CourtListener 10707315•People v. Wansor CA4/1
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Filed 10/20/25 P. v. Wansor CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085993
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. BAF1900410)
RONALD STUART WANSOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Jill M. Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Eric Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury found Ronald Stuart Wansor guilty of one count of sexual
penetration by force, fear, duress, or menace of Jane Doe, a minor under 14
years old and at least seven years younger than him (Pen. Code,1 §§ 269,
subd. (a)(5), 289, subd. (a) (count 1)) and one count of committing a lewd and
lascivious act on Jane Doe, a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a)
(count 2)). Wansor was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 15
years to life and a consecutive determinate term of eight years.
Wansor contends that the trial court improperly allowed the admission
of certain items of evidence, namely, (1) Jane Doe’s videotaped forensic
interview; (2) evidence that Jane Doe observed Wansor slap the face of Jane
Doe’s grandmother; and (3) Jane Doe’s testimony that Wansor committed the
uncharged offense of furnishing marijuana to her (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11361, subd. (b)). With respect to Jane Doe’s testimony that Wansor
furnished marijuana to her, Wansor presents the alternative argument that
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting that evidence. Finally,
Wansor contends that insufficient evidence supports a finding that the sexual
penetration in count 1 was accomplished by force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.
We conclude that Wansor’s arguments either lack merit or are forfeited
because he did not raise them in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2015, Jane Doe was 12 years old. Wansor is Jane Doe’s father. Jane
Doe lived primarily with her mother, but she sometimes stayed with Wansor
in the house where Wansor lived with Jane Doe’s grandmother. On those
1 Unless otherwise indicated all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
occasions, Jane Doe and Wansor shared a bedroom and often slept in the
same bed.
In August 2015, Jane Doe disclosed to her mother that Wansor had
recently committed a sexual assault against her while she was staying with
him. Jane Doe’s mother immediately reported the incident to the police, and
Jane Doe participated in a forensic interview on August 27, 2015.
During the 2015 forensic interview, and later during her 2023 trial
testimony, Jane Doe stated that Wansor had pressured her to start smoking
marijuana with him approximately a month before the sexual assault.
During her forensic interview, Jane Doe explained that she initially refused
Wansor’s requests that she smoke marijuana, but he continued to insist and
then became angry, so she acquiesced. As Jane Doe stated, “[H]e . . . started
getting mad and when he gets mad he has like anger issues and he punches
things and I was scared he was gonna hurt me so I just did it.” According to
Jane Doe, “I kept telling him no but he got mad and I was scared” because
Wansor “started raising his voice” and had “this look” like “he was gonna to
hit me or . . . hurt me,” and “I just got scared so I didn’t want to be hit.” Jane
Doe subsequently smoked marijuana with Wansor every time she stayed with
him over the next month. Jane Doe’s trial testimony regarding her use of
marijuana with Wansor was consistent with her statements during the
forensic interview.
As Jane Doe explained in her forensic interview, a few weeks after she
started using marijuana with Wansor, she woke up to find Wansor
masturbating to pornography on the television.2 Later that day, after
2 During her 2023 trial testimony, Jane Doe recalled that the incident
when Wansor displayed pornography on the television preceded the incident
when Wansor masturbated in front of her, whereas during her 2015 forensic
3
confirming that Jane Doe had seen him masturbating, Wansor asked Jane
Doe, “Can I do it to you?” Jane Doe initially refused, but Wansor returned to
the subject the next evening while Jane Doe was high from the marijuana
that Wansor told her to smoke.
Jane Doe told the forensic interviewer, “[T]he next day he started
getting mad so he was like, ‘Take off your pants.’ And, you know, I was
scared, I didn’t wanna be hit so I did and he was like, ‘Take off your
underwear.’ So I did.” According to Jane Doe, Wansor “seemed more violent,
he was like raising his voice” and had “more of the mean look on his face.”
