In re Michael S. CA2/7

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Filed 10/9/25 In re Michael S. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re MICHAEL S. et al., Persons B341709
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
________________________________ Super. Ct. No.
23CCJP01063)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AZUCENA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy A. Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed in part and
dismissed in part.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

INTRODUCTION

Azucena S. appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition
orders removing 12-year-old Michael S., 11-year-old Joseph S.,
and nine-year-old Aaron G. from her custody. She also appeals
from the court’s order removing two-year-old Zeak S. at the
12-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.21, subdivision (f).1 Azucena argues substantial
evidence did not support the court’s findings at the disposition
hearing or the 12-month review hearing.
While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court returned
Michael and Aaron to Azucena. Therefore, we dismiss Azucena’s
appeal from the orders regarding Michael and Aaron as moot.
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders regarding Joseph and Zeak
because substantial evidence supported the court’s findings.

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Zeak Tests Positive for Methamphetamine at Birth,
and the Juvenile Court Removes All Four Children
from Azucena
We described much of the factual and procedural
background of these proceedings in Azucena’s prior appeal. (See
In re Michael S. (May 3, 2024, B330633) [nonpub. opn.]
(Michael S. I).) When Azucena gave birth to Zeak in March 2023,
they both tested positive for methamphetamine. Azucena denied
using drugs and said she drank a cup of lemonade that tasted
“funny” at a baby shower the previous day. Her friend told the
social worker that she put methamphetamine in her cup at the
baby shower and that Azucena must have drunk from the friend’s
cup. A few days later Azucena and Francisco S., Zeak’s father,
tested positive for methamphetamine.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services filed a petition alleging two counts under
section 300, subdivision (b), based on Azucena’s substance abuse.
In the first count the Department alleged that Zeak tested
positive for amphetamine when he was born and that Azucena’s
substance abuse endangered Zeak’s physical health and safety
and placed him at risk of serious physical harm. In the second
count the Department alleged that Azucena was a current abuser
of amphetamine and methamphetamine, which rendered her
unable to provide regular care for the children, and that
Francisco failed to protect the children from Azucena’s substance
abuse. The Department also asserted counts under section 300,
subdivision (b), based on Francisco’s substance abuse and the
criminal history of Jorge O. (Michael and Joseph’s father), and
under section 300, subdivision (j), based on prior dependency

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jurisdiction over Zeak’s half-siblings relating to Francisco’s
substance abuse.
At the detention hearing the juvenile court found the
Department had made a prima facie showing the children were
persons described by section 300 and ordered their continued
detention. The court ordered monitored visitation and weekly
drug testing for Azucena.

B. The Juvenile Court Sustains the Petition and
Removes the Children, and We Reverse in Part
At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
June 2023 the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the
petition and found the children were persons described by
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The court found not credible
Azucena’s account she accidentally ingested methamphetamine
when she drank someone else’s lemonade. The court declared the
children dependent children of the juvenile court and removed
them from Azucena and their fathers. The court ordered weekly
drug testing, parenting classes, individual counseling, and
unmonitored visitation for Azucena.
Azucena appealed from the court’s jurisdiction findings and
disposition orders. We affirmed the court’s jurisdiction findings
and disposition orders for Zeak, but reversed the jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders for Michael, Joseph, and Aaron.
We directed the juvenile court to enter new disposition orders for
Michael, Joseph, and Aaron. (See Michael S. I., supra, B330633.)

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C. The Juvenile Court Again Removes Michael, Joseph,
and Aaron
At the new disposition hearing in October 2024 the juvenile
court acknowledged that Azucena had been testing negative for
drugs and that she was almost finished with a substance abuse
program. The court stated, however, Azucena had relapsed at
least twice, once in late 2023 and again in February 2024 while
she was pregnant with her daughter, who was born in
August 2024. The court also stated that, though Azucena
admitted to the social worker that she had a substance abuse
problem, Azucena later denied making the statement. The court
stated that it was “concerned about whether she has gained
insight and whether the progress she has made thus far is
sufficient to ensure the children’s safety” and that Azucena
needed “more time to ensure that she is maintaining her sobriety
and can safely parent now five children.”
The court again declared Michael, Joseph, and Aaron
dependent children of the juvenile court and removed them from
Azucena. The court ordered Azucena to undergo weekly drug
testing and to participate in individual counseling and a full drug
and alcohol program, but stated Azucena would receive credit for
her current program once she completed it. The court also
ordered unmonitored visitation for Azucena in a public setting
and ordered her to give the Department the date, time, and
location of the visits so the social worker could “drop in and
ensure that the children are safe.” Azucena timely appealed from
the disposition orders removing Michael, Joseph, and Aaron.

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D. At the 12-month Review Hearing, the Juvenile Court
Finds It Would Be Detrimental To Return Zeak to
Azucena
At the October 2024 12-month review hearing under
section 366.21, subdivision (f), the juvenile court denied
Azucena’s request to return Zeak to her custody, finding that
Azucena was “making good progress” but her compliance was
“not substantial yet.” The court stated Azucena needed “to make
further progress in her insights with regard to substance abuse”
and “continue to demonstrate her sobriety.” The court found
returning Zeak to Azucena would create a substantial risk of
detriment. The court ordered unmonitored visitation for Azucena
in a public setting and ordered her to give the Department the
date, time, and location of the visits. Azucena timely appealed
from the court’s order removing Zeak.

