CourtListener 10692695•In re Gabriel W. CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 10/8/25 In re Gabriel W. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re GABRIEL W., a Person B340528
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 23CCJP02896B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NICOLE A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed
with directions.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Nicole A. appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her family reunification services under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.211 regarding her son Gabriel W.
Nicole argues that the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services failed to provide reasonable family
reunification services and that the Department and the court
failed to consider a maternal aunt for preferential relative
placement under section 361.3. Nicole also argues the
Department failed to conduct a proper inquiry under the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and
related California law.
We conclude the juvenile court erred in several respects.
First, the court failed to find at the six-month and 12-month
review hearings whether the Department offered Nicole
reasonable reunification services, as required by section 366.21,
subdivisions (e) and (f). The minute orders (presumably prepared
by the clerk) state the court made those findings, but the court
did not make them. To the extent the court made such implied
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
findings, substantial evidence did not support them. Second, the
court failed to determine whether the Department made an
adequate inquiry regarding Gabriel’s possible status as an Indian
child, as required by ICWA and related California law. The
court, however, did not fail to consider placing Gregory with a
relative under section 361.3: There was no evidence that anyone
requested a change in Gabriel’s placement or that a qualifying
relative was available for placement. Therefore, we reverse the
order terminating Nicole’s reunification services and direct the
juvenile court to order the Department to provide Nicole
additional reunification services. We also direct the juvenile
court to make findings whether the Department conducted an
adequate inquiry under ICWA and related California law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Juvenile Court Declares Gabriel a Dependent
Child of the Court and Removes Him from Nicole
In July 2023 the Department received a referral stating
Nicole was neglecting Gabriel’s brother Carl W. Jr. (born in 2005,
therefore now an adult, and not involved in this appeal). The
referring party stated that Nicole told Carl that he could no
longer live at home and that, when Nicole heard Carl planned to
stay with a family friend, Nicole told the friend not to take Carl
in because “she wants him on the streets.” During the initial
investigation the case social worker learned that the family
(which included the boys’ father, Carl Sr.) was about to be evicted
from their home and that Nicole feared they would be homeless.
Nicole said that Gabriel (born in 2013) had been staying with the
maternal grandmother temporarily, but that he could not stay
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there very long because the grandmother lived in a senior
community that did not allow long-term guests.
The social worker interviewed Nicole, both boys, and the
maternal grandmother in August 2023. Nicole said Carl Sr. had
just completed a five-month rehabilitation program for alcohol
abuse. (The social worker observed Carl Sr. was “passed out” on
the floor in the home and then struggled to walk around the
apartment. She and Nicole agreed Carl Sr. appeared to be
intoxicated.) Gabriel said that both Nicole and Carl Sr. “needed
help,” that Nicole “has a mental health problem” and “breaks
down a lot,” and that Nicole yelled frequently at Carl Sr. and the
boys. He also said that Carl Sr. had “a problem with alcohol,” but
that he felt safer with Carl Sr. than with Nicole “because of her
mood and mental health.” Gabriel also said that Nicole would
disappear for days at a time, leaving them in Carl Sr.’s care, and
that he had not attended school since February or March 2023.
The maternal grandmother said Nicole was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder as a teenager, was involuntarily hospitalized
several times, and had attempted suicide. She also said that
Nicole had a history of methamphetamine use and that she
suspected Nicole was “drinking or using drugs again due to her
behavior,” which the maternal grandmother described as
“erratic” and “irrational.”
In late August 2023 the Department requested, and the
court issued, an emergency detention order. The court ordered
monitored visitation for Nicole. The Department placed Carl
with a family friend, Heather P., and placed Gabriel with a foster
family.
In supplemental interviews described in the Department’s
jurisdiction and disposition report, Carl Sr. said Nicole had been
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using methamphetamine since September 2022. Nicole denied
using methamphetamine, admitted using marijuana, and
declined to take a drug test without a court order. Regarding
visitation, Nicole visited with Gabriel once, and the visit went
well. The Department tried to schedule additional visits, but
encountered two challenges. First, though Gabriel’s foster family
initially agreed to monitor Nicole’s visits with Gabriel, the family
declined to continue monitoring visits after Nicole “started
canceling and/or failing to show up for family time.” Second,
Nicole stopped responding to the social worker. Though the
Department approved Heather P. to monitor Nicole’s visits with
Gabriel, the social worker could not reach Nicole to confirm a
visitation schedule. Nicole contacted Gabriel by phone
approximately twice a week.
