CourtListener 10704463•Herskovitz v. Snowflake CA1/4
Texto completo
Filed 10/15/25 Herskovitz v. Snowflake CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
STEVEN HERSKOVITZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A171051
v. (San Mateo County
SNOWFLAKE, INC., Super. Ct. No. 21CIV00580)
Defendant and Respondent.
Steven Herskovitz appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment in
favor of Snowflake, Inc. (Snowflake), his former employer. The court
dismissed Herskovitz’s two age discrimination claims after granting
Snowflake’s renewed motion for summary judgment. Herskovitz alleged
Snowflake terminated him based on his age in violation of both the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900
et seq.) and public policy.
For the same two reasons, Herskovitz argues the trial court erred: In
dismissing, the court (1) applied the wrong legal standard for evaluating
whether he met his burden in opposing Snowflake’s motion, and (2)
exceeded its authority to determine factual merit on summary judgment.
We conclude these arguments are without merit. The court applied the
correct legal standard and properly granted summary judgment because of
1
the lack of any evidence from which it can be permissibly inferred that, in
terminating Herskovitz’s employment, Snowflake was motivated by age
discrimination.
Accordingly, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Heskovitz’s Complaint Allegations
In February 2021, Herskovitz filed a complaint alleging three causes
of action against Snowflake1—two for age discrimination under the FEHA
(one for disparate treatment because of his age and one for disparate impact
because of stock options he held) and a third for age discrimination in
violation of public policy. He alleged he was one of the founding employees
at Snowflake, incorporated in 2012, and that he rose to the position of
Snowflake’s Vice President of Global Sales Engineering because of his
outstanding work, which management repeatedly recognized and rewarded.
Herskovitz further alleged that a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
took over Snowflake in April 2019. A day or two later, the CEO told
everyone the previous management had been too generous with stock
options. A week later, Herskovitz, then 62 years old, was demoted to “ ‘VP
Global Expansion’ ” and replaced by Eve Besant, a much younger employee
whom he had hired and trained.
Moreover, Snowflake did not provide sufficient support for
Herskovitz’s first assignment in his new position, which was to move to
Japan to develop a market for Snowflake’s products there. Then, when he
1 Herskovitz also sued Snowflake Computing, Inc., but alleged that it
and Snowflake, Inc. might function as one. Only Snowflake, Inc. moved for
summary judgment and it alone is referred to in the trial court’s judgment
and by the parties on appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss Snowflake
Computing, Inc.
2
returned to the United States, he was told he had to find another position
within the company. Despite his diligent search, and the availability of
positions for which he was highly qualified, no one hired him. He was
terminated in May 2020 and his unvested stock options, worth over $17
million, were cancelled.
Herskovitz alleged his age and stock options were substantial factors
in Snowflake’s adverse employment actions against him, and that
Snowflake fired him while disguising these true motives for doing so. He
sought compensatory damages in excess of $15 million dollars and punitive
damages.
B. Snowflake’s Motions for Summary Judgment
In June 2023, Snowflake moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication. It contended that it replaced Herskovitz
with Besant because she was experienced in scaling a sales engineering
organization and more suited for its new management’s priorities.
According to Snowflake, Herskovitz’s search for a new assignment was
unsuccessful for non-discriminatory reasons, including challenges brought
about by the outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic. After Herskovitz
was unable to find another position within the company, his employment
was terminated.
Herskovitz opposed summary judgment on the grounds that he
established a prima facie case for age discrimination, Snowflake’s proffered
reasons for its actions against him were pretextual, and substantial
evidence supported the inference that its actions were motivated by age
discrimination. He contended he was well qualified from his years of
growing Snowflake’s Sales Engineering organization to scale it—more so
than Besant; that his work in Japan failed because Snowflake had not
3
properly supported it; and that he was well qualified for other positions
within Snowflake but was not hired for any of them.
The trial court denied Snowflake’s motion for summary judgment. It
granted Snowflake’s motion for summary adjudication on the second cause
of action (for age discrimination based on disparate impact regarding the
stock options) and otherwise denied it.2 While the court concluded
Snowflake met its initial burden of showing it acted for nondiscriminatory
reasons, it ruled that Herskovitz raised a triable issue of fact regarding
whether Snowflake’s stated reasons for its actions were pretextual, which
permitted an inference of age discrimination.
