People v. Sibilio CA1/4

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Filed 10/22/25 P. v. Sibilio CA1/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A167325
v. (San Francisco City & County
JULES LOUIS SIBILIO, Super. Ct. No. CRI14022755)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Jules Louis Sibilio appeals from a judgment of conviction for
the second degree murder of his long-time girlfriend, Mary Aileen Atchison,
in their San Francisco apartment, for which he was sentenced to a prison
term of 15 years to life.
Sibilio called emergency services to the apartment, purportedly upon
finding Atchison lying on the floor of their bedroom dead when he woke up
one morning. Evidence from the autopsy revealed 57 blunt force injuries on
different places all over her body, including injuries to the head that caused
fatal subdural hemorrhaging. The wrecked condition of the apartment’s
living room and injuries to Sibilio suggested a pre-death physical struggle,
and there was testimony from friends, family, and neighbors that Sibilio had
abused Atchison for years. At trial, Sibilio admitted to his history of abusing

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Atchison and said they drank heavily and physically fought the night of her
death, but he denied murdering her.
Sibilio contends we must reverse because of the trial court’s insufficient
response to a jury question about implied malice, a lack of substantial
evidence that he murdered Atchison, and the trial court’s erroneous denial of
his motion to suppress certain evidence obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. We see no
grounds for reversal and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2022, the San Francisco District Attorney filed a first
amended information charging Sibilio with Atchison’s murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187) on August 26, 2014, and alleging five aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421). A jury trial followed.
A. The Prosecution’s Case
1. Testimony of Jerome Vail
Jerome Vail, who, with his wife, was Sibilio’s landlord, testified that
Sibilio and Atchison lived on the second floor of an apartment house with one
unit each on the second and third floors and a two-car garage on the first
floor (apartment house). Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. on the morning of
August 26, 2014,2 he was at the apartment house with workers to install new
garage doors when Sibilio ran to him in an agitated and disheveled state,
with his hair wildly out of place and his eyes red.
Sibilio said very excitedly to call 911 and indicated Atchison was not
breathing. Vail dialed 911 and gave his phone to Sibilio, who took it and ran

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We summarize testimony of events occurring on August 26, 2014,

unless otherwise indicated.

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back upstairs. Vail then went up to Sibilio’s apartment, where he found a
living room bookcase overturned and the living room floor covered with
various things. Vail saw Sibilio administering CPR to Atchison, who was
lying face up on the bedroom floor, and pumping her chest while on the phone
to a dispatcher, crying and talking to himself.
2. Testimony of Paramedic Greg Stangland
Greg Stangland, a San Francisco Fire Department paramedic, testified
that he was dispatched to the apartment house at about 9:30 a.m. Sibilio,
looking a little disheveled, answered the door and let Stangland into his
apartment. He directed Stangland to the bedroom, but did not give him
much information. Sibilio had dried blood on his shirt, a cut on his forehead,
and some minor scrapes on his face. The inside of the apartment looked like
a “tornado” had hit it. Books and things were strewn about the living room
as if “some sort of violent incident had occurred,” as were several empty
alcohol containers.
Stangland found Atchison in the bedroom, lying face up between the
bed and a window, her body pulseless and cold to the touch.3 Stangland
thought she had been lifeless or in bad shape for up to three hours because
blood was starting to pool on her back, legs, and arms, her abdomen appeared
bruised due to lack of blood flow, and her jaw was stiff.
Upon repeated questioning, Sibilio said he and Atchison had been
drinking heavily the night before and had fought, that he had last seen her
alive around 11:00 p.m., and that he later found her lying face down on the
floor. At the preliminary hearing, Stangland testified that Sibilio also said
Atchison had punched and scratched him. Unable to get straight answers
from Sibilio and suspecting foul play, Stangland requested police.

3 The paramedics pronounced her dead at 9:33 a.m.

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3. Testimony of Lieutenant Lisa Springer
Lieutenant Lisa Springer of the San Francisco Police Department
testified that she responded to a fire department alert about a suspicious
death and arrived at the apartment house at around 9:50 a.m. She was the
first police officer to arrive at the scene. When she entered the apartment,
she saw Sibilio standing in the living room, appearing distraught. His nose
and forehead appeared to be injured and his t-shirt had some red material on
it. The living room was in disarray. Bookshelves were knocked over, a coffee
table was on its side, glass was on the floor, and papers were strewn about.
She detained Sibilio and put him in the back of her patrol car.
4. Other Evidence from the Apartment House
A retired police crime scene investigator testified that he saw the flat
screen television in the living room had two areas “of what appear[ed] to be
an impact point . . . that had damaged the screen.”
Upon subsequent testing, blood on an orange shirt that was lying by a
living room couch and apparent blood on the living room walls, floor, and
ceiling were found to contain Sibilio’s DNA. Blood on a pillowcase lying near
Atchison’s body and on a hand towel in the bathroom hamper contained both
Atchison’s and Sibilio’s DNA. Blood stains from the edge of the bathtub and
blood on a towel taken from the bedroom floor by Atchison’s head, a pillow
found close to her body, and a hand towel contained Atchison’s DNA. Items,
such as a shirt, towels, and sheets, found in a dusty trash bag in the garage,
some of which bore a Holiday Inn label, contained Atchison’s DNA.4

4 There was also blood or apparent blood found on a sock near

Atchison’s body, a paper bag, a gel pack, and the bathroom sink, but its
source or sources were not identified at trial.

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5. Testimony of Dr. Amy Hart
Dr. Amy Hart, a medical examiner with the San Francisco Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner, testified that she and two medical examiner
investigators arrived at the apartment about 11:09 a.m. The investigators
measured the bedroom’s ambient temperature as 75.5 degrees and Atchison’s
body’s armpit temperature as 86.7 degrees. This was consistent with
Atchison dying within the last day, probably closer to the time she was found
than to 24 hours before.
Dr. Hart, designated a prosecution expert in forensic pathology,
testified about the results of an autopsy she performed on Atchison’s body.
She found 57 blunt force injuries to the head, neck, torso, and extremities
that appeared to have occurred at or within a day of death. She confirmed
this for 15 of the injuries upon examining microscopic sections of them.
More specifically, Dr. Hart found three injuries on the back of
Atchison’s head, one on the left side and two on the right side, all involving
bleeding into the scalp, which would have occurred when Atchison’s heart
was beating. She did not find any skull fractures. A large volume of blood,
120 milliliters, was in a subdural space on the right side of the brain that
normally did not contain blood, consistent with bleeding from trauma. It was
the kind of injury “associated with loss of consciousness,” and could have
occurred from one or multiple impacts. It also could have led to the
potentially fatal “Duret’s syndrome”—the additional bleeding in the
brainstem area, which controls such things as the beating of the heart and
breathing.
Dr. Hart also found bruises on the left side of Atchison’s chin, on the
upper part of the neck, on the right and left sides of the forehead, and around
the left temple; some redness, hemorrhaging, and tearing of the skin on the
inside of the upper lip; and some bruising on the right side of the lip and the

5
tongue. Atchison likely inhaled blood found in the lungs from the tear in her
lip. There were bruises on Atchison’s right shoulder and breast, the other
side of the left breast, the upper left side of the back, the right side of the
back, the back of the right hand, the right thumb, the back of the left hand,
the back of both thighs, the front of the right thigh (which was also abraded),
both knees, the top and back of the left foot, and the back of the heel, and an
abrasion on the back of the left thigh. Dr. Hart observed lividity—the pooling
of blood—on Atchison’s back, indicating the body laid face up after death.5
Also, Atchison had hepatic cirrhosis of the liver. Such a condition
might or might not make it more likely for a person to bleed more than a
person with a healthy liver. Dr. Hart did not see any evidence that Atchison
bruised more easily than others.
The concentration of ethyl alcohol was determined to be .15 in
Atchison’s femoral blood and .19 in the vitreous humor; blood from the
subdural hemorrhage, indicative of what was in her system at the time of
hemorrhaging, was tested and did not have alcohol in it. The absence of
alcohol would indicate Atchison consumed some after sustaining the subdural
hematoma.
Dr. Hart opined that “[t]he multiple blunt force injuries which
[Atchison] sustained which resulted in the bleeding . . . and the internal
hemorrhaging in the brain are what caused her death.” She could not say
how long it took for Atchison to die, but it could have occurred within

5 Dr. Hart also found “rare petechia hemorrhage” and “bleeding or

confluent hemorrhages” in the white part of both eyes, which could occur
from the compression of blood vessels of the neck or chest, violent retching or
vomiting, or heart attacks. There was no evidence of the neck being grabbed
or compressed or of force being applied to the eyes. Also, there was a mark on
the abdomen that was probably just an impression on the skin that occurred
after death.