In a last minute information report for the court, the
Department said that Nicole visited Gabriel a second time in late
October 2023 and that the visit went well. The Department,
however, was looking for a new monitor because Heather P. could
not monitor visits every week. Gabriel’s foster family declined to
monitor Gabriel’s telephone calls with Nicole after she “began
calling the caregivers at all hours of the day including at
5:00 a.m. In addition, she began sending multiple text messages
to them and also including them in group text messages with
[Department] staff and unknown individuals where she was
ranting and accusing [the Department] of kidnapping her child.”
The Department advised the court it was “highly concerned about
mother’s mental health and mental/emotional stability or lack
thereof and the impact this continues to have on the children and
their respective caregivers. There is concern that mother’s
behavior is jeopardizing the children’s, specifically child,
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Gabriel’s placement.” The Department subsequently learned
Nicole had been arrested in late October 2023 for assault with a
deadly weapon and attempted carjacking.
On November 29, 2023 the juvenile court sustained a
petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The court found true
allegations the boys had suffered, or there was a substantial risk
they will suffer, serious physical harm or illness because
(1) Carl Sr. had a history of substance abuse and was a current
abuser of alcohol, which rendered him unable to adequately
supervise or regularly care for the children; (2) Nicole had a
history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine, and
was a current abuser of marijuana and alcohol, which rendered
her unable to adequately supervise or regularly care for the
children; and (3) Nicole had mental and emotional problems
(including erratic and violent behavior toward the children), had
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, had attempted suicide and
suffered two prior involuntary hospitalizations, and failed to take
psychotropic medications as prescribed, which rendered her
unable to regularly care for the children.
The juvenile court declared Gabriel a dependent child of
the court, removed him from both parents, and ordered family
reunification services. Nicole’s case plan included weekly drug
testing (and a six-month drug and alcohol program if she tested
positive or missed a test without excuse); individual counseling
and courses to address case issues, including anger management,
parenting, substance abuse, and the effect of family violence and
drug abuse on children; and mental health counseling, including
psychiatric evaluations and medications as prescribed. The court
ordered monitored visitation for Nicole and gave the Department
discretion to liberalize visitation. The court also ordered the
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Department to provide Nicole with transportation and housing
assistance.
B. Nicole Does Not Substantially Comply with Her Case
Plan, and the Juvenile Court Continues Family
Reunification Services
In July 2024 the court held a six-month review hearing
under section 366.21, subdivision (e). Prior to the hearing the
Department was largely unable to verify Nicole’s compliance with
her case plan because Nicole had not signed a release form
authorizing the Department to obtain information from her
medical providers. Nicole told the Department social worker that
she was participating in individual therapy, mental health
counseling, and a parenting class. Nicole did not enroll in a
26-week anger management class. Nicole appeared for drug
testing on December 27, 2023 and tested negative, but otherwise
Nicole did not comply with the court’s order for weekly drug
testing. Though the court had ordered the Department to return
to court if Nicole missed any drug tests without a valid excuse,
the Department did not do so. (That may have been because the
court uploaded an incorrect case plan after the disposition
hearing. More on that later.) The Department also reported that
as of March 2024 Nicole was homeless and living in Riverside
County. The Department, however, did not arrange for Nicole to
drug test in Riverside County until September 2024 and never
provided transportation assistance there.
The court found that Nicole had not substantially complied
with her case plan and that returning Gabriel to her would create
a substantial risk of detriment to his safety and well-being. The
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court ordered the Department to provide additional family
reunification services.
C. Nicole (Still) Does Not Substantially Comply with Her
Case Plan, and the Juvenile Court Terminates Family
Reunification Services
For the next review hearing the Department reported
Nicole had complied with some aspects of her case plan. Nicole
completed a parenting class, but still had not enrolled in an anger
management class. Nicole was under the care of a psychiatrist
(and had been since April 2021), but missed several medication-
management appointments with her doctor. Nicole was still
homeless and residing in Riverside County for most of the period
of supervision.
