Springs v. SBM Site Services CA4/3

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Filed 10/23/25 Springs v. SBM Site Services CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

BRIAN SPRINGS,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063924

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-
01015248)
SBM SITE SERVICES, LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Randall J. Sherman, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Request for judicial notice is granted.
Downey Brand, William R. Warne, Annie S. Amaral and
Alexandra K. LaFountain for Defendant and Appellant.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Kiran Prasad, Matthew
W. Gordon and Erin R. Hutchins for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff Brian Springs filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s
prior order compelling to arbitration Springs’s employment-related claims
against his former employer, defendant SBM Site Services, LLC (SBM).
Springs argued SBM failed to timely pay arbitration fees pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1281.98, subdivision (a)(1).1 The court granted the
motion and awarded Springs monetary sanctions pursuant to sections
1281.98, subdivision (c)(1) and 1281.99, subdivision (a).
SBM acknowledges JAMS, Inc., the parties’ alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) provider, provided SBM’s counsel of record an invoice
requesting payment of then due and owing arbitration fees, which fees SBM
did not pay within 30 days as required by section 1281.98, subdivision (a).
SBM challenges the trial court’s order granting the motion by raising the
novel argument section 1281.98 requires service of the invoice directly on the
party who owes fees, and not on its counsel. Therefore, its argument
continues, because SBM was never directly served, the 30-day period was
never triggered, and the court should not have granted the motion.
Alternatively, SBM argues section 1281.98 is preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
We conclude the trial court correctly determined the 30-day
period under section 1281.98 was triggered when JAMS provided the invoice
to SBM’s counsel. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2015) 18 Cal.5th 310 (Hohenshelt), we reverse
the trial court’s order granting Springs’s motion to vacate the prior order

1 All further code references are to the Code of Civil Procedure

unless otherwise specified.

2
compelling arbitration and remand with directions the court consider
whether SBM may be excused for its failure to timely pay arbitration fees.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2018, Springs filed a putative class action complaint
against SBM alleging wage and hour claims under the Labor Code, a claim
for violation of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq.), and a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004
(PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). The trial court granted SBM’s motion to
compel arbitration as to Springs’s individual wage and hour claims,
dismissed his class claims, and stayed his PAGA claim pending arbitration.
In July 2021, Springs and SBM reached a settlement agreement regarding
Springs’s individual claims, leaving only Springs’s PAGA claim unresolved.
In April 2022, Springs and SBM agreed to stay the PAGA claim
while Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 was pending
in the United States Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Viking River in June 2022, the parties stipulated to lift the stay
on the PAGA claim and met and conferred about how to handle the litigation
moving forward in light of the high court’s decision.
SBM took the position the individual component of the PAGA
claim should proceed in arbitration and the representative component of that
claim should be dismissed or stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration.
Springs “disputed the impact of Viking River on the instant matter and
disagreed that arbitration over any aspect of Springs’s PAGA claim was
appropriate.”
In light of the parties’ disagreement, SBM filed another motion to
compel arbitration as to the individual component of Springs’s PAGA claim.
In January 2023, the trial court granted the motion to compel and ordered

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the individual component of the PAGA claim to arbitration and the
representative component of that claim stayed pending the completion of
arbitration.
The parties thereafter agreed on an arbitrator to hear the claim
through JAMS. On September 13, 2023, JAMS sent the parties a letter
confirming the commencement of the parties’ arbitration and the
appointment of the parties’ selected arbitrator. That letter stated in part:
“Pursuant to JAMS policy, the paying party has been billed a preliminary
deposit to cover the expense of all pre-hearing work, such as reading, drafting
of orders, and conference calls. An invoice for this deposit will follow in a
separate email. Payment is due upon receipt. Upon receipt of payment, a
Preliminary Arbitration Management Conference Call will be scheduled with
the Arbitrator.”
The following day, JAMS sent an e-mail to SBM’s attorney
William Warne, copying SBM’s attorney Annie Amaral and Springs’s
attorneys, stating: “Please find your Deposit Request attached for the above
referenced matter. Please note that payment is due upon receipt.” The
deposit request dated September 13, 2023, and addressed to attorney Warne,
reflected SBM was billed and then owed JAMS a balance of $14,000.
A couple weeks later, on September 27, 2023, a JAMS case
manager sent an e-mail to all counsel, including Warne and Amaral, stating:
“Dear Counsel, [¶] This initial retainer for [the selected arbitrator] was due
upon receipt. Once paid, a conference call to initiate this arbitration will be
set. [¶] I have attached a copy of the invoice for your consideration. Please
submit your payment at your earliest convenience via overnight mail to[]
JAMS . . . and please include a copy of the invoice with your payment.” A
couple weeks after that, on October 12, 2023, the JAMS case coordinator sent

