consistent phone contact with the parents.” DPSS sought

dependency jurisdiction on grounds that included lack of progress on “any necessary

steps to address [Minor’s] mental health diagnoses.” Minor’s counsel concurred. DPSS

acknowledged that, with its involvement, Minor was “seeing a dentist . . . now,” whereas

previously that had not been “happening before the Department investigated.”

The court sustained some of the allegations of the Department’s dependency

petition and rejected others. The petition alleged three alternate bases for juvenile court

dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), all of which required for

jurisdiction, as stated on the face of the petition, that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is

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a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300,

subd. (b)(1).)

The petition alleged Minor suffered the requisite harm in one or more of three

ways. First: “as a result of the failure or inability of . . . her parent[s] to supervise or

protect [her] adequately.” Second: “by the willful or negligent failure of the parent[s]

. . . to provide [her] with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” And

third: “by the inability of [a] parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the

parent’s . . . mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.”

The Department alleged one or more of these jurisdictional grounds were satisfied

by the following factual allegations, two of which the court rejected as unfounded

(Allegations b-3 and b-5) and three of which the court sustained (Allegations b-1, b-2,

and b-4).

The court sustained Allegation b-1 as written, as follows: “The mother and father

neglect the child’s educational and developmental needs, in that the child has not attended

school since August of 2020, thereby limiting the child’s ability to maintain age-

appropriate educational services and/or necessary services to address the child’s

diagnoses of Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder.”

The court sustained Allegation b-2 with interlineations by the court (additions

shown by underlining), as follows: “The mother and father neglect the child’s medical

and dental needs, in that the child has not had a physical or seen a doctor for a routine

checkup since 2020, nor has had she seen a dentist before [the] Department’s

intervention.”

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The court rejected Allegation b-3 for “insufficient evidence” to support

jurisdiction at the time of the hearing. The allegation had stated: “The mother and father

neglect the health, safety, and wellbeing of the child, in that the home was found to be in

unkempt conditions, smelled foul and had limited space to move. Further, the child’s

sleeping space was covered in clothing and miscellaneous items, causing the child to

sleep on a bean bag.”

The court sustained Allegation b-4 with interlineations by the court, as follows:

“The mother suffers from unresolved mental health issues, including but not limited to

exhibiting signs of paranoia, delusions, and experiencing feelings of depression and

anxiety. These untreated conditions have prevented the mother from sending the child to

school or allowing the child to receive medical/dental care. Further, the mother has failed

to obtain treatment and/or medication to address her mental health needs, thereby placing

the child’s safety and wellbeing at risk.” (Strikethrough in original, underline added.)

The court rejected Allegation b-5 regarding Father’s mental health as unproven.

The allegation mirrored Allegation b-4 as to Mother, but without asserting he suffered

from anxiety or depression. The court explained: “(b)(5), I don’t find there’s sufficient

evidence. . . . Understanding there have been behaviors that were described by the social

worker, aside from that—or aside from those observations, there’s no indication of a

mental health diagnosis or issues. The Court doesn’t find sufficient evidence of (b)(3)

and (b)(5).”

Based on its findings regarding Allegations b-1, b-2, and b-4, the court found

Minor to be “[a] person described by Welfare & Institutions Code Section 300(b)(1).”

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The court declared Minor a court dependent and adopted DPSS’s “recommended findings

and orders with regard to family maintenance for disposition.” The court authorized

psychological assessments for both parents as requested by DPSS, finding that “there’s

observations in the report [for the hearing] that are concerning, so that [referral] will be

maintained.”

DISCUSSION

Parents contend DPSS’s dependency petition allegations and the underlying record

do not show the requisite “substantial risk” of “serious physical harm or illness” required

by section 300, subdivision (b)(1), to support juvenile court jurisdiction. (Italics added.)

They are correct.

