People v. Maki CA2/6

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Filed 10/15/25 P. v. Maki CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339358
(Super. Ct. No. BA517535)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

SHERIDAN MAKI,

Defendant and Appellant.

Here we hold that a person invoking the Fourth
Amendment who does not have permission to maintain a
structure that illegally obstructs a public pedestrian sidewalk
does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
Thus, law enforcement is not required to obtain a warrant to
search the structure.
Sheridan Maki appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11379, subd. (a)). The trial court placed Maki on formal
probation for two years with terms including 364 days in county
jail.
Maki contends the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress evidence resulting from the warrantless
search of his tent erected on a public pedestrian sidewalk. (Pen.
Code, § 1538.5.) We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Maki was living in a structure (tent) on a public pedestrian
sidewalk in Hollywood off Sunset Boulevard. There was “a
decent amount” of foot traffic in the area. A detective described
the tent as “a structured encampment, like a combination of
different items and tarps,” supported by wood, cinder blocks, and
wires. It was 10 to 15 feet long and five to six feet wide. Police
could not see inside the tent from the street. The entrance could
be closed by tying from the inside.
The tent was in front of four or five fire exit doors of a large
building complex that included a movie theater and a gym.
Because the tent was erected on the sidewalk, it blocked all but
two to three feet of the sidewalk for pedestrian traffic.
Police had surveilled the tent for about a month and
concluded Maki was the sole occupant. They gave an informant
“buy money” of $40. The informant went up to the tent and
talked to Maki who was inside. Maki reached his hand out and
the informant gave him the money. Maki then reached his arm
out and gave the informant what appeared to be
methamphetamine.
Uniformed officers ordered Maki to come out. When Maki
exited the tent he was arrested and handcuffed. Officers
“immediately” searched the tent after the arrest. They needed to
cut through supporting wires to enter the tent. Inside they found
the “buy money,” other currency, scales, and methamphetamine.
Police took only items relevant to the case and left the rest

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behind. The investigation team did not personally dismantle the
tent.
Maki moved to suppress the evidence from the warrantless
search. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The lead detective testified that
structures on the sidewalk blocking doors and wheelchair access
violated Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) section 41.18.1
Section 41.18(a) provides: “No person shall obstruct a street,
sidewalk, or other public right-of-way” by enumerated conduct,
including “(3) by sitting, lying, or sleeping, or by storing, using,
maintaining, or placing personal property, within five feet of any
operational or utilizable building entrance or exit.”
The detective said, “L.A. has gone back and forth, so they
came up with all these sections to come up with a temporary
moratorium. . . . They go and ask them to remove the
encampment, but a lot of times they don’t. So we got to warn
them, you’re suppose[d] to give 24 hours or 48 hours notice to
remove it or else they’ll come through and clean it. Then they got
backlashed for that, so it’s been an ongoing issue with the city of
L.A.”
The detective also testified he did not obtain a search
warrant because the tent could be moved and was “mobile,”
similar to the “vehicle rule.” The officers’ “main priority” was to
“exigently” recover the “buy money” to prove the drug sale and to
avoid it being destroyed or given to another customer.
The court denied the motion to suppress evidence. It ruled

1 We take judicial notice of LAMC section 41.18 on our own
motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (b), 459, subds. (b) & (d);
Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 24;
McMaster v. City of Santa Rosa (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 598, 602,
fn. 3.)

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that Maki did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
search was justified as incident to arrest, and there was exigency
regarding drugs and evidence.
DISCUSSION
Maki contends the warrantless search of his tent violated
the Fourth Amendment because he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in its contents. We are not persuaded.
“The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion
on the part of the government.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22
Cal.4th 900, 971.) “A defendant has the burden at trial of
establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place
searched or the thing seized.” (Id. at p. 972.) “ ‘A person seeking
to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment must
demonstrate both that he harbored a subjective expectation of
privacy and that the expectation was objectively reasonable.’ ”
(People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960 (Nishi).) If that
showing is made, “ ‘[t]he burden is [then] on the prosecution to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts justifying a
warrantless search.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717,
729.)
A legitimate expectation of privacy must be subjective in
that the person invoking the Fourth Amendment “ ‘must
demonstrate that [they] personally [have] an expectation of
privacy in the place searched.’ ” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23
Cal.4th 225, 255.) The expectation of privacy must also be
objectively reasonable because it has “ ‘ “a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

