CourtListener 10708161•People v. Rossberg CA1/5
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Filed 10/21/25 P. v. Rossberg CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171484
v.
KAI DANGER ROSSBERG, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 042301978)
Kai Danger Rossberg appeals after he pled no contest to
involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)),1 admitted
a personal firearm use enhancement allegation (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)), and the trial court sentenced him to a five-year prison term.
Rossberg does not challenge the validity of his plea; rather, he
asserts the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by denying
his request for probation and by declining to strike the firearm
enhancement. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
In April 2023, Rossberg shot and killed his friend Jesus
Gallegos at Gallegos’s home in Bay Point. Several witnesses and
Rossberg—who had been drinking alcohol and smoking
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Because Rossberg entered a no contest plea, we (like the parties)
take the facts from the probation report.
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marijuana—were present when police arrived. Rossberg had
blood on his hands and appeared emotionally distraught. He
yelled, “ ‘Oh my fucking God, why did I do that?!’ ” When officers
asked Rossberg what happened, he responded, “ ‘I can’t say that
shit bro.’ ” Rossberg turned to one of Gallegos’s nephews and
said, “ ‘I am . . . sorry[.] I owe everything to your fucking family
bro.’ ”
One witness told responding officers that the firearm used
in the shooting belonged to Gallegos; that Gallegos had been
showing the firearm to her and Rossberg before the shooting; and
that Rossberg shot Gallegos. A second witness said he was
playing on a phone in a room with his younger brother when he
heard a loud noise that sounded like metal hitting the floor. That
same witness saw Rossberg outside the room. Rossberg was
saying, “ ‘Call the cops, oh my God I don’t want to get arrested,
my only friend is dead. . . . Don’t tell them it was me, tell them he
shot himself.’ ”
A third witness said he was in the garage when he heard
Rossberg and the first witness arrive at the residence and shortly
thereafter, a gunshot went off. The third witness stated that
Rossberg approached him and demanded he report to the police
that Gallegos had shot himself.
B.
Rossberg entered an open plea of no contest to involuntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (b)), admitted having personally used
a firearm in committing that felony (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and
agreed the trial court would determine his sentence. At
sentencing, the trial court denied Rossberg’s requests for
probation and to strike the firearm enhancement. The court
imposed a two-year prison term for involuntary manslaughter
and a (consecutive) three-year prison term for the firearm
enhancement.
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DISCUSSION
A.
Rossberg maintains the trial court should have granted his
request for probation—despite him being presumptively
ineligible—because his case was unusual. (See § 1203, subd.
(e)(2).) He has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. (See
People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831
[standard of review].)
1.
“Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals
whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to
public safety and promotes rehabilitation. [Citations.] The
sentencing court has broad discretion to determine whether an
eligible defendant is suitable for probation and, if so, under what
conditions.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)
However, probation is an unavailable sentencing choice in many
serious felony cases and presumptively unavailable in others.
(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233.)
Section 1203, subdivision (e)(2), creates one instance of
presumptive ineligibility. The statute provides: “Except in
unusual cases in which the interests of justice would best be
served if the person is granted probation, probation shall not be
granted to [¶] . . . [¶] [a]ny person who used . . . a deadly weapon
upon a human being in connection with the perpetration of the
crime of which that person has been convicted.” (§ 1203, subd.
(e)(2).) To determine whether a case is “unusual,” courts consider
the factors listed in California Rules of Court, rule 4.413(c).2
2 All undesignated rule references are to the California
Rules of Court. A court should consider the following factors
(among others) in determining whether a case is “unusual”: (1)
the “circumstance giving rise to the limitation on probation is . . .
substantially less serious than the circumstances typically
3
(Rule 4.413(b).) Rule 4.413 lists factors which “may” indicate the
existence of an unusual case. The rule is permissive, not
mandatory. (People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165, 177-
178 (Stuart).) Thus, even when a listed factor is established, a
trial court is not required to find a case unusual. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, the exception for “unusual cases” must be
construed narrowly to ensure the continued meaning of the
statutory limitations on probation. (People v. Superior Court
(Dorsey) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1229 (Dorsey).) Unusual
cases must be limited to “those matters in which the crime is
either atypical or the offender’s moral blameworthiness is
reduced.” (Ibid.; accord, Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p.