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“minutes to hours” from Duret’s Syndrome. Her death was a homicide, which
Dr. Hart listed as the cause of death on the death certificate, because “[t]he
numbers of injuries in different planes happening at or around the time of
her death resulting in a chain of events in the brain that led to sudden death
. . . are consistent with injuries that were caused by the actions of another
person.”
Dr. Hart rejected the theory (which the defense offered at trial) that
Atchison died from a fall because she would expect injuries from a fall to be
on a single plane only. A fall onto an irregular surface or irregular objects
might impact a body on different planes, but the injuries would still be
limited to the side of the body impacted. Also, bruises on Atchison’s left
armpit and on the left earlobe area were in “areas that are protected” from a
fall, and there were no injuries to the nose. A fall could not explain the
variety and distribution of Atchison’s injuries. Further, injuries on Atchison’s
hands, including bruises, abrasions, and a broken fingernail, were consistent
with her defending herself.
6. Sibilio’s and Atchison’s 2014 Voicemails and Text Messages
The prosecution introduced text messages and voicemails from
Atchison to Sibilio in 2014 indicating he repeatedly beat her, including the
following excerpts:
February 4 texts: “I am in a lot of fucking pain. You really did a
number on me this time. I can’t sit. I can’t lay. . . . I can’t fucking sit down!”;
“I feel like my head is going to explode”; and “a coworker commented on my
bloody eye . . . .” She also sent a photo showing skin discoloration around her
eyes.
A February 25 voicemail indicating she had to wear a long-sleeved shirt
in hot New Orleans “because I’m covered in bruises. . . . I had to buy more
makeup . . . .”

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A March 14 text: “Huge bruise on my face from the beating.”
A March 21 text: “I cannot manage your abuse. You hurt me in so
many ways.”
A May 7 text: “You beat me to a bloody pulp and pulled out half of my
hair . . . . For no reason . . . .”
A May 22 text: “hat [sic] are you doing wrong when you beat me so
badly that I have to re [sic].”
June 27 texts: “Want me to message Troy and tell him how you beat
me? . . . You can hit the fuck out of me all the live long day, and there is
nothing that I can do about it because 1) I am weaker than you and 2) you
know I will never call the cops on you.” Later, she texted that she was afraid
of him and asked that he promise not to beat her.
A June 28 voicemail: “Are you ready to beat me up in the stands in
front of our fucking seat mates? . . . Ready to do it in front of everybody, not
in the privacy of your own home?”
July 15 text: “I am in a lot of pain. I can’t see out of my left eye or hear
out of my right ear. I have bruised ribs on the front and back of my torso. I
have a bruise on my right knee that is eight inches long and covers my calf
and thigh. I have a bruise on my neck where you strangled me. My hand is
stolen [sic] where you hit me with the remote three days ago. . . . So bruised
that the bruise goes all the way through my hand to my palm.”
A text of August 25—the last date she was seen alive: “I can’t do my
job when you’re constantly yelling at me.”
7. Evidence of Sibilio’s History with Atchison
More than a dozen friends, family, and neighbors of Atchison and
Sibilio testified about the couple’s history, including that Sibilio and Atchison
had tempers, were in a volatile relationship, and could set the other off; on
social occasions, they often drank to the point of intoxication and were very

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heavy drinkers; Atchison had a drinking problem that got worse once she
became involved with Sibilio; and Atchison often drank to excess and
sometimes became heavily intoxicated. One friend testified that Atchinson
could be clumsy, fall, and bump into things when intoxicated. Numerous
witnesses testified that Sibilio repeatedly yelled at Atchison and called her
profane names.
Numerous witnesses also testified that they saw bruises on Atchison
during her time with Sibilio. These included bruises on her arms, neck, right
cheek, face, right bicep, and near her mouth. From 2011 to 2014, one friend
repeatedly observed bruises on Atchison; in May 2014, Atchinson’s cheek
bones were puffy and her cheeks bruised; and on ten occasions between 2013
and 2014, her coworker noticed bruises on Atchison’s upper shoulder and, in
May 2014, a large bruise on Atchison’s chin.
During a trip to New York in 2008, a friend saw Sibilio slap Atchison
two or three times, hit her at least once with a closed fist, body-slam her, and
push her against a closed metal gate; he also acknowledged throwing a
remote control at her. Sibilio told the friend he had a problem hitting
Atchison, mostly when he was intoxicated.
In 2011, a person walking by Sibilio’s and Atchison’s apartment heard
a man screaming obscenities, a woman yelling, “Ow, ow, ow. You are hurting
me,” and loud banging. She reported it to 911, and told police in 2014 it had
sounded like real violence.
Atchison repeatedly denied that Sibilio physically assaulted her and
was protective of him. She told one friend that she felt trapped and unhappy

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in the relationship but was worried about her credit card debt, and another
friend that she was afraid to go home because Sibilio was mad.6
8. The Upstairs Neighbor’s Testimony
On the evening of August 25, 2014, around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., the
couple’s upstairs neighbor heard Sibilio run up the stairs to the couple’s
apartment and, once inside, say, “[Y]ou fucking bitch.” She heard him and
Atchison then argue for maybe two hours. At one point, she heard Atchison
say, “Ow, ow,” and then “Get off me, get off me.” At another point, she heard
a big thump, like when you bang something on a wall, floor, or ceiling.
Things quieted down before 11:00 p.m., when the neighbor went to bed, but
she awoke around midnight to a crashing noise and heard another half hour
of yelling between the two. The neighbor plugged her ears and went back to
sleep; in the morning, she put a domestic violence flyer on Sibilio’s truck that
police later found there.7
B. The Defense Case
1. Sibilio’s Testimony
Sibilio, about 49 years old in 2014, testified that in 2002 he began
dating Atchison, 42 years old in 2014. They had a number of things in
common, including drinking. They moved into the apartment house in 2005.
Sibilio said he was an alcoholic and had been very unhappy when he
was involved with Atchison. He would always blame her for things and
verbally and physically abuse her. He acknowledged some of what other

6 A marriage and family therapist testified for the prosecution about

several categories of common abusive behavior, including emotional and
physical abuse. He also testified that a victim of domestic violence could stay
with an abuser and deny abuse to family and friends for a variety of reasons.
7 A next-door neighbor heard Sibilio yelling at Atchison for about 30

seconds at some point on the night of August 25. Another neighbor heard
nothing unusual that night.

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witnesses testified about, such as some of his actions in 2008 in New York,
and said that from 2008 until 2014 he engaged in numerous acts of even
worse physical violence against Atchison. He punched her “[a] lot,” mostly on
the arms and back, and slapped her perhaps five times during their
relationship; “it really escalated towards the end” when he “was physical with
her often.” He slapped, but did not punch, her in the face on eight or nine
occasions, usually only once. He threw things at her perhaps six or seven
times and punched the wall of their apartment a few times. He did not
strangle Atchison and only grabbed her by the throat once, as indicated in
one of her 2014 text messages. He denied beating her to a pulp in 2014. He
said the bloodied items found in the garage of his apartment house were from
a Holiday Inn where Atchison had hurt herself in an accident in 2013.
On August 25, 2014, Sibilio testified, he quarreled with Atchison by
phone and text messages about whether one of her coworkers could borrow
his cooler. He went to a bar at about 5:00 p.m., leaving his uncharged phone
in his truck; as a result, he missed calls from Atchison to him. He was
intoxicated when he left at around 9:30 p.m. At the time, he thought he and
Atchison had resolved their fight.
When Sibilio got home, Atchison was sitting on a couch drinking beer,
upset that he had missed her calls. He told her he did not intentionally
ignore her, but she kept yelling at him. He jumped on her and tried to kiss
her to lighten the moment. She pushed him off and he started drinking and
watching television.
About 30 or 45 minutes later, Atchison brought up the cooler, which
irritated Sibilio because he thought they had resolved the matter. He called
her profane names, “acting like a child.” After a few minutes, their fight
escalated when he hit her with a lighter. They began throwing things at each

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other and he may have yelled. He jumped on her to get her to stop throwing
things, and “probably . . . hit her a couple of times” in the arms and back.
Atchison pushed Sibilio away. He came at her again and pushed her
backwards towards a couch. They fell over a coffee table and when she stood
up he dragged her back down to the floor. He hit her in her back and slapped
her as they fought on the floor for 30 seconds to a minute, when Atchison
jumped up and went into the kitchen. He returned to the couch. She
returned to the living room and they drank and yelled at each other for a
time.
Sometime later, they argued about her giving away some of their San
Francisco Giants season tickets. When Atchison ignored him, Sibilio threw a
beer can against a television, breaking it in a top corner, and then threw an
ashtray into it, smashing it. He jumped on Atchison again and “probably
slapped her.” She pushed him off and got up. He grabbed her by the arms,
pulled her to the ground, and hit her again. At some point, she got up and
threw an ashtray that hit him on the bridge of his nose. He fell over and hit
the entertainment center and a table next to it. He pushed her into a
bookcase containing all kinds of things, which “kind of fell” on Atchison, but
she got out of the way and things scattered all over the floor. He threw her
onto them.
Sibilio stood there, dripping blood onto the floor from a forehead wound
caused by the entertainment center and table. Atchison got an orange shirt,
an ice pack, and a towel to try to stop Sibilio’s bleeding. They laughed
together. He went into the bedroom. At some point, she came in with their
cat and laid down next him. They petted the cat, apologized to each other,
and, Sibilio testified, “laughed at how fucked up I was.”