Wansor “looked like he was gonna hit me so I got really scared and I said,
‘No,’ about once or twice,” but “finally I did it because he started raising his
voice and stuff even more.” Jane Doe stated that Wansor “looked mad or
something like as if he and . . . my grandma just got in a fight,” and she
explained that she had previously witnessed Wansor slapping her
grandmother on the face. Jane Doe told the forensic interviewer that Wansor
had never hit her in the past, “[b]ut there’s always that thought in the back of
your mind because he has punched through the door,” “he has punched
through the wall,” “and there’s a big hole in his wall right now” “from his
punch.” Similarly, during her trial testimony Jane Doe explained that she
complied with Wansor’s demand to undress because she was scared Wansor
might hit her. Explaining her fear, Jane Doe testified, “I had seen just
different fights in the house, and I had personally never been hit, but I know
he had hit his mom before. And so I was worried about that.” Also, she
remembered that Wansor “would get upset and . . . punch walls or doors,”
creating holes.
interview, Jane Doe described those two incidents as occurring
simultaneously.
4
During her forensic interview and her trial testimony, Jane Doe
explained that after she undressed, Wansor licked his pinky finger and
inserted it into Jane Doe’s vagina, moving his finger in and out a few times
for approximately 30 seconds to a minute. Wansor stopped and left the room
when Jane Doe pushed him away. Later, Wansor came back into the room
and told Jane Doe, ‘You can’t tell anyone about this.’ ” Wansor did not say
why Jane Doe could not make a disclosure, but Jane Doe explained to the
forensic interviewer that she understood Wansor would go to jail if anyone
found out.
According to Jane Doe’s trial testimony, a second lewd act occurred the
day after the digital penetration. Specifically, Wansor grabbed Jane Doe’s
foot and rubbed it on his penis, through his clothing, for approximately 15
minutes while they were in bed watching pornography together. Wansor’s
penis became erect during the rubbing. The incident ended when Jane Doe
pulled her foot away.
The police did not immediately bring criminal charges against Wansor
after Jane Doe’s 2015 forensic interview. However, in 2019 Jane Doe’s
mother became aware of videos that Wansor had recently posted on
Instagram, in which he described and boasted about sexual acts with Jane
Doe and appeared to masturbate while saying Jane Doe’s name. Jane Doe’s
mother reported the videos to law enforcement, and the police interviewed
Wansor about them. During the interview, although Wansor denied ever
touching Jane Doe in a sexual manner, he did admit to smoking marijuana
with her, to masturbating with her in the room, and to being sexually
aroused by fantasizing about her. Wansor stated he “came super close” to
touching Jane Doe in a sexual manner, “but it didn’t happen.”
5
An amended information charged Wansor with one count of sexual
penetration by force, fear, duress, or menace of a minor under 14 years old
and at least seven years younger than him (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5), 289, subd. (a)
(count 1)) and one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child
under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a) (count 2)).
Wansor was granted leave to represent himself during trial. The jury
convicted Wansor on both counts, as charged, and then made true findings on
certain aggravating factors. The trial court sentenced Wansor to an
indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life and a consecutive determinate
term of eight years.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Wansor’s Challenges to the Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings
Wansor contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain items of
evidence, namely (1) Jane Doe’s videotaped forensic interview; (2) evidence
that Wansor slapped Jane Doe’s grandmother; and (3) evidence that Wansor
furnished marijuana to Jane Doe. We consider each item in turn, and in so
doing, we explain that Wansor has forfeited each of his appellate challenges.3
1. Jane Doe’s Forensic Interview
We first address Wansor’s argument that the trial court improperly
allowed the People to play the video of Jane Doe’s forensic interview during
trial.
3 We are mindful of the fact that Wansor chose to represent himself in
the trial court. However, “[s]elf-represented defendants are ‘held to the same
standard of knowledge of law and procedure as is an attorney.’ ” (People v.
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1000.) Thus, a defendant who represents
himself is subject to the forfeiture doctrine, including as to the admissibility
of evidence. (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 618, 625.)
6
The admission of the video was first raised in the People’s motion in
limine, in which they requested that the video of the forensic interview be
admitted as a prior consistent statement. (Evid. Code, §§ 791, 1236.) At an
initial in limine hearing, the trial court noted that the People had filed a
motion seeking a ruling on the admissibility of the video, but it deferred
ruling stating, “We don’t have to take care of that now. Because we don’t
know if there’s any consistent or inconsistent statements.”
During a later in limine hearing, the trial court stated, “For the record,
the Court has received premarked 1 through 11A. Any objections on the
record?” The video of the forensic interview was marked as exhibit 11, and
the transcript of that video was marked as exhibit 11A. Wansor replied, “No,
sir” as to the entire range of the exhibits. The trial court then stated, “They’ll
be admitted subject to foundation.” Immediately thereafter, referring
specifically to the video of the forensic interview and the People’s asserted
ground for seeking its admission, the trial court explained, “As to the
[forensic] interview, if the victim testifies in this trial, the [forensic] video will
then be played, either during the time the victim is on the witness stand or
after. It’s up to the People. But it is coming in as a consistent statement.