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“ ‘ “A ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy is an objective
entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted
community norms.” ’ ” (Nishi, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 960;
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37.)
“ ‘There is no set formula for determining whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, but the
totality of the circumstances are considered.’ ” (Nishi, at pp. 960–
961.) “ ‘The protection afforded to the [privacy interest] must be
relative to the customs of the time and place, . . . and to the
habits of . . . neighbors and fellow citizens.’ ” (Hill, at p. 37.)
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial
court’s express and implied factual findings that are supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th
548, 592.) We exercise our independent judgment in determining
the reasonableness of the search. (Ibid.)
It appears that Maki had a subjective expectation of
privacy. The tent was enclosed on all sides, the interior was
generally not visible from the outside, and it could be tied or
buttoned shut. (See United States v. Sandoval (9th Cir. 2000)
200 F.3d 659, 660 (Sandoval) [subjective expectation of privacy
for tent “closed on all four sides” in area “heavily covered by
vegetation and virtually impenetrable” and contents “could not be
seen from outside”].)
But Maki has not shown his expectation of privacy was
objectively reasonable. His tent was illegally erected on a public
sidewalk that was not intended for camping and was within five
feet of exit doors in violation of LAMC section 41.18(a)(3). Maki
presented no evidence that he had permission to erect a tent at
this location. Nor does the evidence establish that Maki could
reasonably believe doing so was lawful.

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In People v. Thomas (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Thomas),
the court held that an unhoused person did not have an
expectation of privacy in a “cardboard box” (actually, a residence
constructed of wooden pallets and heavy cardboard) on a public
sidewalk. The structure blocked the sidewalk in violation of an
earlier version of LAMC section 41.18. (Thomas, at p. 1333 & fn.
1.) The city had previously removed his “box” from the area. (Id.
at pp. 1333–1334.) The court stated, “In short, a person who
occupies a temporary shelter on public property without
permission and in violation of an ordinance prohibiting sidewalk
blockages is a trespasser subject to immediate ejectment and,
therefore, a person without a reasonable expectation that his
shelter will remain undisturbed.” (Id. at p. 1335.)
Similarly, in Nishi, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at page 960, the
defendant camped in an open space preserve where camping was
prohibited without a permit. The court stated, “The most
significant, and ultimately controlling, factor . . . is that
defendant was not lawfully or legitimately on the premises where
the search was conducted.” (Id. at p. 961.) The court held the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
campsite after being cited for unlawful camping and evicted from
other campsites in the preserve. (Id. at pp. 960–961.)
Like Thomas, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pages 1334–1335,
and Nishi, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at page 961, Maki did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy. There was no evidence that
he had permission to erect a tent on the sidewalk. Nor was there
evidence that could support a claim that Maki could reasonably
believe maintaining a tent there was lawful. We acknowledge
that in both Thomas and Nishi, there was affirmative evidence of
the defendants’ knowledge of the illegality because they had been

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previously ejected from the area. But Maki had the burden to
show his expectation of privacy was reasonable, and he presented
no evidence that he had never been cited, ejected, or told to leave.
This case is unlike People v. Hughston (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 1062 (Hughston), upon which Maki relies. There, a
“tent structure was erected on land specifically set aside for
camping during the music festival.” (Id. at p. 1070.) Hughston is
factually inapposite because Maki’s tent was unlawfully erected
on a public pedestrian sidewalk that was not intended for
camping.
Hughston, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pages 1069–1070
relied in part on Sandoval, supra, 200 F.3d 659, which held that
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
“makeshift tent” located on Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
land. The court emphasized that “whether Sandoval was legally
permitted to be on the land was a matter in dispute,” and “the
record [did] not establish any applicable rules, regulations or
practices concerning recreational or other use of BLM land.” (Id.
at p. 661.) Although it was “unclear” whether the defendant had
or needed permission to camp there, the Ninth Circuit concluded
“the reasonableness of Sandoval’s expectation of privacy [did not
turn] on whether he had permission to camp on public land”
because “public land is often unmarked and may appear to be
open to camping.” (Id. at p. 661 & fn. 3; see also United States v.
Gooch (9th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3d 673, 677 [defendant had objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in tent on public campground
where he was “legally permitted to camp”].)
Unlike Hughston, Sandoval, and Gooch, the sidewalk
where Maki erected his tent was intended for pedestrian traffic.
It was not intended for erecting a tent that would block a busy

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public pedestrian sidewalk, and an ordinance prohibited
structures that blocked exit doors to commercial buildings. Maki
did not present evidence of lawful possession or permission to
occupy the sidewalk where he erected his tent. “A ‘person can
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in premises on which
they are wrongfully present . . . .’ ” (Nishi, supra, 207
Cal.App.4th at p. 961.) Thus, Maki “was not in a position to
legitimately consider” his tent “as a place society recognized as
private to him.” (Ibid.)
Because we conclude Fourth Amendment protections do not
apply to Maki’s tent, we need not decide whether the warrantless
search would be justified as a search incident to arrest. (Chimel
v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 763–764.)
Our holding is a limited one. There was no evidence that
Maki had permission to erect a tent on a public pedestrian
sidewalk that was not intended for camping, nor evidence that
Maki could reasonably believe doing so was lawful. Thus, we
conclude law enforcement officers were not required to obtain a
warrant to search inside Maki’s tent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.

8
Renée F. Korn, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Bina Ahmad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and David A. Wildman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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