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Atchison fell asleep and Sibilio went back into the living room, then
returned to the bedroom, where Atchison, still dressed, was sleeping on top of
the bed. He passed out and slept through the night, waking up around 9:00
a.m. to the sound of banging from the building’s garage. He found Atchison
lying face down on the floor between the bed and the window, unresponsive.
He rolled her over, found she was not breathing, and gave her mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation, which was difficult because she was really stiff. Blood
came out of her mouth, which he wiped off with a rag. He could not find his
phone and ran downstairs, where he found Vail.
Sibilio talked to a 911 operator and continued performing CPR on
Atchison until paramedics arrived. After the paramedics said Atchison was
dead and that they were contacting the police, he told them Atchison had hit
and scratched him in a fight. He admitted at trial this was a self-serving
account.
2. Testimony of Dr. Judy Melinek
Dr. Judy Melinek, a forensic pathologist formerly with the Alameda
County Coroner, testified as a defense expert in forensic pathology, wound
interpretation, and forensic toxicology interpretation. She opined that
Atchison died from blunt force trauma to the head with a subdural
hemorrhage and brain injury. This could have resulted from someone
striking her in the head with a hard object or from a fall. Evidence of lividity
on Atchison’s abdomen and face indicated her body had been face down and
then flipped over. There were also what looked like pressure marks on the
left side of the abdomen from the body lying on something.
Dr. Melinek testified that a photograph showed apparent blood on the
floor near Atchison’s head, which, given the injury to the inner lip, suggested
the body had been face down on the floor. Atchison may have suffered this
injury and the bruises on her chin and lips from collapsing to the floor, as

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bloodstains were absent from her shirt where drip marks should have been if
she had been upright when she sustained them. Also, several of her facial
injuries were on the same plane, consistent with a face-first fall, and she
could have hit a nearby nightstand as she fell.
Dr. Melinek said it was possible to sustain multiple bruises on different
planes from a single push or fall. A person’s arm might go out to try to catch
the fall and a person might hit something like a nightstand on the way down,
or land on objects on the floor. The injuries to Atchison’s lips, the small
pooling of blood by the head, and the body’s lividity suggested a fall from a
standing position or from a seated position on the bed and some sort of
rotational acceleration against the floor.
According to Dr. Melinek, the first sign of a subdural hemorrhage is
usually a headache. The person becomes more confused or lethargic, may
become drowsy and collapse, and, if asleep, may not wake up. Death can
occur from two to 48 hours later. When it occurs sooner, there are usually
injuries such as a skull fracture and brain contusion. She estimated Atchison
died at 3:30 a.m., plus or minus a few hours, based on the temperature
measurements at the scene and photos of the body showing signs that it was
face down for less than eight hours.8
Dr. Melinek also opined that Atchison’s cirrhosis of the liver could have
contributed to her hemorrhage because a person with cirrhosis was generally
susceptible to bleeding due to the reduction of blood clotting factors, resulting
in more pronounced bruises from minor injuries and an increased tendency to
develop subdural hemorrhaging. Also, the upper normal weight of Atchison’s

8 Dr. Melinek testified that the petechial hemorrhaging in the eyes

could have occurred from forceful coughing or vomiting, heart failure,
strangulation, or from lying face down in an awkward position.

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brain suggested it was atrophic, perhaps from many years of excessive
drinking. However, she could not say from slides taken of the brain that it
was atrophied.
Dr. Melinek also said years of alcohol abuse could impair a person’s
coordination and balance, even when sober. Dr. Melinek considered this in
assessing whether Atchison’s subdural hemorrhage could have been from a
fall. Also, the blood alcohol levels found in Atchison’s body were associated
with slurred speech, slow reaction time, unsteady balance, and vomiting.
They possibly could have been higher when Atchison sustained the subdural
hemorrhage because her kidneys and liver would have continued to function
for a time.
Dr. Melinek disagreed with Dr. Hart that the toxicology report
indicated there was no alcohol in the subdural blood because the technique
used for testing alcohol in the documentation was only listed for the femoral
blood and vitreous humor and there was no alcohol result listed for the
subdural blood. Atchison would have been unconscious by the time her
brain’s subdural was filled with blood, and, therefore, she would have been
unable to consume more alcohol.
Dr. Melinek was asked about hypothetical events that were consistent
with Sibilio’s testimony. She opined that the subdural hemorrhage resulted
from Atchison getting up from the bed and falling. If it had been from the
fighting, Atchison more likely would not have gotten up from bed, but it was
possible the subdural hemorrhaging started during the fighting. Dr. Melinek
would have listed the cause of death on the death certificate as
undetermined.
C. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
Sibilio was found not guilty of first-degree murder and guilty of second-
degree murder, assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,

15
subd. (a)(4)), and domestic violence - injury to cohabitant resulting in a
traumatic condition (§ 273.5).9 The court found four of the five aggravating
factors alleged to be true.
The court sentenced Sibilio to 15 years to life in state prison for murder
and stayed any sentence for assault and domestic violence.
Sibilio filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Jury’s Question About Implied Malice
1. Relevant Proceedings Below
The court instructed the jury on murder using CALCRIM No. 520,
including: “The defendant had implied malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally
committed the act; [¶] 2. The natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act
was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He deliberately acted with
conscious disregard for human life.”
The court added in the same instruction, “An act causes death if the
death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the
death would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable
consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if
nothing unusual intervenes.”
The jury began its deliberations on the afternoon of November 28, 2022.
At about 10:15 a.m. the next morning, the court received a note from it that
reads, “Can you clarify the definition of what ‘dangerous to human life’ is?
Does it include great bodily injury or does it imply death only?” It states on a
separate line, “Pg. 33. Implied malice #3.”

9 The parties do not explain how these other charges were added after

the filing of the first amended information, nor does Sibilio challenge them.

16
At a hearing with counsel to determine how to answer the jury’s note,
the court said it had had a lengthy off the record discussion with counsel and
asked them for their suggested responses to the note. Defense counsel
proposed: “ ‘An act is dangerous to human life if a reasonable person would
know death is likely to happen as a result of the act if nothing unusual
intervenes.’ ” Counsel explained this tracked the definition of “natural and
probable” consequences that was also in the instruction. He proposed in the
alternative that the court refer the jury to element number two of the
instruction’s definition of implied malice and to its definition of natural and
probable consequence.
The prosecutor proposed the court respond pursuant to CALCRIM No.
200, which was also given to the jury. It instructs in relevant part, “Words
and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied
using their ordinary, everyday meanings.”
The court, after noting the jury’s focus was on “dangerous to human
life,” not “natural and probable consequences,” said, “[T]he potential answer
is, great bodily injury constitutes dangerous to human life if the great bodily
injury in question . . . is dangerous to human life,” but said this was
unhelpful “circular reasoning.” It read its proposed answer: “ ‘Number one,
review all the elements of implied malice. . . . [¶] Number two, the words,
“dangerous to human life” are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday
meaning in the context of the elements of implied malice.’ ”
Defense counsel objected that “dangerous to human life” did not have
an ordinary meaning; that “the natural and probable consequences portion of
CALCRIM 520 . . . should be applied”; and “that the jury should be
specifically told that great bodily injury is not sufficient or appropriate for
purposes of acts which are dangerous to human life.”

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The court sent its proposed answer. At 3:18 p.m., it announced the jury
had reached a verdict earlier that afternoon.
2. Legal Standards
Murder is committed with implied malice when “the killing is
proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 152;
§§ 187, subd. (a), 188, subd. (a)(2).) The court’s instruction followed this law,
and Sibilio does not argue it was incorrect. Rather, he contends the court’s
response to the jury’s question was in error.
During jury deliberations “when the jury ‘desire[s] to be informed on
any point of law arising in the case . . . the information required must be
given.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 97, quoting § 1138[10].)
“However, ‘[w]here the original instructions are themselves full and
complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what
additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for
information.’ ” (People v. Brooks, at p. 97.) Although the court need not
always elaborate on standard instructions, it has “a ‘mandatory’ duty to

10 Section 1138 states: “After the jury have retired for deliberation, if
there be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court,
the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to,
the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have
been called.” Sibilio did not object below, and does not contend on appeal,
that the court’s written response to the jury’s note violated section 1138’s
procedural requirements. (See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 729
[failure to object below waives claim under section 1138], disapproved on
other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 & fn. 22.)