E. At the Six-month Review Hearing for Michael,
Joseph, and Aaron, the Juvenile Court Returns
Michael and Aaron to Azucena
At the April 2025 six-month review hearing under
section 366.21, subdivision (e), the juvenile court found Azucena’s
progress was substantial. The court returned Michael and Aaron
(but not Joseph) to Azucena.2

2 We granted the Department’s request for judicial notice of
the juvenile court’s April 30, 2025 minute orders.

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DISCUSSION

A. Azucena’s Appeal Regarding Michael and Aaron
Is Moot
“Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness
concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to
appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court
proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) The
“‘critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is
moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective
relief if it finds reversible error.’” (In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
275; In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 224.) “For relief to
be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the
[appellant] must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm
must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome
the [appellant] seeks.” (D.P., at p. 276; accord, In re T.R. (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 206, 214.) “‘“ When no effective relief can be
granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.”’” (In re J.A.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1050-1051.)
As discussed, at the six-month review hearing in April 2025
the juvenile court returned Michael and Aaron to Azucena.
Azucena does not deny her appeal from the court’s disposition
orders removing Michael and Aaron is moot. We agree it is.
Because we cannot provide Azucena any effective relief, we
dismiss her appeal from the disposition orders removing Michael
and Aaron.

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B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Removing Joseph
from Azucena

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), provides: “A dependent
child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her
parents . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing
evidence” there “is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and
there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical
health can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (See In re M.D. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 836, 856; In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510,
520.) “‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not
have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The
focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.’ [Citation.]
The court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present
circumstances.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159,
169-170.)
“We review a dispositional order removing a child from a
parent for substantial evidence, ‘“keeping in mind that the trial
court was required to make its order based on the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence.”’ [Citation.]
‘[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of
a finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for
the level of confidence this standard demands.’” (In re M.V.
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960; see Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) “‘[W]hen reviewing a finding that a
fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the

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question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true.’” (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132,
1150; see Conservatorship of O.B., at pp. 995-996.) “We view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give
due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (M.V., at p. 960;
see Conservatorship of O.B., at p. 996.) The appellant has the
burden to show “‘“there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
nature”’ to support the dispositional removal order.” (In re L.O.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245; see In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Order Removing Joseph
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
by clear and convincing evidence that returning Joseph to
Azucena would create a substantial danger to his physical health,
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. The
juvenile court reasonably concluded it was highly probable
Azucena had not overcome her issues with methamphetamine.
Azucena used methamphetamine in March 2023 in the last days
of her pregnancy with Zeak (and possibly a second time
immediately after Zeak was born). In May 2023 she enrolled in
an outpatient treatment program. Between June and
August 2023 she tested negative five times but missed nine tests.
In November 2023 Azucena again tested positive for
methamphetamine. Azucena initially denied using drugs, but

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later admitted to the social worker that she used
methamphetamine in November 2023 because she was depressed
and “stressed out” about “possibly losing her children.” In
December 2023 she left the outpatient program, entered and left
two inpatient drug treatment programs, and reentered the
outpatient program.
Substantial evidence also supported the juvenile court’s
finding Azucena had not developed sufficient insight into her
substance abuse. In March 2024 Azucena admitted to the social
worker that she had used methamphetamine two or three times
in February 2024 and that she was avoiding drug testing for that
reason.3 Azucena told the social worker that she tested positive
at her outpatient substance abuse program, that she asked her
counselor not to tell the Department, and that she canceled visits
with the children when she was under the influence of drugs.
Azucena also told the social worker that she knew she was
pregnant when she used methamphetamine in February 2024.
She said “she usually uses meth to cope with her depression and
loneliness.”
In August 2024, however, Azucena recanted. She told the
Department’s investigator she tested positive when Zeak was
born because her friend put something in her drink. She blamed
her subsequent positive test on a “mix up” at the lab. She denied
telling the social worker that she had relapsed and claimed the
social worker “mixed up [her] words.” She also denied she had a
drug problem and said she enrolled in a treatment program
because her attorney said she “had to do it in order to regain
custody” of her children. Given the evidence of Azucena’s