But obviously you have -- the victim should be here present. Court cannot
play Exhibit No. 11 or 11-A if the victim does not come here and testify
because it’s hearsay, unless there’s an exception.”
During trial, after Jane Doe had already testified, the trial court
inquired whether the People would play the video of the forensic interview
during the next day’s testimony. After the People confirmed their intention
to do so, the following discussion took place between Wansor and the trial
court:
7
“THE COURT: All right. And your -- is there an objection for
the [forensic] interview to be played tomorrow? Did you want the
[forensic] interview?
“THE DEFENDANT: Is that the interview with --
“THE COURT: When she was 12 years old.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.
“THE COURT: Do you have any objection? And if you do, you
need to state it.
“THE DEFENDANT: I do have an objection. But I do not want
-- I do not know what it would be based upon.
“THE COURT: Just tell me in -- why you want to object to it.
“THE DEFENDANT: Prejudice. Again --
“THE COURT: Since you watched the interview, is there
anything in there that you’re saying it’s objectionable?
“THE DEFENDANT: It’s been a while before [sic] I’ve seen it.
“THE COURT: Would you like to see it again before we leave?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, it’s fine. I’ll withdraw my objection.
“THE COURT: All right.”
The People presented the video to the jury the next day during the
testimony of the police detective who observed the interview as it occurred.
Wansor argues on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted the
video because it “amounted to impermissible hearsay to which no exception
applied.” (Capitalization omitted.) The People counter that, because Wansor
did not object to the admission of the video, Wansor has forfeited his ability to
argue that the trial court improperly admitted it.
“Reviewing courts will generally not consider a challenge to the
admissibility of evidence unless there was a ‘ “ ‘specific and timely objection
in the trial court on the same grounds sought to be urged on appeal.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 286 (Gomez); see also Evid. Code,
§ 353, subd. (a) [error in admitting evidence may not be the basis for the
8
reversal of a judgment unless “an objection to or a motion to exclude or to
strike the evidence . . . was timely made and so stated as to make clear the
specific ground of the objection or motion”].) However, forfeiture may be
excused when the record establishes that “ ‘an objection would have been
futile.’ ” (Gomez, at p. 287 [an evidentiary objection on a different or more
specific ground would have been futile when “the record suggest[ed] that the
trial court would have rejected any objection to the testimony” about the
defendant’s failure to leave his jail cell to come to court on one morning of
trial, based on its statements that “ ‘I don’t plan to let it go,’ ” that even if it
could not “ ‘find a case exactly in point,’ it was ‘going to be a pioneer,’ ” that it
was “ ‘not going to let the defendants control the court,’ ” and that it had “ ‘no
doubt but what it shows a consciousness of guilt,’ ” italics added].)
Wansor acknowledges that he did not object to the admission of the
forensic interview. However, he contends that his forfeiture should be
excused because “any specific objection to the [forensic] interview, either in
limine or during trial, would have been futile” because “any objection would
have been overruled.” He concludes that the trial court would have overruled
the objection because “the trial court preemptively addressed the notion the
interview was hearsay” and “inasmuch as the trial court erroneously believed
the [forensic] interview was admissible as a prior consistent statement.”
The record does not support Wansor’s contention that it would have
been futile for him to object to the admission of the video of Jane Doe’s
forensic interview. As we have explained, at two distinct points in the
proceedings, the trial court gave Wansor an opportunity to raise an objection,
with no indication that it had already decided how it would rule on such an
objection. First, during in limine motions, without commenting on what its
ruling would be, the trial court inquired whether Wansor had any objection to
9
the admission of the video and its transcript. Wansor said, “No sir.” The
trial court followed up with a comment explaining the legal framework
governing the admissibility of the video, including that the video would
ultimately not be admitted unless Jane Doe testified and an exception to the
hearsay rule applied. Second, during trial, the trial court specifically
inquired whether Wansor had an objection to the People’s request to play the
video for the jury. Far from discouraging Wansor from asserting an objection
or indicating that it would rule against Wansor if he did so, the trial court
offered to give Wansor an opportunity to view the video so that he could
evaluate whether he wanted to raise an objection. Wansor expressly stated
that he did not have an objection.