Nicole began drug testing a month before the scheduled
review hearing. She tested negative once, missed one test, and
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine twice.
Nicole denied using drugs and maintained one of her prescription
medications caused the (false, according to her) positive test
results. The Department was unable to ascertain whether
Nicole’s theory was viable. The Department recommended
terminating Nicole’s reunification services and continuing-
monitored visitation.
At the 12-month review hearing in October 2024 the
juvenile court found returning Gabriel to Nicole would create a
substantial risk of detriment because Nicole had recently tested
positive for methamphetamine. The court terminated Nicole’s
family reunification services. Nicole filed timely notices of appeal
from the court’s orders at the six-month and 12-month review
hearings. We consolidated the two appeals.
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DISCUSSION
Nicole challenges the order terminating her reunification
services on three grounds: The juvenile court erred in finding at
the six-month and 12-month review hearings the Department
provided her with reasonable services, the Department and the
juvenile court failed to apply the relative placement preference in
sections 309 and 361.3, and the court erred in finding the
Department conducted an adequate inquiry under ICWA and
related California law. We conclude that Nicole’s first and third
arguments have merit and that the juvenile court erred in
several respects that require reversing the order terminating her
reunification services.
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Find the
Department Provided Reasonable Reunification
Services, and Substantial Evidence Did Not
Support an Implied Finding
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“When a child has been removed from a parent’s custody,
the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to
facilitate the reunification of the family. [Citations.] Such
services may, depending on the case, include evaluations and
assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse
treatment and testing, and other forms of assistance.”
(Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624,
fn. omitted; accord, In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059;
see In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 590 [“In a juvenile
dependency proceeding, a parent generally has a statutory right
9
to reunification services when his or her child is removed from
the parent’s custody at a disposition hearing.”], disapproved on
another ground in Michael G., at p. 631, fn. 8; see also §§ 361.5,
subd. (a), 362, subds. (c), (d).)
At both the six-month review hearing and the 12-month
permanency hearing the juvenile court “shall order the return of
the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian
unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the return of the child to their parent or legal guardian would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21,
subds. (e)(1), (f)(1).) In addition, “[i]f the child is not returned to
their parent or legal guardian, the court shall determine by clear
and convincing evidence whether reasonable services that were
designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the
problems that led to the initial removal and the continued
custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or
legal guardian . . . .” (§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8), (f)(1)(A).) “Although
the statute does not define ‘reasonable services,’ the Courts of
Appeal have generally held that, to support a finding that
services were reasonable, ‘the record should show that the
supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of
custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the
course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist
the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’”
(Michael G. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625, fn. 6;
see In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.)
“‘When a finding that reunification services were adequate
is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.’
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[Citation.] ‘In general, when presented with a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring
clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether
the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
high probability demanded by this standard of proof.’ [Citation.]
‘The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s
efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the
circumstances of the particular case.’” (In re A.O., supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1061-1062.)
2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Find the
Department Provided Reasonable Reunification
Services at the Six-month and 12-month Review
Hearings
As discussed, at the six-month and 12-month review
hearings the juvenile court had to determine by clear and
convincing evidence whether the Department provided
reasonable reunification services designed to address the
problems that led to Gabriel’s removal from Nicole. (§ 366.21,
subds. (e)(8), (f)(1)(A).) The court, however, made no such
finding.