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another e-mail to all counsel, including Warne and Amaral, in which he
asked: “Dear Counsel, [¶] Any update on payment of the attached invoice? [¶]
Please let me know.”
As of October 25, 2023, SBM had not paid the invoice. Springs’s
counsel thereafter wrote a letter to JAMS, copying SBM’s attorneys, in which
counsel informed all parties that because SBM had failed to pay fees within
30 days after they were due and had thus materially breached the arbitration
agreement, Springs had elected to withdraw his claims from arbitration
pursuant to section 1281.98, subdivision (a). That same day, SBM placed a
check in the amount of $14,000 in the overnight mail to JAMS.
On October 25, 2023, Springs filed a motion under section
1281.98 seeking an order vacating the trial court’s prior order compelling
arbitration of the individual component of Springs’s PAGA claim. In his
motion, Springs argued: “Despite receiving multiple warnings from JAMS,
[SBM] has failed to pay its outstanding balance of $14,000.00 in direct breach
of the JAMS Arbitration Administrative Policies, the arbitration agreement,
and [Springs’s] statutory obligations under [section] 1281.98[, subdivision]
(a).” Springs also requested, pursuant to sections 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1)
and 1281.99, subdivision (a), an award of monetary sanctions in the amount
of $24,069.50 for SBM’s breach of the arbitration agreement. SBM filed an
opposition to the motion, arguing the 30-day deadline to pay the arbitration
fees invoice was never triggered because the deposit request was only served
on SBM’s attorneys and not directly on SBM itself. SBM also opposed
Springs’s request for sanctions.
The trial court rejected SBM’s arguments and granted Springs’s
motion to vacate the order compelling arbitration pursuant to section 1281.98

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and also awarded Springs monetary sanctions in the total amount of $6,458.
SBM timely appealed.2
Following briefing and oral argument in this case, the Supreme
Court decided Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th 310. We vacated submission
pursuant to rule 8.256(e)(1) of the California Rules of Court and invited the
parties to file letter briefs addressing the impact of that decision on this case.
Both parties submitted letter briefs accordingly.
DISCUSSION
I.
SECTION 1281.98
The California Arbitration Act (CAA) (§ 1280 et seq.) was enacted
in 1961 to safeguard the “the right of private parties to resolve their disputes
through the ‘efficient, streamlined procedures’ of arbitration.” (Gallo v. Wood
Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621, 633 (Gallo), disapproved on
other grounds in Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) In 2019, the

2 During the pendency of this appeal, Springs filed a motion

requesting this court take judicial notice of (1) legislative history pertaining
to the enactment of section 1281.98; (2) the petition for order compelling
arbitration filed in Abarca v. Lyft, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Dec. 13, 2018, No. 3:18-cv-
07502); and (3) the petition for order compelling arbitration filed in Abadilla
v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Dec. 5, 2018, No. 3:18-cv-07343). In his
request, Springs argues the proffered legislative history “is relevant to this
appeal to the extent this [c]ourt finds the plain language of the statute to be
unclear or in conflict with other statutory provisions,” and the proffered court
documents “are relevant to the legislative finding that employers’ delayed
payment of arbitration fees was delaying resolution of employees’ claims.”

SBM did not file an opposition to the request. Springs’s request
for judicial notice is granted. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (d), 459,
subd. (a).)

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Legislature added section 1281.98 to the CAA as part of Senate Bill No. 707
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 707) (Stats. 2019, ch. 870, § 5).
In enacting the statute, the Legislature explained it sought to
address how “[a] company’s failure to pay the fees of an arbitration service
provider in accordance with its obligations contained within an arbitration
agreement or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the
arbitration provider hinders the efficient resolution of disputes and
contravenes public policy.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 870, § 1, subd. (c).) The
Legislature further explained: “A company’s strategic non-payment of fees
and costs severely prejudices the ability of employees or consumers to
vindicate their rights. This practice is particularly problematic and unfair
when the party failing or refusing to pay those fees and costs is the party that
imposed the obligation to arbitrate disputes.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 870, § 1,
subd. (d).)3

