CourtListener 10707337•People v. Gonzalez CA2/5
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Filed 10/20/25 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B337608
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. TA160992)
AAREN GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael D. Abzug, Judge. Reversed.
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss and Stefanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to
establish participation in a conspiracy to commit that crime or
aiding and abetting its commission. (People v. Ware (2022) 14
Cal.5th 151, 165 [“Because the law will not recognize a rule of
guilt by association, we insist on proof of a defendant’s knowledge
of, and specific intent to further, [a conspiracy’s] unlawful ends”];
People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 72; In re Michael T. (1978)
84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [“Mere presence at the scene of a crime
which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge
that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does
not amount to aiding and abetting”].) We consider whether the
People presented substantial evidence of more than mere
presence with respect to defendant and appellant Aaren Gonzalez
(defendant), who was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit
murder, four counts of attempted murder, and a firearm
possession offense.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct, as Established by the Evidence
at Trial
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers Francisco
Lozano and Lester Castillo were on patrol in Los Angeles County
on the evening of September 22, 2023. Shortly before 8:00 p.m.,
they were traveling westbound on 108th Street, approaching
Stanford Avenue. This stretch of 108th Street is primarily
residential, with one lane of traffic in each direction, a left turn
lane down the middle of the street, and curb parking on either
side.
The officers saw a Lexus, which was traveling in the
opposite direction on 108th Street, stop in the roadway next to a
2
parked Mercedes. While the officers were driving toward the
Lexus from the opposite direction, the Lexus’s passenger rapidly
fired multiple gunshots (estimated to be between seven and nine)
at the Mercedes. There were no cars behind the Lexus, and the
appellate record (including video footage from the officers’ dash
camera) does not reveal for how many seconds the Lexus was
stopped.
After the gunshots, the Lexus sped off eastbound on 108th
Street and the officers gave chase. Less than one minute later,
the Lexus collided with a vehicle at 107th and Wadsworth—as
circumstances would have it, the same Mercedes targeted in the
shooting. The Lexus continued for another half block after the
collision and, at that point, defendant exited the driver’s side and
Davion McFarlan (McFarlan) exited the passenger side. Both
fled on foot, splitting up as they ran,1 and McFarlan threw or
dropped a handgun as he fled.
While the police officers on scene called for back-up, they
observed at least four people get out of the Mercedes that had
been fired on; one of those people told an officer he had been shot
in the arm and stomach. The Mercedes’s other occupants left the
scene without identifying themselves, and no weapons were
found in the Mercedes or on the shooting victim.
The police recovered the gun discarded by McFarlan and
found it had a “double feed malfunction.” This type of
malfunction “occurs when a pistol or firearm is fired rapidly and
1
The police apprehended defendant on 106th Street “just
east of Wadsworth” and McFarlan on 107th Street east of
Wadsworth.
3
two rounds . . . attempt to enter the chamber at the same time,”
which causes the weapon to jam.
B. McFarlan’s Jail Call
Defendant and McFarlan were charged with conspiracy to
commit attempted murder, four counts of attempted murder
(corresponding to four occupants of the Mercedes), and firearm
offenses. Both men were tried together. None of the Mercedes
occupants who were shot at testified during trial.
The prosecution did introduce in evidence a recording of a
phone call McFarlan made from jail a few days after he was
arrested.2 The call, which lasted about five minutes, was between
McFarlan, a woman McFarlan referred to as “mama,” and a man
who addressed McFarlan as “nephew.”
During the call, McFarlan’s mother asked him “what
happened when [he] left.” She said she “kn[e]w pretty much
everything” and the “Citizen App” said “it’s connected to some
shit. The boy getting shot at Marco?” McFarlan answered, “I
don’t know.” McFarlan’s mother remarked, “They got you for
attempted murder,” and McFarlan responded, “Yeah.”
McFarlan’s uncle asked, “Why,” and his mother cut in to
say, “Yeah, because that’s what she Amaya saying. . . . Did they
catch him? Did they find anything on you?” McFarlan
responded, “not on me,” and his mother said, “But they found
something somewhere.” McFarlan remarked, “I think so.”