178.) When a trial court denies probation to a presumptively
ineligible defendant, the court need not specify its reasons.
(People v. Bradley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1156.)
On the other hand, if a sentencing court determines that a
presumption against probation is overcome, the court must then
continue to the second step of the evaluation—determining
whether probation is appropriate under the circumstances. (See
rules 4.413(b), 4.414; Dorsey, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.)
Rule 4.414 sets out circumstances affecting the probation
present in other cases involving the same probation limitation,
and the defendant has no recent record of committing similar
crimes or crimes of violence” (rule 4.413(c)(1)(A)); (2) “[t]he
defendant participated in the crime under circumstances of great
provocation, coercion, or duress not amounting to a defense, and
the defendant has no recent record of committing crimes of
violence” (rule 4.413(c)(2)(A)); (3) “[t]he crime was committed
because of a mental condition not amounting to a defense, and
there is a high likelihood that the defendant would respond
favorably to mental health care and treatment that would be
required as a condition of probation” (rule 4.413(c)(2)(B)); and (4)
“[t]he defendant is youthful or aged, and has no significant record
of prior criminal offenses.” (Rule 4.413(c)(2)(C).)
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suitability decision, which include facts relating both to the crime
and to the defendant. (Rule 4.414(a)-(c).)
A trial court’s denial of probation “ ‘is almost invariably
upheld’ ” if the decision is made after consideration on the
request’s merits. (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
1125, 1157.) The defendant bears the burden to show that,
considering all the circumstances, the denial of probation was
arbitrary, capricious or exceeded the bounds of reason. (People v.
Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 89.) In reviewing sentencing
decisions, we presume the trial court properly exercised its
judicial discretion in the absence of a clear showing that the
decision was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377; People v. Martinez (1985) 175
Cal.App.3d 881, 896.)
2.
Rossberg concedes he is presumptively ineligible for
probation, under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2), because he used
a deadly weapon in committing involuntary manslaughter. (See
§ 192.) He nonetheless contends the trial court abused its
discretion because the court gave insufficient weight to evidence
that suggested his culpability was reduced because: (1) he
committed the crime due to a mental condition (rule
4.413(c)(2)(B)), and (2) he was a youth (18 years old at time of the
shooting) and lacked a criminal record.3 (Rule 4.413(c)(2)(C).)
We find no abuse of discretion.
3We note that defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum
and the supporting forensic psychological evaluation were filed
under seal in this court and that the parties have, in compliance
with Rule 8.46(g), filed both redacted and unredacted briefs to
preserve confidentiality. Although we have reviewed the
contents of the sealed reports, we do not refer to the content of
the reports in any detail.
5
Rossberg’s argument appears to be grounded (at least in
part) in the fact that the trial court did not explicitly mention all
these factors on the record when it stated the presumption of
ineligibility was not overcome. But the court did not need to
state its reasons for denying probation—because Rossberg was
presumptively ineligible—and we presume the trial court
considered the correct factors unless the record affirmatively
shows otherwise. (Rule 4.409; People v. Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at pp. 376-377; People v. Bradley, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1156.) Furthermore, the trial court explicitly stated it had
considered the probation report and a forensic psychological
evaluation submitted by the defense, which discussed the very
same factors Rossberg now claims were ignored. Despite
considering Rossberg’s youth, the fact this was his first offense,
and other factors (including the seriousness of the harm he
caused), the probation department found this did not present an
unusual case.
And, even if the court agreed that Rossberg’s youth, record,
and developmental disorder were existing circumstances that
diminished his culpability, the court was not required to find his
case unusual. (See Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.) In
fact, after defense counsel emphasized the same factors at the
sentencing hearing, the court explained, Rossberg “clearly is
youthful and has . . . no record. This is a very strongly favorable
factor to [his argument]. [¶] But having considered all of the
other relevant factors . . . to be considered in the decision whether
to grant probation, I do not think that this factor, his youth and
lack of record, itself overcomes the presumption that probation is
not eligible.” The court also later explicitly recognized that
Rossberg had been diagnosed with a developmental disorder as a
child. Although this “may be one of the many complex factors
that led him to make the decision that he made,” the court did
not believe that condition “significantly reduces his culpability.”
