CourtListener 10692100•In re J.O. CA3
Texto completo
Filed 10/7/25 In re J.O. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
In re J.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C101505
Law.
THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No. JD20203)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
This appeal concerns a juvenile court transfer hearing under subdivision (a) of
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1 In January 2020, when J.O. was 16 years
old, he was involved in a drug-deal where an accomplice shot and killed the victim
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1
during a robbery. A juvenile wardship petition (§ 602) was filed charging J.O. with
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), attempted murder (id., §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and
second degree robbery (id., §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). The wardship petition also alleged
a robbery-murder special circumstance. (Id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) In November
2020, the juvenile court granted the People’s motion to transfer the matter to adult
criminal court. Following a preliminary hearing and the passage of Assembly Bill No.
2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 2361), which modified the evidentiary
standard that applies at juvenile court transfer hearings, a second transfer hearing was
held in 2024. Applying the new evidentiary standard, the juvenile court found that it was
proper to transfer the matter to adult criminal court.
J.O. appeals, contending substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
transfer order and that the court prejudicially erred by allowing an unqualified probation
officer to testify as an expert witness on certain subjects. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Factual Background
We briefly summarize the relevant facts.2 Additional information related to the
claims raised on appeal is set forth as necessary in the Discussion, post.
At all relevant times, J.O. was on probation for committing a battery with serious
bodily injury when he was 14 years old. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).) As a condition of
his probation, J.O. was required to wear a Global Position System (GPS) ankle monitor,
which tracked his location 24 hours a day. On December 31, 2019, when J.O. was 16
years old, he sent a friend request on Snapchat to Samantha Farris, a minor female he did
2 Before the commencement of the second transfer hearing, the parties stipulated that the
evidence submitted at the first transfer hearing could be deemed “received” at the second
hearing. The juvenile court also granted the defense’s request to take judicial notice of
the transcript from the January 2022 preliminary hearing.
2
not know. After they exchanged a few messages and photographs, J.O. indicated that he
wanted to buy some marijuana. Samantha agreed to sell J.O. two ounces of marijuana for
$280, an amount she believed to be significantly more than the actual price for such a
quantity of marijuana. J.O. arranged for the transaction to occur at the “dead end” of
Benton Place, a residential area of West Sacramento near a pedestrian trail/path.
Several days later, on January 4, 2020, J.O. and two other minors--M.A. (female)
and M.F. (male)--went to a gas station in M.A.’s car around 7:00 p.m. M.F., who was
J.O.’s best friend, had a backpack. Video recordings showed J.O. using his hand at the
gas station to mimic the firing of a gun multiple times.
After the group left the gas station, J.O. told M.A. about the drug deal. J.O. and
M.F. talked about “ripping off” a female. At around 7:20 p.m., J.O. and M.F. left M.A.’s
car at a nearby high school and walked towards Benton Place. It was dark and foggy.
Meanwhile, Samantha and two other minor females (S.S. and S.K.) drove to
Benton Place to complete the drug deal. When they arrived, J.O. approached Samantha,
who was sitting in the front passenger seat of S.K.’s car. After Samantha gave J.O. both
ounces of marijuana, he handed her $15 and then ran toward the high school; Samantha
and S.S. ran after him.
During the pursuit, S.S. saw J.O. and M.F. running together along the pedestrian
trail. Shortly thereafter, M.F. fired seven gunshots. One of the bullets struck Samantha.
J.O. did not call for help, but instead ran away from the area with M.F. Samantha died at
the scene from a single gunshot wound to the lower back.
When J.O. and M.F. returned to M.A.’s car, M.F. was holding a gun and carrying
his backpack. M.A. drove M.F. to a friend’s house. When M.F. got out of the car, he
took his backpack with him.
Less than two hours after the shooting, the police went to the residence where
M.F. had been dropped off. A search of the backpack with M.F.’s name on it revealed
the weapon used in the shooting--a semiautomatic black “AR-15 style firearm pistol”
3
with a 30-round magazine. During the police investigation into the shooting, there was
no evidence indicating that the victim or the other minor females were armed with a gun
or other weapon. The data from J.O.’s ankle monitor revealed that he had been in the
area near Benton Place at the time of the shooting and on two other occasions just days
before the shooting. The data also indicated that J.O. cut his ankle bracelet off less than
two hours after the shooting.
A search of J.O.’s and M.F.’s Snapchat accounts revealed content (images, video
recordings, and messages) indicating that, around the time of the shooting, J.O. possessed
and sold firearms, marijuana, and other substances, including pills. There was also
content suggesting that J.O. had participated in other robberies.
Procedural Background
On November 8, 2016, the voters of California approved Proposition 57, the
Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). It went into effect the
next day and applies to all juveniles charged directly in adult criminal court whose
judgment was not final at the time it was enacted. (People v. Superior Court (Lara)
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303-304.) As relevant here, Proposition 57 eliminated the People’s
ability to initiate criminal cases against juvenile offenders anywhere but in juvenile court.
Instead, it requires the People to commence such actions in juvenile court. If the People
wish to try a juvenile as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct a “transfer hearing” to
determine whether the matter should remain in juvenile court or be transferred to adult
criminal court. During the transfer hearing, the court considers factors such as the
minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether
the minor can be rehabilitated. Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult
criminal court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult. Proposition 57 also
removed the presumption of unfitness to be tried as a juvenile that previously attached to
the alleged commission of certain offenses. (See People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th
152, 159-160, 166; Lara, at pp. 303, 305.)