In October 2023, Snowflake filed a “renewed” motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication based on Herskovitz’s tardy discovery
production of a text message he sent to another Snowflake employee on May
7, 2020, shortly before his employment termination, in which he stated he
was a “builder,” not a “scaler.” Snowflake challenged Herskovitz’s
remaining two causes of action on much the same grounds as it did in its
initial motion. Herskovitz opposed the motion on much the same grounds as
he did before, and contended his May 2020 text message did not show
anything material.
At the hearing on Snowflake’s renewed motion, the trial court
explained that it had applied an incorrect burden-shifting standard. Upon
Snowflake meeting its initial burden as movant, the court said, the correct
standard called for Herskovitz to put forward “evidence of discrimination
besides the fact that Mr. Herskovitz was replaced by a younger employee.”
2 Herskovitz does not challenge the trial court’s dismissal of his second
cause of action, so we do not discuss it further.
4
Finding no such evidence this time, the court granted Snowflake summary
judgment.3
In its written order, originally issued as a tentative ruling, the trial
court further explained its decision: “The court . . . sua sponte reconsiders
its ruling on defendant’s previous motion . . . . During the argument . . .
Plaintiff argue[d] that he need[ed] to establish only falsity. [¶] . . . [T]he
court agreed with plaintiff at the first hearing, [but] the court now believes
that it was incorrect. Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating evidence
that the reason was false and [a product] of discrimination. (Hicks v. KNTV
Television, Inc. [(2008)] 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.) Here, plaintiff shows
that he is in a protected classification and that he was replaced by a younger
person. That fact alone is insufficient to defeat this summary judgment
motion. There is no other evidence that can support, either directly or
inferentially, that there was discrimination.”
The court found Snowflake met its initial burden to show
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The court noted that, for the
purposes of the motion, Snowflake did not dispute that Herskovitz
established a prima facie case of age discrimination and turned to whether
he raised a triable issue of material fact. It stated that “if [Herskovitz]
attacks the veracity of [Snowflake’s] stated nondiscriminatory reasons for
adverse employment actions, he must include evidence creating a triable
issue of fact as to discriminatory intent.”
The court found Herskovitz did not raise a triable issue regarding his
2019 demotion and replacement with Besant because he did not controvert
3 The trial court also granted Snowflake summary judgment on its
cross-complaint against Herskovitz regarding his use of Snowflake’s
proprietary information. Herskovitz does not challenge that ruling, so we do
not discuss it further either.
5
that Chris Degnan, the Snowflake executive who reassigned Herskovitz and
Besant, based his decision “on his perception, accurate or not, of the
respective skills of [Herskovitz] and Besant.”
The court found Herskovitz did not show a triable issue regarding his
2020 employment termination because it was undisputed that Snowflake,
again via Degnan, terminated Herskovitz because he was unable to timely
find a new position within the company. Also, contrary to Herskovitz’s
contention, there was not substantial evidence that Snowflake provided
contradictory reasons for his termination.4
Subsequently, the trial court entered judgment in Snowflake’s favor.
Herskovitz filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Herskovitz argues the trial court erred by dismissing both his second
and third causes of action—for age discrimination in violation of FEHA and
age discrimination in violation of public policy respectively—for the same
reasons: that the court (1) applied the wrong legal standard, and (2)
exceeded its authority to determine factual merit on summary judgment.
We will consider these claims together.
A. Legal Standards
1. Summary Judgment
“A trial court must grant a motion for summary judgment ‘if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II
4 The court also concluded Herskovitz’s effort to show discrimination
by Snowflake via evidence of statistical disparities was wanting. Herskovitz
does not argue on appeal that we should consider that evidence, so we do not
discuss it further.
6
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 127, 150.) “Our review of an order granting summary
judgment is de novo. . . . We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment [citation], and assess whether the
evidence would, if credited, permit the trier of fact to find in favor of the
party opposing summary judgment . . . .” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente
Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109.)
2. Age Discrimination
Under FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer, “because of the race, . . .
national origin, . . . [or] age of any person, . . . to discharge the person from
employment.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).)
For employment discrimination claims, our courts at trial apply a
three-step burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 354–355 (Guz).) First, the plaintiff raises a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination by making a prima facie showing, i.e., that “(1) [the plaintiff]
was a member of a protected class, (2) [the plaintiff] was qualified for the
position [the plaintiff] sought or was performing competently in the position
[the plaintiff] held, (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action
. . . , and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.”