McFarlan’s uncle asked, “Did you use it? Yes or no? Did you use
2
There was no objection that the jury could not consider the
call made by McFarlan against defendant (who was not a party to
the conversation).
4
it? Yes or no?” McFarlan said “Huh?” and his uncle repeated,
“Did y’all use it? Yes or no?” McFarlan grunted in response.
Moments later on the call, the uncle asked, “Nephew? Yeah,
nephew. Was it a green—was it a go or no? Did it go or no?”
McFarlan responded, “I don’t talk over this phone. Huh?
Whatever they got me in here for. That’s what it is.”
Los Angeles Police Department detective Mario Leonidas,
who testified that he investigated hundreds of gang-related
crimes, was asked to offer an opinion on the meaning of the “go or
no” exchange between McFarlan and his uncle. The detective
testified that, “based on talking to arrestees[ and] victims, when
they say, ‘It’s a go or no,’ it’s indicating, like, a mission, for
example, like, a drive-by shooting or a shooting, if it’s a go, if they
actually did what they were supposed to do. [¶] So in this case
that means to me, based on . . . my experience, the mission they
were on that day to do that shooting was—were they able to
accomplish or not?” That limited opinion was the only expert
testimony presented at trial. There was no testimony that
defendant or McFarlan (or any of the occupants of the fired-upon
Mercedes) were members of a criminal street gang.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
The prosecution argued McFarlan was the one who shot at
the Mercedes and defendant was guilty of the four charged
attempted murders as an aider and abettor (and a conspirator
who planned with McFarlan in advance to commit murder). The
jury found defendant guilty as charged, convicting him of
5
conspiracy (Pen. Code, 3 § 182, subd. (a)(1)), four counts of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder ( §§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm with a prior violent
conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to concurrent terms of life and 25 years to life on the
attempted murder and conspiracy counts, respectively. The court
imposed a concurrent two-year prison term for the firearm
offense.
II. DISCUSSION
At trial, all the evidence was that McFarlan was the
shooter. Nobody who was in the Mercedes testified. There was
no evidence about the nature of defendant and McFarlan’s
relationship (beyond the evidence that they were in a vehicle
together and ran in different directions when chased by the police
after McFarlan shot at the Mercedes). As the prosecution
conceded during closing argument, there was no evidence about
the motive for the shooting.4 There was also no expert testimony
concerning whether or not a driver of a vehicle would ordinarily
be aware that one of his passengers was carrying a firearm. In
light of these evidentiary deficits, the prosecution did not present
substantial evidence defendant knew McFarlan was armed or
3
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
4
The detective did offer limited opinion testimony about the
meaning of the “go or no” question posed by McFarlan’s uncle on
the recorded call, but there was no evidence McFarlan’s uncle—or
defendant or McFarlan—were gang members.
6
intended to kill anyone. As we explain, the criminal judgment
against defendant must accordingly be reversed.
A. Standard of Review
“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence for a jury finding, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We
evaluate whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and
credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting
the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] ‘“The standard of review is the same in cases in which
the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820.)
B. Attempted Murder Convictions
“‘[T]o be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and
abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with
knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the
purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of
the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.)
“Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the intent
to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of the
defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (People
v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602; accord People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 [“‘Such intent must usually be derived
from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the
defendant’s actions’”].)
7
The mere fact that defendant stopped the Lexus in the
roadway alongside the parked Mercedes does not demonstrate
defendant knew McFarlan was armed, knew McFarlan intended
to kill any occupants inside the Mercedes, or shared that intent.
The Attorney General’s suggestion that McFarlan’s jail call may
be read to include an “adoptive admission to his uncle that they
were on a mission[,] . . . suggest[ing] a shared purpose that
[McFarlan] and [defendant] carried out together,” is unfounded.