4
In September 2017, when J.O. was 14 years old, he was arrested after he and two
others physically attacked a minor and stole his cell phone. The victim suffered head
injuries and lost consciousness. A few weeks later, J.O. admitted to committing a battery
involving serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)), was declared a ward of the
juvenile court, and placed on probation. Thereafter, J.O. participated in Multi-Systemic
Therapy (MST) and family therapy, but was discharged from the MST program in May
2018 due to a violation of the conditions of his probation. As a result, J.O. was placed in
the Juvenile Justice Diversion and Treatment Program [(JJDTP)] and “worked with a
team of support persons” that included various services (e.g., family therapy, anger
management, substance abuse treatment).
From September 2017 to December 2019, J.O. was incarcerated multiple times
and “incurred 11 incident reports for non-compliant behaviors,” including fighting with
another inmate and “aggression towards staff.”
In January 2020, after Samantha was killed, the instant juvenile wardship petition
(§ 602) was filed charging J.O. with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), attempted
murder (id., §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and second degree robbery (id., §§ 211, 212.5, subd.
(c)). The wardship petition also alleged a robbery-murder special circumstance (id.,
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and firearm enhancements (id., § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). On the day
the wardship petition was filed, the People moved to transfer the matter from juvenile
court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
From January 2020 to August 2020, J.O. “incurred over 20 incident reports” while
incarcerated in connection with this case, including reports for “defiance, failure to
follow staff directives, manipulation of staff, threatening to assault staff, [and] assault on
another minor.”
In November 2020, after a hearing, the juvenile court issued an order transferring
the matter to adult criminal court. The court found that all five of the relevant (statutory)
criteria weighed in favor of transfer. At that time, section 707 only required the People
5
“to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘the minor should be transferred to
a court of criminal jurisdiction.’ ” (In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284 (S.S.)
[describing prior law], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re J.M.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745; see former § 707, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018,
ch. 1012, § 1.)
From November 2020 to January 2022, J.O. incurred numerous incident reports
for various misconduct while incarcerated, including misuse of a computer/Internet for
non-school purposes and defiant and disrespectful behavior toward staff. In January
2022, after a preliminary hearing, J.O. was held to answer the charges and enhancements
alleged in the wardship petition. From January 2022 to November 2022, J.O. incurred
various incident reports for misconduct, including using a computer for non-school
purposes and failing to follow staff directives.
In November 2022, the defense filed a motion to remand the matter to the juvenile
court to conduct a new transfer hearing in light of the change in law effected by
Assembly Bill No. 2361. As discussed more fully post, Proposition 57 was amended
several times after the juvenile court issued its first transfer order in 2020. (See, e.g.,
Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1, Assembly Bill No. 2361.) Of particular relevance here,
Assembly Bill No. 2361 raised the People’s burden of proof on a transfer motion and
made clear that the analysis of the five criteria set forth in section 707 should be focused
through the lens of the minor’s “amenability to rehabilitation.” Effective January 1,
2023, a minor cannot be transferred to adult court unless the juvenile court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under its
jurisdiction. (Assembly Bill No. 2361; see § 707, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)3
3 As a decision from this court recently explained: “Under prior versions of [section
707], courts determined whether minors were ‘fit and proper subject[s] to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law’ and considered ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘amenability to care,
6
In February 2023, after the superior court denied the defense’s request for an order
remanding the matter to the juvenile court for a second transfer hearing, we issued an
order granting such relief in response to a writ petition.
In July 2024, after a hearing that spanned multiple days, the juvenile court issued a
detailed written order again transferring the matter to adult criminal court. The court
found by clear and convincing evidence that J.O. was not amenable to rehabilitation
while under its jurisdiction.
J.O. filed a timely notice of appeal. The matter was assigned to this panel in July
2025 and fully briefed in August 2025.
DISCUSSION
I
Transfer Order
J.O. first argues reversal is required because substantial evidence does not support
the juvenile court’s transfer order, including the court’s ultimate finding that he was not
amenable to rehabilitation while under its jurisdiction. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring an individual who committed
a crime as a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction (or adult
criminal court). “It provides that whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to
have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move ‘to transfer the minor from juvenile
treatment, and training’ as part of the analysis. [Citations.] After Proposition 57
removed the language regarding both fitness and amenability, some courts that had
referred to section 707 hearings as ‘fitness hearings’ began referring to ‘transfer
hearings.’ [Citations.] Now that section 707 makes ‘amenab[ility] to rehabilitation’ the
ultimate determination, juvenile courts would be better served referring to ‘amenability
hearings.’ ” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1288.) In this opinion, we refer to the
relevant hearing as a juvenile court transfer hearing to be consistent with the record,
although we agree that such hearings are more accurately characterized as “amenability
hearings.”
7
court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’ ” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152,
164 (Miguel R.), citing § 707, subd. (a)(1).) The motion must be made prior to the
attachment of jeopardy. After the motion is filed, the probation department prepares “a
report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).)
“The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024. Effective January 1,
2023, Assembly Bill [No.] 2361 amended section 707[, subdivision] (a)(3) by adding the
following italicized language: ‘Following submission and consideration of the report,
and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit,
the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In
making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to
(E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis
for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons
supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p.