(Ibid.) The employer must then “rebut the presumption by producing
admissible evidence . . . that its action was taken for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.” (Id. at pp. 355–356.) “The plaintiff must then
have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts
for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.
[Citations.] In an appropriate case, evidence of dishonest reasons,
considered together with the elements of the prima facie case, may permit a
finding of prohibited bias.” (Id. at p. 356.)
7
“A defendant’s summary judgment motion ‘ “slightly modifies the
order of these [McDonnell Douglas] showings.” ’ ” (Wills v. Superior Court
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 160.) The defendant has the initial burden “to
either (1) negate an essential element of [the plaintiff’s] prima face case
[citation] or (2) establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [the
challenged adverse action].” (Ibid.) Once done, the employee “ ‘must offer
substantial evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer
acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional
discrimination.’ ” (Ibid.)
“[D]irect evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and . . . such
claims must usually be proved circumstantially.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 354.) Nonetheless, “if nondiscriminatory, [an employer’s] true reasons
need not necessarily have been wise or correct. [Citations.] While the
objective soundness of an employer’s proffered reasons supports their
credibility . . . , the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted
with a motive to discriminate illegally. Thus, ‘legitimate’ reasons [citation]
in this context are reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and
which, if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.” (Id. at
p. 358.)
A plaintiff’s evidence “must be construed liberally,” but “in
employment cases it ‘ “ ‘remains subject to careful scrutiny.’ [Citation.] The
employee’s ‘subjective beliefs . . . do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do
uncorroborated and self-serving declarations.’ ” ’ ” (Taylor v. Financial
Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966, 994.)
8
B. Analysis
1. Snowflake’s Contentions in Support of Its Summary
Judgment Motion
In support of its summary judgment motion, Snowflake asserted
nondiscriminatory reasons for the decisions of Chris Degnan, who was its
Chief Revenue Officer, to (1) replace Herskovitz, then 62 years old, as the
company’s head of sales engineering with Eve Besant, then 37 years old,
and reassign him to be in charge of sales engineering’s global expansion;
and (2) require Herskovitz, when this global expansion stalled, to find
another internal position, and terminate his employment when he did not.
a. Replacing Herskovitz with Besant and Reassigning Him
Specifically, Snowflake asserted that in 2019, a new chief operating
officer (CEO) took over its management and, contemplating an initial public
offering for Snowflake, “instituted organizational changes and changes in
Snowflake’s approach to doing business.” The new CEO wanted “the Sales
Engineering organization to rapidly scale,” and “be ‘flatter’ in structure with
fewer managers who managed other managers.”
Chris Degnan hired Herskovitz in 2014 as Snowflake’s first sales
engineer and directly supervised him throughout his employment at
Snowflake. Degnan promoted Herskovitz in 2016 to Vice President of Sales
Engineering and, in 2018, to Vice President of Global Sales Engineering.
In the spring and summer of 2018, based on Snowflake’s expansion
and at Degnan’s suggestion, Herskovitz searched for a Vice President of
Sales Engineering, North America who would report to him, and he hired
Besant for this new role. Herskovitz testified in deposition that one of the
reasons he hired Besant was because he felt “we would benefit from what
she learned at SAP [her previous company],” which “had been successful
over a long haul and I felt that there were processes we could learn from
9
that . . . were a little different than the usual Silicon Valley processes.”
According to Herskovitz, Besant had some experience scaling operations at
SAP, including growing a group of 65 people to 92 people. Herskovitz
“hoped to learn from her as well as have her take over some
responsibilities,” as it had been his practice to hire “people who knew things
I didn’t know.”
Prior to his reassignment, Herskovitz told Degnan he ranked Besant
first among his direct reports, that she “had the biggest role” and “the
biggest potential,” that she had the “most prior experience as a 2nd line
manager in a large company,” and that she was a “ ‘trusted partner in
scaling the largest chunk of the [sales engineering] team.’ ”
Degnan was impressed with Besant. He “personally observed Ms.
Besant’s ability to take a leadership role in effectuating new operational
processes, manage complex organizational structures, and communicate
engineering advancements.” She impressed him and “other key
stakeholders” in April 2019 with her presentation of a quarterly report
regarding the Sales Engineering organization.
Degnan also believed that Herskovitz, “[a]lthough . . . skilled in
creating start-up organizations and building businesses from nothing,” “did
not [have] the experience or ability to effectively scale the Sales Engineering
organization.” On the other hand, Degnan believed “Herskovitz had
significant skills in developing international offices, as he had done
successfully in Europe and Asia-Pacific regions, and was then doing in
Singapore.”