Moreover, Wansor’s appellate argument regarding the admissibility of
the video serves to underscore that his futility argument is without merit.
Evidence Code section 791 provides: “Evidence of a statement previously
made by a witness that is consistent with his testimony at the hearing is
inadmissible to support his credibility unless it is offered after: [¶] . . . [¶]
(b) An express or implied charge has been made that his testimony at the
hearing is recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper
motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication,
or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.” (Evid. Code, § 791, italics
added.) Wansor argues that Jane Doe’s statements during the forensic
interview did not meet this requirement because she did not make the
statements before her motive to lie arose. Specifically, Wansor argues that
Jane Doe lied because of custody proceedings between him and Jane Doe’s
mother that were already underway during Jane Doe’s forensic interview.
Wansor’s argument is intensely factual and depends on circumstances and
evidence that Wansor failed to identify for the trial court in the context of
10
whether the forensic video was admissible. Because the record contains no
indication that the trial court was aware that the timing of the custody
proceedings had any relevance to the admissibility of the forensic video, we
perceive no ground to conclude that it would have been futile for Wansor to
raise that factual issue in the trial court when objecting to the video’s
admissibility.
In sum, based on the foregoing, we conclude that Wansor has forfeited
his appellate contention that the trial court erred in admitting the video of
Jane Doe’s forensic interview.
2. Evidence That Wansor Slapped the Face of Jane Doe’s
Grandmother
Next, we consider Wansor’s contention that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence that Jane Doe witnessed Wansor slap her grandmother’s
face on an occasion prior to the crimes at issue in this case.
The People filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling permitting the
admission of evidence that Jane Doe witnessed Wansor slap her 71-year-old
grandmother in the face in June 2015, causing bruising. As the People
explained, Jane Doe mentioned the incident during her forensic interview
when explaining why she was afraid that Wansor would hit her if she refused
to submit to his demands. The People argued that the slapping incident was
admissible because it was relevant to whether Wansor committed sexual
penetration by using force, fear or duress.
At the in limine hearing, the prosecutor explained his basis for seeking
to admit evidence that Jane Doe witnessed the slapping incident: “One of the
elements I have to prove for Count 1 is that the act was committed by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear. Just to show that the victim was in
reasonable fear of the defendant when the sexual act occurred. Because she
claims she was afraid of her father because she saw him being violent in the
11
past.” Wansor replied to this argument by stating, “Which she will not testify
to because she’s never feared me at all. She’s had no reason to.” The trial
court characterized Wansor’s objection by saying, “You just disagreed with
the facts -- with the offer of proof; is that correct?” Wansor replied, “Correct.”
The trial court stated, “Your offer of proof objection is noted. But the
[prosecutor] is an officer of the court and he must do so in good faith, and the
Court finds, at this time, he’s acting in good faith.” The trial court ruled that
it would admit evidence that Jane Doe witnessed Wansor slap her
grandmother’s face.4
Subsequently, Jane Doe’s forensic interview was played for the jury at
trial, including her statements about Wansor slapping her grandmother.
Further, during Jane Doe’s testimony, she stated that she was scared of
Wansor because she had seen him slap her grandmother, which was why she
complied with Wansor’s demand that she take off her pants and underwear.
During trial, Wansor made no objection to the introduction of that evidence.
The doctrine of forfeiture applies to Wansor’s appellate argument
regarding the slapping incident. As we have explained, Wansor’s only
objection in the trial court to the evidence that he slapped Jane Doe’s
grandmother was that he did not think that Jane Doe would state she was
scared of him on that basis, which the trial court characterized as an
objection to the prosecutor’s offer of proof. On appeal, Wansor raises
completely different arguments concerning the admissibility of the evidence.
Principally, Wansor argues that the slapping incident was only minimally
4 In making its ruling, the trial court cited Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b) and Evidence Code section 1103. The parties agree that the
trial court mistakenly cited Evidence Code section 1103, as that provision
deals with evidence of the victim’s character for violence, which is not at issue
here.