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides for juvenile court dependency

jurisdiction when a child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will

suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” specified conduct or neglect by a

parent or guardian. These jurisdictional grounds include, as alleged by DPSS in its

petition: “(A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately

supervise or protect the child,” “(C) The willful or negligent failure of the parent or

guardian to provide the child with . . . medical treatment,” and “(D) The inability of the

parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s

mental illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)

An earlier version of the statute, as noted by Janet T., “required no separate

showing of concrete harm or risk of physical harm to a child.” (Janet T., supra,

93 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) Rather, “[a] child could be declared a dependent if he or she

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was ‘in need of proper and effective parental care or control and ha[d] no parent or

guardian . . . willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care or control.’ However,

the 1987 revisions to section 300 added this [serious physical harm or illness]

requirement, indicating a legislative intention to narrow the grounds on which juvenile

court jurisdiction could be invoked.” (Id. at pp. 387-388, fns. omitted.)

The statute does not define “serious physical harm or illness,” but instead leaves

the matter to “common intelligence [to] discern what injuries fall within its reach.” (In re

Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438.) Relevant here, medical treatment may

include dental care to address or prevent serious physical harm. Thus, a child’s

“need[ for] extensive dental work, including oral sedation for a tooth fracture,

11 pulpotomies[2] with steel crowns, and three fillings,” together with a finding that the

father failed to provide food or clothing for his daughters, supported a finding of

“substantial risk of serious physical harm to the girls.” (In re A.R. (2014)

228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152.)

The juvenile court “ ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to

assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re S.F. (2023)

91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712-713.) A parent’s “ ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current

conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” (In re Cole L.

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) Still, the “basic question under section 300” for both

2 “Pulpotomy” is defined as “Removal of a portion of the pulp structure of a
tooth, usually the coronal portion”; “SYN: pulp amputation.” (Stedman’s Medical Dict.
(online ed. 2014) 739660.)

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the juvenile court and the appellate court on review is whether circumstances at the time

of the hearing subject the minor to the risk of harm enumerated in the statute. (In re J.N.

(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) “ ‘Subdivision (b) means what it says. Before

courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must

be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical

harm or illness.’ ” (Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 391, fn. omitted.)

A child welfare agency petitioning for dependency jurisdiction bears the burden of

proof to establish section 300 applies, and must do so by a preponderance of the

evidence. (§ 355; In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) In particular, the agency must

“present evidence of a specific, nonspeculative and substantial risk to [the child] of

serious physical harm.” (Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.)

On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial

evidence. (In re B.H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 469, 480.) “ ‘In making this

determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the

findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most

favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are

the province of the trial court.’ ” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We do not reweigh

the evidence; instead, provided there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile

court’s decision, we affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary finding.

(In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 857.)

Substantial evidence “means evidence that is ‘reasonable, credible and of solid

value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a

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particular case.’ ” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) “Substantial evidence

is not synonymous with any evidence; a decision supported by a ‘ “mere scintilla of

evidence” ‘ need not be affirmed on appeal.” (In re G.Z. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857,

876.) “On appeal, the parent has the burden of showing there is insufficient evidence to

support the order.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 168.)

The Department concedes, as it must, that Minor’s nonattendance at school “is not

a basis for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).” (See Destiny S., supra, 210

Cal.App.4th 999; Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 377.) As Destiny S. explained, by

statute the Legislature has determined that “[j]urisdiction under section 300, subdivision

(b) can exist ‘only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering

serious physical harm or illness.’ ” (Destiny S., at p.1003.) Quoting Janet T., the Destiny

S. court continued: “Although missing school is a ‘serious’ problem, ‘that is not the same

as saying the failure to attend school created a “substantial risk” of suffering “serious

physical harm or illness.” ’ ” (Destiny S., at p. 1003), as required for jurisdiction.

The Janet T. court found the gap in the children’s schooling there extremely

troubling, as do we here for Minor. “Failing to attend school regularly not only deprives

. . . children of an education, but also of the social interaction and ‘peer relationships

necessary for normal growth and development,’ as alleged in the petition. It is a very

serious allegation and a factual circumstance which need[s] immediate correction.”

(Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 388.) The court acknowledged that a “lack of

education may well cause psychic or emotional or financial or social harm.” (Id. at

p. 389.) Nevertheless, jurisdiction did not follow where “there [were] no facts alleged or

14
suggested by the supporting documentary evidence to indicate [the] mother’s failure to

ensure the children’s regular school attendance subjected the children to physical injury

or illness, serious or otherwise.” (Janet T., at pp. 388-389.) The same is true here

regarding Minor.

Nor do Minor’s autism or ADHD diagnoses, perhaps made when she earlier

attended school, suggest a different result than in Destiny S. or Janet T. The Department

does not argue as much. Nor does the record support such a distinction. The Department

did not obtain Minor’s IEP from her elementary school, which may have shed light on the

origin of the diagnosis regarding her neurodivergent learning challenges—and their scope

or degree. The Department also did not seek to compel Minor’s attendance at a mental

health evaluation. In any event, nothing in the record—including Minor’s engagement

with the social workers—indicated a level of severity to Minor’s autism or ADHD or any

mental health condition suggesting a risk of incurring physical harm to herself. Nor,

notably, did the Department choose in investigating or filing its petition to proceed under

subdivision (c) of section 300 for “willful failure of [a] parent or guardian to provide

adequate mental health treatment.” The record developed by the Department does not

indicate any risk of, for example, “untoward aggressive behavior toward self” that might

warrant jurisdiction under not only subdivision (c)’s “serious emotional damage”

provisions, but also subdivision (a)’s risk of “serious physical harm” threshold. (§ 300,

subds. (a), (c).)

Instead, the Department relies only on Minor’s three cavities. The Department

offers no authority that this alone is enough to constitute serious physical harm or a

15
substantial risk of serious physical harm, and we have found none. As noted, in In

re A.R., one of the children needed three fillings for cavities, but that was in addition to

“extensive dental work,” which included sedation to address a tooth fracture, plus almost

a dozen pulpotomies and corresponding crowns. (In re A.R., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1152.) Furthermore, the juvenile court in A.R. sustained allegations that the father

sexually abused the children, failed to provide them food or clothing; that the mother

knew the father had a significant substance abuse and domestic violence history, but

nevertheless abandoned them to his care. (Id. at pp. 1149, 1152.) She did so even though

she admitted “he ‘scares the hell out of me’” and she knew he was not providing for

them. (Ibid.) There is nothing remotely close to such harm or risk of harm here.

The Department asserts that Parents “would not have made appointments to

address [Minor’s] medical and dental needs without [its] intervention.” The Department

also argues this “[l]ack of medical and dental care could have led to more serious

physical harm” for Minor. Even if the first proposition is true, jurisdiction for failure to

provide adequate medical treatment exists “only so long as is necessary to protect the

child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3);

Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.) Here, Parents had previously ensured

Minor had regular, routine medical and dental care before the Covid-19 pandemic; they

learned through engaging in reunification services that they could now obtain that care

without the Covid-19 vaccinations to which they objected; Minor made a habit of

brushing her teeth, providing some protection against cavities; and Parents ensured Minor

obtained medical care for an infection (her eye) when she needed it. Regarding the

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second proposition, the Department does not say what further harm “could have” been at

stake beyond just three cavities, and we also decline to speculate. Evidence supporting

jurisdiction based on risk of serious physical harm must be specific and nonspeculative.

(Destiny S., at p. 1003.)

On the record presented here, and barring mere speculation, we find the evidence

insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate Minor faced the requisite substantial risk of

serious physical harm or illness required for dependency jurisdiction under section 300,

subdivision (b).

We are guided to this conclusion by considering the Supreme Court’s analytic

framework to assess whether a risk of harm is substantial. “ ‘Some risks may be

substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of the

harm is potentially great. . . . Conversely, a relatively high probability that a very minor

harm will occur probably does not involve a “substantial” risk. Thus, in order to

determine whether a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood that

harm will occur and the magnitude of potential harm.’ ” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at

p. 778.)