According to Degnan, in 2019, he thought Snowflake’s role as “a major
player in the cloud-based storage and analytics space,” its contemplation of
an initial public offering, and the new management priorities meant
10
“Snowflake needed to be able to scale its business at a rapid pace (i.e.,
growing the business from its current size to something bigger, more
efficient, and more effective).” Degnan concluded “the Sales Engineering
organization needed to rapidly scale to meet leadership expectations,” and
that “the leader of the Sales Engineering team needed to have the skills and
experience to scale the organization, especially with the possibility of an
IPO on the horizon.” He decided to make a change in the Sales Engineering
leadership.
Specifically, Degnan decided in the spring of 2019 that Besant would
replace Herskovitz “and her job would be to focus on scaling the
organization.” Herskovitz would “dedicate his full working time to
launching Snowflake into new global markets, starting with Japan,” where
he would work for six months, and then “likely into other geographic
markets, such as Latin America.” Degnan’s decision to promote Besant and
reassign Herskovitz had nothing to do with either’s age. Herskovitz
characterized these circumstances in an April 2020 internal email this way:
“Snowflake has changed (new CEO, CFO, focus on scaling and improving
margins for IPO).” “I no longer run Snowflake’s global SE team. Based on
my experience in opening new territories . . . , the CRO [Degnan] wanted me
to focus on additional new territories like Japan, LatAm, etc.”
Degnan also stated that in either late 2018 or early 2019, before he
reassigned Herskovitz and Besant in May 2019, he told another Snowflake
manager who reported to him, and who also had a skill set well-suited to
building and not scaling, that Herskovitz’s “ ‘skill set . . . was in helping
build and not scale.’ ” That manager testified in deposition that Degnan
criticized his scaling abilities, wanted him to bring in someone with “big
company experience” who “dealt with scaling,” and that someone with
11
scaling skills was brought into his department. Further, Degnan told him
“one time that [Herskovitz] had trouble scaling[,]” testifying it was a general
comment about scaling challenges and not about Hersovitz’s performance,
along the lines of: “[A]s we think about the next chapter of getting the
company to bigger, both you and [Herskovitz] don’t have that big company
type of experience.” The manager also testified that as a company grows
from a thousand or so employees to 30 thousand, “there’s just a different
scale associated with management” regarding how to lead, motivate, set
boundaries, and “creat[e] more layers of management. . . . [T]here’s more
complexity . . . .”
Snowflake also pointed out that Herskovitz, in a May 7, 2020 text
message found in Herskovitz’s tardily produced documents, wrote to a friend
within the company, “I have the energy and desire to do another startup,
don’t want to work for a big company. I’m more convinced than ever that
I’m a Builder not a Scaler.”5
In short, Snowflake contended that it reassigned Besant and
Herskovitz because of “1) Snowflake’s changing business direction, 2)
Degnan’s belief that Snowflake needed to be able to scale its business at a
rapid pace, 3) Besant’s experience and expertise in scaling a sales
engineering organization, 4) Herskovitz’s lack of experience and expertise in
scaling a sales engineering organization, and 5) Herskovitz’s skills and
expertise in opening international sales and sales engineering offices.”
5 Herskovitz incorrectly contends he sent this message “in the summer
of 2020, long after” his termination. But the timestamp on the message
indicates Herskovitz sent it on May 7, 2020, and that, in it, he says “time is
running out at Snowflake,” and that the day before he was told there was no
role for him on a Snowflake team. Thus, the record shows he sent the text
message prior to his May 15, 2020 termination.
12
b. Herskovitz’s Employment Termination
Snowflake further contended that when the COVID-19 global
pandemic broke out in early 2020, it became clear to Degnan that Snowflake
would not be expanding into any other countries around the world for the
foreseeable future, including Japan. According to Degnan, it quickly became
clear that “Herskovitz would need to find a new role if he wanted to
continue at Snowflake.” Herskovitz himself wrote in an April 2020 email
that the pandemic was “killing nearly all travel for months,” and that
Snowflake’s expansion into new geographic areas was “on ice for a while.”
He testified in deposition, “I knew I needed to find a new role because I
knew I had been switched from career mode into project mode. And if there
weren’t new regions to expand into, . . . I’d have to figure it out.”
To help Herskovitz, Degnan “personally contacted a number of
individuals at Snowflake and asked them to meet with Mr. Herskovitz about
potential roles.” At some point, it was determined that Herskovitz would
have 45 days to find a new position.