12
probative on the issue of whether he committed sexual penetration by fear or
duress and that evidence of the slapping incident was unduly prejudicial
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352. An appellate argument
that evidence was improperly admitted is forfeited unless the appellant made
a “ ‘ “ ‘specific and timely objection in the trial court on the same grounds
sought to be urged on appeal.’ ” ’ ” (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 286, italics
added.) Because Wansor did not assert any objection in the trial court on the
grounds that he now raises on appeal, we conclude that he has forfeited his
appellate arguments.
3. Evidence That Wansor Furnished Marijuana to Jane Doe
Wansor’s final challenge to the court’s admission of evidence concerns
Jane Doe’s statements that he furnished marijuana to her when she was 12
years old, which is a crime. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361, subd. (a)
[furnishing cannabis to a minor under 14 years of age].)
As we have noted, Jane Doe explained during her forensic interview
that Wansor pressured her to smoke marijuana and that she was high on
marijuana when Wansor sexually penetrated her. Wansor also admitted
during his police interview that, in 2015, he smoked marijuana with Jane
Doe. The complaint originally filed against Wansor charged him with the
crime of furnishing marijuana to a minor, but that charge was not included in
the information.
The People did not file a specific motion in limine to alert the court that
they intended to present the jury with evidence that Wansor furnished
marijuana to Jane Doe. However, the trial court first learned of the issue
while ruling on the People’s motion in limine to admit into evidence the video
recording of Wansor’s police interview. Wansor asserted an objection to the
entirety of the video, and the trial court inferred that the objection was based
13
on undue prejudice pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The trial court
then went through the video to decide which parts should be excluded
pursuant to Wansor’s objection. With respect to Wansor’s admission that he
smoked marijuana with Jane Doe, the trial court asked the prosecutor about
the relevance of that admission. The prosecutor explained that it
“corroborates that the victim claimed force and fear. The defendant made her
at 12 years old smoke marijuana.” After confirming that Jane Doe would
testify to that fact, the trial court ruled, “That is relevant, it’s probative, not
highly prejudicial.” The trial court indicated that the People’s motion to
admit statements in the video about “smoking weed” was granted, “over the
defendant[’s] objection.” While the court was delivering its ruling, Wansor
stated, “Is that actually relevant?” The trial court replied, “Yes. [The] Court
already -- you made the objection, [the] Court noted your objection,” which
was “overruled.”
During Jane Doe’s testimony, the prosecutor began to question Jane
Doe at length about Wansor providing her with marijuana. Wansor did not
raise any objection. However, in the middle of the prosecutor’s questioning
on the subject, the trial court, on its own initiative, excused the jury and
called for a conference with Wansor and the prosecutor. Noting that a
conviction would “be looked at closely by [the] court of appeals” because
Wansor was representing himself, the trial court explained that due to the
length of the questioning on the subject “[i]t’s starting to get too prejudicial,
that’s why the Court intervened.” The trial court explained that it wanted to
formulate a limiting instruction to present to the jury. It therefore asked the
prosecutor to review CALCRIM 375 and identify the purpose for presenting
the marijuana evidence to the jury. The prosecutor stated that the evidence
was being offered to prove Wansor’s motive and opportunity to commit sexual
14
assault. The trial court concluded that it would “give, over the defendant’s
objection, CALCRIM 375” to instruct the jury on the limited use it could
make of the evidence that Wansor had committed the uncharged offense of
furnishing marijuana to Jane Doe.5
After resuming proceedings in the presence of the jury, the trial court
immediately instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 375. It then allowed the
prosecutor to continue questioning Jane Doe about smoking marijuana with
Wansor. Prior to the jury’s deliberations, the trial court again instructed
with CALCRIM No. 375, specifying that the instruction was directed to
“evidence that the defendant committed the offense of furnishing cannabis or
giving cannabis to a minor under 14 years of age in violation of California
Health and Safety Code section 11361(a) that w[as] not charged in this
case.”6
On appeal Wansor challenges the admission of Jane Doe’s trial
testimony that he furnished her with marijuana.7 He argues that the
5 Although the trial court stated it was giving CALCRIM No. 375 “over
the defendant’s objection,” that statement is puzzling because the reporter’s
transcript does not reflect any objection or other statement by Wansor with
respect to either that instruction or Jane Doe’s testimony on the subject of
marijuana.
