In re J.B. CA2/3

CourtListener 10708169Calctapp21 de out. de 2025

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Filed 10/21/25 In re J.B. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B342543
In re J.B., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00374F)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jennifer Baronoff, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed.
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Father E.B. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings and orders made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 342 concerning his son, J.B., and its orders
regarding J.B.’s petition filed pursuant to section 388.1 The sole
issue raised on appeal is whether the juvenile court and Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) complied with their obligations under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and related
California law. We conclude father’s appeal is not justiciable and
dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and mother are the parents of J.B., born in May
2017. Mother is not a party to this appeal.
In July 2023, mother was arrested after she allegedly
struck and bit J.B.’s older half brother. The juvenile court
ordered J.B. and his twin half siblings detained from mother.
J.B. remained in the care of father, while his half siblings were
placed with father’s sister, paternal aunt S.B.
DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300 alleging that
mother physically abused J.B.’s half siblings and father failed to
protect J.B. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court ordered father struck from the petition. It ordered
that J.B. remain released to father and subject to the jurisdiction

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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of the court and ordered family maintenance services. The court
also ordered no corporal punishment and random, on-demand
drug testing for father.
In March 2024, DCFS informed the court that father had
not completed drug testing and had punished J.B. by hitting him
on the hands and with a belt. At a review hearing, the juvenile
court instructed father to comply with the case plan and
admonished him not to physically discipline J.B.
In May 2024, a social worker observed a cigarette burn
mark on J.B.’s arm. Father and J.B. claimed that J.B. had run
into father while father was smoking. J.B. appeared nervous and
did not provide further information. DCFS was concerned that
the burn was intentional and that father had failed to seek
medical care for J.B.
In June 2024, J.B. filed a request to change court order
pursuant to section 388. The request sought J.B.’s removal from
father based on father’s alleged physical abuse. The court
detained J.B. from father. DCFS filed a subsequent dependency
petition pursuant to section 342, alleging that father medically
neglected J.B. by failing to get appropriate treatment for the
burn.
In October 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing on the
petitions filed pursuant to sections 342 and 388. The court found
the burn was non-accidental. It sustained DCFS’s section 342
petition and granted J.B.’s section 388 petition. The court
ordered random drug testing, parenting courses, and monitored
visitation.
Father timely appealed.

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Facts Pertaining to ICWA
In the July 2023 detention report, DCFS informed the court
that father, mother, and paternal aunt S.B. had stated they had
no reason to believe J.B. had Native American ancestry. Mother
and father also filed ICWA-020 forms indicating that neither had
Native American ancestry.
At the initial hearing, the court found it had no reason to
believe ICWA applied as to father but deferred the determination
of ICWA status for mother’s appearance. The court ordered
DCFS to interview all known relatives.
At mother’s arraignment hearing, mother indicated she
may have Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry on her maternal side.
The trial court instructed DCFS to speak with mother and
maternal grandmother. It stated that “it looks very likely that
the Blackfoot and Cherokee tribes should be noticed on this case.”
In the August 2023 jurisdiction and disposition report,
DCFS stated ICWA does or may apply and “eligibility is
pending.” A DCFS investigator had interviewed mother
regarding Native American ancestry. Mother had again
“reported possible ‘Blackfeet and Cherokee’ ancestry” and told the
investigator to speak with maternal grandmother. She also
provided the maternal grandfather’s name. Maternal
grandmother had reported that her mother’s father, maternal
great-great-grandfather, had possible Blackfeet ancestry. She
denied ancestry from any Cherokee tribe. She provided the
names of her parents (maternal great-grandparents) and of a
maternal great-great-grandfather, all of whom were deceased.
She stated no one else would have any information. DCFS sent
inquiry and information letters to the Blackfeet tribe identifying