Similarly, as Janet T. set out, “[i]n determining what constitutes a substantial risk

of serious physical harm” in section 300, subdivision (b), courts may look to language in

subdivision (a) authorizing jurisdiction when a parent or guardian has inflicted “ ‘serious

physical harm . . . nonaccidentally.’ ” (Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 388; see

§ 300, subd. (a).) Specifically, “a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious

future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of

17
repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a combination of

these and other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of

serious physical harm.” (§ 300, subd. (a), italics added.)

Here, there was no history of Parents causing injuries as serious or less serious

than Minor’s three cavities. Nor that they did so repeatedly: there was no history of

other physical harms caused by Mother or Father. Nothing in the record indicated they

were responsible for Minor’s eye infection, nor that it was severe or nonresponsive to

Parents’ treatment measures. Regarding Minor’s cavities, the Department did not present

evidence indicating whether she had others in the past or whether this type of “injury”

was newly due to Parents’ nontreatment choices during the Covid-19 pandemic. Nor,

unlike the egregious harms the children suffered in A.R., was there a combination of less

serious harms (three fillings as the least of horrific harm there) with other actions causing

serious physical harm in A.R., nor any nonspeculative substantial risk of a combination of

any specific harms harm. Nor unlike in I.J. does there appear to be any low-probability-

but-absolute-magnitude risk of harm like potential sexual abuse of the father’s sons there

after he abused his daughter. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 771, 778-780.)

In sum, measured against the degree of harm at stake, as established by the record

(three cavities in a young teenager, found after a global pandemic), and the likelihood and

magnitude of other potential, unknown harm (left unstated and only speculative by the

Department), we conclude the evidence here is too slight to establish jurisdiction under

section 300, subdivision (b).

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This is true not just as to the Department’s assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction

under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(C) [inadequate medical treatment], as alleged by

the Department in its dependency petition, but also the Department’s alternate grounds

under subdivisions (b)(1)(A) [failure to adequately protect or supervise child] and

(b)(1)(D) [inability to care for child due to mental illnes]. Each of these subparagraphs of

section 300, subdivision (b), equally required substantial evidence of a substantial risk of

serious physical harm or illness. (§ 300, subd. (b).) The only specific, nonspeculative

evidence the Department put forward of physical harm or risk of physical harm was

Minor’s cavities. Regarding jurisdiction based on Mother’s mental health for instance,

the Department on appeal still cites only Minor being “diagnosed with having three

cavities.” That evidence being insufficient under one subprong of subdivision (b) for

lack of risk of physical harm, it is insufficient under the others as well.

We remain troubled by Minor’s education deficits, especially given her mental

health diagnoses. The record reflects Parents were still attempting to obtain Minor’s IEP

and arrange school enrollment for her at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Father’s

representation through counsel at the hearing that he and Mother were “currently working

with the Department on trying to get [Minor] an IEP, as well as working with the

Regional Center” for mental health services suggests Parents may be receptive to

voluntary Departmental assistance to secure these essential services. As the concluding

paragraph of section 300 states, the statute “is not intended to limit the offering of

voluntary services to . . . families in need of assistance.”

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Furthermore, if on remand, concerns for Minor’s well-being have not been

resolved, our conclusion here that the evidence was insufficient to support jurisdiction on

the grounds alleged does not preclude the Department from acting to protect Minor. As

Janet T. observed there, “[I]t is entirely possible valid grounds exist for the state to

assume jurisdiction over these children and indeed it may be in the children’s best

interests for this to happen.” (Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 392.) We decide here

only that the Department “failed to prove the grounds it asserted or to assert the grounds

it might have proved.” (Ibid.) Consequently, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order

must be reversed, as well as the dispositional order and any subsequent orders dependent

upon it. (Ibid.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional order, dispositional order, and subsequent

related orders, if any, are reversed, and the matter is remanded.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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