6 When instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 375 during trial, the
trial court stated that the jury could consider the evidence only for the
limited purpose of deciding whether Wansor had a motive or plan to commit
the offenses alleged in this case. When instructing with CALCRIM No. 375
prior to the jury’s deliberations, the trial court stated that the jury could
consider the evidence only for the purpose of deciding whether Wansor had
an opportunity to commit the offenses alleged in this case.
7 In his opening appellate brief, when challenging the admission of
evidence that he furnished marijuana to Jane Doe, Wansor targets only the
statements made during Jane Doe’s trial testimony. He does not argue that
15
evidence was not relevant to prove his motive, opportunity or plan as the trial
court instructed the jury. According to Wansor, Jane Doe’s testimony on that
subject therefore constituted inadmissible character evidence. (See Evid.
Code § 1101, subd. (a), (b).)8 Wansor also argues that the evidence should
have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 because it was
unduly prejudicial.
Wansor has forfeited these arguments because he did not object to the
admission of Jane Doe’s testimony on those grounds in the trial court.
Wansor made only one objection in the trial court concerning evidence that he
furnished marijuana to Jane Doe, but that objection concerned Wansor’s own
statement on the subject during his police interview. The trial court
overruled that objection, and Wansor does not challenge that ruling on
appeal.
Wansor did not object when the prosecutor elicited testimony from Jane
Doe about obtaining marijuana from Wansor. Although the trial court
initiated a discussion with Wansor and the prosecutor regarding Jane Doe’s
marijuana-related testimony, that discussion did not involve any objection to
the trial court erred in admitting (1) Wansor’s statements during the police
interview that he smoked marijuana with Jane Doe, or (2) Jane Doe’s specific
statements during her forensic interview on that subject.
8 Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) states that despite the rule
in Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) against offering evidence of a
person’s character to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion,
“admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other
act” may be admitted “when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful
sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good
faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to
commit such an act.”
16
the admissibility of that testimony. Instead, the trial court initiated the
discussion because it perceived the need for a limiting instruction. At no
point did either the trial court or Wansor raise the possibility that the
testimony should be excluded based on the grounds that Wansor now
advances on appeal.
Recognizing that he did not raise an objection in the trial court, Wansor
contends that any objection based on prejudice would have been futile, as
shown by the trial court’s statement during its discussion with Wansor and
the prosecutor that “[i]t’s starting to get too prejudicial.” (See Gomez, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 287 [forfeiture may be excused when “ ‘an objection would
have been futile’ ”].) According to Wansor, any objection would have been
futile after the trial court made that statement because “[e]ven after
acknowledging that the marijuana[-]related evidence was highly prejudicial,
the trial court still allowed it.” We are not persuaded. When read in context,
the trial court’s comments that the testimony was “starting to get too
prejudicial” referred to the trial court’s view that, without a limiting
instruction, there was a risk that the jury would improperly use the
marijuana evidence to conclude that Wansor has a “bad character or is
disposed to commit crime.” (CALCRIM No. 375.) The trial court’s statement
was made at the beginning of the discussion, before it stated it would proceed
by instructing with CALCRIM No. 375. Therefore, the trial court’s comments
gave Wansor an opportunity, had he chosen to use it, to argue that testimony
on the subject was so unduly prejudicial that it should be excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 and that a limiting instruction would be
ineffective.
17
In sum, we conclude that Wansor has forfeited his appellate argument
challenging the admission of Jane Doe’s testimony that Wansor furnished her
with marijuana.
B. Wansor’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Argument Is Forfeited
Wansor next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
eliciting testimony from Jane Doe that Wansor furnished her with marijuana.
Relying on the principle that “it is misconduct for a prosecutor
intentionally to elicit inadmissible testimony” (People v. Fuiava (2012)
53 Cal.4th 622, 679 (Fuiava)), Wansor argues that the prosecutor’s
questioning of Jane Doe regarding Wansor’s provision of marijuana to her
“amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because the testimony was
inadmissible.” Further, he argues that the purportedly inadmissible
testimony was elicited solely for the improper purpose of evoking an
emotional bias against Wansor and appealing to the passion and prejudice of
the jury.
“ ‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her conduct either
infects the trial with such unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a
denial of due process, or involves deceptive or reprehensible methods
employed to persuade the trier of fact.’ [Citation.] ‘As a general rule a
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in
a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to
disregard the impropriety.’ ” (People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1,
31.) “A defendant’s failure to object and to request an admonition is excused
only when ‘an objection would have been futile or an admonition ineffective.’ ”
(Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 679.)
