People v. Jones CA2/3

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Filed 10/8/25 P. v. Jones CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B332666

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA107031)
v.

JASON JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rene C. Gilbertson, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kim Aarons and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Appellant Jason Jones appeals from the judgment after a
jury found him guilty of robbery. He contends the trial court
reversibly erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offenses of grand theft and petty theft. We affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2022, Jones and another man attacked Erick
Palacios as he was leaving a liquor store in Gardena. Palacios
did not know Jones or the other assailant, and neither spoke to
him before or after the attack.
Surveillance footage from the liquor store showed Jones
and the other assailant approached Palacios on the sidewalk
outside the liquor store, pushed him against a wall, and began to
hit him.1 After a few seconds, Jones and the other assailant
moved away from Palacios and outside the camera’s frame.
Palacios can be seen leaning over with a hand to his face and
blood dripping near his feet. Jones and the other man returned
and appeared to begin attacking Palacios again for a few seconds.
The other man then bent down and picked something up from the
ground behind Jones before walking out of frame. Palacios
testified that he did not see what the man picked up off the

1 A deputy who responded to the scene recorded footage of
the incident from the liquor store’s security camera onto his
partner’s phone. The recording is 34 seconds long and was
played for the jury at trial. Due to the angle of the video, the
upper bodies of the assailants are not visible during the incident,
and it is unclear who threw the punches. At trial, Jones was
identified as the individual wearing yellow shoes next to Palacios
during the incident.

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ground. Jones remained facing Palacios for a few seconds before
leaving the scene.
After the incident, Palacios noticed that his keys and wallet
were still in his pocket, but his cell phone was missing. He did
not feel his phone fall out of his pocket or feel someone remove it
during the assault.
Police were called. They arrived within minutes. A deputy
observed a group of three to four men, including Jones, walking
away from the liquor store. Deputies detained Jones and
conducted a pat-down search. They found Palacios’s phone in
Jones’s pocket.
In 2023, the People charged Jones with second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4);
count 2).
The case proceeded to a jury trial. During a colloquy
outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel requested
instructions on two lesser included offenses of robbery: petty theft
(CALCRIM No. 1800) and grand theft (CALCRIM No. 1801).
Counsel argued that because it was unclear when, how, and by
whom Palacios’s phone was taken, there was a basis for the jury
to decide Jones did not form the intent to steal the phone until
after the assault and that he therefore acted with the requisite
intent for theft, but not robbery. The court observed there was no
evidence about the value of the phone that would allow the jury
to distinguish between grand theft or petty theft. The prosecutor
agreed and added that the theft offenses still required the jury to
find that Jones intended to deprive Palacios of his phone
permanently at the time he took it. The prosecutor argued that if
the jury did not find “the required intent at the required time, it

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doesn’t create the lesser. It creates a not guilty verdict overall, so
. . . the issue here is not a lesser-included offense.” The court
denied the defense’s request for instructions on the lesser
included theft offenses.
The court instructed the jury that both crimes charged
required “proof of the union or joint operation of act and wrongful
intent.” The court further instructed that the jury could convict
Jones of robbery only if it found that Jones intended to take
property “before or during the time he used force or fear,” and
that “[i]f the defendant did not form this required intent until
after using the force or fear, then he did not commit robbery.”
(CALCRIM No. 1600.) The court also instructed the jury that it
could not convict Jones solely on the basis that he possessed
stolen property, and could “consider how, where, and when the
defendant possessed the property, along with any other relevant
circumstances tending to prove his guilt of robbery.” (CALCRIM
No. 376.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Jones
“used force or fear to take the property or to prevent [Palacios]
from resisting.” He asserted the evidence established that Jones
“hit Mr. Palacios at least three times . . . to prevent Mr. Palacios
from resisting as they [took]the phone.” Alternatively, the
prosecutor argued that even if the jury did not conclude Jones
threw the punches or took the phone from Palacios’s pocket, it
could still convict Jones as an aider and abettor of robbery
because the evidence proved he was “an active participant” in the
robbery and formed the intent to steal “before any of this
happened.” The prosecutor argued: “When [Jones] used the force
or fear he intended to deprive [Mr. Palacios] of the property
permanently. . . . [O]nce he and the unnamed other person . . .