The court did not find at the contested six-month review
hearing, by clear and convincing evidence or otherwise, the
Department provided reasonable services. The court began the
hearing like this: “This is a contested [hearing under
section 366.21, subdivision] (e). This is mother’s contest. The
court has read and considered the [Department’s] report, as well
as today’s last minute [report] reflecting that reunification
services have been provided to mother. She continues to be in
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meager compliance with the case plan.” The court received two
exhibits into evidence, and counsel for Nicole made a brief
argument relating to the case plan. The court ruled: “The court
has read and considered the documents. Mother continues to be
in partial compliance with the case plan. There is a likelihood in
the next period she will reunite. We’ll continue the matter over
to August 28, that’s the date of the [hearing under section 366.21,
subdivision] (f), the 12-month date. And mother is ordered back
on that date. The Department has discretion to liberalize
mother’s visits; otherwise, all prior orders to remain.” Nothing
about reasonable services or their provision. The court did refer
at the outset of the hearing to the “last minute [report] reflecting
that reunification services have been provided to mother,” but
that was not really a finding, by clear and convincing evidence,
the Department provided reasonable services designed to address
the issues that led to Gabriel’s removal. When the court made
that statement at the beginning of the hearing, the court was
only summarizing the material it had “read and considered.” The
court never stated it was making a reasonable-services finding
based on that material.
At the contested 12-month permanency hearing the
juvenile court again did not find the Department provided
reasonable reunification services. The court summarized the
materials it had reviewed and invited counsel to argue. Counsel
for Nicole argued the Department had not provided reasonable
services during the period of supervision and asked the court to
continue reunification services for an additional six months. The
court’s ruling was brief: “Well, I, too, would like to reunite this
child with his parents, but mother has made it impossible for me
to do that. As late as less than a month ago, September 25,
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mother tested positive for methamphetamine. On September 17
she tested positive for methamphetamine. . . . We’re 14 months
in this case and mother is still testing positive. I cannot make
the appropriate findings for mother.” After granting Carl Sr.’s
request for additional reunification services, the court stated,
“I’m finding there is no likelihood that she will reunite and I’m
terminating her services today.” The court did not rule the
Department had provided reasonable reunification services. And
that omission is particularly glaring because counsel for Nicole
argued the services the Department had provided were neither
adequate nor reasonable under the circumstances.
The minute orders from the six-month and 12-month
review hearings do not mention “reasonable services.” The
closest they come is the statement: “The Court finds that the
Department of Children and Family Services has complied with
the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the child to
a safe home and to complete any steps necessary to finalize the
permanent placement of the child.” It is unclear whether this
statement was intended to be the required finding, by clear and
convincing evidence, the Department provided reasonable
services designed to address the problems that led to Gabriel’s
removal. But if it was, the minute orders include findings the
juvenile court did not make. We again ask the court (or the clerk)
to cease the practice of entering orders not made at the hearing.
(See In re R.O. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 586, 594 [“[T]he courtroom
clerk embellished the trial judge’s oral ruling with actions the
judge did not take. This practice is wrong. Courtroom clerks
must faithfully reflect in the minutes what actually happened
and nothing more.”] (conc. opn. of Robie, J.); In re T.G. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298, fn. 20 [discouraging the practice of
13
entering “minute orders that include findings that were not made
or, on occasion, are in direct conflict with the statements as
reported in the hearing transcripts”].)
3. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support an
Implied Finding the Department Provided
Reasonable Reunification Services
In the absence of express findings by the juvenile court, we
may imply a finding the Department provided reasonable
reunification services. (See In re Aurora P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1166 [“Where the statute does not
mandate explicit findings, and where substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s order, findings may be implied.”];
see, e.g., Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018
[“sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s implicit finding
that the department provided reasonable reunification
services”].) But we cannot do that here.
Assuming the court determined at the six-month and
12-month review hearings the Department provided reasonable
services because the Department complied with the court’s case
plan, as the Department suggests, substantial evidence did not
support such findings. Regarding the first period of supervision
(before the six-month review hearing), the written case plan the
court issued at disposition was admittedly incorrect. As stated,
in November 2023 the court ordered Nicole to drug test on a
weekly basis and ordered the Department to return to the court if
Nicole missed a test or tested positive for any substances, so that
the court could order Nicole to a drug rehabilitation program.
But the case plan signed by the court—which the Department
used to develop its referrals—stated Nicole needed to
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immediately enroll in a full-drug and alcohol-rehabilitation
program and a 12-step program with a sponsor.
It is true Nicole did not comply with the court’s order to
drug test on a weekly basis during the first six-month period of
supervision. But the record suggests the Department’s referrals
did not match the services prescribed by the (correct) case plan
during that time. In the Department’s report for the six-month
review hearing the social worker said she gave Nicole a copy of
the court’s (incorrect) case plan, a resource guide, and a drug
testing referral in December 2023. But the report also said the
social worker did not learn until May 16, 2024 the court had not
ordered Nicole to complete a full drug rehabilitation program.