3 Azucena missed weekly drug tests for six weeks between
February 23, 2024 and April 9, 2024.

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relapses, her drug use during pregnancy, and her denial of that
drug use, the court could reasonably conclude it was highly
probable Joseph would be at risk of harm if returned to Azucena.
(See In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601 [juvenile court
could reasonably infer from the mother’s “dissembling
about . . . drug use” she was “trying to hide [an] ongoing drug
addiction”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“In light of
[the] mother’s failure to recognize the risks to which she was
exposing the minor, there was no reason to believe the conditions
would not persist should the minor remain in her home.”]; In re
Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a
problem one fails to acknowledge.”].)
Azucena argues substantial evidence did not support the
court’s order removing Joseph from her because, though she “was
admittedly inconsistent with her drug testing and did test
positive for methamphetamines one time” in November 2023, she
“addressed her use of methamphetamines” by enrolling in a
treatment program in April 2024. Azucena asserts that, between
April 25, 2024 and September 16, 2024, she tested negative for
22 consecutive weeks. The juvenile court, however, could
reasonably find that, in light of Azucena’s pattern of
methamphetamine use, including during pregnancy, 22 weeks
was not a long enough period of sobriety to show she would not
relapse again. (See In re H.B. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 219, 242
[“Given father’s decades-long history of substance abuse, and the
fact he was in the early stages of recovery, the juvenile court
could reasonably find it highly probable that father’s four or so
months of sobriety did not mean he was no longer at risk of
relapsing.”]; In re J.C. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [after the
father’s “years-long struggles with drug abuse, his seven months

11
of sobriety did not mean that he was no longer at risk of
relapsing”]; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531,
fn. 9 [“It is the nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a
much longer period than 120 days to show real reform.”].)
Citing In re M.V., supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 944, Azucena
argues her “unwillingness to acknowledge having a ‘drug
problem’ when speaking with the dependency investigator” in
August 2024 was not “clear and convincing evidence of
substantial danger to the children.” The facts in M.V., however,
were very different. In that case “the sole cause of harm to the
[c]hildren derived from domestic violence between [the parents],
and the threat of that harm could be eliminated by dispositional
orders requiring [the parents] to live and parent separately”
(which the parents had done twice before “when doing so was
necessary to maintain custody” of the children). (Id. at pp. 969,
968.) Indeed, the social worker testified: “‘I can’t think of any
safety risk right now placing [the children] with the father’” (who
was the victim of the domestic violence). (Id. at p. 961.) The
court in M.V. stated that the child protective agency “was mostly
troubled” by the father’s “recanting” of his earlier statements
about incidents of domestic violence “and his so-called ‘lack of
transparency’” and that, “[a]lthough troubling, the parents’ ‘lack
of transparency’ or subsequent denial of the events that led to
dependency is not sufficient, by itself, to justify removal of the
[c]hildren from either parent’s custody.” (Id. at pp. 961-962.)
Here, in contrast, the juvenile court relied on Azucena’s drug
addiction and continuing drug use, even while pregnant, not
merely her denial of drug use.
Azucena also argues there were reasonable means to
protect Joseph without removing him, such as unannounced

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visits by the social worker, continuing drug tests, or family
counseling. Azucena does not explain how unannounced visits or
family counseling would address the danger caused by her
methamphetamine use. As for drug testing, by the time of the
disposition hearing Azucena had been undergoing weekly drug
testing for more than one year. During that period, as discussed,
she frequently missed drug tests and twice relapsed. Although
she had tested negative for 22 weeks, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude it was not safe to return Joseph to Azucena
until she had tested negative for a longer period of time. (See
In re A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“Unannounced visits
can only assess the situation and mother’s sobriety at the time of
the visit. Substance abuse testing can only detect use after the
fact—which would be after mother had already placed the minor
at risk again.”].)

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Continuing Zeak’s
Placement

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
At the 12-month permanency review hearing the juvenile
court must return the child to the parent unless the court finds,
by a preponderance of the evidence, returning the child “would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21,
subd. (f)(1); see L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
1021, 1033; In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.) The
Department has the burden of proving detriment. (§ 366.21,
subd. (f)(1); see L.C., at p. 1033.)

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“‘In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider
the extent to which the parent participated in reunification
services,’” as well as “‘the efforts or progress the parent has made
toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-
home placement.’” (In re E.D., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 966.)
“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for
substantial evidence.” (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864; see M.G. v. Superior Court (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 646, 660.) “Under that standard we inquire
whether the evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
the court’s determination. We resolve all conflicts in support of
the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold
the findings and may not substitute our deductions for those of
the juvenile court.” (Georgeanne G., at p. 865; see L.C. v.
Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Finding That Returning Zeak to
Azucena Would Be Detrimental to Zeak
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
returning Zeak to Azucena would create a substantial danger to
his physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being. The same evidence that supported the court’s order
removing Joseph supported the court’s finding that returning
Zeak would be detrimental to him. As discussed, the juvenile
court found Azucena used methamphetamine in November 2023
and while pregnant in February 2024. And though Azucena
admitted to the social worker that she had used drugs, she later
denied saying that and denied she had a drug problem. The
danger to Zeak, who at the time of the hearing was only

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19 months old, was even greater than the danger to Joseph, who
was 10 years old at the time. (See In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th
520, 559 [“a child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the
care that the child may require and whether a parent’s . . .
substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious
physical harm”].) The court could reasonably conclude not
enough time had elapsed since Azucena last used
methamphetamine to entrust her with the care of such a young
child.

DISPOSITION

Azucena’s appeal from the disposition orders regarding
Michael and Aaron is dismissed. The disposition order regarding
Joseph and the order at the 12-month review hearing regarding
Zeak are affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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