164; see S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1294 [explaining that the “recite the basis for its
decision” requirement means the juvenile court “should ‘explicitly “articulate its
evaluative process” by detailing “how it weighed the evidence” and by “identify[ing] the
specific facts which persuaded the court” to reach its decision’ whether to transfer minor
to a court of criminal jurisdiction”]; ibid. [noting that the juvenile court’s articulation of
its evaluative process, like its analysis, “should focus on minor’s amenability to
rehabilitation”].)
Accordingly, Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended the procedure for transferring a
case to adult criminal court in three ways: (1) it raised the People’s burden of proof to
clear and convincing evidence, (2) it made amenability to rehabilitation while under
8
jurisdiction of the juvenile court “the ultimate question for the court to decide,” and (3) it
required the juvenile court to state the reasons supporting a finding that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation. (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.)
The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 707,
subdivision (a)(3) were not amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361. (See Stats. 2022, ch.
330, § 1.) Those criteria are: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
minor”; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”; (4)
“[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”; and (5)
“[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been
committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) The statute sets forth a
nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the court to consider with respect to each of the
five criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) These criteria
“are based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the offense.” (People v.
Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682 (Jones); Kevin P. v. Superior Court
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189 (Kevin P.).) The ultimate determination of whether “the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)) is not the same as the second criterion, which calls for consideration
of “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction” (id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)). (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
“Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill [No.] 545 [(2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)]
amended section 707 to require that with respect to each of th[e] five criteria the juvenile
court ‘shall give weight to any relevant factor,’ including the specific factors listed as
relevant to each criterion. [Citation.] The previous version of the statute made
consideration of those factors discretionary, not mandatory.” (Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164-165.) Senate Bill No. 545 further amended section 707 to
specify additional factors that must be considered in determining whether the People have
9
carried their burden of proof to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court. (See § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A).) Specifically, Senate Bill No. 545 amended the factors the court must
weigh in evaluating a minor’s criminal sophistication to include “the existence of
childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and
the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) It also amended the factors the court must weigh in evaluating
the circumstances and gravity of the offense to include “evidence offered that indicates
that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked,
sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(E)(iii).)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of section
707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] In
conducting a substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of
the court’s findings.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
“Likewise, we review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding
‘that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.’ [Citation.] Because the juvenile court must make that finding by clear
and convincing evidence, we ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
high probability demanded by’ the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
10
“ ‘The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence demands a
degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less
than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]
‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability.’ [Citations.]
Courts have also described the standard ‘as requiring that the evidence be “ ‘so clear as to
leave no substantial doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of
every reasonable mind.’ ” ’ ” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)
B. Analysis
We are unpersuaded by J.O.’s contention that the juvenile court’s transfer order is
not supported by substantial evidence. As noted ante, in deciding whether transfer was
proper, the court was required to evaluate the five criteria set forth in subdivision (a) of
section 707. Applying these factors, the ultimate question was whether the People
demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that J.O. was “not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3);
Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The weight to be given each of the five
criteria is within the juvenile court’s discretion. (D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 441, 445 (D.C.); see In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417 [the court
has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to
determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a
different result].)
Next, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the findings in the
juvenile court’s transfer order, which was issued after the court heard testimony from a
number of witnesses (e.g., mental health experts, probation officers, police officers) and
considered various other materials submitted by the parties and the probation department
11
(e.g., juvenile court transfer hearing report, mental health expert reports).4 In making this
determination, we accept all evidence that supports the successful party and draw all
reasonable inferences to uphold the challenged order. (Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.
Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213.) “It is not our role to reweigh the
evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it.” (Ibid.)
In applying the substantial evidence standard, we do not review the evidence to determine
if there is substantial evidence to support J.O.’s position, but only to see if substantial
evidence exists to support the challenged order. Thus, we only look at the evidence
offered in the People’s favor and determine if it was sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s findings as to each of the five statutory criteria. (See Pope v. Babick (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal for insufficient evidence.
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1054.) “As with all substantial evidence
challenges, an appellant challenging [a finding of fact] for insufficient evidence must lay
out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking. Failure to do so
is fatal. A reviewing court will not independently review the record to make up for
appellant’s failure to carry his burden.” (Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1266 (Defend the Bay).)
4 As relevant here, Corey Johnson, Senior Deputy Probation Officer, testified as an
expert witness for the People, as we discuss in more detail post. Dr. Matthew Soulier, a
board certified child and forensic psychiatrist, was retained by the defense to evaluate
J.O. in connection with the transfer hearing and testified therein. Dr. Rahn Minagawa, a
clinical and forensic psychologist, was also retained by the defense and testified at the
hearing as an expert in the field of adolescent psychology.
12
1. Criminal Sophistication
The first statutory criterion is “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile
court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s
age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the
minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the
existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care
system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or
sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
The juvenile court “consider[s] the whole picture, that is, all the evidence that
might bear on the minor’s criminal sophistication, including any criminal sophistication
manifested in the present crime.” (Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 683-684; Kevin P.,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192.) Criminal sophistication can be shown with facts
demonstrating an ‘ “ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of [one’s] criminal
behavior’ and [one’s] awareness ‘of the wrongfulness . . . of [one’s] conduct.’ ”
(Kevin P., at p. 193.) Positive factors such as “normal cognitive functioning” or
intelligence by itself “do not affirmatively demonstrate criminal sophistication.” (Ibid.)