18
Here, Wansor has forfeited his prosecutorial misconduct argument
because he did not object to the evidence at trial and did not request that the
jury be admonished to disregard the evidence. Although Wansor contends
that he should be excused from failing to object because “admonition of the
jury would not have cured the harm already done,” we disagree. We must
assume that the jury will follow a trial court’s instruction to disregard
testimony that was the subject of a successful objection. (People v. Mills
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 199.) Here, had Wansor raised an objection and asked
for an admonition, the trial court could have instructed the jury to disregard
any testimony already elicited on the subject of Wansor providing marijuana
to Jane Doe, which we presume the jury would have followed.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding That the Sexual Penetration
in Count 1 Was Accomplished by Force, Violence, Duress, Menace, or
Fear of Immediate and Unlawful Bodily Injury
Wansor’s final contention is that insufficient evidence supports his
conviction in count 1.
In count 1 Wansor was convicted under section 289, subdivision
(a)(1)(B), which makes it a crime to commit “an act of sexual penetration
upon a child who is under 14 years of age, when the act is accomplished
against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.”
(§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(B).)9 The jury was instructed that the People had the
burden to prove that Wansor accomplished the act of penetration “by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
9 The conviction in count 1 was also based on section 269, subdivision
(a)(5), which sets forth the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child when
the child is under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than the
defendant, and the defendant violates section 289, subdivision (a).
19
injury . . . .” Wansor argues that insufficient evidence supports a finding that
the sexual penetration was accomplished by any of those means.
“In evaluating Wansor’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
“we must ‘ “review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment,” ’ and then determine whether it contains ‘ “evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ such that a reasonable jury could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [¶] . . . We
must ‘ “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence . . . ‘ . . . for it is the
exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a
witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ ” ’ . . . But we cannot, however, venture beyond the evidence
presented at trial, and may consider only those inferences that are
reasonably supported by the record. ‘ “[A] reasonable inference . . . ‘may not
be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition,
surmise, conjecture, or guess work.’ ” ’ . . . It ‘must logically flow from other
facts established in the action,’ and it cannot be ‘based entirely on the
suspicions of the officers involved in the case and the conjecture of the
prosecution.’ ” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167–168, citations
omitted].)
At trial, the People argued to the jury that the evidence supported a
finding that Wansor accomplished the sexual penetration of Jane Doe either
by (1) duress or (2) fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. The People
take the same position on appeal. As we will explain, the evidence presented
to the jury through Jane Doe’s testimony and her forensic interview provides
20
substantial evidence to support a finding of both duress and fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury.10
1. The Relevant Evidence
During her forensic interview, Jane Doe stated that she complied with
Wansor’s demand that she take off her pants and underwear because Wansor
“started getting mad,” she “was scared,” and she “didn’t wanna be hit.” Jane
Doe described Wansor’s demeanor as “more violent . . . like raising his voice,”
with a “mean look on his face,” “like he was gonna hit me.” Regarding
Wansor’s demand that she remove her clothing, Jane Doe stated that even
though she “said, ‘No,’ about once or twice” she “finally . . . did it because he
started raising his voice and stuff even more.” Jane Doe explained her fear
by stating that although Wansor had not hit her in the past, Wansor had
previously committed violent acts, such as slapping her grandmother and
punching through the door and the wall.
At trial, Jane Doe testified that when Wansor told her to take off her
pants and underwear, “I was scared so I did.” Specifically, Jane Doe testified
she was afraid that Wansor might hit her, as she knew he had hit her
grandmother, and because, when he got upset, he punched holes in walls or
doors. During his own cross examination of Jane Doe, Wansor asked her why
she was scared of him. Jane Doe explained, “Just through my life, you would
get upset.” She explained the reason she feared Wansor “was definitely how
quickly things could turn upside down” and because Wansor would “get upset
10 Wansor’s appellate briefing also discusses whether the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that the sexual penetration was accomplished
by means of force, violence or menace. However, because the People do not
rely on those theories to support Wansor’s conviction, and because we
conclude the conviction is supported on other grounds, we need not, and do
not, discuss the issues of force, violence and menace.
21
very quickly and very easily.” As an example, Jane Doe recounted an episode
when she and Wansor were riding scooters and Wansor “got upset at the
scooter” and threw it at the wall.
