CourtListener 10712579•In re O.G. CA2/4
Texto completo
Filed 10/28/25 In re O.G. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re O. G., a Person Coming B341033
Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
24CCJP01819,
24CCJP01819A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
M. G.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Father M.G. appeals from a juvenile court exit order
terminating dependency jurisdiction over his daughter, O. G.,
and awarding sole physical custody to her mother. Father argues
that the court erred by removing O. G. from his physical custody,
requiring monitored visits until he “completed” counseling, and
ordering him to pay for a professional visitation monitor. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The dependency court took jurisdiction over O. G. pursuant
to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), sustaining an allegation that
O. G. was at risk due to father’s history of mental and emotional
problems, including bipolar disorder; manic and erratic behavior;
verbal aggression and paranoid statements; and noncompliance
with mental health services and medication.2
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the full factual and
procedural background because our opinion is unpublished, and
the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its
procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial
court's decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal
statement”].) Undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 The court also issued a restraining order protecting mother
from father but did not include O. G. as a protected party.
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After a continued, contested disposition hearing at which
father testified, the court declared O. G. a dependent, ordered her
removed from father, and released her to mother. Because
mother was not in need of services and O. G. was safe with her,
the court found that it was in O. G’s best interest to terminate
jurisdiction.
Over father’s objection, the court granted sole physical
custody to mother and granted both parents joint legal custody,
with tie-breaking authority to mother. It ordered thrice weekly
monitored visits for father, with a professional monitor paid for
by father; father made no objections regarding the visitation
order. The order stated that monitored visits were necessary
because father “has not completed (1) individual Counseling to
address case issues including mental health with a licensed
therapist/intern supervised; and (2) Mental Health Counseling
which includes a psychological assessment, psychiatric
evaluation and taking all prescribed psychotropic medication.”
Father’s counsel objected to the mental health counseling as
“duplicative and not needed,” but “submit[ted] on individual
counseling to address all case issues.”
DISCUSSION
I. Removal
Father contends the order removing O. G. from his custody
was not supported by substantial evidence, and reasonable
means were available to maintain her in his care. We disagree.
Removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) is appropriate
when a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here is
or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
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minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical
custody.” “In determining whether to remove a child, the court
‘may consider the parent’s past conduct and current
circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that
gave rise to juvenile court intervention.’” (In re Miguel J. (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 635, 649.) “‘The parent need not be dangerous
and the minor need not have been harmed before removal is
appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the
child.’” (Ibid.)
We review a juvenile court’s dispositional orders, including
removal, for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773; see also In re Miguel J., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p.
649.) We view the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence to support the findings and orders. (In re I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We do not reweigh the evidence or
exercise independent judgment. (Ibid.)
Because removal findings must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence, we consider whether the “record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996.) “The
appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.”
(In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
Substantial evidence supported removal here. Father had
angry outbursts, directed at mother and service providers. His
medical providers found him “intimidating,” and social workers
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were unable to get him to answer straightforward questions. He
was verbally aggressive and erratic with various aid providers,
whom he claimed were conspiring against him, and yelled at
them for long periods of time while O. G. cried in the background.
Father also told a social worker that he would get a gun because
no one was doing anything to help him. The dependency court
reasonably could conclude that such unpredictable and volatile
behavior placed preschool-aged O. at risk. (Contra In re A.L.
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1051 [finding no substantial
evidence to support jurisdiction where 16-year-old child “was well
aware” of parent’s mental illness and “knew what to do when
Mother was in a manic state”].)
Additionally, there was substantial evidence that father
struggled to meet O. G.’s needs. Father told an aid worker that
he had not fed or changed O. G. in four days. O. was “unkempt
and unclean” and wearing dirty, fecal-stained underwear when
she was detained. Father also expressed concerns about O. G’s
mental health—concerns shared by mother and DCFS—yet
refused to consent to treatment and “create[d] unnecessary
barriers to his child getting the services she needs.”
Father downplayed and denied concerns about his mental
health. Though he previously had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder and prescribed medication, father “adamantly” denied
the diagnosis and other mental health issues. Father
additionally denied engaging in manic and erratic behavior and
making paranoid statements, despite numerous reports to the
contrary, and did not follow up on appointments that he
scheduled. “One cannot correct a problem one fails to
acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.)
Father’s contention that O. could have remained in his care with
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a safety plan “to address any concerns if he had another mental
health episode” accordingly is not persuasive. (See In re A.F.
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [due to parent’s “refusal to
acknowledge her substance abuse and its potential effect to her
judgment and on the minor, there was no way to guarantee the
minor’s physical health, well-being, and protection while living
with” parent.])
II. Exit Order Provisions
Father contends the exit order was an abuse of discretion
because it ordered him to “complete” individual counseling and
required him to pay for a professional visitation monitor. DCFS
responds that father forfeited these arguments by failing to object
below. We agree.
An appellant generally forfeits the right to claim error as
grounds for reversal when he or she fails to object in the trial
court. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.)
Principles of forfeiture apply in dependency litigation and are
intended to encourage parties to bring errors to the juvenile
court’s attention, so that they may be corrected. (In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
Here, father expressly submitted on the order regarding
individual counseling and did not object to the requirement that
he pay for professional visitation monitoring services. Father
claims his testimony that monitored visitation was unnecessary
preserved the issue, and his general objection to the custody
order “also implied that he did not submit or agree to the court’s
requirement that his visits remain monitored.” Yet neither
father’s testimony nor his general objection apprised the juvenile
court of the concerns he now asserts or afforded the court an
opportunity to address them before terminating jurisdiction. (See
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In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790 [“General objections
are insufficient to preserve issues for review.”].) Father has
forfeited his arguments.
Though we have discretion to excuse forfeiture, we use
“special care” when exercising that discretion in dependency
matters. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) As a general
rule, we do so “rarely and only in cases presenting an important
legal issue.” (Ibid.) The issues father attempts to raise—his
ability to “complete” individual counseling and pay for a
professional monitor—are factual questions, not legal ones. Since
no specific objection was made in the juvenile court, the record
contains limited material pertinent to these issues. We
accordingly decline to exercise our discretion.
If father believes he has adequately addressed case issues
in individual counseling or is unable to pay for a professional
monitor, he is “permitted to raise those claims in the family
court, and a family court judge would make the final decision” on
those issues. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 214; see
also In re A.B. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1439 [upon
termination of dependency jurisdiction, “the noncustodial
parent’s interests in custody and visitation can be heard in the
family law court”]; § 302, subd. (d).)
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
VAN ROOYEN, J.*
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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