But they can support finding this criterion “weighs in favor of transfer to the extent [the
positive factors] fail to mitigate other evidence that does affirmatively demonstrate
criminal sophistication.” (Ibid.; see In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 214 (J.S.)
[where the minor finished high school and took college courses in custody, there was
“little to no indication of intellectual deficits”].)
In assessing the criminal sophistication criterion, the juvenile court found that
several of the relevant factors were inapplicable or “neutral,” including J.O.’s age and
maturity. In this regard, the court explained as follows: “[J.O.’s] level of maturity
13
generally aligns with his chronological age, both at the time of the offense[s] [(16 years
and 10 months old)] and now. [¶] While many of his behaviors can certainly be
described as immature for his age, [J.O.] also has shown resourcefulness and a degree of
sophistication and worldliness. For instance, while on supervision before the present
offense, with advance planning he managed to sneak away to Los Angeles for a number
of days. While incarcerated, he managed to procure marijuana during an offsite dental
visit. Additionally, while incarcerated in connection with this case he has proven
resourceful in using the computer for unauthorized purposes . . . . Overall, the Court
finds that this subfactor is neutral, as [J.O.] has shown both immaturity and
sophistication.” (Fn. omitted.)
The juvenile court also found that the intellectual capacity factor was neutral,
noting that J.O. was “at least of average intelligence,” and that he had “achieved
admirable academic success” while incarcerated, obtaining “multiple [Associate of Arts
(AA)] degrees with a good grade point average [i.e., 3.5 or above].” Other neutral or
inapplicable factors included J.O.’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system
(neutral) and J.O. as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery
(inapplicable or neutral). In making these determinations, the court explained that
although there were approximately 12 child welfare referrals involving J.O.’s family
between 2005 and 2019 “none were substantiated,” and there was no evidence that J.O.
was a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.
The juvenile court cited two factors related to the criminal sophistication criterion
that weighed against transfer, including J.O.’s physical, mental, and emotional health at
the time of the alleged offenses. As for this factor, the court cited his diagnosis with
ADHD at an early age, as well as various mood disorders, noting that “[o]ver the years,
[J.O.] has received a variety of medications to treat his mental health and behavioral
symptoms.” The court concluded that “[o]verall, this subfactor weighs against transfer.
While [J.O.’s] emotional state at the time of the offense (undisturbed if not enthusiastic)
14
weighs in favor of transfer, it is outweighed by his mental health diagnoses and trauma
history.” (Emphasis omitted.)
The juvenile court also found that the childhood trauma factor weighed against
transfer, explaining that “[t]here is no doubt that [J.O.] suffered childhood trauma.”
By contrast, the juvenile court found that four factors related to the criminal
sophistication criterion weighed in favor of transfer, including J.O.’s conduct in
connection with the charged offenses. In reaching its conclusion as to this factor, the
court explained: “[J.O.’s] actions on and just before January 4, 2020 show a significant
degree of sophistication. The crime was planned, including selecting and scouting a
favorable location, coordinating with accomplices, positioning a get-away driver [(M.A.)]
and accomplice [(M.F.)], ensuring the presence of a firearm to aid in completing the
crime, and developing a ruse (payment of a premium price) to entice [Samantha] and her
friends to engage in the transaction. [¶] On the other hand, there are aspects of [J.O.’s]
actions that suggest a lack of sophistication, including the wearing of a tracking device
(the GPS ankle monitor) to the crime, his failure to attempt to hide his face, and the fact
that he used an email account with his name to arrange the transaction. [¶] . . . [¶] But
the fact that [J.O.] committed the crime while wearing a GPS device shows two things:
(i) his determination to commit the crime notwithstanding the unavoidable risk that
resulted from the requirement that he wear a GPS monitor (which supports transfer), and
(ii) some lack of sophistication (which weighs against transfer), as a more sophisticated
person would wait until he was off GPS before committing the crime. [¶] However,
overall, the Court finds that [J.O.] displayed a relatively high degree of criminal
sophistication, for his age, with respect to his actions on January 4, 2020. This subfactor
weighs in favor of transfer.” (Emphasis omitted.)
The juvenile court also found that J.O.’s impetuosity and appreciation of risks and
consequences, the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure, and the effect of J.O.’s
family and community involvement all weighed in favor of transfer. As for the first of
15
these factors, the court found that J.O.’s “actions on January 4, 2020 were not the result
of impetuousness or unconsidered reactivity. Instead they resulted from deliberation,
planning (if imperfect), calculation, and design. [¶] So while [J.O.] acts impetuously, he
is also a person who plans, considers, weighs costs and benefits, and then executes. [¶]
This subfactor weighs strongly in favor of transfer, since [J.O.’s] actions on January 4th
were not impetuous but planned and deliberate.” (Emphasis & fn. omitted.)
In finding that the factor concerning the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure
weighed in favor of transfer, the juvenile court explained: “There is no evidence that
anyone pressured [J.O.] to take part in the alleged robbery of January 4, 2020. While
[M.F.’s] and [M.A’s] participation undoubtedly reinforced [J.O.’s] own resolve to
commit the act, there is substantial evidence that [J.O.] has leadership skills, and it is
reasonable to assume that he was at least an equally-willing co-participant in the planning
and execution of the robbery.” (Fn. omitted.) In connection with this finding, the court
noted that J.O.’s mother and father believed that he was not a “follower” but rather “the
ringleader.”