Counsel for Nicole advised the court on May 29, 2024 the
Department social worker “didn’t have the proper case plan so
she was not on the proper drug testing sites.” When the court
asked if Nicole was in a drug program, her attorney explained
“she was never ordered to do a drug program, Your Honor. The
case plan was incorrect, that’s why the reports are all incorrect.
You ordered testing and there [were] issues with testing.” Nicole
raised the issue with the social worker on May 30, 2024 and said
“per your consistent errors please fix the drug screening
paperwork and send me a signed case plan and orders from a
judicial officer before I can comply with this information. I have
yet to hear any judge order anything of me nor been given any
paperwork or evidence to support that what you are giving me
now is accurate and correct.” Nicole added: “Please for the love
of God send me these corrected orders signed by a judicial officer
and have the drug screening paperwork corrected . . . .” Counsel
for Nicole raised the issue again at the six-month review hearing
and said “that was the issue in the beginning with why the social
15
worker was not providing mother with the proper referrals
because she had the wrong case plan.” The court did not enter a
corrected case plan until July 17, 2024. Thus, Nicole’s failure to
drug test before July 2024 may have been, at least in part, due to
an error by the court and misdirected referrals by the
Department.
Nicole also had difficulty drug testing due to housing and
transportation instability—areas in which the court ordered the
Department to provide services. The Department’s efforts fell
short. Nicole was evicted from her home in early March 2024. As
a result, from March 2024 to September 2024 Nicole frequently
moved between temporary housing she found outside of Los
Angeles County. Though Nicole lived temporarily in Riverside
County beginning in May 2024 and did not have a working car,
the Department did not refer Nicole to a drug testing site in
Riverside County until September 2024. And the Department
did not attempt to provide Nicole with transportation assistance
outside of Los Angeles County until late September 2024. Again,
Nicole’s failure to comply with the court’s drug testing order may
have been due in part to the Department’s failure to provide
services tailored to her circumstances. In any event, Nicole never
received the services the court said it was ordering: a six month
drug and alcohol rehabilitation program.
It is also true that the Department made significant efforts
to facilitate Nicole’s visitation with Gabriel, that the social
worker spent a substantial amount of time responding to Nicole’s
voluminous written communications, and that Nicole was often
reluctant to cooperate with Department social workers. But the
court’s erroneous case plan guided the family reunification
services the Department provided during the first six-month
16
period of supervision, and the Department failed to provide
transportation assistance and drug testing opportunities in
Riverside County, where Nicole found temporary shelter during
the second period of supervision. Substantial evidence did not
support implied findings the Department provided reasonable
services during the six-month and 12-month review periods.
B. Neither the Court nor the Department Ignored the
Relative Placement Preference
Nicole argues the court and the Department “failed to
comply with sections 309 and 361.3 with respect to the mother’s
request to assess maternal aunt for preferential relative
placement of Gabriel.” There is no evidence, however, anyone
asked the court or the Department to place Gabriel with the
maternal aunt or any relative covered by the statutes.
“At the outset of a dependency case, section 361.3,
subdivision (a), requires [the child protective agency] and the
court to give ‘preferential consideration’ to a relative’s request for
placement, which means ‘the relative seeking placement shall be
the first placement to be considered and investigated.’ [Citation.]
The reason for preferential consideration requires little
explanation. The trauma of removing a child from their home,
and all that is familiar, can be eased by placement with beloved
and recognizable relatives who can provide needed comfort.”
(Amber G. v. Superior Court (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 465, 490.)
Section 309 includes a similar requirement regarding temporary
placement of a child following an emergency detention. (§ 309,
subd. (d).)
Nicole argues she “requested for the maternal aunt to be
evaluated for placement early in the case” and complains the
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juvenile court “committed errors of law in completely ignoring
sections 309 and 361.3 relative placement preference in selecting
foster placement for Gabriel, without regard to mother’s request
for placement assessment with the maternal aunt.” Although
Nicole does not identify the maternal aunt by name in her briefs,
she appears to mean Gabriella C. At the 12-month review
hearing (which Nicole cites) counsel for Nicole stated: “Mother
has also offered relative placement options. She has a sister.