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the parents, maternal grandparents, and two maternal great-
grandparents.
The DCFS investigator spoke with father and paternal
aunt again in August 2023. Both denied knowledge of Native
American ancestry. Neither identified additional family
members for DCFS to interview.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court observed
there had not yet been a response from the Blackfeet tribe and
set a further progress hearing concerning ICWA. In a last
minute information, DCFS reported that it had yet to receive a
response from the Blackfeet tribe. At the progress hearing, the
court instructed DCFS “to make efforts to contact the Blackfeet
tribe via email, fax, and phone” and stated that DCFS “should
probably notice Cherokee as well just to be safe.”
In a status report filed in March 2024, DCFS asserted that
ICWA did not apply. It reported that, in January 2024, father
again stated he had no reason to believe the children had Native
American ancestry. A social worker had contacted the Blackfeet
tribe “to inquire as to the status of ICWA” and “noticed the
Cherokee Tribe to inquire as to the status of ICWA,” but had
received responses from neither.
In a May 2024 interim review report, DCFS again stated
ICWA did not apply, citing prior statements from mother, father,
and paternal aunt S.B. that they had no reason to believe the
children had Native American ancestry. DCFS also stated
mother and father had not provided any new information
pertaining to Native American ancestry. The report made no
mention of mother’s claim of Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry or
DCFS’s outreach to those tribes.

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A service log filed in May 2024 reflected a telephone call
between a social worker and paternal aunt S.B. from March 2024,
during which paternal aunt stated that she believed the paternal
great-grandmother was “Red Foot Indian and white.”2 She
provided names for paternal grandmother and the paternal
great-grandmother who she believed had “Red Foot” ancestry.
She did not have the dates of birth for either and stated “[t]here
is no one else from the family who has any further information.”
She stated paternal grandmother was not registered with a tribe
but did not know whether the paternal great-grandmother was
registered. She also provided paternal grandfather’s address.
In the July 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report, DCFS
detailed the further ICWA inquiries it had made. Paternal aunt
S.B. reported she believed her family may have Cherokee
ancestry through the paternal great-grandmother but could not
provide names or dates of birth. Maternal aunt denied
knowledge of Native American ancestry. Maternal grandmother
stated that the maternal great-grandfather’s family was from the
“Blackfoot” tribe, but she had already provided DCFS all the
information she had regarding Native American ancestry and
had no relatives who could provide additional information.
Father again denied knowledge of Native American ancestry on
his or mother’s sides of the family.
DCFS stated it would “continue to contact the Blackfeet
and Cherokee tribes noticed. If there is still no response by
07/12/24, the Department will complete a new ICWA inquiry as
to those tribes.”
In a last minute information filed in August 2024, DCFS
reported that a DCFS investigator had contacted the Blackfeet

2 There is no federally recognized “Red Foot” tribe.

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tribe, which instructed the investigator to resend the inquiry.
The investigator did so on August 15, 2024.
In another last minute information filed in October 2024,
DCFS reported it had received letters from the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians stating that J.B. was not eligible for registration with
their tribes. DCFS was awaiting responses from the Cherokee
Nation and the Blackfeet tribe.
In a case plan filed October 2024, DCFS indicated that the
applicability of ICWA was pending.3
DISCUSSION
Father contends insubstantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply to J.B. He
argues that there is no indication in the record that DCFS asked
certain known family members, such as the paternal and
maternal grandfathers, about Native American ancestry. He
further argues that, after learning of potential Native American
ancestry on both sides of the family, DCFS failed to contact
extended family members and others who may have information.
He also contends that it is impossible to know whether the
inquiries DCFS sent to the Cherokee tribes were adequate
because they were not in the record.
DCFS seeks dismissal of this action because the sole issue
raised is whether DCFS and the juvenile court erred with respect
to the duty of inquiry pursuant to ICWA, and that duty is

3 DCFS asked this court to take judicial notice of a minute
order, dated August 7, 2025, which stated that a permanency
review hearing was set for August 21, 2025. We decline to
consider this evidence. Even if we did, it would not impact the
outcome of this appeal.

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ongoing. DCFS therefore argues that the appeal is premature
and father’s arguments are not justiciable. We agree with DCFS.
I. ICWA Inquiry and Notice
“Section 224.2 codifies and expands on ICWA’s duty of
inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian child.”4 (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131.) An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a).)
Section 224.2, subdivision (a), provides that both the
juvenile court and child welfare agency have an “affirmative and
continuing duty” to inquire whether a child is or may be an
Indian child, beginning with the initial contact. Under
section 224.2, subdivision (b), if a child is placed in the agency’s
temporary custody, the agency must inquire whether the child is
or may be an Indian child, by asking a nonexclusive group that
includes the child, the parents, and extended family members.
Under section 224.2, subdivision (e), if the juvenile court or
social worker has reason to believe an Indian child is involved in
the proceeding, but does not have enough information to
determine there is a reason to know the child is an Indian child,
the court or the social worker must make further inquiry, as soon
as practicable. “[R]eason to believe” means the court or social
worker has information “suggesting that either the parent of the
child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for
membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(1).)