18
clear up any instructional confusion expressed by the jury.” (People v.
Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212, superseded by statute on another
ground as stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691.) “This means
that a trial court’s response to a jury question can be erroneous even if it
does not technically misstate the law.” (People v. Fleming (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 754, 766.) In other words, “a court must do more than
figuratively throw up its hands and tell the jury it cannot help. It must at
least consider how it can best aid the jury. It should decide . . . whether
further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely reiterate the
instructions already given.” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.)
We review further instructions in response to a jury’s inquiry for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 887, fn. 4; see
People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745–746.)
3. The Court Did Not Err in Responding to the Jury’s Question
Sibilio argues the jury’s question indicates “it did not know what
‘dangerous to human life’ meant; did it mean merely ‘great bodily injury,’ or
did it mean something else, ‘a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.’ ” The trial court’s answer—instructing it to examine all the elements
of implied malice and apply “dangerous to human life” using its “ordinary,
everyday meaning” within the context of implied malice—“misdirected” the
jury into thinking “ ‘dangerous to human life’ was the functional equivalent of
great bodily injury.”
We disagree. The court’s answer was reasonable under the
circumstances. The record shows the trial court carefully considered the
question and extensively discussed it with counsel before answering. And its
answer did more than merely refer the jury to the instruction. It reminded
the jury to examine all the elements of implied malice and apply the term
“dangerous to human life” according to its ordinary, everyday meaning.

19
The court had already instructed the jury to consider an intentional act, the
natural and probable consequences of which Sibilio knew were dangerous to
human life. Sibilio’s trial counsel acknowledged the clarifying value of this
part of the instruction by recommending the court refer the jury specifically
to it. That the court declined to do so does not mean the jury disregarded it,
and Sibilio offers no reason for us to think the jury did. (See People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382 [jurors are presumed to be able to
“ ‘correlate instructions’ ”].) Nor is there any indication the jury ignored
another clarifying element of implied malice, i.e., that it determine if Sibilio
acted with a conscious disregard of that danger to human life.
Sibilio also points to a post-trial revision of CALCRIM No. 520 as part
of his contention that the court should have given a more extensive answer.
The second element of implied malice in CALCRIM No. 520 now reads: “The
natural and probable consequences of the [act] were dangerous to human life
in that the [act] involved a high degree of probability that it would result in
death.” The revision might facilitate a jury’s ready digestion of the necessary
elements of murder, but it does not establish the trial court’s answer was
insufficient. (See People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 111 [“ ‘an act,
the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life’ and ‘an act
[committed] with a high probability that it will result in death’ are equivalent
and are intended to embody the same standard”], citing People v. Watson
(1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300; People v. Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152
[acknowledging Watson’s holding].)
In short, Sibilio fails to establish the trial court abused its discretion or
made any legal error in answering the jury’s question.
4. Any Error Was Harmless
“A court’s failure under Penal Code section 1138 to adequately answer
a jury’s question ‘is subject to the prejudice standard of People v. Watson

20
[(1956)] 46 Cal.2d 818, 836,’ i.e., whether the error resulted in a reasonable
probability of a less favorable outcome. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th
271, 326.)” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1017.)11
There is overwhelming evidence that Sibilio attacked Atchison with
great violence. Atchison’s body had several dozen blunt force injuries on
different planes all over her body. They include five different blunt force
injuries to three different planes of her head so severe that they caused
bleeding into her scalp, at least one of which led to her death. There were at
least eight different injuries to Atchison’s face, mouth, lip, tongue, and ears;
numerous bruises on the left and right sides, and front and back, of her torso;
bruising and abrasions on the front and back of both legs; bruises on both
arms; and multiple injuries to Atchison’s hands that were consistent with her
defending herself. Also, the defense theory that Atchison died from a fall was
belied by bruises on her left armpit and left earlobe area, which were
protected from falls, and by defensive injuries to her hands.
There is other evidence as well. The wreckage of the living room
further suggests Sibilio viciously attacked Atchison that night. Sibilio
indicated in his own self-serving account of their fighting that he hit her
repeatedly and threw her about the living room. The testimony of the
upstairs neighbor indicates he entered the apartment angry (contrary to his
own account), and that his entrance was followed by arguing and thumping
sounds. Paramedic Stangland’s testimony indicates Sibilio was evasive in his

11 Sibilio argues the trial court’s answer reduced the elements required

by the jury to consider for second degree murder and, therefore, was federal
constitutional error pursuant to Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,
24. But the court’s duty to answer is governed by a state statute, section
1138, and Sibilio does not argue its violation requires application of the
Chapman test. Regardless, we would reach the same conclusion that any
error was harmless under the Chapman test.

21
account of what had occurred, which account itself was inconsistent with
Stangland’s observations of the injuries to Atchison’s body, further
suggesting Sibilio’s guilt.
The testimony of friends, family, and neighbors of the couple’s history
further indicates Sibilio’s capacity for physically attacking Atchison with a
reckless disregard for her safety. Their testimony at least suggests, such as
by their observation of bruises on Atchison regardless of her denials that
Sibilio caused them, that Sibilio punched her in the face, body-slammed her,
pulled out her hair, and bruised her time and again in different parts of her
body.
Further, although not needed for our harmless error conclusion,
Atchison’s numerous text messages and voicemail in 2014—such as that
Sibilio beat her “to a bloody pulp,” bloodied and discolored her eye, “beat [her]
up,” caused her to lose hearing in one ear, and more—indicate he knowingly,
repeatedly caused significant injuries to her. They indicate in particular that
he repeatedly hit Atchison in the face. And the blood evidence found in the
apartment indicates the violent nature of the couple’s fighting the night
before the paramedics found Atchison lying dead in the bedroom.
At trial, Sibilio tried to explain away Atchison’s deadly injuries by
minimizing his assault of her that night. He testified that they fought on
only a few, brief occasions, during which she hit him and he only hit her a few
times, that he did not punch her in the head, and that he acted to try to
restrain her attacks on him as much as anything else. He described an
almost rosy denouement scene where Atchison sought to staunch his bloody
wounds and the two ultimately laid in bed together petting their cat and
laughing over how “fucked up [he] was.” This account is patently
unbelievable in light of the evidence we have just discussed.

22
Sibilio also relies on Dr. Melinek’s expert testimony. Read closely, her
testimony is largely conjecture and fails to grapple with much of Dr. Hart’s
autopsy findings, or even parts of Dr. Melinek’s own testimony. She opined
that Atchison died from blunt force trauma to the head with a subdural
hemorrhage and brain injury, which could have resulted from either someone
striking her in the head with a hard object or from a late-night fall. She
concluded it was more likely from a fall because Atchison was unlikely to get
up from bed if she suffered subdural hemorrhaging from Sibilio’s attacks.
But in forming her opinion, Dr. Melinek relied on Sibilio’s fanciful
account of what occurred that evening rather than the physical evidence of
Atchison’s many blunt force injuries on many different planes all over her
body. Dr. Melinek asserted that injuries could have occurred on different
planes of Atchison’s body if Atchison had fallen face first and pointed to some
of the injuries to Atchison’s face and the blood found on the floor near the
head, and she suggested Atchison could have tried to break her fall or hit a
nearby nightstand. But there are several obvious flaws with her theory.
First, her theory fails to explain how a fall could have caused the
dozens of injuries Atchison suffered over almost every part of her body and
many different planes; even if in the course of a fall some injuries were
caused to another plane of the body, it fails to contend with the great extent
of these injuries. It also does not explain how Atchison’s blood came to be on
different items, including in the bathroom. Nor does Dr. Melinek’s scenario
account for the injuries to areas of Atchison’s body that are not vulnerable to
injury by fall, the injuries to Atchison’s hands consistent with her defending
herself, the lack of any injury to Atchison’s nose, and the lack of any evidence
that Atchison actually hit the nightstand on her way down. Dr. Melinek’s
contention that the injury to Atchison’s lip must have occurred when she fell

23
because if she suffered it while standing blood would have stained her clothes
ignores that Sibilio could have caused her these injuries while she was prone;
Sibilio himself testified that he attacked her while they were on the floor and
forced her onto the floor multiple times.
Also, as Dr. Hart and Dr. Melinek both acknowledged, a person
suffering subdural hemorrhaging resulting in Duret’s Syndrome might
remain conscious for some hours. Dr. Melinek offers no real reason why
Atchison could not have been conscious for some time after being fatally
injured by Sibilio’s attacks, enough time to collapse by her bed when her
brain bleeding became critical.
Dr. Melinek also opined that Atchison’s cirrhosis of the liver could have
contributed to her brain hemorrhage. But Dr. Melinek offered this
susceptibility only as a general characteristic of the disease. She did not
point to any evidence suggesting the disease was a significant factor in
Atchison’s death or any of her injuries, nor did she challenge Dr. Hart’s
testimony that nothing in the autopsy results indicated Atchison was
particularly susceptible to bleeding due to her cirrhosis of the liver.
Sibilio argues there is no evidence that he punched Atchison in the
head, such as a skull fracture or, in his case, a swollen hand. Even if true
(which we doubt in light of his fanciful testimony), it is of no real significance
in light of the severity of her head injuries and the numerous injuries she
suffered. He cites People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500 for the proposition
that, as the Cravens court noted regarding fistic assaults, “ ‘if the blows
causing death are inflicted with the fist, and there are no aggravating
circumstances, the law will not raise the implication of malice aforethought,
which must exist to make the crime murder.’ ” (Id. at p. 508.) But Cravens
made this observation in discussing a case involving a single blow to the