Herskovitz does not dispute that he explored potential opportunities
while continuing to receive full pay and benefits; that he spoke with 25
Snowflake employees about what might be available to him; and that at no
point during his internal job search was anyone at Snowflake ever
instructed not to hire him.
Herskovitz was considered for positions in both the Field Chief
Technology Officer (CTO) and Sales Engineering organizations but did not
receive job offers from them. Snowflake contended this was for
nondiscriminatory reasons.
It contended Field CTO’s reasons included that, according to its head,
in the course of conversations between members of his team and Herskovitz,
and based on the head’s own work with Herskovitz for a year or two, it
13
became apparent that Herskovitz was not strong in the ability to innovate
and create new products, an important part of the role for which he was
being considered (although he was strong in another part, customer
interaction). In addition, in conversations with the team, Herskovitz
critiqued the CTO organization and asserted what he thought it should be
doing, creating the sense that he was “condescending” and perhaps lacking
in the empathy and emotional intelligence needed to help build a team.
Despite the head’s efforts to “carve out” an opportunity for Herskovitz at
Degnan’s encouragement, he could not because of the negative assessments
of his team.
As for the Sales Engineering organization’s reasons for not hiring
Herskovitz, Besant testified in deposition that Herskovitz talked with a
member of her team about playing a role in the organization. She did not
attempt to sway that person’s view of Herskovitz, and the person came away
from his conversation with Herskovitz thinking they were not aligned on the
kind of role Herskovitz should play. Herskovitz told her he did not think
that person was “head[ing] down the right path.”
Besant had other concerns. Because Herskovitz had bluntly said
previously that he was not interested in working in her organization, her
interest in bringing him in was “extremely low.” In any event, “of two-thirds
significance” was Herskovitz’s desire to be paid more than double what
Besant had in mind for the role. She was also aware of his “rumblings”
about his disappointment with certain Snowflake leaders, did not know
“how long his negative attitude had been an issue,” and “didn’t have
confidence that he would come to be [a] positive force on our team.”
When Herskovitz did not find a new position in Snowflake within 45
days, Degnan decided he needed to terminate his employment, and it was
14
terminated on May 15, 2020. Degnan’s decision to terminate Herskovitz’s
employment, he asserted, had nothing to do with Herskovitz’s age.
By this evidence, Snowflake met its burden as movant of showing its
adverse employment actions against Herskovitz, whether wise or unwise,
were for nondiscriminatory reasons. By doing so, it successfully shifted the
burden to Herskovitz to present evidence that raises a rational inference
that Snowflake acted because of age discrimination. Herskovitz does not
argue otherwise. We turn, then, to his showing, but first address his claim
that the trial court committed legal error.
2. Herskovitz’s Contentions in Opposition to Snowflake’s
Summary Judgment Motion
a. The Correct Legal Standard for Evaluating Herskovitz’s Evidence
Herskovitz contends the trial court applied the wrong legal standard
in considering his evidence by requiring that he show direct evidence of age
discrimination when he needed only to raise a permissible inference.
Herskovitz makes three contentions in support of this argument.
First, he relies for the correct statement of law on a Sixth Appellate District
opinion which, consistent with Guz, states that, “[i]f the employer meets its
initial burden, the burden shifts to the employee to ‘demonstrate a triable
issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reasons
were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory
animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.’ ”
(Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861 (Serri); see
Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 333 [noting that, after the defendant met its
initial burden, “the burden shifted to Guz to produce evidence that the
proffered reason was discriminatory or pretextual”].)
15
As we have already indicated in our own discussion of the legal
standard we are to apply, Serri’s statement of the applicable law is correct,
so we have no quarrel with Herskovitz on this point. We do, however, find
both of his remaining two contentions to be problematic.
First, Herskovitz extrapolates from Serri’s correct statement of law
that the trial court should have denied Snowflake summary judgment
because he purportedly showed Snowflake stated false reasons for its
adverse employment actions, and did not need to show “independent
evidence demonstrating a discriminatory motive.” This contention is
flawed. Herskovitz’s extrapolation gives short shrift to the core of the
standard he quotes from Serri and that is emphasized by our Supreme
Court in Guz. That is, regardless of whether a plaintiff relies on prima facie
discrimination or pretext, the plaintiff can only defeat summary judgment if
able to demonstrate “ ‘a triable issue by producing substantial evidence . . .
such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged
in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.’ ” (Serri, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861, italics added.)