2. Fear of Immediate and Unlawful Bodily Injury
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1045 that “[a]n act is
accomplished by fear if the other person is actually and reasonably afraid or
she is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of her fear
and takes advantage of it.” “[T]he element of fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury has two components, one subjective and one objective.” (People
v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856 (Iniguez).)
“The subjective component asks whether a victim genuinely
entertained a fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury sufficient to
induce her to submit . . . against her will. In order to satisfy this component,
the extent or seriousness of the injury feared is immaterial.” (Iniguez, supra,
7 Cal.4th at p. 856.) If the jury found Jane Doe to be credible, her statements
that she complied with Wansor’s demands because she was scared Wansor
would hit her if she did not do so were sufficient to support a finding that
Jane Doe was subjectively afraid of immediate and unlawful bodily injury if
she did not comply with Wansor’s demands.
“[T]he objective component . . . asks whether the victim’s fear was
reasonable under the circumstances, or, if unreasonable, whether the
perpetrator knew of the victim’s subjective fear and took advantage of it.”
(Id. at p. 857.) In arguing that Jane Doe’s fear was not objectively
reasonable, Wansor focuses on the fact that Wansor had never struck Jane
Doe in the past. However, that fact is not dispositive. Jane Doe stated that
Wansor “started getting mad” at her, was increasingly raising his voice, and
had a “mean look on his face.” She further explained that she had witnessed
22
sudden angry outbursts, during which Wansor inflicted physical harm on
objects or people. Based on that evidence, a rational juror could conclude that
it was objectively reasonable for Jane Doe to fear immediate and unlawful
bodily injury from Wansor.
3. Duress
Regarding duress, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1045:
“Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship,
or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person of ordinary
sensitivity to do or submit to something that he or she would not otherwise do
or submit to. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress,
consider all the circumstances, including the age of the other person and her
relationship to the defendant.” “[T]he legal definition of duress is objective in
nature and not dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.”
(People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246, italics added.)
Our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of
duress is similar to our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the objective component of fear. Here, the evidence supported a finding that
Wansor made an implied threat of force or violence. Specifically, Jane Doe
testified that based on Wansor’s voice and facial expressions, she perceived
that Wansor was going to hit her. The jury was entitled to credit Jane Doe’s
interpretation of the situation to find that Wansor did indeed communicate
an implied threat of force or violence in the manner that Jane Doe perceived.
With respect to whether the implied threat “was enough to cause a
reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity to do or submit to something that he
or she would not otherwise do or submit to” (CALCRIM No. 1045, brackets
omitted), the jury could reasonably find that someone in Jane Doe’s position,
having experienced her father’s prior violent outbursts, would react to
23
Wansor’s implied threat by submitting to Wansor’s demands rather than
resisting and risking physical harm.
Wansor contends we should conclude that insufficient evidence
supports a finding of duress because his case is “more analogous” to People v.
Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287 (Espinoza). We disagree. The crucial
distinction is that Jane Doe perceived an implied threat that Wansor was
going to hit her if she did not submit to him. In Espinoza, the court
explained, “The only way that we could say that defendant’s lewd act on L.
and attempt at intercourse with L. were accomplished by duress is if the
mere fact that he was L.’s father and larger than her combined with her fear
and limited intellectual level were sufficient to establish that the acts were
accomplished by duress. What is missing here is the ‘ “direct or implied
threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which
otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which
one otherwise would not have submitted.” ’ [Citation.] Duress cannot be
established unless there is evidence that ‘the victim[’s] participation was
impelled, at least partly, by an implied threat . . . .’ [Citation.] No evidence
was adduced that defendant’s lewd act and attempt at intercourse were
accompanied by any ‘direct or implied threat’ of any kind.” (Id. at p. 1321,
italics added.) Here, because the evidence amply supports a finding that
Wansor made an implied threat to hit Jane Doe, Espinoza is inapposite.11
11 Because Espinoza, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, is factually inapposite
and the evidence supports a finding that Wansor made an implied threat to
hit Jane Doe, we need not, and do not, discuss the People’s contention that
subsequent case law has called into question Espinoza’s reliance on
authorities stating that psychological coercion, without more, is insufficient
24
In sum, Wansor’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction in count 1 is without merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
RUBIN, J.
to support a finding of duress. (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
8, 15; People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 47–48.)
25
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