Her name is Gabriella C., . . . who has a place and is willing and
able to have the child placed with her, yet the Department—
I think just this week—had spoken to her for the first time.” As
best we can tell from the Department’s (redacted) delivered-
services log, Nicole gave the social worker Gabriella’s name and
phone number for the first time on September 9, 2024 “for
placement emergency reasons.”
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether the relative
placement preference under section 361.2 applies to Gabriella.
“‘Relative’ means an adult who is related to the child by blood,
adoption, or affinity within the fifth degree of kinship, including
stepparents, stepsiblings, and all relatives whose status is
preceded by the words ‘great,’ ‘great-great,’ or ‘grand,’ or the
spouse of any of these persons, even if the marriage was
terminated by death or dissolution.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(2).) The
Department social worker contacted Gabriella by phone and
identified Gabriella as Nicole’s stepsister, not Nicole’s sister. The
definition of “relative” for purposes of section 361.3 does not
include Gabriella’s relationship to Gabriel (maternal stepaunt?).
Moreover, though Nicole argues she repeatedly asked the
Department to assess the maternal aunt for placement, she cites
nothing in the record to show she made such a request. Nicole
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suggested placement options, but not with Gabriella. For
example, Nicole filled out a relative-information sheet in August
2023 and listed her great-grandmother Dalores A. and family
friend Rose C.; she did not list Gabriella. There is no evidence
Nicole told the Department about Gabriella before September 9,
2024.
In any event, there is no evidence either Nicole or Gabriella
asked the Department or the court to place Gabriel with
Gabriella. And when the social worker spoke to Gabriella a few
weeks before the 12-month review hearing, Gabriella said she
was not ready to care for Gabriel. She stated: “‘Yes, I am willing
to take Gabriel in. Nicole and I have been discussing this for
some time. However, I only have a one-bedroom apartment, and
I am in the process of upgrading to a two-bedroom.’” The social
worker obtained Gabriella’s email address and sent her a
resource family application, but there is no other information in
the record. And as stated, counsel for Nicole mentioned Gabriella
at the 12-month hearing, but she did not ask the court to change
Gabriel’s placement.
C. The Juvenile Court Must Determine Whether the
Department Conducted an Adequate Further Inquiry
Under ICWA and Related California Law
Finally, Nicole argues “the juvenile court and the
Department failed to comply with the inquiry and notice
requirements of the ICWA and related California law.” Nicole is
correct.
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1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers
of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128; accord, In re Ja.O.
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 277; In re C.R. (2025)112 Cal.App.5th 793,
799.) “[W]hether ICWA applies in dependency proceedings turns
on whether the minor is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., at p. 1129; see
In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1098 [“The protective
provisions of ICWA turn on a determination of whether a minor
is an ‘Indian child’ as defined by statute.”].) ICWA and California
law define an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b).)
“Agencies and juvenile courts have ‘an affirmative and
continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine
whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be
an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-
1132; see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 277.) “This continuing duty can be divided into three phases:
the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the
duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re C.R., supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 799; see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
558, 566.) The Department’s duty to inquire begins with the
initial contact “including, but not limited to, asking the party
20
reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any
information that the child may be an Indian child, and upon a
county department’s first contact with the child or the child’s
family, including extended family members . . . .” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(1); see Dezi C., at p. 1132; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(1).)2
When the court or child protective agency has reason to
believe an Indian child is involved, the law requires further
inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).)
Further inquiry includes interviewing the parents and extended
family members, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
2 Effective September 27, 2024, the Legislature amended
section 224.2 to clarify the juvenile court’s role. “For a court
presiding over any juvenile proceeding that could result in
placement of an Indian child with someone other than a parent or
Indian custodian, including proceedings where the parents or
Indian custodian have voluntarily consented to placement of the
child, the duty to inquire begins at the first hearing on a petition.