4 Section 224 et seq., is the California Indian Child Welfare
Act.

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“Further inquiry” includes actions such as “[i]nterviewing
the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members” to
gather information that would be necessary to provide notice to
any relevant tribes. (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
That information includes “[a]ll names known of the Indian
child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents,
or Indian custodians, including maiden, married, and former
names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses,
birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment,
membership, or citizenship information of other direct lineal
ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if
known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) Further inquiry also includes
contacting the “tribe or tribes and any other person that may
reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s
membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(2)(C).)
There is “reason to know” a child is an Indian child when,
among other things, a person having an interest in the child
informs the court the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (d).)
Formal notice to a tribe or tribes is required only when there is a
reason to know the child is an Indian child. (§§ 224.2, subd. (f),
224.3, subd. (a).) An Indian tribe’s determination that a child is
or is not a member, or eligible for membership in the tribe, is
conclusive. (§ 224.2, subd. (h).)
Under section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2), if “the court makes a
finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence as required in this section have been conducted and
there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,
the court may make a finding that [ICWA] . . . does not apply to

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the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.”
II. Father’s Appeal Is Not Justiciable
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) A case is moot where the court can
grant no effective relief. (Ibid.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(Ibid.)
Father contends that the adequacy of DCFS’s and the
juvenile court’s ICWA inquiry is cognizable on appeal, citing In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10, and other cases involving the
termination of parental rights. In Isaiah W., the Supreme Court
held a parent who did not file a timely appeal from a juvenile
court order that included a finding of ICWA’s inapplicability may
nevertheless challenge such a finding by appealing from a
subsequent order terminating parental rights. (Isaiah W., at
p. 6.) The Supreme Court explained the juvenile court has “a
continuing duty” to inquire whether the child before it is an
Indian “in all dependency proceedings” and that an order
terminating parental rights “was necessarily premised on a
current finding by the juvenile court that it had no reason to
know [the child] was an Indian child and thus ICWA notice was
not required.” (Id. at p. 10.)

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This case involves an appeal from the juvenile court’s
orders on petitions filed pursuant to sections 342 and 388, which
are not necessarily premised on a current finding of ICWA
inapplicability. As father concedes, the juvenile court’s October
2024 orders did not address ICWA. The only finding of ICWA
inapplicability father identifies is the court’s statement at a July
2023 hearing that it did not have reason to know ICWA applied
as to father. However, the court deferred determination of J.B.’s
ICWA status for mother’s appearance. Since learning of the
child’s possible Native American ancestry, the juvenile court
instructed DCFS to follow up on inquiries sent to the Blackfeet
tribe and advised that notice should be provided to the Cherokee
tribes. At the time the court issued the orders from which father
appeals, responses to DCFS’s inquiries were still outstanding
from the Blackfeet tribe and one of the Cherokee tribes.
Although DCFS asserted in two reports that ICWA did not
apply, subsequent reports DCFS filed with the juvenile court
reflect its further inquiry efforts and the case plan it filed in
October 2024 stated that the question of ICWA applicability
remained pending. Thus, the record does not indicate that DCFS
or the juvenile court understood that their inquiry obligations
had been satisfied.
Father points out that there is no evidence that DCFS
asked certain known family members, including the paternal and
maternal grandfathers, about possible Native American ancestry.
Further, the adequacy of the information provided in the
inquiries to the Cherokee tribes is unclear. However, “all we
could order in resolving this appeal is that [DCFS] and [the]
juvenile court fulfill their inquiry and notice obligations under
ICWA and related California law. Because that is what [DCFS]

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is already doing, and because we are not in a position to
micromanage that process in this appeal (detailing, for instance,
all those who must be interviewed, what they must be asked, and
what must be included in any notice to tribes that is required),
there is no effective relief we can now provide. The juvenile court
must direct that process, at least in the first instance. This
appeal is moot.” (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635,
638–639.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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