The trial court also reasonably found that the circumstances were
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not “substantially less serious” because Gallegos was vulnerable
in his own home and had been killed as a result of Rossberg’s
recklessness; because Rossberg had previously threatened to kill
Gallegos out of apparent romantic jealousy; because Rossberg
was admittedly familiar with firearms; and because Rossberg
likely loaded the magazine and racked the slide to move a
cartridge into the chamber before pulling the trigger. The court
concluded, “Rossberg’s conduct in this case reflects such a degree
of recklessness . . . that there is a substantial risk of further
dangerous behavior, at least until he reaches the age of maturity
and judgment that doesn’t come until adulthood, more biological
adulthood than chronological.”
In other words, the trial court explicitly considered the
circumstances Rossberg cites and found these circumstances were
not sufficient, under all the circumstances, to overcome the
presumption of ineligibility. We cannot reweigh the evidence to
reach a different decision. (See Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 178-179.)
3.
We also reject Rossberg’s claim that the trial court’s
decision deprived him of his constitutional right to due process.
An arbitrary denial of procedural sentencing rights afforded to a
defendant by state law may violate a defendant’s right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Hicks v. Oklahoma
(1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346-347.) Here, however, the trial court did
not arbitrarily reject probation or violate any identified
procedural safeguards.
B.
Rossberg also challenges the trial court’s decision to decline
to strike, in furtherance of justice, his admitted firearm use
enhancement. (See §§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 1385, subd. (c).) He
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shows no abuse of discretion. (See People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298 [standard of review].)
1.
Since 2018, trial courts have discretion to strike or dismiss
firearm enhancements found true “in the interest of justice.”
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h), as amended by Stats.
2017, ch. 682, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2018; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87
Cal.App.5th 9, 15-16.) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides:
“Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.” (Italics added.) “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that
the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury
or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), italics
added.)
As relevant here, the list of mitigating circumstances in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), includes: “The current offense is
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(E).) “ ‘Childhood trauma’ means that as a minor the
person experienced physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, physical
or emotional neglect. A court may conclude that a defendant’s
childhood trauma was connected to the offense if, after reviewing
any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to,
police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness
statements, medical records, or records or reports by qualified
medical experts, the court concludes that the defendant’s
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childhood trauma substantially contributed to the defendant’s
involvement in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(6)(A).)
In deciding whether to strike a firearm enhancement in the
interest of justice, the trial court must consider the same factors
it is required to consider when sentencing in the first instance.
(People v. Pearson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 112, 116-117.) Those
factors include general sentencing objectives (including
protecting society and deterrence of criminal conduct), whether
the victim was particularly vulnerable, whether the defendant
was armed or used a weapon in committing the crime, and
whether the crime involved great violence, threat of great bodily
harm, or a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness. (Id.
at p. 117; Rules 4.410 & 4.421.)
2.
Rossberg claims that his parents’ divorce and purportedly
improper treatment of his diagnosed developmental disorder
constituted childhood trauma and the trial court was thereby
compelled to strike his firearm enhancement in the interests of
justice. He is wrong.
First, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), does not erect a
rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be
overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.
(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1032-1034
(Walker).) Although the statute uses the word “shall,” the text of
subdivision (c) as a whole reflects that the trial court has
discretion to determine whether dismissal of an enhancement
would be in the interests of justice. (Walker, at p. 1033.) Our
Supreme Court, in Walker, explained: “[I]f the court does not
conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then
mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the
enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether
dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a
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danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036, italics added.)
Second, the trial court implicitly found that dismissal of the
firearm enhancement would endanger public safety. Thus, the
trial court was free to impose the enhancement without
considering the enumerated mitigating factors at all. (Walker,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1038 [“absent a finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety, a court must assign significant
value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present”]; accord, People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p.
296 [“if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement ‘would
endanger public safety,’ then the court need not consider the
listed mitigating circumstances”].)
Rossberg has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused
its discretion in declining to strike the firearm enhancement.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.
P. v. Rossberg (A171484)
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