24
head. (Id. at pp. 508–512.) Sibilio ignores the evidence we have already
described—the many, many injuries to Atchison’s head, face, torso, arms, and
legs. This was a far cry from a fistfight involving a single blow.
Also, the jury asked its question within a few hours of beginning its
deliberations, and returned a verdict a few hours after receiving the court’s
answer. These circumstances do not indicate the jury was suffering from
abject confusion or was engaged in a fractious debate about Sibilio’s guilt, but
suggest instead that it was merely seeking some clarification as it reviewed
the case. They do not suggest prejudicial error. (See, e.g., People v. Saddler
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 683–684 [erroneous jury instruction was harmless in
light of the circumstances of the robbery, the strength of the witness
identification testimony, other instructions, and the jury’s quick
deliberations].)
The only reasonable explanation that can be drawn from the evidence
is that Sibilio violently attacked Atchison for an extended period of time,
striking her with such force as to consciously endanger her life while
disregarding this danger. Any error by the trial court was harmless under
the state (or federal) standard for error.
B. Substantial Evidence of Second Degree Murder
Sibilio next contends substantial evidence does not support his murder
conviction because nothing shows he knowingly endangered Atchison’s life.
Once more, we disagree.
In assessing his claim, we “ ‘ “ ‘ “review the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 58.)

25
Again, Sibilio does not deny that he fought with Atchison but instead
seeks to minimize his actions. He repeats many of the contentions we found
unpersuasive in concluding that any instructional error was harmless. We
incorporate and rely on that analysis here.
Sibilio points to some other evidence as well. He improperly compares,
based on evidence not contained in the record, Atchison’s purported size (five
feet, five inches tall and 177 pounds) to his own. Regardless, there was
substantial evidence that he repeatedly injured Atchison.
Second, Sibilio claims he had no reason to suspect he was endangering
Atchison’s life, contending Atchison was not necessarily intoxicated when she
suffered a subdural hemorrhage in light of Dr. Hart’s testimony about the
lack of blood alcohol in her subdural blood,12 which, he argues, suggests he
testified truthfully that she was alert and talking after their fight. This not
only relies on his own questionable testimony, but is of little significance in
light of Atchison’s extensive injuries and the evidence that her subdural
hemorrhaging and death could have occurred over some hours.
Sibilio also contends his actions the next morning—he sought out
others, called 911, and tried to revive Atchison—were inconsistent with those
of a murderer. This too is of no real significance in light of the evidence we
have summarized. That he may have woken up the next morning in a more
sober state and realized the trouble he was in if Atchison died (as seen by his
admittedly self-serving statement to the paramedic, Stangland, that Atchison
had attacked him) does little to explain the overwhelming evidence that he
murdered her. Moreover, the prosecution’s domestic violence expert

12 Sibilio also asserts that Atchison was “probably . . . snorting cocaine”

after they fought. The only evidence of cocaine was an unexplained, inactive
metabolite of cocaine found in her subclavian blood. It does not support
Sibilio’s assertion of “probability.”

26
explained that abusers often follow a pattern that includes feeling remorseful
after physically abusing a victim.
In short, Sibilio’s contentions ask us in effect to reweigh the evidence.
But “ ‘[t]he determinations should “be upheld if . . . supported by substantial
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists . . . .” ’ ”
(People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646, quoting In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) Sibilio’s insufficient evidence argument is without
merit.
C. The Suppression Motion
Sibilio next argues the trial court prejudicially violated his state and
federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
when it denied his section 1538.5 motion to suppress 10 items of evidence and
quash the two search warrants police relied on to obtain them (suppression
motion).
Sibilio makes several arguments for prejudicial error, but we need not
address all of them. The trial court properly denied his suppression motion
because (1) the August 26, 2014 warrant was based on information obtained
in the course of entries into the apartment earlier that day that were justified
by exigent circumstances and as part of an uninterrupted, minimally
intrusive police presence; (2) the challenged evidence would have been
inevitably discovered in the course of the proper seizure and examination of
Atchison’s body; (3) Sibilio has forfeited his claim regarding the plastic bag
seized in the apartment house garage on August 29, 2014 by failing to raise it
below; and (4) even assuming error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

27
1. Relevant Proceedings Below
a. The August 26 Warrant
The August 26, 2014 warrant (August 26 warrant), obtained by San
Francisco Police Sergeant Domenico Discenza, authorized the police to search
the apartment for blood evidence, cell phones, and computers. Discenza
declared in an accompanying statement of probable cause that, upon learning
that morning of a suspicious death, he and two other police investigators
went to the apartment house. Arriving at about 11:50 a.m., he spoke to
Springer, who said Atchison was dead in the apartment’s bedroom, and that
Sibilio, the 911 caller, was Atchison’s boyfriend or co-habitant, and unwilling
to talk until his lawyer arrived.
Dr. Hart told Discenza the death seemed suspicious. A medical
examiner investigator told Discenza that Atchison’s body had blunt force
trauma to the face and upper lip, injuries inside the mouth, and bruising to
the abdomen, and that the paramedics said Sibilio told them he last saw
Atchison at 11:00 p.m. the night before and found her not breathing that
morning. Discenza further stated that, once in the apartment, he observed
that the living room was “in disarray,” with a “a book shelf knocked over,”
“items strewn about,” and a damaged television screen, as if “there was some
type of struggle”; “bruising” to the swollen abdomen and injuries to the face of
Atchison’s body; and a “cut” to the “forehead and nose” of Sibilio (who had
been handcuffed and detained) that “appeared to be fresh” and “a reddish
tint” where “the cuticle [met] the skin area” on his fingers.
b. The August 29 Warrant
The August 29, 2014 warrant (August 29 warrant), also obtained by
Discenza, authorized the police to search the apartment for additional items.
Discenza repeated what he declared in his August 26 statement and stated
additional information we need not summarize.

28
c. Sibilio’s Suppression Motion
Before trial, Sibilio moved to suppress the 10 items of evidence and
quash the two search warrants.13 The items he sought to exclude were cell
phones belonging to Atchison and Sibilio; items appearing stained with blood
seized from the apartment and the apartment house garage and the forensic
testing of the items; clothing worn by Sibilio; photographs taken and
observations by police and medical examiner personnel on August 26, 2014;
suspected psychedelic mushrooms; and the contents of two computers.
The prosecution opposed the motion, and an evidentiary hearing
followed.
d. Hearing Testimony of Lieutenant Springer
Lieutenant Springer testified that she went to the apartment house on
August 26, 2014, to investigate a reportedly suspicious death. Upon arriving
at about 9:50 a.m., she spoke with paramedic Stangland outside the
apartment. Stangland told him Atchison was dead inside. Stangland said
Sibilio and Atchison were the only people in the apartment, and that Sibilio
told him the two were drinking the night before, that Atchison was heavily
intoxicated, that he remembered seeing her alive at around 11:00 p.m., and
that he woke up in the morning to find her lying face down on the floor, dead.
But Sibilio could not recall a lot of details and Atchison’s body displayed
several injuries, such as bruises to her abdomen and face, that were
inconsistent with his account. Also, according to a previously written
statement by Springer, Stangland said the apartment showed signs of a
physical struggle.

13 Almost four years earlier, in January 2019, Sibilio filed two similar

motions. He briefly refers to them but does not indicate the court ruled on
them, nor does he argue their merits. Therefore, we will not discuss them
further.