Assuming McFarlan’s statements can be construed as a tacit
admission of his own culpability for attempted murder, none of
McFarlan’s statements indicates defendant knew he was armed
or had any knowledge of his plans until he started firing. Even if
the jury could conclude from the recorded call and opinion
testimony that McFarlan was on a “mission,” nothing in the call
or the expert testimony provides a rational basis to infer
McFarlan and defendant were on a shared mission.
The Attorney General also suggests that defendant “waited
for McFarlan to finish firing as many shots as the gun allowed
before he sped off,” but this is not a fair characterization in light
of the evidence presented on the rapidity of the shooting.
McFarlan fired between seven and nine shots so quickly his gun
jammed, and the seconds this took means the “wait[ing]” that the
Attorney General postulates is just as easily explained as a short
period of shock at an unexpected event—presumably no more
than a couple seconds.5
5
The Attorney General compares this case to People v.
Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, in which the defendant and
a co-defendant walked by a man and a woman, circled back, the
defendant stood in front of the two victims when the co-defendant
pulled a gun and demanded money, and the defendant robbed the
8
The circumstances of defendant’s flight fail to fill in the
wide evidentiary gaps. Defendant fled the scene of the shooting
with McFarlan still in the car, but he and McFarlan ran off in
different directions after they collided with the Mercedes. To be
sure, the split between defendant and McFarlan could have been
undertaken in the hope of better avoiding capture, but it is still
incorrect, as the Attorney General says, that defendant “made no
attempt to distance himself from McFarlan.” By all appearances
based on the evidence, defendant disassociated himself from
McFarlan at the earliest practical opportunity following the
shooting. (See People v. Lara (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296, 321-323
[holding that two defendants’ decision “to flee the scene of a
shooting” together in a car “[did] not support a reasonable
conclusion they did so because of a consciousness of guilt rather
than simple self-preservation or a desire to disassociate
themselves from what had just occurred” because “[i]t would have
made little sense for [them] to have fled the scene on foot
when . . . [they had access to] a more efficient means of leaving
the dangerous situation”].) Regardless, defendant’s flight after
the fact while being pursued by the police cannot be substantial
evidence about what he knew before the shooting started.6
woman after the co-defendant ran off in pursuit of the fleeing
man. (Id. at 409-410.) The Court of Appeal held this evidence
was sufficient to establish the defendant “played an affirmative
supportive role in the attempted robbery” of the male victim. (Id.
at 410.) Defendant’s conduct in this case—stopping the car and
failing to drive off immediately upon the firing of seven to nine
rapid shots—is not analogous.
6
The Attorney General’s citation of People v. Chagolla (1983)
144 Cal.App.3d 422 is inapposite. In Chagolla, it was “farcical” to
9
We have discussed the points argued by the Attorney
General individually but considered them collectively. So
considered, there is still insufficient evidence supporting
defendant’s four attempted murder convictions.
C. Conspiracy Conviction
The crime of conspiracy “has four elements: (1) the
existence of an agreement between at least two persons; (2) the
specific intent to agree to commit an offense; (3) the specific
intent to commit the offense that is the object of the agreement;
and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which may
be committed by any conspirator. [Citations.]” (Ware, supra, 14
Cal.5th at 163.) “The first element, concerning the existence of
suppose the defendant was “oblivious of what was going on” with
respect to a drive-by shooting carried out by his brother in light of
evidence that the brothers and another person cruised the
neighborhood for several hours prior to the shooting, defendant
yelled “Northside” and his brother pointed a gun at witnesses
prior to the shooting, and the group was arrested after driving by
the site of the shooting over an hour later. (Id. at 429.) The facts
here are entirely different. In addition to the lack of any evidence
concerning the relationship between defendant and McFarlan or
their conduct prior to the shooting, defendant had no realistic
opportunity between the shooting and the collision to disassociate
himself from McFarlan.
The Attorney General also suggests defendant’s failure to
immediately eject his armed passenger from the car he was
driving is analogous to cases in which the defendants fled on foot
in the company of others. (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
1, 4-5; In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1095.) The
factual scenarios are not comparable, and, as we have said,
defendant and McFarlan separated when they were on foot.