Finally, as for the factor concerning the effect of J.O.’s family and community
involvement, the juvenile court stated: “Throughout his life, [J.O.] has received
significant support from his family and community. He reported to Dr. Soulier that ‘I
was raised better than this. My family taught me better.’ He has also received significant
outside support and direction from therapists and educators, and since his contact with the
juvenile justice system, from probation officers, legal counsel, juvenile court judges and
social workers. He was not ignored -- to the contrary, throughout his life significant
resources were deployed (imperfectly at times) to help [J.O.]. [¶] On the other hand,
[J.O.] did suffer significant family trauma, including the after-effects of a difficult
divorce, a challenging family situation, and what Dr. Soulier labeled ‘deficient
parenting.’ [¶] Balancing these considerations, the Court finds that this subfactor
slightly favors transfer.” (Emphasis omitted.)
16
At the conclusion of its evaluation of the criminal sophistication criterion, the
juvenile court stated: “Considering all the subfactors relating to sophistication, . . . the
court finds that this factor weighs in favor of transfer. The sophistication shown on
January 4, 2020 is entitled to heavy weight, as it most directly relates to the potential for
serious criminality in the future.” (Emphasis omitted.)
We reject J.O.’s contention that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile
court’s finding. J.O. simply cites a handful of cases for the proposition that minors, as a
general matter, are less mature and responsible than adults, and then highlights certain
evidence in support of his position and based thereon makes arguments more
appropriately directed to a trier of fact. For example, J.O. asserts that the manner in
which the charged offenses were committed showed a lack of criminal sophistication on
his part because he set up the drug deal using his real name, exchanged photographs with
the victim, wore an ankle monitor at the time of the incident, made no effort to disguise
himself during the incident, and made a video about stealing marijuana “[d]irectly” after
the incident. But in a substantial evidence challenge, an appellant cannot carry his
burden on appeal by merely rearguing the “facts” and/or reasserting his position at trial.
Instead, the appellant must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why
it is lacking. J.O.’s failure to do so here is fatal to his claim.5 (Defend the Bay, supra,
119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) It is not our role to independently review the record to
make up for J.O.’s failure to carry his burden. (Ibid.)
In any event, we have reviewed the record and find that it includes sufficient
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding as to the criminal sophistication
criterion. Among other things, there was evidence showing that J.O. was in the average
5 J.O. acknowledges that there was “some planning involved” with respect to the charged
offenses, but claims, without further elaboration, that “his behavior was not so
sophisticated as to impede or preclude his rehabilitation.”
17
range for cognitive functioning and was of “at least” average intelligence, had no
physical health issues or significant maturity issues other than being a typical 16 year-old,
and did not act impulsively in connection with the charged offenses. Further, there was
evidence that J.O.’s actions were deliberate and calculated, and that he had a leadership
role in the execution of the robbery. Indeed, a reasonable factfinder could have
concluded that J.O. was a willing participant in a plan he designed (or helped to design)
to “rip off” Samantha (i.e., obtain marijuana without paying the agreed-upon price),
which included selecting the location of the drug deal and ensuring the presence of an
escape route, getaway driver, and an armed accomplice to carry out the plan. Under the
circumstances presented, ample evidence supports the trial court’s findings with respect
to the criminal sophistication criterion.
2. Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction
The second statutory criterion is “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) In
evaluating this criterion, the court must consider “the minor’s potential to grow and
mature.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) The focus “is whether there is enough time to
rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court
jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
On appeal, J.O. does not raise a substantial evidence challenge to the juvenile
court’s findings with respect to this criterion. He does not argue or suggest that the
juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that this criterion weighed against transfer
to a court of criminal jurisdiction. We therefore discuss the court’s observations and
findings only briefly, and to the extent that they may relate to later claims.
During its analysis, the juvenile court noted that Dr. Minagawa had “testified that
[J.O.] could be rehabilitated within the time remaining in juvenile court jurisdiction. The
People did not offer any expert evidence from an adolescent psychologist rebutting this
evidence. While [Johnson] is a well-qualified, experienced probation officer and has
18
expert knowledge about the programs and activities at the JDF, he does not have the
ability to offer the sort of psychological evaluation offered by Dr. Minagawa. Dr.
Minagawa’s psychological testimony stands unrebutted.”
The juvenile court then found the testimony’s weight was reduced by the fact that
although Minagawa “focuse[d] on the causal connection between [J.O.’s] history of
trauma and his criminality,” the court found “additional motivation for his actions,
namely thrill-seeking and a desire for gain.” The court went on to describe the
transactional nature of the most successful interventions with J.O., both before the
murder and later while J.O. was in custody, and found “most important of all” that J.O.’s
involvement in the drug trade “was at least partially motivated by a rational if misdirected
desire to enrich himself.” Thus, “while his trauma history may have turned [J.O.] in an
anti-social and troubled direction, his own rational-if-misguided choices propelled him to
embrace a criminal lifestyle.”
The court then noted that Minagawa had testified it would take approximately two
to four years to rehabilitate J.O., which “bumps into the outer edge of juvenile court
jurisdiction.” Minagawa had also “accepted as true the claims of severe and sustained
physical abuse,” but the court found those claims unsupported by the evidence,
concluding that “[w]hile weakened by these considerations, Dr. Minagawa’s testimony
remains unrebutted, and thus this factor weighs slightly against transfer.” (Emphasis
omitted.)