In other words, as the Guz court instructed, “[i]n an appropriate case,
evidence of dishonest reasons, considered together with elements of the
prima facie case, may permit a finding of prohibited bias.” (Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 356, italics added.) But this does not mean that Guz, Serri,
or any other case requires a trial court to deny summary judgment
whenever a plaintiff establishes dishonest reasons for an adverse
employment action or prima facie age discrimination—assuming solely for
the sake of argument that Herskovitz did so below. Indeed, the cases do
not. (See, e.g., Slatkin v. University of Redlands (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th
1147, 1158–1159 [stating, after quoting Guz, “We question, however,
16
whether this is ‘an appropriate case,’ ” and concluding “there was
insufficient evidence of a discriminatory motive.”].)
As the Guz court made clear, “the ultimate issue is simply whether
the employer acted with a motive to discriminate illegally.” (Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 358, italics omitted.) Accordingly, the Guz court further
instructed that “an inference of intentional discrimination cannot be drawn
solely from evidence, if any, that the company lied about its reasons. The
pertinent statutes do not prohibit lying, they prohibit discrimination.
[Citation.] Proof that the employer’s proffered reasons are unworthy of
credence may ‘considerably assist’ a circumstantial case of discrimination,
because it suggests the employer had cause to hide its true reasons.
[Citation.] Still, there must be evidence supporting a rational inference that
intentional discrimination, on grounds prohibited by the statute, was the
true cause of the employer’s actions.” (Id. at pp. 360–361, italics omitted.)
In short, the Guz court explained, an “age discrimination claim under
the FEHA cannot survive [a] motion for summary judgment unless the
evidence in the summary judgment record places [the employer’s] creditable
and sufficient showing of innocent motive in material dispute by raising a
triable issue, i.e., a permissible inference, that, in fact, [the employer] acted
for discriminatory purposes.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 362.)
And that was the standard applied by the trial court. Herskovitz
contends that the trial court erred by “impermissibly demand[ing he]
provide additional, direct evidence of discrimination.” The record shows
otherwise. As we have discussed, the trial court, in its written order
granting summary judgment, cited Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc. supra,
160 Cal.App.4th 994 at page 1003. That passage states the standard
correctly, indicating that a plaintiff, once the employer has met its initial
17
burden, must produce “ ‘substantial evidence that the employer’s stated
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual,
or evidence that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a
combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
the employer engaged in intentional discrimination.’ ” (Hicks v. KNTV
Television, Inc., at p. 1003, italics added.)
Moreover, the trial court indicated that Herskovitz could meet this
burden by producing circumstantial evidence from which such a reasonable
inference could be drawn. The court specifically stated, “Here, plaintiff
shows that he is in a protected classification and that he was replaced by a
younger person. That fact alone is insufficient to defeat this summary
judgment motion. There is no other evidence that can support, either
directly or inferentially, that there was discrimination.” (Italics added.)
This makes plain the court understood that Herskovitz could defeat
Snowflake’s summary judgment motion by presenting evidence merely
raising an inference of discrimination.
The trial court concluded Herskovitz did not meet this standard. As
we will now discuss, we agree.
b. Herskovitz’s Contentions
Herskovitz next contends that the trial court exceeded its authority to
determine factual merit on summary judgment rather than just determine
whether he presented substantial evidence that raised a triable issue of
material fact.
As did the trial court, we will assume for argument’s sake that
Herskovitz showed prima facie age discrimination. But we conclude he did
not raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Snowflake’s stated
reasons for its actions against him were pretextual. And regardless of what
he may have established, the determinative point under the legal standard
18
articulated in Guz, Serri, and the other cases we have cited is this: None of
Herskovitz’s evidence raises a permissible inference that Snowflake’s
actions were motivated by age discrimination.
We have already discussed Snowflake’s explanations. Upon a new
management’s focus on scaling, Degnan decided to reassign Herskovitz and
Besant to take best advantage of their particular skill sets. Snowflake
presented undisputed evidence to support that decision. Besant had a
particular expertise in scaling and experience with a larger company
engaging in that task, while Herskovitz was stellar at growing sales
engineering organizations. Snowflake did not assert that Degnan believed
Herskovitz was incompetent at scaling; rather, Degnan’s explanations
indicate he was making best use of the resources available to him to meet
the new management’s change of focus. Notably, he did not fire Herskovitz,
but reassigned him to a substantial new role for which he was well-
experienced; nothing about this reassignment implies age discrimination.