At the commencement of the hearing, the court shall ask each
party to the proceeding and all other interested persons present
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, whether they
know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian child,
and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian are
domiciled, as defined in Section 224.1. Inquiry shall also be made
at the first appearance in court of each party or interested person
who was not present at the first hearing on the petition. The
inquiry and responses shall occur on the record. The court shall
instruct the parties and persons present to inform the court if
they subsequently receive information that provides reason to
know the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
This provision was in effect for the 12-month review hearing.
21
State Department of Social Services, and contacting tribes the
child may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility for
membership in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C); see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) At this stage, contact with a
tribe “shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or
electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt
of [ICWA] notices” and “sharing information identified by the
tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or
eligibility determination, as well as information on the current
status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C); see
In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1132-1133.)
The juvenile court must then determine whether there is
reason to know the child is an Indian child and whether ICWA
applies to the proceedings. If the facts discovered during the
initial and further inquiry give the court “reason to know that the
child is an Indian child, the court shall treat the child as an
Indian child,” unless and until further information establishes
the child is not an Indian child, and shall order compliance with
ICWA, including formal notice to relevant tribes. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(B).) If, on the
other hand, “the court makes a finding that proper and adequate
further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been conducted and
there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,
the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not apply to the
proceedings . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A); see In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1134 [juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply if it finds
the agency’s “inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and
adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no reason to know
22
the child is an Indian child”]; In re C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th
at p. 800 [same].) The “juvenile court errs in making a finding
ICWA does not apply to the proceedings without first ensuring
that the Department has made an adequate inquiry under ICWA
and California law, and if necessary, the court must continue the
proceedings and order the Department to fulfill its
responsibilities.” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421,
431.)
2. Additional Facts Regarding the Department’s
Investigation
In its section 300 petition the Department indicated the
social worker asked Nicole and Carl Sr. about Indian ancestry
and that, based on her inquiry, she had “reason to believe the
child [Gabriel] is or may be an Indian child” because his “parents,
grandparents, or great-grandparents are or were members of a
tribe.” The parents identified “Yaqui, Sioux, [and] Suri” as the
possible tribes.
The detention report stated ICWA “does or may apply.”
During interviews with the social worker, Nicole said that “her
family was Yaqui, Suri, and Sioux Indian,” that “the maternal
great grandfather Gabriel A. is Yaqui and Suri,” and that “the
maternal great grandmother Geraldine V. is Sioux.” The social
worker interviewed Carl Sr. and the maternal grandmother
Susan V., both of whom denied Indian ancestry.
Both parents completed ICWA-020 forms. Carl Sr. denied
Indian ancestry. Nicole said she was a member of, or might be
eligible for membership in, a federally recognized tribe because
one or more of her parents, grandparents, or other lineal
ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized tribe. She
23
identified the tribes as the “Suri and Yakee Apachee” tribes in
Arizona.
At the initial hearing on August 29, 2023 the court asked
counsel for Nicole if she had any additional information
regarding her family’s tribal affiliation. Counsel said that
Nicole’s mother might have additional relevant information and
that Nicole’s father had died. The court directed the Department
to interview the maternal grandmother to get more information
and subsequently found “it’s not an Indian case, as to mother, as
I have no reason to know.”
The jurisdiction and disposition report contained no new
information regarding the Department’s ICWA inquiry. On
November 29, 2023 the juvenile court held the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. Counsel for Nicole told the court that the
Department social worker interviewed the maternal grandmother
and that, though the maternal grandmother initially denied any
Indian ancestry, “she’s reporting Dakota, maybe that’s Lakota.
I’m not sure.” The court directed the Department to submit a
progress report to “address the [Department’s] efforts in
investigating whether ICWA applies or does not apply in this
case” and set a progress hearing for February 28, 2024.