“Considering the subfactors relating to potential for rehabilitation before
expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction, . . . the court finds that this factor weighs against
transfer.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Because this finding is unchallenged, no further discussion of this criterion is
necessary. However, we note that the juvenile court was not required to credit the
opinions proffered by the defense expert (Dr. Minagawa) or otherwise weigh evidence
regarding the rehabilitation criterion in the way J.O. preferred. (See In re Alejandro G.
19
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 472, at p. 480 [the fact that the court’s finding conflicted with
two experts’ opinions did not show a lack of substantial evidence because the court is not
obligated to adopt the experts’ opinions].)
3. Previous Delinquent History
The third statutory criterion directs the juvenile court to consider the “minor’s
previous delinquent history” and, when doing so, to “give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history
and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma
on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).) Juvenile
courts enjoy “broad discretion to consider all evidence relevant to this inherently case-by-
case determination,” including all forms of delinquent behavior. (D.C., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 455; see id. at p. 456 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s
“behavior documented in his school records”]; J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214-
215 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s “ ‘significant school delinquency’ history
starting in the seventh grade, including poor behavior, suspensions, and multiple attempts
by school officials to rehabilitate [the minor]”].)
In evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court began its analysis by discussing the
seriousness of J.O.’s previous delinquent history, stating: “[J.O.’s] behavioral problems
began at an early age, including being expelled from pre-school for disruptive behavior.
By middle school he had dozens if not hundreds of behavioral incidents.
“[J.O.’s] involvement with legal system began when he was 14 years old with an
assault that resulted in a concussion for the victim. While under supervision, his track
record was quite poor -- he had numerous violations of GPS and other terms. There is
strong evidence that January 4, 2020 was not his first rip-off or ‘lick.’ Instead, the
evidence indicates that [J.O.] was fully immersed in a criminal lifestyle, involving
involvement with stolen marijuana and firearms.
20
“Also, [J.O.] has had a serious substance use problem: He reported first using
marijuana in 5th grade, and was a daily user by age 12, and had used other drugs . . . . He
completed a substance abuse program from River Oak in 2019, but continued to use until
his incarceration. In January 2019, he told [a counselor] that he planned to start using
again when off probation. And while incarcerated he once managed to smuggle
marijuana into the JDF. . . . It does not appear that [J.O.] has overcome his substance
abuse problem; abstaining from use in the controlled environment of the JDF is much
different than abstaining outside of a locked facility. [¶] The Court finds that his
previous delinquency history was sustained, wide-ranging, and escalating. This subfactor
weighs in favor of transfer.” (Emphasis omitted.)
After finding that the factor of childhood trauma weighed against transfer, the
juvenile court concluded that, on balance, the previous delinquent history criterion
weighed moderately in favor of transfer.
On appeal, J.O. argues the juvenile court erred because “there is nothing in his
delinquency history that would make him unamenable to the services available in
juvenile hall.” He acknowledges that he violated his probation “several times,” but notes
that he only had “one prior sustained petition” for assaulting “another juvenile” with two
other minors and taking the victim’s cell phone. J.O. also notes that he endured
“traumatic events” during his childhood (e.g., intense conflict between his parents during
their divorce, physical abuse by his mother and father), and that his “clinicians all
testified to his openness and commitment to treatment (e.g., therapy).” As we have
explained, in a substantial evidence challenge, an appellant cannot carry his burden on
appeal by merely rearguing the evidence and/or reasserting his position at trial. Instead,
the appellant must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is
21
lacking. J.O.’s failure to do so here is fatal to his claim.6 (Defend the Bay, supra,
119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.)
In any event, there is ample evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s
determination that the previous delinquent history criterion weighs in favor of transfer.
J.O. ignores the evidence in the record showing his extensive delinquent history, which
encompasses a person’s criminal or antisocial behavior that occurred before they reached
the age of majority (i.e., 18 years old). (See D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-446,
450-451, 453, 455-456 [delinquent history may include conduct that occurred after the
offense related to the transfer hearing, as well as conduct in school records even if that
conduct did not result in a delinquency petition].) In addition to the numerous (more than
200) instances of serious misconduct at school (e.g., possession of a knife, hitting another
student) and the violent offense giving rise to the sustained wardship petition when he
was 14 years old--battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d))--there
was evidence indicating that J.O. was involved in other delinquent behavior, including
drug sales, firearm sales, and robberies. And, following his arrest in this matter, J.O.
received numerous disciplinary reports while in custody for a variety of improper conduct
(e.g., fighting, disruptive behavior, defiance). In short, substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings as to the previous delinquent history criterion.
4. Previous Attempts at Rehabilitation
The fourth criterion requires the juvenile court to consider whether the “[s]uccess
of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” weighed in favor of
transfer. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court
6 J.O. acknowledges that there was “some planning involved” with respect to the charged
offenses, but claims, without further elaboration, that “his behavior was not so
sophisticated as to impede or preclude his rehabilitation.”
22
must “give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of
the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)
In assessing this criterion, the juvenile court stated: “The efforts to rehabilitate
[J.O.] were long-running, multi-disciplinary, sustained, and, on occasion, intensive. The
quantity of services that [J.O.] received is quite impressive. For instance, in third grade,
he was referred to the UC Davis CAARE Diagnostic and Treatment Center to address his
behavioral problems at school. By fourth grade, a section 504 Accommodation Plan was
put in place, and by the end of that academic year he was found to have made
‘tremendous progress’ in his treatment. With further support it was reported by 6th
Grade that [J.O.] had ‘done well’ in regulating his behaviors.