Herskovitz argues Snowflake did not make these reassignments for
the reasons Degnan stated because, he contends, he was more qualified than
Besant to lead the Sales Engineering organization. He cites his years of
experience with Snowflake, that he grew Snowflake’s Sales Engineering
organization from one person—him—to 172 sales engineers at the time of
his reassignment, doubling and sometimes tripling the number each year;
that he was repeatedly recognized for “his prowess in the position”; and that
Besant was 25 years his junior, less experienced than him, and had
managed no team larger than 92 people. But whether or not he was
objectively more qualified—and Snowflake has grounds to contend that
Besant was objectively a better choice to scale the Sales Engineering
organization given her experience scaling with a larger company—is not
19
what matters here. The question is whether Snowflake, via Degnan, was
motivated by age discrimination. To this, Herskovitz offers nothing of
substance, relying only on his prima facie showing and his own view that he
was a better choice than Besant for the repurposed position as leader of the
Sales Engineering organization. But his own opinion is not particularly
relevant.6 (Taylor v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 994 [The employee’s “ ‘subjective beliefs . . . do not create a
genuine issue of fact’ ”].) What matters is Snowflake’s intent, especially
Degnan’s, given the evidence here, and on this issue Herskovitz presents
nothing that contradicts Degnan’s assertions of why he did what he did.
Under the circumstances we have just discussed, we therefore conclude
Herskovitz’s evidence of his demotion and replacement is insufficient to
raise a permissible inference of age discrimination.
The same is true for Herskovitz’s challenge to Snowflake’s contentions
about its end of his new role as head of the global expansion of sales
engineering. According to Snowflake, Herskovitz’s expansion efforts in
Japan, and the chances for expansion elsewhere, were upended by the
outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic in early 2020. Herskovitz
virtually ignores this reason. Instead, he contends Snowflake undermined
his global expansion efforts by slashing his budget and limiting his
opportunities in Japan, which, he contends, was a deliberate effort to
undermine him, shows pretext, and raises a rational inference of age
discrimination. This is too big a leap to raise a triable issue of material fact.
6 Even if it were, Herskovitz’s own statement to another Snowflake
employee shortly before his employment termination that he was a
“builder,” not a “scaler,” while it does not necessarily mean he was
unqualified to lead the Sales Engineering organization, suggests his own
preferences were consistent with Degnan’s decision to reassign him.
20
Even if Snowflake reduced Herskovitz’s budget and limited his
opportunities, it could have done so for a myriad of reasons; Herskovitz
offers only speculation that it was a set-up for later termination based on
age discrimination. Again, something more is needed for his evidence to
reasonably imply that Snowflake reduced his budget and limited his
opportunities as part of a deliberate effort to discriminate against him
because of his age. Herskovitz again offers nothing beyond his own opinion
and conjecture on this point.
As for the events that occurred after Herskovitz returned from Japan,
Snowflake’s requiring him to find another position himself or face
termination, as opposed to keeping him in his role until the COVID-19
pandemic abated or assigning him directly to a new role, raises a question
as to whether Snowflake was fully committed to keeping Herskovitz
employed, despite his considerable experience and success there. A trier of
fact could reasonably conclude that Snowflake’s failure to ensure Herskovitz
was retained in some position within the company suggests a flagging
commitment to him.
But nothing about this flagging commitment, if it existed, implies
anyone at Snowflake was motivated by age discrimination. It is undisputed
that Snowflake allowed Herskovitz 45 days to interview for positions within
the company rather than terminate his employment. Further, Snowflake
presented evidence, also unchallenged by Herskovitz, that Degnan,
Herskovitz’s long-time supervisor and supporter, encouraged other
managers to consider Herskovitz for positions within their organizations.
(See Slatkin v. Univ. of Redlands supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158
[“ ‘ “Where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of
a discriminatory plaintiff, . . . a strong inference arises that there was no
21
discriminatory motive.” ’ ”].) Also, two managers submitted declarations in
support of Snowflake’s summary judgment motion indicating they
considered and rejected Herskovitz for nondiscriminatory reasons.
Herskovitz makes only vague allegations amounting to the contention
that some sort of conspiracy existed among Snowflake managers to merely
go through the motions when the intention all along was to fire him
motivated by age discrimination. He alludes briefly to an email sent from
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to Degnan in April 2020 asserting that,
since Herskovitz was not going back to Japan, if he did not have a
meaningful role and responsibilities, he needed to be terminated, an email
to which Degnan agreed.