29
After talking to Stangland, Springer walked up the stairs to Sibilio’s
apartment. The door was open, and she could see about 80 percent of the
living room from outside. Sibilio was standing in the living room and the
apartment was in some disarray. Sibilio did not invite Springer to enter and
she did not ask his permission. She entered to detain him, make sure no one
else was in the apartment, evacuate anyone there, and secure the scene.
Once in the apartment, Springer saw the living room was “in disarray
with furniture knocked over,” including a bookshelf and coffee table, and
there was “broken glass on the floor along with some papers and garbage.”
Sibilio “looked very distraught.” He had blood on his shirt and small
lacerations on the bridge of his nose and his forehead. Springer thought that
“some sort of a crime had been committed, whether it was an assault or a
homicide.”
Springer began detaining and removing Sibilio from the apartment,
and Sibilio said he would not talk without his lawyer present. Sibilio
retrieved his shoes while Springer retrieved his socks from the bedroom, as
she did not want him near Atchison’s body. She did not see Atchison’s body,
which she understood was lying on the floor on the other side of the bedroom,
and she did not otherwise search the apartment. She placed Sibilio in the
back of her patrol car at about 9:55 a.m., just as Officers Ng and Tillan
arrived.
Springer, as the highest ranking officer present, supervised activities at
the crime scene, including controlling the recording on a crime scene log of
who was allowed into the apartment. She left the crime scene at
approximately 1:10 p.m.
e. Hearing Testimony of Officer Tillan
San Francisco Police Department Officer Luis Tillan testified that he
and Officer Ng arrived at the apartment house at about 10:04 a.m. to find

30
Sibilio in the back of Springer’s patrol car. According to a statement he
previously wrote of his actions that day, he, Ng, and Springer then entered
Sibilio’s apartment to investigate further. Starting at 10:05 a.m., he began
keeping a log of those entering the crime scene. The log, reviewed at the
hearing, indicated that Springer, three members of the homicide team, the
medical examiner personnel, and seven other crime scene investigators and
police entered the crime scene before a warrant was obtained.
f. Hearing Testimony of Dr. Hart
Dr. Hart testified that the medical examiner’s office “investigates
sudden, unexpected and violent deaths” as required by state law. The office
was “staffed by peace officers . . . . So they are a type of law enforcement as
am I.” Its personnel first examines the body and, if they find something
suspicious about the death, they wait for the police department’s crime scene
investigation unit and homicide unit “to perform their protocols,” after which
they return to the scene in order to remove and examine the body.
Dr. Hart testified that she went to the apartment on August 26, 2014,
to investigate Atchison’s death. There, she observed Atchison’s body without
moving it and saw contusions and signs of trauma. Investigators
accompanying her touched the body to check for rigor mortis (the stiffening of
the body after death) and lividity (the settling of blood in the deceased body
caused by gravity), both of which they found. The bedroom temperature was
measured as 75.5 degrees and the body’s temperature was also recorded. Dr.
Hart found the circumstances of the death to be suspicious.
Dr. Hart further testified that when the time of death might be near
the time a decedent is found, it is helpful to record the body’s and the room’s
temperature because the body temperature changes over time. Similarly,
rigor mortis and lividity change over time, and are generally recorded “to
help understand the circumstances surrounding the death.” Rigor mortis can

31
occur in 90 minutes or over some hours, and lividity can first appear at highly
variable times. Some observations that can be made soon after death about
lividity, rigor mortis, and temperature are not available after a number of
hours because of changes in the body over time.
g. Hearing Testimony of Sergeant Discenza
Sergeant Discenza, who was a homicide detective, testified that he
arrived at the apartment house at about 11:00 or 11:10 a.m. on August 26,
2014. Springer, police officers, medical examiner personnel, and two other
members of the homicide team were present. He spoke with a medical
examiner investigator, who said Atchison’s body, in a bedroom, had injuries
to the inside of the mouth, blunt force trauma to the face and “upper left,”
and bruising to the abdomen. Dr. Hart said Atchison’s death was suspicious.
Discenza entered Sibilio’s apartment at about 11:50 a.m. or noon. He
conducted a “walk-through” for a “few minutes,” “more observing the
deceased body and the general overview of the scene” without touching or
moving anything or opening drawers, in order to “have an idea of what I
would be . . . able to describe in my search warrant, the condition of the
scene.”14 The living room looked like “a tornado went through it. There was
a shelf knocked over. There was books all over the place. There . . . looked
like there was biological material”—by which he meant blood—“on a TV and
some of the walls. It . . . looked like somebody had just took everything and
dumped it on the ground.” Some blood was on a living room couch, on
Atchison’s body, and on Sibilio’s jersey. He observed bruising on the
abdomen of Atchison’s body, which was swollen, and injuries to the face.

14 He also testified, “I walked through the apartment just to see if

there’s any obvious forced entry or anything like that to help determine if
there was maybe a burglary or somebody broke in or any other things that
could have happened.”

32
Discenza obtained a search warrant at 3:22 p.m. that afternoon and a
second search warrant three days later, on August 29.
h. The Trial Court’s Denial of Sibilio’s Motion
The trial court denied Sibilio’s suppression motion. It ruled the
warrantless entries of the paramedics, Springer, and the medical examiner
personnel were lawful, and that Dr. Hart performed a non-law enforcement
function under California statute to determine the cause of death. Also, the
homicide inspectors could lawfully enter Sibilio’s apartment for a brief time,
without touching or seizing anything, in order to prepare a request for a
warrant. It denied the motion regarding the August 29 seizure of the
contents of a bag found in the garage that included items stained with
Atchison’s blood.
We have already summarized the evidence presented at trial, including
the DNA evidence and Atchison’s text messages and voicemails to Sibilio that
were obtained from the evidence Sibilio sought to suppress.
2. Legal Standards
Section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1), under which Sibilio brought his
motion, provides that a defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained as
a result of an unreasonable search or seizure. Section 1538.5 “provides a
defendant the ‘sole and exclusive’ means before trial to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of a search or seizure.” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th
147, 182.) Both the federal and California Constitutions prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. (U.S. Const., 4th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) We review such state issues under federal
constitutional standards. (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.)
“ ‘The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[T]he ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ” [Citation.] . . .

33
“[R]easonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” ’
[Citations.] ‘In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’ [Citation.] The
burden is on the People to establish an exception applies.” (People v.
Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1212–1213.) “ ‘It is a “basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” (People v. Thompson (2006)
38 Cal.4th 811, 817.) Further, there is no “ ‘murder scene exception’ ” to the
warrant requirement. (Thompson v. Louisiana (1984) 469 U.S. 17, 21, citing
Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392, 395; People v. Superior Court
(Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1020 (Chapman).)
For a motion to suppress, “ ‘ “[w]e review the court’s resolution of the
factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The
ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question
of law and fact that is subject to independent review.” [Citation.] . . . [W]e
consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of
the trial court’s reasons for reaching its decision.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364–365.)
3. Analysis
a. Exigent Circumstances
Without a warrant, police may enter a residence if exigent
circumstances exist, and also as part of an uninterrupted, minimally
intrusive police presence after an initial lawful entry. These exceptions to
the warrant requirement justified all of the entries into and observations
made in Sibilio’s apartment, particularly those of Springer, the medical
examiner personnel, and Discenza, which Discenza relied on in his August 26
statement of probable cause.

34
“ ‘ “ ‘ “[E]xigent circumstances” means an emergency situation requiring
swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property,
or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.’ ” ’
” (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 151.) “ ‘ “[T]he reasonableness of
an officer’s conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts available to him
at the moment of the search or seizure which would warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” ’ ”
(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043.) “ ‘[E]ntry into a home based
on exigent circumstances requires probable cause to believe that the entry is
justified by . . . factors such as the imminent destruction of evidence or the
need to prevent a suspect’s escape.’ ” (People v. Thompson, supra, 38 Cal.4th
at p. 818.)
“Probable cause ‘ “means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation. . . . It [describes] circumstances which warrant suspicion.” ’
[Citations.] Probable cause . . . may be shown by evidence that would not be
competent at trial. [Citation.] Accordingly, information and belief alone may
support the issuance of search warrants, which require probable cause.”
(Humphrey v. Appellate Division (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 573–574.)
Exigent circumstances justified the entries of both Springer and the
medical examiner personnel. Springer responded to a call of a suspicious
death and, while outside the apartment, learned from paramedic Stangland
that Atchison was dead inside after, by Sibilio’s own account, a night of their
drinking; that Sibilio was the only other person present in the apartment;
and that the apartment showed signs of physical struggle. Also, Stangland
said Atchison’s body displayed several injuries that were inconsistent with
Sibilio’s limited account of what had occurred. Springer also testified that
from outside the apartment, she could see through the open door that

35
Springer was standing in a living room that was in some disarray. She then
entered the apartment to, among other things, detain Sibilio as a suspect in
Atchison’s death and secure the scene. She observed fresh injuries to Sibilio’s
face and blood on his t-shirt.
Sibilio argues Springer did not have an exigent need to enter the
apartment because Atchison was dead and her body located, and Springer
had no information that Sibilio was suicidal or possessed a weapon, no
reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous, and could from outside the
apartment see him and determine if he at any point was acting to destroy
evidence, such as by going to the bedroom. These arguments are
unpersuasive. Certainly, Springer had probable cause—from what
Stangland told her outside the apartment, she had good reason to suspect
Sibilio had violently killed Atchison and was not fully cooperative, given his
evasive and possibly false answers to Stangland. These gave Springer
probable cause to believe Sibilio was violent, dangerous, and could attempt to
cover his tracks or worse. They provided Springer probable cause to
immediately enter the apartment and detain him so as to, for example,
prevent any efforts by him to escape, destroy evidence, or harm others or
himself. (See People v. Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1051 [“ ‘[W]hen the
police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is
still on the premises’ ”], quoting People v. Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 392.)
Importantly, Springer limited her activities upon first entering the
apartment to detaining Sibilio without searching for anything other than
Sibilio’s socks as part of removing him to her patrol car. And what she
learned and what she observed in the apartment that was in plain view—in
particular, the wrecked living room, blood on Sibilio’s shirt, and fresh injuries