In a February 27, 2024 last minute information report the
Department summarized its further ICWA investigation. Nicole
referred the social worker to her uncle, Randy A. He said that
“‘my great, great, great grandfather married a Seri Indian, but it
is such a little amount of Indian within the family,’” and that
“‘my father was part of Boys Scout organization Choctaw
Indian.’” The maternal grandmother told the social worker, “‘my
maternal grandmother and [her] twin were found in a basket by
grandma G. who adopted them in 1800’s in South Dakota, but
24
don’t know the tribe.’” Carl Sr., who initially denied any Indian
ancestry, told the social worker that his paternal grandmother
had Indian ancestry. The Department interviewed her and she
said she had “‘always been told Cherokee and Blackfoot Indian,
but never had any proof.’” The Department social worker told the
court that she was “currently investigating all of the Indian
tribes of affiliation that . . . each individual reported.” The court
did not address ICWA at the (extremely brief) progress hearing
on February 28, 2024.
In the Department’s report for the six-month review
hearing the social worker said that on February 29, 2024 she
“sent first class mail to 54 Indian tribes.” The report listed the
tribes, their points of contact, and their mailing addresses. The
report did not specify the information the social worker provided
to the tribes, and there is no copy of the correspondence in the
record. The social worker said that 33 tribes responded to the
Department and that each tribe determined Gabriel was neither
registered with nor eligible for enrollment in the tribe. The
report attached copies of certified mail receipts and the response
letters from the tribes.3 The court did not address ICWA at the
six-month review hearing.
The Department’s report for the 12-month review hearing
repeated the information in the report for the six-month review
3 The record does not include a copy of the notice. The record
does include one of the response letters, which attached a copy of
the first page of a form notice (ICWA-030) the Department
apparently sent to the tribe. The court did not find it had reason
to know Gabriel is an Indian child, nor did the court order the
Department to provide formal notice of the proceedings to any
tribes.
25
hearing regarding its ICWA investigation. During the
intervening period of supervision, one additional tribe responded
to the Department’s inquiry and that tribe, like the others,
determined Gabriel was not registered with, or eligible for
membership in, the tribe. The court did not address ICWA at the
12-month review hearing.
3. The Court Failed To Comply with Its Duties
Under ICWA and Related California Law
Nicole argues the Department did not conduct an adequate
inquiry and failed to provide adequate notice to the tribes it
identified. She also argues the juvenile court erred in “finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to gather familial
history from available relatives, and that . . . ICWA did not apply
to Gabriel, because the Department did not report the linear
information on its ICWA-030 Notice to the tribes, as apparent
from the response letters received.” Though Nicole is wrong
about what the court did, she is correct the court erred.
As discussed, at the outset of the proceedings the
Department had reason to believe Gabriel was an Indian child
because Nicole (and later Carl Sr.) claimed Indian ancestry. The
court ordered, and the Department conducted, a further inquiry.
So far, so good. The problem is that the court did not decide
whether it had reason to know Gabriel was an Indian child after
the Department conducted its further inquiry. The court was
required to “review . . . the evidence of due diligence, further
inquiry, and tribal contacts” and determine whether “the agency
or other party has fulfilled its duty of due diligence, further
inquiry, and tribal contacts . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(b)(3).) If the court found the Department’s
26
investigation was adequate, the court had to decide whether it
had reason to know Gabriel was an Indian child. (Ibid.) The
court did not make any of those findings.
True, each of the tribes that responded to the Department
said Gabriel was not enrolled or eligible for membership in the
tribe—evidence that could support a finding there is no reason to
know Gabriel is an Indian child. But Nicole argues the
Department’s inquiry was insufficient because, according to
Nicole, the social worker did not provide the tribes with all the
relevant information she obtained from the family members she
interviewed. That argument goes too far. We do not know what
information the Department sent to the tribes. The
Department’s reports do not say what information the social
worker shared with the tribes, and the record does not include
copies of the Department’s correspondence with the tribes. And
because the juvenile court failed to review or evaluate the
Department’s investigatory efforts, the court never learned what
information the Department relayed to the tribes. The
Department might have done everything right. But on this
record, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could
have (expressly or impliedly) found the Department fulfilled its
duty of further inquiry under ICWA and related California law.
27
DISPOSITION
The July 17, 2024 and October 9, 2024 findings the
Department provided reasonable reunification services to Nicole
during the relevant periods of supervision are reversed. The
juvenile court is directed to order a minimum of six months of
additional reunification services for Nicole and to make findings,
on the record, whether the Department conducted an adequate
inquiry under ICWA and related California law.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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