People v. Curry CA1/4

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Filed 10/16/25 P. v. Curry CA1/4
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A167782
v.
RENARD RICKY CURRY, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 05001407857)

This case comes before us on remand from the Supreme Court with
directions to vacate our decision reversing the denial of Renard Ricky Curry’s
Penal Code section1172.61 resentencing petition and to reconsider the cause
in light of the recently decided People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549
(Patton). Patton disapproved case law limiting the trial court’s ability to
consider preliminary hearing testimony in determining whether a petitioner
has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to resentencing. (Id. at
pp. 568–569 & fn.12.) In view of this, we now affirm the trial court’s order.

1 Originally codified as section 1770.95 and renumbered effective

June 30, 2022, with no change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, §10.) For ease
of reference, we use the current citation throughout.
Unless otherwise noted, further undesignated statutory citations are to the
Penal Code
BACKGROUND
1. Legal Principles
Effective 2019, the Legislature amended our state’s felony murder law
“ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Subsequent legislation
clarified that relief under section 1172.6 extends to manslaughter and
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 926; Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 558.) As a consequence, malice may no longer be imputed to a homicide
defendant solely because they participated in another crime. (Patton, at
p. 558.)
A defendant seeking relief from a murder conviction under a theory
disallowed by these amendments may petition the trial court to vacate the
conviction and for resentencing on any remaining counts. (§1172.6,
subd. (a).) To do so, the petitioner must first file a facially sufficient petition
stating that, among other allegations, he or she could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder due to the 2019 amendments.
(§1172.6, subds. (a), (b)(1)(A); Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 558–559.)
If the court finds the petition facially sufficient, the petitioner is
appointed counsel; the prosecution must, and the petitioner may, submit
briefing; and the court holds a hearing to determine whether the petition
establishes a prima facie case for relief. (§1176.2, subd. (c); Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 559.) At this stage the court may not reject the petition’s
factual allegations on credibility grounds unless they are refuted by facts in
the underlying record of conviction. (Patton, at p. 563; Lewis, supra,

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11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–971.) If they are not, the court proceeds to an
evidentiary hearing at which the People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty under the amended law.
(§1172.6, subds. (c), (d); Patton, at p. 559.)
2. Factual and Procedural History
This factual summary is taken from the transcript of the preliminary
hearing preceding Curry’s plea.2
Curry believed Timothy Smith, Jr., had robbed him and his brother of a
gun. Several months later a sole assailant approached Smith, shot him once
in the head, then fled to a waiting car and told passengers Demetria T. and
Brian F. that he had “handled his business.” Both passengers identified
Curry as the shooter. The person depicted in video surveillance footage of the
shooting was of similar height, build, and complexion to Curry.
Brian F.’s brother tentatively identified the assailant in the footage as
Brian F., who bears some resemblance to Curry but, he testified, had a large
beard at the time of the shooting. The person depicted on the surveillance
footage did not. A bystander who witnessed the shooting eliminated Brian F.
as the culprit from a photographic lineup.
Curry pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and four related
felonies and admitted personally using a firearm and committing
manslaughter while on bail. He stipulated as the factual basis of his plea

2 We denied the People’s motion to judicially notice this transcript

when we originally considered Curry’s appeal. (See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [only relevant matters are subject to
judicial notice], overruled on another point in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) In view of Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549, we now
grant the motion pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d),
and 459.

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that a finder of fact who heard the evidence against him could find him
guilty. The court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 25 years and
8 months.
In 2022, Curry petitioned the trial court for resentencing under
section 1172.6. He alleged by checking boxes on a preprinted form that he
was entitled to relief because, as relevant here, he could not presently be
convicted of murder due to the 2019 changes to the Penal Code. Neither the
form petition nor Curry’s supporting brief raised factual allegations about the
shooting, and he submitted on the pleadings at the prima facie hearing.
At that hearing, the court expressly declined to consider the
preliminary hearing transcript but determined from the remainder of the
underlying record that Curry was the actual killer. It explained Curry was
the only person charged with malice aforethought murder with personal and
intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death; that
he pled to voluntary manslaughter with gun use, false imprisonment by
violence of the same victim, carrying a loaded firearm, and other crimes all
occurring on the same day; and that he stipulated to the factual basis of his
plea. “Just looking at the record of conviction, not even considering the
transcript from the preliminary hearing, just looking at that, there’s no
possibility that anybody but Mr. Curry was the actual killer.”
Curry appealed, asserting the record of conviction failed to foreclose the
possibility that he could presently be convicted under a now-invalid theory of
murder liability. The Attorney General responded that the record including
the preliminary hearing transcript conclusively established Curry was the
actual killer, and invited this court to reconsider our conclusion in People v.
Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476 (Davenport), later disapproved in
Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569 & fn. 12, that courts may not rely on

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preliminary hearing testimony to deny a petition at the prima facie stage
unless–as was not the case here–the petitioner had stipulated to it as a
factual basis for the plea. (See Davenport, at p. 481; but see, contra, People v.
Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 992, review dism. July 9, 2025
[disagreeing with Davenport]); People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
268, 279–281, review dism. July 9, 2025 [petition properly denied where
preliminary hearing transcript established petitioner was convicted on theory
he was the actual perpetrator].)
We declined that invitation, noting the issue was then pending in the
Supreme Court. Finding the record insufficient to refute Curry’s allegations
without the preliminary hearing evidence, we reversed.
The Court subsequently issued its opinion in Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
549, and remanded to this court with directions to vacate our decision and
reconsider the cause in light of its holding. (People v. Curry (July 16, 2025,
S287780).) We do so now.
ANALYSIS
We agree with the Attorney General that, on the full record, Curry is as
a matter of law ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. Expressly disapproving
Davenport, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 476, Patton holds the trial court may
properly rely on unchallenged facts in a preliminary hearing transcript to
refute conclusory allegations in a form petition regardless of whether the
petitioner stipulated to the transcript as the factual basis of their plea.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.) Here, the preliminary hearing
testimony supports only the theory that Curry was the shooter. Moreover,
that he alone was charged and admitted to personally using a handgun in
committing manslaughter further indicate he was the sole, direct
perpetrator.

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Confronted with a record containing “unchallenged, relief foreclosing
facts” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569), Curry proffered only conclusory
allegations and speculation that some unidentified culprit, not he, could have
been the direct perpetrator. “[A] section 1172.6 petitioner who, despite
having access to counsel upon submission of a facially sufficient petition,
offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief, in response to a
record of conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a
still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.” (Patton, at
p. 565.) That is the case here.
DISPOSITION
Our original opinion in this matter is vacated. The trial court’s order
denying Curry’s resentencing petition is affirmed.

CLAY, J.*

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

*Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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