People v. Robinson CA2/3

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Filed 10/10/25 P. v. Robinson CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B336978

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA086228)
v.

ANTOWINE ROBINSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Scott Millington, Judge. Affirmed.
Antowine Robinson, in pro. per.; Joshua L. Siegel, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Antowine Michael Robinson appeals from the judgment
entered after he was resentenced pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75.1 His appellate counsel filed a brief under People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and Robinson
filed a supplemental brief. We consider Robinson’s contentions
and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2017, the People charged Robinson by third
amended information with two counts of possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); unlawful possession of
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)); grossly negligent discharge of
a firearm (§ 246.3, subd. (a)); and criminal threats (§ 422,
subd. (a)). The information alleged that Robinson had suffered
six prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b); two prior strikes within the meaning of the Three
Strikes law; and two prior convictions within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1). As to three of the counts, the
information alleged Robinson was out on bail at the time he
committed the crimes (§ 12022.1). In addition, as to the charges
for criminal threats and grossly negligent discharge of a firearm,
the information alleged Robinson personally used a firearm
within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
In February 2018, pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, Robinson pled no contest to the criminal threats
count.2 Robinson admitted suffering one prior strike. He further
admitted suffering one prior conviction under section 667

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 An earlier jury trial had resulted in a mistrial.

2
subdivision (a)(1), and one prior conviction under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). He admitted the section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
firearm enhancement and the out-on-bail enhancement under
section 12022.1. The trial court imposed the negotiated sentence
of 18 years, consisting of the upper term of three years on the
substantive offense, doubled due to the prior strike; five years for
the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement; one year for the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement; the midterm of four
years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancement; and
two years for the section 12022.1 enhancement.
In 2023, the trial court set the matter for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75. Robinson, through counsel, filed a
motion seeking a full resentencing and the imposition of a
reduced sentence. Robinson asked the court to exercise its
discretion under amended section 1385, subdivision (c) and
amended section 12022.5 and sentence him to the middle term on
the criminal threats charge, dismiss the section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) and section 12022.1 enhancements, and strike the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.3
The People opposed Robinson’s request and asked that the
court strike only the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.
The opposition referred to the underlying facts of the charged
crimes, Robinson’s prior criminal history, and the fact that
Robinson “entered the disposition to avoid a third strike sentence
and a retrial.”

3 At the resentencing hearing, defense counsel appeared to
instead ask that the court dismiss the section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), section 667.5, subdivision (b), and
section 12022.1 enhancements, and impose the middle term for
the firearm enhancement, resulting in a sentence of eight years.

3
The trial court initially struck the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancement and set the matter for a further
resentencing hearing. The court also noted it had received a
letter from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
suggesting the section 12022.1 out-on-bail enhancement was
improperly imposed. At the subsequent resentencing hearing,
the trial court acknowledged the ameliorative changes to relevant
sentencing laws. The court reviewed Robinson’s prior criminal
history and determined the upper term and application of the
prior strike remained warranted. The trial court explained:

“I . . . reviewed the probation report dated
January 8th, 2013. It should be noted that the
defendant has the following prior convictions: A
juvenile adjudication in 1999 for 148.9, in 2000, a
459. [¶] . . . So adult convictions he has a 2001
11350, which is now a misdemeanor, 2002 a 14601.1,
which is a misdemeanor, 2002, 653.23 misdemeanor,
and 2002 a gun charge under 12031 (a)(1) where he
received probation, and 2002 he received his first
strike for a 12034 (d) where he got two years prison.
Then in 2004 he had a 10851 where he received two
years prison, 2006 another gun charge for a 12021
(a)(1), 32 months state prison, so in that case his
strike was used to double the sentence. In 2008[,] a
14601.1 misdemeanor, in 2010 an attempted robbery
in San Bernardino County, which is his second strike,
and in 2011 a D.U.I. misdemeanor.
“This crime alleged to have occurred on
December 19th, 2012. So when I look—I would look
at anything with regards to . . . [People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497] as to how old
the priors are, the remoteness of the priors, this
crime occurred in 2012, so it’s clear it’s only shortly

4
after robbery in 2010, so it’s not remote. Therefore
and based upon his prior record I’m not going to
strike the strike in this matter.”

