CourtListener 10708165•People v. Clem CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 10/21/25 P. v. Clem CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B337135
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA070295)
v.
TERRILL KEITH CLEM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
Gloria C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
In 2017, Terrill Keith Clem (defendant) pled no contest to
two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)1 and was
sentenced to serve 17 years in state prison. In 2024, the trial
court conducted a full resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75,2
struck a one-year prior prison term enhancement (former § 667.5,
subd. (b)), and declined to otherwise reduce defendant’s sentence.
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it reimposed the
upper term sentence that defendant originally received for one of
his convictions. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Underlying Crimes3
On January 3, 2017, defendant approached a woman seated
in her vehicle. He held a gun to her face, ordered her out of the
car, and demanded she give him the rings she was wearing.
Defendant took a diamond ring worth $2,000, a wedding band
worth $400, and a purse containing currency as well as other
items.
The following day, defendant approached another woman
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered
section 1172.75, with no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 378, fn. 2.) For
simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.
3 We draw these underlying facts from the probation report.
2
as she was getting into her car, pointed a gun in her face,
threatened to “blow [her] fucking head off” if she did not “give
[him her] fucking purse,” and took her purse.
II. Conviction and Sentencing
Defendant pled no contest to two counts of robbery (§ 211)
with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5), and admitted that his
2013 robbery conviction constituted a prior “strike” within the
meaning of our “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d), 667, subds. (b)–(j)) as well as a conviction for which he had
served a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).4 The trial
court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 17 years in
state prison, comprised of a base term of 10 years for one robbery
(an upper term of five years, doubled due to the prior strike), plus
a consecutive two-year term for the second robbery (one-third the
midterm sentence of three years, doubled due to the prior strike),
plus a midterm sentence of four years for the firearm
enhancement, plus one year for the prior prison term
enhancement.
III. Resentencing Proceedings
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified defendant as being potentially entitled
to resentencing relief under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.). Through appointed counsel, defendant filed a motion for
resentencing, asking the trial court to strike the one-year prior
prison term enhancement and to conduct a resentencing hearing
4 The People also charged defendant with two counts of being
a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and
giving false information to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)), and
alleged that his prior conviction constituted a prior serious felony
(§ 667, subd. (a)), but the People dismissed those counts and
allegations as part of the plea deal.
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in which the court impose the middle term (rather than the upper
term) for his robbery base term conviction, and impose the low
term (rather than the middle term) on the firearm enhancement.
In its opposition, the People agreed that defendant was
entitled to have his one-year prior prison term enhancement
stricken but opposed further reduction of his sentence, citing “the
extreme danger that defendant poses to public safety.” In
support, the People attached a list of prison rule violations
committed by defendant, documenting a history of fighting,
delaying police officer duties, possession of contraband, and
disobeying orders.
At the resentencing hearing on March 7, 2024, the trial
court resentenced defendant to a 16-year prison sentence. The
court struck the one-year prior prison term enhancement, but
declined to further reduce defendant’s sentence after finding that
the factors in aggravation (namely, that defendant’s non-remote
2013 conviction involved the robbery of two elderly men, that
defendant was on parole for that offense when he committed the
robberies in this case, and that defendant had several rules
violations while in custody) outweighed the factors in mitigation
(namely, that defendant attended anger management and grief
counseling in 2021 as well as a few other courses), and concluded
that defendant was a danger to the public.
IV. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from his resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court violated the Sixth
Amendment in reimposing the upper term sentence on the
robbery conviction used as the base term without having a jury
4
find the aggravating factors justifying that upper term.5
Defendant forfeited this argument because he did not object to
the trial court’s use of the upper term, even after the court
explained why he was not entitled to a jury finding of
aggravating factors. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.)
For the sake of completeness, we will nevertheless address the
merits of his claim. We generally review sentencing decisions for
an abuse of discretion (People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
870, 874), but review de novo any subsidiary questions of
statutory interpretation (People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 585, 595).
Enacted in Senate Bill No. 483, section 1172.75 declares
“legally invalid” nearly all previously imposed prior prison term
enhancements, entitling eligible defendants to a “full
resentencing” under the law as it exists at the time of
resentencing, and may also present “postconviction factors” for
consideration. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (d)(2)–(3); People v.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402; People v. Carter (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 960, 966-967.) Section 1172.75 recognizes that
under current law a “court may not impose a sentence exceeding
the middle term unless” the “circumstances in aggravation that
justify the imposition” of the upper term are either “stipulated to
by the defendant” or “found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury,” but explicitly exempts resentencings under
section 1172.75 from this aspect of current law if “the court
originally imposed the upper term.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4);
People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466-
467; People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 371-374.)
5 Defendant does not challenge the imposition of the
midterm sentence or the firearm enhancement.
5
Defendant urges us to follow People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 312, 328, which construes the language in section
1172.75 as not creating an exemption for sentences that
originally imposed the upper term. (Id. at p. 330.) Although the
resolution of this split of authority is pending before our Supreme
Court (see People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub.
opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903), we in the interim
find the reasoning of Brannon-Thompson and Mathis more
persuasive. We accordingly reject defendant’s Gonzalez-based
challenge to his new sentence.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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