36
to his face— gave her probable cause to reenter the apartment upon securing
him in her patrol car.
Similarly, Dr. Hart and the medical examiner investigators went to the
apartment to investigate a reported death.15 Discenza’s August 26 statement
of probable cause and Dr. Hart’s hearing testimony indicate they observed
Atchison’s body, which was in plain view, touched it to determine if rigor
mortis and lividity were present, and measured its temperature as compared
to the room temperature, all as part of an investigation into the
circumstances of Atchison’s death. Sibilio argues the People failed to show
there was an exigency requiring that they take these actions because Dr.
Hart’s testimony was too qualified and vague about the timing and impact of
changes in a deceased body over time and, therefore, did not establish the
destruction of evidence was imminent.
Sibilio’s argument ignores that the People needed only to show “ ‘ “the
existence of facts available [to the personnel] which would warrant a [person]
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate” ’ ”
(People v. Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1043). In an analogous situation—
the warrantless testing of the defendant’s blood-alcohol level in his home—
our Supreme Court, after an extensive review of case law in other
jurisdictions, concluded the testing was justified by exigent circumstances in

15 Sibilio acknowledges Government Code section 27491.2, subdivision

(a) provides that the medical examiner’s office, upon being informed of a
suspicious death that falls within the classification of deaths requiring its
inquiry, “may immediately proceed to where the body lies, examine the body,
make identification, make inquiry into the circumstances, manner, and
means of death and, as circumstances warrant, . . . order its removal for
further investigation . . . .” He argues, however, that state law does not
override the federal Constitution, one of the arguments we need not address.

37
large part because blood-alcohol evidence begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops, thereby threatening the imminent destruction of evidence.
(People v. Thompson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 824–82816.) Similarly, here the
medical examiner personnel were confronted with indications that Atchison’s
death was suspicious and, in that context, conducted a limited examination of
her body for signs regarding the timing and cause of death. As Dr. Hart
testified, a body’s telling characteristics could change with the passage of
time, including in a matter of hours. In other words, there was an imminent
danger that the culprit time would destroy evidence helpful in determining if
a crime had occurred. These were exigent circumstances justifying their
entry into the apartment and limited examination of Atchison’s body under
our governing “reasonableness” legal standard.
b. Uninterrupted Police Presence
There is a second, independent reason that justified the medical
examiner team’s warrantless activities, as well as Discenza’s. Their activities
were part of an uninterrupted, minimally intrusive police presence in Sibilio’s
apartment to gather evidence in plain view following Springer’s own justified
entry and activities. For this reason, these activities and the team’s
observations could be used to obtain the August 26 warrant.
When a lawful entry “is based upon exigent circumstances or consent,
the law is clear that any incriminating evidence observed in plain view may
be seized. . . . ‘The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that
once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s

16 The Ninth Circuit was critical of Thompson because it involved a

misdemeanor offense (Hopkins v. Bonvicino (2009) 573 F.3d 752, 768–769,
772), but that has no bearing where, as here, a potential murder is involved.

38
privacy interest in that item is lost . . . .’ ” (Chapman, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1012–1013.)
“Generally, an independent justification is required for every
warrantless entry by police, including those instances when the officers
initially entered a residence lawfully but depart the premises and reenter
later. [Citations.] [¶] But California decisions uphold an officer’s reentry to
seize evidence observed in plain view during a lawful entry but not seized
initially because the officer was performing a duty that took priority over the
seizure of evidence.” (Chapman, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014.)
The Chapman court discussed instructive decisions: “[I]n People v.
McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 564 (McDowell), an officer reentered a
residence to retrieve evidence observed in plain view while pursuing a
murder suspect. The court explained: ‘[The officer’s] initial entry revealed
evidence in plain view. His departure occurred before the items were seized
because his first priority was the search for the suspect who was still at large.
As he left, however, [he] secured the house by instructing another officer to
assure that no one entered. “Thus his physical withdrawal from the [house]
did not terminate what was in legal effect an uninterrupted police presence
in [the residence] . . . .” [Citation.] We do not believe [the officer]
relinquished his right to seize this evidence by giving more immediate
priority to defendant’s arrest. We therefore conclude that [his] actions, under
the particular circumstances of this case, were reasonable.’ ([Citation]; see
also People v. Amaya (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 424, 431 [the court upheld reentry
of detectives to observe and collect evidence observed in plain view about two
hours earlier by the first responding officer because there was effectively an
uninterrupted police presence at the residence, the officer could have seized
the evidence during the original entry, and it was not unreasonable for police

39
to wait a reasonable time for trained personnel before disturbing lawfully
seizable evidence].)
“In People v. Ngaue (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 896, 901–902, the court
upheld a police reentry into a residence to retrieve a gun seen in plain view
when arresting the occupant. The occupant promptly escaped from custody,
and the arresting officer turned his attention to containing the area in order
to apprehend him, but later called another officer and instructed him to
return to the house to retrieve the gun. The appellate court held that the
reentry was constitutionally valid under McDowell because ‘there was no
intent on the part of the officers to abandon the gun and retrieval of the gun
took place without inexcusable delay.’ (Ngaue, supra, at p. 905.)” (Chapman,
supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1014–1015; see also People v. Justine (1983)
140 Cal.App.3d 729 [regarding a drug possession for sale conviction,
affirming denial of a suppression motion when police were initially allowed
into a residence for other purposes and observed bullet holes and apparent
drugs and paraphernalia in plain view, leading to their reentry soon
thereafter, upon which a test showed a substance that was in plain view was
cocaine].)
Chapman involved police who, without a warrant, entered a residence
where a shooting reportedly had occurred to find a dead body; one of the
officers secured the premises and remained with the body until the much
later arrival of the coroner. (Chapman, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007–
1008.) In the hours that followed, numerous law enforcement personnel
arrived and entered the residence, also without a warrant. (Id. at pp. 1008–
1009.) Based on the cases it discussed, the Chapman court held that the
“uninterrupted stream of second wave responders” entering the residence

40
was justified to process and seize evidence observed in plain view inside the
residence. (Id. at p. 1016.)
Sibilio argues that none of the warrantless activities here were part of
a justified uninterrupted police presence because the People failed to show
any entry was justified by exigent circumstances. We disagree. The cases we
have just discussed make clear the applicable law here. When a police officer
lawfully enters a residence without a warrant due to exigent circumstances,
other minimally intrusive entries, including by other officers, that follow soon
thereafter to gather evidence in plain view are justified as part of an
uninterrupted police presence. The entries and observations made by the
medical examiner personnel and Discenza were part of such an
uninterrupted police presence and gathering of evidence (meaning, the
observations Discenza referred to in his statement of probable cause). As we
have discussed, exigent circumstances justified Springer’s initial entry into
and observations of the apartment, and were soon followed by these further,
limited investigations of the evidence in plain view. They were therefore
justified as part of an uninterrupted police presence.
Springer did leave the apartment momentarily to secure Sibilio in her
police car, but she did not abandon the scene. To the contrary, after securing
him there, she immediately acted to secure the apartment and further
investigate. She immediately returned with two other officers to the
apartment and, as the senior officer, began supervising the securing of the
scene, such as by Officer Tillan’s maintenance of the crime scene log. And
she remained at the scene for three more hours as the investigation
continued without interruption. Moreover, everyone’s investigation was
limited to that which was in plain view, such as Atchison’s body and the

41
wrecked living room. Thus, Springer’s momentary departure from the
apartment was insignificant under the case law we have just discussed.
c. Inevitable Discovery
Our Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘Under the inevitable discovery
doctrine, illegally seized evidence may be used where it would have been
discovered by the police through lawful means. . . . [T]he doctrine “is in
reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the
tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been
discovered.” (Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 539.)’ . . . [¶] The
inevitable discovery rule ‘applies only to evidence obtained as the indirect
product, or fruit, of other evidence illegally seized.’ [Citation.] The
prosecution must prove ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ ”
(People v. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 183–184.)
Sibilio argues the inevitable discovery rule does not apply here because,
as he correctly points out, the existence of probable cause does not justify
application of the inevitable discovery exception. (People v. Superior Court
(Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1215.) We may not disregard a Fourth
Amendment violation “ ‘simply because the police, had they thought about
the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of
achieving their desired results.’ ” (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30; see also People v.
Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800–801.) This argument is unpersuasive
because we have no doubt that, as the People argue, independent of any
information obtained as a result of warrantless police entries into Sibilio’s
apartment, the court, whether on August 26 or soon thereafter, would have
correctly found probable cause for at least the removal and autopsy of
Atchison’s body as a suspicious death.