10
an agreement, ‘is the crux of criminal conspiracy.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) The agreement may be express or tacit. (People v. Maciel
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 516.) No direct evidence is required, and
“such agreement must often be proved circumstantially.” (People
v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 870.)
As we have already discussed, there is no evidence of
defendant’s relationship to McFarlan, any shared interest (such
as membership in a gang), or their conversation or activities
preceding the shooting. There is no basis to infer defendant knew
who was in the Mercedes—or, really, whether it was even
occupied at all. The bare facts that defendant stopped the car
next to the Mercedes and drove off after McFarlan quickly fired
between seven and nine shots do not support an inference that he
agreed to commit murder.
D. Firearm Conviction
Penal Code section 29900, subdivision (a)(1) makes it a
felony for “any person who has been previously convicted of any
of the [violent] offenses listed in Section 29905” to “own[ ] or
ha[ve] in possession or under custody or control any firearm.”
Here, defendant stipulated to having suffered a qualifying
conviction and there is no evidence that he owned a firearm, so
the sole issue is whether defendant had actual or constructive
possession of the gun McFarlan fired from the car he was driving.
“‘“A defendant has actual possession when the weapon is in
his [or her] immediate possession or control,”’ i.e., when he or she
is actually holding or touching it. [Citations.]” (People v. Bay
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 132.) “To establish constructive
possession, the prosecution must prove a defendant knowingly
exercised a right to control the prohibited item, either directly or
11
through another person. [Citations.] Possession may be shared
with others. [Citation.] But mere proximity to the weapon,
standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of possession.
[Citation.]” (People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410,
1417, disapproved on another ground in People v. Farwell (2018)
5 Cal.5th 295, 304, fn. 6.)
There is no evidence defendant ever had the gun in his
actual possession and the Attorney General’s argument that he
had constructive possession of the gun is largely based on the
unsupported premise that he and McFarlan were on a joint
“mission.” As we have already discussed, however, there is no
evidence concerning defendant’s relationship to McFarlan and no
evidence (even expert testimony) that McFarlan displayed the
gun for any appreciable period of time before rapidly opening fire
on the Mercedes. In the absence of such evidence, there is no
basis to infer defendant knew McFarlan was armed and no
proper evidentiary predicate for defendant’s firearm conviction;
nothing about the gun’s physical features suggests defendant
must have seen it before McFarlan started shooting. (Compare
People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 410-411 [holding
it was reasonable to infer the defendant was aware of gun in car
because, “after all, [it] was a shotgun not a handgun”].)
The Attorney General relies on cases generally endorsing
the inference that a driver must be aware of and have the right to
control prohibited items inside a car, but the evidence of the
drivers’ knowledge in these cases is significantly stronger than
merely stopping a car in a roadway and fleeing after a passenger
with an unknown relationship to the driver fires a gun. For
example, in People v. Austin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1596, the
defendants were in constructive possession of cocaine in the
12
trunk of a car where they used a key taken from an undercover
officer held at gunpoint to open it. (Id. at 1609.) In Miranda,
supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 398, the jury could reasonably infer the
defendant was aware of a shotgun inside a Ford Escort based on
its size. (Miranda, supra, at 411.) In People v. Gant (1968) 264
Cal.App.2d 420, the defendant driver of a stolen car was held to
be in constructive possession of stolen guns hidden in the car
based on his attempt to evade police, his “t[aking] charge when
asked by [a police officer] concerning the ownership and
possession of the car,” and his conflicting statements to the
officer. (Id. at 424-425.) The only case the Attorney General cites
that is remotely comparable to this case is People v. Taylor (1984)
151 Cal.App.3d 432, in which the defendant was held to be in
constructive possession of a gun that his passenger threw from a
car in which they were joyriding shortly after police started
chasing them. (Id. at 436.) Unlike this case, however, there was
evidence the defendant in Taylor knew he and his passenger were
committing a crime even before the gun was produced.
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
14
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