“[J.O.] was provided with mentors through the River Oak Treatment Center. He
received intensive and extensive services from the JJDTP. According to Dr. Soulier,
‘[J.O.] agreed that he was often held accountable for his actions and offered multiple
services by probation.’
“During this hearing, [J.O.] has argued that the services he received, while
bountiful, were flawed, and were often undermined by other actions. For instance,
[J.O.’s] mother stopped bringing him to PCIT (Parent-Child Interaction) therapy in 2007,
and she disengaged from the UC Davis CAARE program in 2012.
“Staff turnover has also been identified as a contributing factor to the failure of
previous efforts at rehabilitation. In particular, [J.O.] cites the departure of therapist
Mirah James in 2019, with whom he had developed a positive and strong relationship.
“But of course there is no guarantee of continuity in therapists going forward
either—to the extent his rehabilitation relies on the confluence of optimal therapeutic
conditions it is fragile indeed, as such conditions rarely occur in a world where people
change jobs, communications are missed, and not every performer meets high standards.
23
“Dr. Minagawa opined that the services were inadequate because they were not
tailored to address his extensive trauma history. However, as noted above, the Court
parts company with Dr. Minagawa when he accepts at face value the reports of sustained
and regular physical abuse.
“[J.O.’s] ADHD was well known and has been addressed by professionals for
most of his life. Dr. Soulier noted a marked change in behavior when taking medication,
but [J.O.] has stopped taking ADHD medication.
“One particularly important fact about the previous rehabilitative efforts is how
frequently they were reported to be successful in changing his behavior. Over and over
again, [J.O.] reported insight and a resolve to do better, and the professionals treating him
found progress, but backsliding and even escalation ensued. The events of January 4,
2020 belie the claim of earlier progress.
“Particularly in the few years before the present offense, [J.O.] received intense
supervision and intervention, and yet he nonetheless took part in a robbery that led to the
killing of [Samantha]. Indeed, he was in court the day before the robbery, supported by
the probation office, and agreeing to comply with the terms of GPS. This factor weighs
very strongly in favor of transfer, as years of treatment, support, and supervision failed to
rehabilitate [J.O.].”
On appeal, J.O. does not specifically argue there was evidence showing that the
previous attempts to rehabilitate him were successful. Instead, he claims the attempts at
rehabilitation “were inadequate to meet his needs” and that he did not receive the “right
type of therapy,” as his treating therapists were not informed “about his exposure to
trauma and abuse,” which “led to anger, defiance, disrespect and problems with authority
figures.” J.O. adds that “a lack of consequences” was partly responsible for his poor
behavior, and that, according to Dr. Minagawa, the probation department was “ ‘sort of
complicit in not holding him accountable.’ ” Finally, J.O. notes, without citation to the
record, that he has “benefitted from childhood-focused cognitive behavior,” and that he
24
has “received structure and consistent consequences” over the preceding four years in
custody, which has led to positive change.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that this criterion
weighed in favor of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The record reflects that
J.O. engaged in a continuous pattern of delinquent behavior from a young age until the
commission of the current offenses, which was escalating in seriousness. As a result of
his delinquent behavior, J.O. received various professional services to address his needs
over the course of many years. The record discloses that, despite those extensive services
and the supervision of the probation department, J.O. continued to engage in delinquent
behavior and violated the terms of his probation multiple times, including the condition
related to his ankle monitor. And J.O.’s poor behavior continued after he was
incarcerated for the current offenses.
On this record, a reasonable factfinder could have concluded that, despite J.O.’s
intellectual capacity, receipt of extensive mental health and other professional services,
and placement on probation, he had no willingness or ability to improve his behavior
based on his continued misconduct and cessation of medication. The juvenile court was
not required to accept Dr. Minagawa’s opinion that the services J.O. received were
inadequate because they were not tailored to address his history of trauma. The court did
not abuse its discretion in disagreeing with the defense expert’s opinion and instead
relying on the other evidence before it. (See J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [trial
court is not bound by an expert’s testimony and opinion]; In re Alejandro G., supra,
205 Cal.App.4th at p. 480 [court not obligated to adopt experts’ opinions].)
5. Circumstances and Gravity of Alleged Offenses
The fifth and final criterion, the circumstances and gravity of the offense (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), “focuses on the offense ‘ “alleged in the petition” ’ [citation], and like
the other statutory criteria, it is ‘based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit
the offense.’ [Citation.] But the allegation that a minor committed a serious offense,
25
including murder, does not ‘automatically require a finding of unfitness.’ ” (Kevin P.,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189, italics omitted.) When evaluating this criterion, the
juvenile court must give weight to any relevant factor, including evidence that, while not
justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude, including, but not limited
to, “the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree
of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the
person’s mental and emotional development. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii); Kevin P., at
p. 189.)