3 In Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 761

(Espinoza), disapproved on other grounds in Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
page 349, the appellate court provided further background on the
Legislature’s intent: “The enacting legislation cited two opinions by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc. (2005) 430 F.3d 1004 and
Sink v. Aden Enterprises, Inc. (2003) 352 F.3d 1197, characterizing them as
holding that ‘an employer’s refusal to participate in arbitration’ or ‘an
employer’s failure to pay arbitration fees’ constituted ‘a material breach’ of
the arbitration agreement.” (Id. at p. 773.) The Espinoza court continued:
“The legislation also quoted Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 for the proposition that ‘“when an
employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the
arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the
employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be
required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.”’ [Citation.]
Senate Bill . . . 707 was intended to ‘affirm’ these three court decisions and
establish ‘that a company’s failure to pay arbitration fees pursuant to a
mandatory arbitration provision constitutes a breach of the arbitration

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Section 1281.98, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “In an
employment . . . arbitration that requires, either expressly or through
application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider,
that the drafting party pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of an
arbitration proceeding, if the fees or costs required to continue the arbitration
proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date, the drafting party
is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the
arbitration, and waives its right to compel the employee . . . to proceed with
that arbitration as a result of the material breach.”
Subdivision (a)(2) of section 1281.98 specifies: “The arbitration
provider shall provide an invoice for any fees and costs required for the
arbitration proceeding to continue to all of the parties to the arbitration. The
invoice shall be provided in its entirety, shall state the full amount owed and
the date that payment is due, and shall be sent to all parties by the same
means on the same day. To avoid delay, absent an express provision in the
arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the
arbitration must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall
issue all invoices to the parties as due upon receipt. Any extension of time for
the due date shall be agreed upon by all parties. Once the invoice has been
paid, the arbitration provider shall provide to all parties a document that
reflects the date on which the invoice was paid.”

agreement and allows the non-breaching party to bring a claim in court.’”
(Espinoza, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 773–774.)

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II.
SBM MATERIALLY BREACHED THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BY
FAILING TO TIMELY PAY ARBITRATION FEES
In this appeal, SBM does not dispute: (1) SBM was represented
by the same counsel of record in both the trial court and arbitration
proceedings; (2) JAMS provided SBM’s counsel with an invoice for fees and
costs SBM was required to pay for the arbitration proceeding to continue;
(3) the fees and costs were due upon receipt of the invoice; (4) the invoice
satisfied the requirements of subdivision (a)(2) of section 1281.98; (5) JAMS
sent follow-up communications to SBM’s counsel regarding the status of the
due and owing payment on the invoice within the 30-day period of providing
the invoice to counsel; and (6) SBM did not pay the invoice within 30 days of
SBM’s counsel’s receipt of the invoice.
Instead, SBM argues it did not materially breach the arbitration
agreement because section 1281.98, subdivision (a)(1) requires an ADR
provider to serve an invoice directly on the party responsible for paying the
fees and not the party’s counsel and yet JAMS never served the invoice
directly on SBM. Therefore, SBM further argues, section 1281.98,
subdivision (a)(1)’s 30-day payment deadline was never triggered.
In support of its argument, SBM cites section 1281.98,
subdivision (a)(2)’s requirement an ADR provider provide the invoice to all of
the “parties to the arbitration.” SBM contends because the CAA’s section
1280, subdivision (h) defines the phrase “‘[p]arty to the arbitration’” to
“mean[] a party to the arbitration agreement,” section 1281.98,

9
subdivision (a)(2) must be interpreted to require service of an invoice directly
on a party itself.4
For the reasons we explain, we reject SBM’s proffered
interpretation of section 1281.98, subdivision (a)(2).
A. Standard of Review

“Ordinarily, a trial court’s determination [as to whether] a party
waived the right to arbitrate is subject to substantial evidence review.
[Citation.] However, where the parties do not dispute the factual support for
the trial court’s ruling, but instead dispute the proper interpretation of
section 1281.98, the appellate court’s review is de novo.” (Doe v. Superior
Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 346, 353, disapproved on other grounds in
Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.)
“‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin by examining the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not,
however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the
entire substance of the statutes in order to determine their scope and
purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context,
keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We

4 Section 1280, subdivision (h) provides in its entirety: “‘Party to

the arbitration’ means a party to the arbitration agreement, including any of
the following: [¶] (1) A party who seeks to arbitrate a controversy pursuant to
the agreement. [¶] (2) A party against whom such arbitration is sought
pursuant to the agreement. [¶] (3) A party who is made a party to the
arbitration by order of the neutral arbitrator upon that party’s application,
upon the application of any other party to the arbitration, or upon the neutral
arbitrator’s own determination.”