Nothing in this exchange suggests the time Herskovitz was given to
find such a role was a pretext, nor does Herskovitz challenge Snowflake’s
assertion below that Degnan did not report to or work for the CFO. Also,
Herskovitz did not dispute below that no one who considered him for a new
role after his return from Japan was instructed not to hire him. In short,
there is simply no evidence of a conspiracy to go through the motions of
considering him for new positions with the intent to terminate him all
along—let alone to do so motivated by age discrimination. Herskovitz again
does not raise a triable issue of material fact. (See Slatkin v. University of
Redlands, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1157–1159 [affirming summary
judgment for lack of discriminatory motive even if pretext were shown,
given that “all the evidence that the University’s claimed reasons were
dishonest pointed equally to the conclusion that its true reasons were
nondiscriminatory”].)
Herskovitz also contends Snowflake asserted inconsistent reasons for
his termination, indicating pretext. As we have already indicated, “[i]n
22
demonstrating that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is
false or pretextual, ‘ “[an employee] cannot simply show that the employer’s
decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is
whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. . . . Rather, the [employee]
must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
‘unworthy of credence,’ . . . and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for
the [asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’ ” ’ ” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug,
Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 314.)
Herskovitz contends that Snowflake provided three different and
inconsistent explanations for its termination of his employment, from which
a fact finder could permissibly infer the company terminated him motivated
by age discrimination. First, he contends that Snowflake, in a May 12, 2020
document, which Herskovitz describes as a “Termination Notification,”
described his termination as “involuntary” for “performance.” Three days
later, he further contends, Snowflake described his termination as
“voluntary” in an “option report” given to him. Third, Snowflake asserted
that he was terminated because there was not a position for him within the
company.
The trial court concluded these different characterizations of his
termination did not infer a discriminatory motive, and so do we. Herskovitz
does not present any evidence that indicates other than in the weeks before
his termination Snowflake required him to look for and find another
position in the company and that he was unable to do so, although he was
considered by at least two different internal organizations. Nor does he
23
contend that the executive who terminated his employment, Degnan, or any
other management person asserted another reason for his termination.
Instead, Herskovitz relies on two apparent administrative documents
that he only vaguely describes. The May 12 document is an email from
Snowflake’s Director of Human Resources to an undefined “Team” which
states Herskovitz’s upcoming termination was “involuntary” and because of
“performance” without further explanation. Herskovitz does not cite any
evidence that the email was given to him, that it was relied on by Snowflake
to explain his termination to him, or that its author had anything to do with
his termination.
Herskovitz’s evidence of the May 15 “option report” is his own May 27,
2020 email to this same Director of Human Resources in which he stated
that a “termination option report”—an apparent reference to his stock
options—stated the reason for his termination was “ ‘Voluntary,’ ” “which,”
he wrote, “is false (at this time).” Herskovitz did not put forward any
evidence indicating who prepared this “termination option report,” that
Snowflake relied on it in any way, or that its author had anything to do with
Herskovitz’s termination either.
Like the trial court, we conclude the administrative nature of these
documents and the paucity of Herskovitz’s evidence about them fail to raise
a material issue of fact about Snowflake’s assertion that it terminated him
because he was unable to find a position within the company, and they do
not raise an inference of age discrimination. (See McGrory v. Applied Signal
Technology, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1530–1531, 1533 [affirming
summary judgment although there was evidence the employer gave three
inconsistent reasons for termination because, regardless, a discriminatory
motive could not be inferred from them]; Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020)
24
53 Cal.App.5th 412, 427–430 [affirming summary adjudication despite
evidence of comments about the plaintiff’s age by employees who were not
involved in his termination and which did not demonstrate discriminatory
animus, and evidence of the company’s failure to follow its disciplinary
process, the court finding the absence of “any evidence supporting a rational
inference that discrimination . . . was the true reason for [the employer’s]
actions”].)
In short, Herskovitz does not present substantial evidence that raises
a triable issue of material fact regarding whether, in terminating his
employment, Snowflake was motivated by age discrimination. The trial
court therefore correctly granted Snowflake summary judgment. In light of
this conclusion, we have no need to address Herskovitz’s contention that the
trial court also erred in dismissing his claim for punitive damages.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Snowflake is awarded costs of appeal.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
CLAY, J.*
* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
25
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.