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[took] the phone, they used force and fear to prevent Mr. Palacios
from resisting.”
In the defense’s closing argument, counsel argued the
evidence did not support a finding that Jones had the requisite
specific intent for robbery. Counsel contended the evidence did
not show “when [the phone] was taken, by whom this item was
taken and how it wound up with Mr. Jones.” She also argued
there was no evidence to support the conclusion that an intent to
steal Palacios’s property motivated the assault, citing the
evidence that neither Jones nor the assailant demanded
Palacios’s property before or during the assault and Palacios still
had his wallet and keys after the assault.
The jury convicted Jones of second degree robbery and
assault. The trial court sentenced Jones to the midterm of three
years for robbery and the midterm of three years for assault. The
court stayed the sentence on the assault count under Penal Code
section 654. Jones timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Theft is a lesser and necessarily included offense in
robbery; robbery has the additional element of a taking by force
or fear.” (People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351
(Ramkeesoon).) “To support a robbery conviction, the evidence
must show that the requisite intent to steal arose either before or
during the commission of the act of force.” (People v. Marshall
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) “If intent to steal arose after the victim
was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is
absent.” (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443.)
“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have his
or her jury determine ‘every material issue presented by the

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evidence’ and this includes the right, where appropriate, to have
the jury instructed on lesser included offenses.” (People v. Abilez
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 513.) “[I]f a crime cannot be committed
without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is
a lesser included offense within the former.” (People v. Lopez
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.)
“ ‘An instruction on a lesser included offense must be given
only if there is substantial evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the lesser,
uncharged offense, but not the greater, charged offense.’
[Citation.] The ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied
by “ ‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’ ” but rather by
evidence from which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser
offense, but not the greater, was committed.” ’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538 (Nelson).) “Although
instruction on a lesser included offense ‘is not required when the
evidence supporting such an instruction is weak’ [citation] or
based on speculation [citation], it is required when the lesser
included offense is supported by ‘ “evidence that a reasonable jury
could find persuasive” ’ [citation].” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11
Cal.5th 332, 345.)
“ ‘On appeal, we review independently the question
whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct on a lesser
included offense.’ [Citation.]” (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 538.) “[I]n doing so we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant.” (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)

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II. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err By Failing
to Instruct on the Lesser Included Theft Offenses
A. There was no substantial evidence from which
the jury could conclude Jones committed theft
and not robbery
Substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that
Jones formed the intent to steal only after the assault. The
evidence adduced at trial showed that Jones, who had no prior
relationship or interaction with Palacios, assaulted him and was
found minutes later with Palacios’s phone in his pocket. No
evidence supported the conclusion that Jones assaulted Palacios
for a reason other than to steal from him.
Jones argues on appeal that a reasonable jury could have
concluded that he did not have the intent to steal from Palacios
before or during the assault, based on the evidence that neither
Jones nor the other assailant spoke to Palacios before the assault,
they did not take his wallet and keys, Palacios did not feel
anyone remove his phone from his pocket, and Jones did not
immediately leave after the incident.2 We disagree.
None of the evidence Jones cites suggests that he had a
reason to attack Palacios other than to facilitate the theft. “Mere
speculation” that Jones may have assaulted Palacios “out of some
other, spontaneous and violent impulse is not sufficient to
warrant the instruction.” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386,
409; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 361 [no error in
failing to instruct on theft as lesser included offense where

2 To the extent Jones contends that the People “failed to
establish” that he formed the necessary intent for robbery, this
argument fails. Jones has not challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his robbery conviction on appeal.

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defendant relied on “sheer speculation” that he did not think to
take victims’ property until after he killed them].) The evidence
Jones cites creates a purely speculative inference that Jones
assaulted Palacios for some unspecified reason other than to steal
from him, thus falling short of the substantial evidence required
to justify instructions on theft. (Zamudio, at p. 361; People v.
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 [“Speculative, minimal, or
insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on
a lesser included offense.”].)
The legal authorities Jones cites are distinguishable on this
basis. In each case, a reviewing court found an instruction on
theft as a lesser included offense of robbery was necessary
because the evidence showed the defendant used force or fear for
reasons other than theft, and the defendant affirmatively
indicated that he formed the intent to steal only after the fact.
(See People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1056 [defendant’s
statements to detective that he killed victim to eliminate her as
witness to sexual assault substantially supported that his taking
of her property “was not the primary motivating factor for the
murder”]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 529–530
[defendant’s statements to police that he took victim’s rings from
trash can after raping and murdering her was substantial
evidence warranting lesser included theft instruction];
Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 351, 349–350 [defendant’s
testimony that he stabbed victim to escape aggressive sexual
advances and decided to take victim’s property afterward “was
credible enough to have supported a verdict of theft instead of
robbery”].)