10
must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering them in
the context of the statutory [framework] as a whole.’” (Skidgel v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14.)

B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded the 30-day Period Under Section
1281.98 Was Triggered When JAMS Provided the Invoice to SBM’s Counsel
As pointed out by the trial court in its minute order granting
Springs’s motion to vacate, SBM’s proposed interpretation of section 1281.98
to require the arbitrator to send the invoice to a represented party directly,
rather than to that party’s counsel, “is contrary to the notion that when a
party to litigation has counsel, it is counsel, not the client, who is served with
papers in the case.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.21(a) [“Whenever a
document is required to be served on a party, the service must be made on
the party’s attorney if the party is represented”].)5
In Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 578, the California
Supreme Court explained: “In the countless procedural statutes in which the
term ‘party’ is used, it is commonly understood to refer to either the actual
litigant or the litigant’s attorney of record. [Citations.] Since that is the
ordinary import of the term, that is the meaning we must ascribe to it when
used in [a statute], unless the Legislature has clearly indicated a contrary
intent.” (See McDowell v. Watson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1164 [the term
“‘party’” in procedural statutes is “commonly understood to refer to either the
actual litigant or the litigant’s attorney of record”].)

5 The trial court also accurately noted in Gallo, the ADR provider

sent its bills to counsel for both parties and not to the defendant directly
(Gallo, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 631–632), yet the appellate court
enforced section 1281.98 and affirmed the trial court’s order vacating its
earlier order compelling arbitration for failure to timely pay fees (Gallo,
supra, at p. 630).

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Section 1280, subdivision (h)’s definition of “party to the
arbitration,” clarifies which individuals or entities are permitted to
participate in an arbitration, but it does not constitute a clear expression of
legislative intent to deviate from the well-established understanding that a
procedural statute’s reference to a “party” refers to that party or its counsel if
the party is represented. SBM does not cite a single case, relevant legislative
history, or any other form of legal authority, suggesting otherwise.
In support of its construction of the phrase “parties to the
arbitration” in section 1281.98, subdivision (a)(2), SBM argues “when a
specific section in the CAA covers both parties and their counsel, that section
expressly references the parties and then separately references their ‘counsel’
or their ‘lawyer.’” SBM only cites sections 1282.4 and 1281.9 in support of its
argument, as both of those statutes separately reference a party to the
arbitration and the party’s attorney. But those two code sections have good
reason to specifically mention counsel. Section 1282.4 establishes a party’s
right to be represented by an attorney in arbitration proceedings. That code
section does not otherwise prescribe litigation activities counsel might
perform on behalf of a client, such as receiving service of documents. That
section 1282.4 specifically references counsel is therefore irrelevant to the
interpretation of the phrase “parties to the arbitration” in section 1281.98,
subdivision (a)(2).
Section 1281.9 is also inapposite. As explained by the trial court
in its minute order vacating arbitration proceedings: “That statute addresses
an arbitrator’s required disclosures of potential conflicts of interest, and in
that context, both clients and attorneys are separately relevant to potential
conflicts and it is logical for the statute to include both.” Section 1281.9 does

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not speak to much less contradict rule 1.21(a) of the California Rules of Court
establishing that serving on counsel equals serving the client.
In any event, if we were to so narrowly interpret the phrase
“parties to the arbitration” in section 1281.98, subdivision (a)(2) to mean
literally and only an actual party, even one represented by counsel of record,
we would need to consistently apply that interpretation of the phrase
whenever it appears in the CAA. Such an exercise quickly leads to absurd
results as the CAA includes several procedural statutes which direct the
performance of various litigation activities typically performed by counsel of
represented parties but counsel is not specifically mentioned in those
statutes. (See § 1281.6 [“In the absence of an agreed method, . . . the court, on
petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator”
(italics added)]; § 1282.2, subd. (b) [“On request of a party to the arbitration
for good cause, . . . the neutral arbitrator may postpone the hearing to a time
not later than the date fixed by the agreement for making the award” (italics
added)]; § 1282.2, subd. (d) [“On request of any party to the arbitration, the
testimony of witnesses shall be given under oath” (italics added)]; § 1283 [“On
application of a party to the arbitration, the neutral arbitrator may order the
deposition of a witness to be taken for use as evidence and not for discovery if
the witness cannot be compelled to attend the hearing” (italics added)];
§ 1283.2 [“The fee and mileage of a witness subpoenaed upon the application
of a party to the arbitration shall be paid by such party” (italics added)];
§ 1284 [“The arbitrators, upon written application of a party to the
arbitration, may correct the award upon any of the grounds set forth in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of Section 1286.6 . . . .” (italics added)].)
In addition, so narrowly construing the phrase “party to the
arbitration” as it appears in such procedural statutes would arguably prevent