The court sentenced Robinson to 15 years in state prison,
consisting of the upper term of three years on the criminal
threats count, doubled for the prior strike; the middle term of
four years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm
enhancement; and five years for the section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) enhancement.
Robinson timely appealed. Court-appointed appellate
counsel filed an opening brief that raised no issues and asked this
court to independently review the record under Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th 216. We directed appellate counsel to send Robinson
the record and a copy of the opening brief. We additionally
advised that within 30 days of the date of the notice, Robinson
could submit a supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds
for an appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to
consider.
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court held that the “procedures
set out in Anders [v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738] and [People
v.] Wende [(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436] do not apply to an appeal from
the denial of postconviction relief, even if the defendant has a
state-created right to the appointment of counsel for that appeal.”
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) However, if the
defendant files a supplemental letter brief, we are “required to
evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to
issue a written opinion.” (Id. at p. 232.) Robinson timely
submitted a supplemental brief.

5
DISCUSSION
Under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” The statute
sets forth procedures for the identification of persons serving
sentences that include now-invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements, and for the recall of such sentences and
resentencing. When resentencing a defendant, the trial court
must “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) The resentencing must “result in a lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of
the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
In his supplemental brief, Robinson contends the trial court
should have dismissed or “reduced” the five-year prior, dismissed
the firearm enhancement, and dismissed the prior strike.
Robinson also argues that the trial court should not have used
the prior strike to double the base term because he has already
served 12 years of his sentence and the trial court should not
have imposed the upper term “because of [the] enhancements
that already gave [him] the max of time.” Finally, Robinson
asserts his defense counsel was ineffective and biased.

6
We review a trial court’s decision declining to strike an
enhancement under section 1385 for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225; People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298; see also People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) A court abuses its
discretion if its decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it” (Carmony, at p. 377), or if
the decision is made without the sentencing court’s informed
discretion or the court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
“ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” ’ ”
(Carmony, at p. 376.)
Aside from simply asserting that the trial court should
have dismissed various enhancements or the prior strike,
Robinson has not explained why this court should find the trial
court’s decision improper, irrational, or arbitrary. In support of
his request for resentencing in the trial court, Robinson did not
identify specific evidence, factors, or changes in the law that
would warrant or require the dismissal of specific enhancements
in his case. He did not ask the trial court to dismiss the prior
strike.4 Generally, a party’s failure to raise a sentencing issue in
the trial court forfeits the issue on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994)

4 Although Robinson asked the trial court to impose the
middle term on the substantive offense, he did not argue that the
trial court was prohibited from imposing the upper term.
Defense counsel also indicated that the defense would not ask the
trial court to review a file of what appeared to be Robinson’s
record while in custody. Counsel explained: “We did not attach
any portions of the C-file because it may not have been favorable
to him.”

7
9 Cal.4th 331, 352; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772,
778 [defendant’s failure to seek lower term, object to imposition of
higher term, or argue mitigating factors under amended § 1170,
subd. (b)(6), forfeited claim on appeal].)
Moreover, while Robinson asserts his counsel was
ineffective, he does not advance any factual or legal argument to
support that claim. The record does not indicate why Robinson’s
counsel made some arguments and not others and we may not
presume error. “ ‘ “In order to prevail on [an ineffective
assistance of counsel] claim on direct appeal, the record must
affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose for
the challenged act or omission.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403.) We have no basis to
reverse the trial court’s sentencing decision.5

5 We must also reject Robinson’s argument that the trial
court erred in applying the Three Strikes law to his sentence
because he had served a significant portion of the original
sentence. The trial court was permitted to consider whether
Robinson’s time served had reduced the risk of him engaging in
future violence (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)), but the amount of time
already served did not prohibit the trial court from concluding it
would not be in the interest of justice to strike the prior strike.
Similarly, we are uncertain how to understand Robinson’s
assertion that imposition of the upper term was improper
because the enhancements already gave him “the max of time.”
The total length of the sentence was a factor for the trial court to
consider when deciding whether to dismiss enhancements and in
determining an appropriate new sentence. (See, e.g., § 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C).) However, the record does not support the claim
that Robinson’s sentence was subject to a statutory maximum
that prevented the trial court from re-imposing the upper term on
the criminal threats count.

8
DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

9

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