42
Springer testified at the suppression hearing that she learned from
paramedic Stangland that Atchison was dead inside after, by Sibilio’s own
account, a night of drinking with him; that Sibilio was the only other person
present in the apartment; that the apartment showed signs of a physical
struggle; and that Atchison’s body displayed several injuries that were
inconsistent with Sibilio’s limited account of what had occurred.
This was more than enough probable cause for the court to at least
issue a warrant authorizing the removal and examination of Atchison’s body
as a suspicious death. And once the body was autopsied, the overwhelming
evidence that her death was due to blunt force trauma and that she had
endured a tremendous beating would have been found, which in turn would
have led to the inevitable discovery of all the challenged evidence.
We also do not agree with Sibilio that these circumstances fall outside
the inevitable discovery doctrine because, assuming for the sake of argument
that Discenza did not assert probable cause, he would have if he had thought
more carefully about it. As we have already indicated, the chief medical
examiner’s office is authorized under Government Code section 27491.2,
subdivision (a) to investigate suspicious deaths, which includes removal of a
body for further examination. Under the circumstances, this inevitably,
independent of the police investigation of which Discenza was a part, would
have led to a court authorizing the lawful removal and autopsy of Atchison’s
body and resulted in the discovery of the challenged evidence.17
Our conclusion on inevitable discovery also defeats Sibilio’s claim that
Discenza’s statement of probable cause supporting the August 26 warrant
lacked probable cause regarding cell phones and computers, did not

17 Notably, in his suppression motion, Sibilio did not argue the autopsy

results should be suppressed.

43
particularly describe the items to be seized, and was overbroad in the absence
of evidence of domestic violence. Once Atchison’s body was inevitably seized
and examined, the glaring signs of domestic abuse would have been obvious,
and would have called out for an investigation into the couple’s
communications before Atchison’s death. This in turn would have ultimately
led to the seizure of all the evidence Sibilio challenges with this argument.
d. Sibilio’s Forfeiture of His August 29 Warrant Claim
Sibilio argues the August 29 warrant did not authorize the police to
seize from the apartment house garage a plastic bag containing items stained
with Atchison’s blood because the warrant authorized a search of the
apartment only.
We need not address the merits of this strand of Sibilio’s Fourth
Amendment argument because, as the People argue, he has forfeited it by
failing to first raise it in the court below. Our Supreme Court has instructed
that, “when defendants move to suppress evidence, they must set forth the
factual and legal bases for the motion . . . . Defendants who do not give the
prosecution sufficient notice of . . . inadequacies cannot raise the issue on
appeal.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136.) Sibilio argued
below only that the type of items (e.g., sheets and towels) seized from the bag
were beyond the scope of the warrant and were not in the plain view of the
police. He did not argue the bag itself was in a location, the garage, that was
beyond the scope of the August 29 warrant. As a result, he has forfeited this
claim.
e. Harmless Error
Even assuming for argument’s sake that the trial court erred in
denying Sibilio’s suppression motion for any of the reasons he asserts, we
would still affirm because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

44
We evaluate an erroneous denial of a suppression motion brought for
violation of the Fourth Amendment under the federal standard for prejudice,
i.e., we affirm only if any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Meza (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 604, 612, citing People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86.)
In addressing the trial court’s jury instructions above, we have already
discussed that evidence admitted at trial showed overwhelming evidence of
Sibilio’s guilt, even if we exclude the evidence he sought to suppress (i.e., the
blood evidence, Sibilio’s clothing, Atchison’s text messages and voicemails to
him in 2014, and the observations of, and photographs taken by, police and
medical examiner personnel on August 26), and exclude his testimony, which
he contends he would not have given if this evidence was excluded. We will
only briefly recap this overwhelming evidence.
At the heart of the prosecution’s case were the autopsy results and
related expert opinion of Dr. Hart regarding the condition of Atchison’s body.
This evidence—the 57 blunt force injuries on different planes all over
Atchison’s body, five of which were so severe as to cause bleeding into her
brain, at least one of which led to her death, and which were inconsistent
with a fall—points powerfully to Sibilio’s guilt.
In addition, paramedic Stangland’s and landlord Vail’s testimony
establish the apartment’s living room was wrecked, indicating a major
physical struggle had taken place there, which struggle was further indicated
by Stangland’s testimony that Sibilio had bloody injuries to his face. That it
was Sibilio who initiated this violence was indicated by the upstairs
neighbor’s testimony that she heard him enter the apartment on the night in
question angrily yelling at Atchison, followed by arguing and thumping
sounds. Stangland also testified that Sibilio was evasive and self-serving in

45
his account of what had occurred, further suggesting his guilt. Also, the
testimony about the couple’s history indicates Sibilio’s capacity for repeatedly
physically attacking Atchison with a disregard for her safety.
From this evidence, only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn: that
Sibilio murdered Atchison. Any error regarding Sibilio’s suppression motion
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.18
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

STREETER, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:

CLAY, J.*

18 Given our rejection of Sibilio’s claims of error in Parts II.A and II.B.

above, we need not address his claim that the cumulative effect of errors
made below was prejudicial.
* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

46
GOLDMAN, J., Concurring
I agree with most of the majority’s analysis and concur in the result,
but write separately about the trial court’s response to the jury’s question.
The jurors wanted to know whether the phrase “dangerous to human life”
“include[s] great bodily injury” or “impl[ies] death only.” The meaning of
their question seems straightforward: By contrasting “great bodily injury”
with “death only,” the jurors were asking whether great bodily injury that is
not likely to result in death can nonetheless be considered “dangerous to
human life.” The answer to that question is also straightforward: No.
Defense counsel’s proposed answer was accurate and would have told
the jury directly that “dangerous to human life” does not include great bodily
injury that is not likely to result in death. And the trial court’s “potential
answer”—that “great bodily injury constitutes dangerous to human life if the
great bodily injury in question is . . . dangerous to human life”—could have
avoided any “circular reasoning” by saying instead that “great bodily injury
constitutes dangerous to human life if the bodily injury in question” is likely
to result in death. By contrast, neither the prosecutor’s proposed answer, nor
the modified version of it the trial court ultimately gave, expressly told the
jurors what they wanted to know. The better course, in my view, would have
been to respond to the question with a direct answer.
Still, I am not persuaded by Sibilio’s argument that the trial court’s
answer would have led the jury to believe that great bodily injury alone,
without a likelihood of death as a consequence, qualifies as “dangerous to
human life.” The court’s reference to the “ordinary, everyday meaning” of the
words “dangerous to human life” would likely have been construed as an
indirect way of saying that great bodily injury alone was insufficient, because
“life” is generally understood as a condition contrasted with “death.” For that

1
reason, the court’s answer may have fallen within the range of permissible
responses, and even if it amounted to an abuse of discretion, it was not
prejudicial under the test in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. The
fact that the jury asked the question may indicate that one or more jurors
were uncertain, at least at that point in their deliberations, that the evidence
showed that Sibilio knew the great bodily injury he inflicted was likely to
result in death. But I do not think it is reasonably probable that the court’s
answer left the jurors believing that a likelihood of death was not required,
and thus that a direct answer to the question would have been reasonably
probable to result in a verdict more favorable to Sibilio.
Lastly, I offer two comments in response to footnote 11 of the majority
opinion. First, I would be cautious to avoid any implication that the fact that
the trial court’s duty to respond to juror questions is governed by a state
statute means that an answer cannot give rise to federal constitutional error
that would require application of the more demanding prejudice test in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. It is true that our Supreme
Court has written that “[a]ny error under [Penal Code] section 1138 . . . is
subject to the [Watson] prejudice standard,” but it made that statement in the
context of a potential “fail[ure] to answer the inquiry in the presence of or
after notice to defendant’s counsel or defendant himself.” (People v. Roberts
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326.) The court was not considering a situation in
which the trial court is claimed to have discharged its state-law obligation to
respond to the jury’s question with an answer that violates the defendant’s
federal constitutional rights—in Sibilio’s view, by “preclud[ing] the jury from
making a finding on a factual issue that is necessary to establish the element
of malice.” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 244.) I would leave it at
this: Because the answer the court gave did not do so, Sibilio’s invocation of

2
Chapman lacks merit. Second, I do not join the majority’s additional
conclusion in footnote 11 that any error was harmless under that standard
too. Again, I think it is enough to say that it is not reasonably probable that
the trial court’s indirect response to the jury’s question left the jurors under
an impression that great bodily injury, without a likelihood of death, satisfied
the definition of “dangerous to human life.”

3

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