13
counsel from acting on a party’s behalf in such instances, in contravention of
the party’s statutory right to be represented by counsel in an arbitration
proceeding. (See § 1282.4, subd. (a) [“A party to the arbitration has the right
to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing in arbitration
under this title”].) Nothing in the CAA supports such a construction.
We therefore conclude JAMS’s provision of the deposit request to
SBM’s counsel for payment of due and owing fees triggered the 30-day period
provided in section 1281.98, subdivision (a). As SBM indisputably failed to
pay the amount due within that time period, the trial court did not err by
concluding SBM had materially breached the parties’ arbitration agreement
within the meaning of section 1281.98.
III.
THE FAA DOES NOT PREEMPT SECTION 1281.98 WHEN PROPERLY CONSTRUED,
BUT WE REMAND FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER WHETHER SBM’S
FAILURE TO TIMELY PAY ARBITRATION FEES MAY BE EXCUSED
For the first time on appeal,6 SBM argues the FAA preempts
section 1281.98 and, therefore, the trial court’s order vacating its prior order
compelling arbitration must be reversed. Appellate courts were divided on
the issue whether the FAA preempted section 1281.98 (see Sanders v.
Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1304, 1322, review granted May 6,
2025, S291437, disapproved on other grounds in Hohenshelt, supra, 18
Cal.5th at p. 349) until the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th 310 in which the court held: “[S]ection 1281.98,
properly construed, is not preempted by the FAA. Although section 1281.98

6 We acknowledge a party may raise a constitutional issue like

preemption for the first time on appeal. (ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. Jones
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1175.)

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has been interpreted by various Courts of Appeal to impose an inflexible and
sometimes harsh rule resulting in loss of arbitral rights, we reject that rigid
construction and instead conclude that the statute does not abrogate the long-
standing principle, established by statute and common law, that one party’s
nonperformance of an obligation automatically extinguishes the other party’s
contractual duties only when nonperformance is willful, grossly negligent, or
fraudulent. As explained below, the Legislature sought to deter companies
and employers from engaging in strategic nonpayment of arbitration fees; we
find no indication that it intended to strip companies and employers of their
contractual right to arbitration where nonpayment of fees results from a good
faith mistake, inadvertence, or other excusable neglect.” (Id. at p. 323, first
italics added.)
The Supreme Court observed the appellate court in Hohenshelt
correctly concluded section 1281.98 is not preempted by the FAA when that
statute is properly construed. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) The
Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded with the following
instructions: “[I]n light of our clarification that section 1281.98 does not
displace background statutes permitting relief to a breaching party in certain
circumstances, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s order ‘direct[ing] the trial
court to vacate its order denying the motion to lift the stay of litigation and to
enter an order lifting the stay.’ [Citation.] We direct the Court of Appeal to
remand the matter to the trial court for consideration of whether [the
employer] may be excused for its failure to timely pay arbitration fees, such
that the stay of litigation should not be lifted and the parties should be
returned to arbitration, and whether the delay resulted in compensable harm
to [the claimant].” (Ibid.)

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To the extent Springs urges us in his supplemental letter brief to
conclude, as a matter of law, SBM’s “failure to timely pay arbitration fees was
not the result of mistake or excusable neglect, but rather a deliberate,
strategic, and grossly negligent course of conduct intended to delay the
arbitration process,” we decline to do so. We remand to the trial court to
determine in the first instance whether SBM’s failure to timely pay
arbitration fees should be excused pursuant to the holding and reasoning of
Hohenshelt.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with instructions that the court consider whether SBM may be excused
for its failure to timely pay arbitration fees, “such that the stay of litigation
should not be lifted and the parties should be returned to arbitration, and
whether the delay resulted in compensable harm” to Springs. (Hohenshelt,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) In the interests of justice, neither party shall
recover costs on appeal.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

DELANEY, J.

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