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Here, in contrast, “[t]here was nothing more than sheer
speculation to support the scenario now advanced by [Jones] that
the idea of taking [Palacios’s] property did not arise until after”
the assault. (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 277.) There
was no substantial evidence to support a finding that Jones
assaulted Palacios for a reason other than to steal his property.
The trial court therefore had no duty to instruct on a lesser
included theft offense.
B. Any instructional error was harmless
Moreover, even if substantial evidence supported a lesser
included offense instruction on theft, the trial court’s failure to
give the instruction did not result in prejudice.
A trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included
offense generally is prejudicial only if there is a reasonable
chance the jury would have returned a different verdict absent
the error. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 867–868,
citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) If “it can be
determined that the factual question posed by the omitted
instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant
under other, properly given instructions,” reversal is not required
even if the trial court erred in failing to give the instruction.
(Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 352.)
Here, it is not reasonably probable that, had the court
instructed the jury on theft, Jones would have obtained a more
favorable result. The record demonstrates that the jury
necessarily concluded Jones formed the intent to steal before or
during the assault.
The jury was instructed that it could convict Jones of
robbery only if it determined he formed the intent to steal before
or during his assault of Palacios. CALCRIM No. 1600 made clear

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that the jury could not convict Jones of robbery without finding
he had the specific intent to steal before or during his application
of force or fear. Counsels’ closing arguments reiterated this
point. The People specifically stated that when Jones used force
or fear against Palacios, either directly or as an aider and
abettor, he intended to permanently deprive Palacios of his
phone. The defense argued that the People had not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones acted with the requisite
specific intent for robbery because no evidence indicated when
Palacios’s phone was taken or by whom, and no evidence reflected
that the assailants intended to rob Palacios at the time of the
assault. That the jury convicted Jones of robbery in light of the
explicit instructions and argument about the concurrence of his
intent to steal and the assault establishes the jurors determined
Jones formed the intent to steal before or contemporaneous with
the assault. (Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 351–352.) Any
erroneous failure to instruct on the lesser included theft offenses
was not prejudicial.
Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d 346, does not compel a
different result. In that case, the trial court instructed the jury
on robbery using CALJIC No. 9.10. (Ramkeesoon, at p. 353.) The
instruction did not require the jury to specifically find that the
defendant formed the intent to steal before or during the
application of force or fear to convict the defendant of robbery.3
The California Supreme Court found the trial court’s failure to

3 CALJIC No. 9.10 was later renumbered to CALJIC
No. 9.40. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 359.) The
instruction provides, in relevant part, that the jury must find the
defendant’s taking of the property of another was “accomplished”
using force or fear.

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instruct on the lesser included offenses of larceny and theft was
reversible error. (Id. at p. 351.) After concluding there was
substantial evidence warranting a theft instruction, the court
further held that the omission was prejudicial because “the jury
was never presented with the factual question posed by the
omitted theft instructions,” specifically, “whether the intent to
steal was formulated after defendant had inflicted the fatal blows
. . . .” (Id. at p. 352.) Instruction on the lesser included offense
was therefore necessary to mitigate “ ‘the substantial risk’ ” that,
“ ‘[w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains in
doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury
is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.’ ” (Id. at
p. 351, quoting Keeble v. United States (1973) 412 U.S. 205, 212.)
In contrast, in People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668
(Turner), the defendant stabbed and killed the victim, then
absconded with the victim’s property. (Id. at pp. 683–685.) The
defendant testified that he was provoked by the victim’s “sudden,
violent sexual advances,” and that he had not intended to take
the victim’s car and television until after the fatal stabbing. (Id.
at p. 682; see id. pp. 683–685.) The jury convicted the defendant
of robbery and murder, and found true the special circumstance
that the murder was committed in the commission of a robbery.
(Id. at p. 679.)
Although our high court concluded the trial court erred by
failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of theft, it found
no prejudice. (Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 690–691.) The
court observed that, in contrast to Ramkeesoon, “the special
instructions in this case did require the jury to confront and
decide the issue of ‘after-formed intent.’ The jurors were told
emphatically not to convict [the] defendant of robbery or first

11
degree felony murder, or to find the robbery-murder special
circumstance true, if they believed it reasonably possible that he
killed for reasons unrelated to theft and stole only as an
incidental afterthought. We cannot lightly assume the jury
disobeyed such clear instructions on so many separate occasions.”
(Id. at pp. 692–693.)
As in Turner, the jury here was presented with the factual
question of when Jones formulated his intent on several
“separate occasions.” (Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 693.) The
trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1600, which
specified that the jury could only find Jones guilty of robbery if it
determined he formed the intent to steal before or during the
assault, and that Jones was not guilty of robbery if he formed the
intent only after the use of force or fear. (People v. Anderson
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 999 [CALCRIM No. 1600 “explains the act
and the intent elements of the offense and that the act must have
been motivated by the requisite intent: the intent to steal”].) In
closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel
emphasized that the jury could convict Jones of robbery only if it
concluded he intended to steal at the time he assaulted Palacios.
The jury verdict reflected the resolution of this question, stating
that the jury found Jones took Palacios’s property “by means of
force and fear.”
The jury necessarily rejected the theory that Jones did not
form the intent to steal until after the attack on Palacios took
place. As in Turner, “there appears no chance the jury was
misled by an ‘all or nothing choice’ on the robbery/theft issue.”
(Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 692.) It was not reasonably
probable that the jury would have found Jones not guilty of

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robbery, and guilty of theft, had the trial court instructed on the
lesser included offenses of grand or petty theft.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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