In assessing this criterion, the juvenile court found that J.O.’s actual behavior,
mental state, and degree of involvement weighed in favor of transfer, and that the level of
harm weighed strongly in favor of transfer. By contrast, the court found that J.O.’s
mental and emotional development weighed against transfer, as explained in the court’s
assessment of the criminal sophistication criterion. As for J.O.’s actual behavior, the
court stated: “The shooter was [M.F.] not [J.O.]. However, [J.O.] was the person who
communicated with [Samantha] about the marijuana transaction, and [J.O.] was the
person who met with her. [J.O.] was undoubtedly a major participant. It is unknown
who, if anyone, was the ‘leader’ of the crime, but there is evidence of [J.O’s] leadership
qualities.” As for J.O.’s degree of involvement, the court said: “[J.O.] was a major
participant in the crime, but it is unknown if he was the leader, or indeed if there was a
leader and two followers, or three equally-willing co-participants. . . . [H]e arranged the
meeting and shorted her for the marijuana, which caused her to chase him. He then ran
towards [M.F.], whom he knew was armed, and who fatally shot her.” As for the level of
harm, the court stated: “It is not possible to overstate the harm caused by the killing of
Samantha Farris. Her family’s grief is deep and lasting, as shown by their moving
testimony, and they kept vigil for her at every single court hearing in this matter. She
was a young person with promise and vitality whose life was taken for some small
amount of money.”
26
On appeal, J.O. acknowledges that murder is a “particularly” serious offense, but
suggests insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding because he was not
the shooter and never displayed a weapon or threatened anyone. J.O. adds, without
citation to the record, that he has changed dramatically from “an irresponsible teenager to
a thoughtful young man,” insisting that he is no longer a danger to society due to
“growth, maturity, education and therapy.”
We are not persuaded that the juvenile court erred. The record reflects that the
juvenile court considered the relevant factors, and substantial evidence supports the
court’s determination that the circumstances and gravity of the offenses weighed in favor
of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
6. Amenability to Treatment as a Juvenile
As noted ante, a recent amendment to section 707 requires the juvenile court to
make an “ultimate” finding that the minor “is not amenable to rehabilitation while under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); see Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164, 167.) The court must consider all five enumerated criteria
and state its reasons for finding the minor to be unamenable to rehabilitation while under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
At the conclusion of its written transfer order, the juvenile court stated:
“Considering all the factors in their totality, through the lens of amenability to
rehabilitation in the juvenile court system, the Court finds clear and convincing evidence
in favor of transfer.
“The Court finds that the most dominant factor is the failure of previous attempts
at rehabilitation. [J.O.] was receiving intensive supervision at the time of this offense.
While he has made progress in the structured environment of the JDF, it will be more
challenging for him to avoid the commission of crime when released, when the
temptation to resume his participation in lucrative but illegal and dangerous drug
activities will be strong.
27
“The Court is not finding that [J.O.] is irreparably delinquent. No such showing is
required for transfer, and [J.O.] has shown real progress, both in his academic endeavors,
and in his improving conduct at the JDF.
“However, the starting point for that progress is a location far from rehabilitation.
On January 4, 2020, [J.O.] was a minor who was resistant to rehabilitation through the
provision of services, who was immersed in a criminal lifestyle, and who displayed
enthusiasm and some sophistication in reaping the gains associated with the dangerous
enterprise of robbing people who were selling marijuana. His behavioral patterns were
deep-rooted, persistent, apparently immune from rehabilitative efforts, and escalating.
“Thus, considering all the factors, the Court finds clear and convincing evidence
that [J.O.] ‘is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.)
Here, because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings as to
each of the four challenged statutory criterion, there is no basis to reverse the court’s
ultimate finding that the People satisfied their burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence that J.O was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts. Accordingly, we will affirm the transfer order.
II
Expert Testimony
Senior Deputy Probation Office Corey Johnson prepared a transfer report that
recommended that J. O. be found unamenable to the care, treatment and training
programs available through the juvenile court and later testified as an expert for the
People in the areas of juvenile justice, criminogenic needs, and programming and
rehabilitation. J.O. argues the juvenile court erred by finding that Johnson was qualified
as an expert and that the error was prejudicial because Johnson “opined on amenability
factors about which he had not background to address.”
28
“A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to
which his testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such special knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education must be shown before the witness may testify as
an expert.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) “ ‘We are required to uphold the trial judge’s
ruling on the question of an expert’s qualifications absent an abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] Such abuse of discretion will be found only where “ ‘the evidence shows that
a witness clearly lacks qualification as an expert.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1032, 1062-1063.)
We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
Johnson was qualified as an expert because J.O. has failed to show prejudice. “ ‘[T]he
erroneous admission of expert testimony only warrants reversal if “it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in
the absence of the error.” ’ ” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 446.) On appeal,
J.O. makes no effort to show how he was prejudiced by Johnson’s testimony, including
testimony within the specific subjects on which the court found him qualified to testify as
an expert. Instead, without further elaboration, J.O. simply states that the testimony was
prejudicial because Johnson “opined on amenability factors about which he had no
background to address.”
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609.) An appellant must “supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894.) It is not the role of a
reviewing court to “act as counsel for a party to construct a proper and persuasive
29
argument.” (Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 285, 302, fn. 20; see
Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“[w]e are not required to
examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants”].))
Pursuant to these principles, J.O. has forfeited his claim of prejudicial evidentiary
error. We disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority and fail to disclose the reasoning by which the party reached the conclusions he
wants us to adopt. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287; see
also Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“[w]hen legal argument
with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as
forfeited and pass it without consideration”].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring this matter to a court of criminal
jurisdiction is affirmed.
/s/
Duarte, J.
We concur:
/s/
Earl, P. J.
/s/
Mauro, J.
30
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.