CourtListener 10692095•Wilson v. VXI Global Solutions CA2/1
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Filed 10/7/25 Wilson v. VXI Global Solutions CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CAMIELLE WILSON, B340615
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV09061)
v.
VXI GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
Lathrop GPM, Laura Reathaford and Jeffrey Richmond for
Defendant and Appellant.
Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw, Norman B.
Blumenthal and Kyle R. Nordrehaug for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
____________________________
When defendant VXI Global Solutions, LLC failed to pay
fees required to initiate an arbitration of a complaint brought by
plaintiff Camielle Wilson, plaintiff moved under Code of Civil
Procedure1 section 1281.97 to vacate the order compelling
arbitration and return the matter to court. Based on evidence of
miscommunications between defendant’s legal and accounts
payable departments, the trial court found defendant’s failure to
pay the fees was “operational” rather than “intentional.” The
court nonetheless granted plaintiff’s motion and followed case
law applying section 1281.97’s forfeiture provisions strictly, with
no allowance for excuse.
Defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, our
Supreme Court issued its decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior
Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310 (Hohenshelt). Hohenshelt held
federal law would preempt section 1281.98, a sister statute to
section 1281.97, if the statute were interpreted to render arbitral
rights forfeited even if the failure to pay arbitration fees within
the statute’s 30-day deadline was inadvertent or otherwise
excusable. To avoid preemption, the Hohenshelt court
interpreted section 1281.98 to mandate forfeiture of arbitral
rights only when nonpayment was willful, grossly negligent, or
fraudulent. Accordingly, Hohenshelt rejected a strict application
of section 1281.98 that did not allow courts to consider whether
nonpayment was excusable.
We conclude Hohenshelt applies equally to the forfeiture
provisions of section 1281.97, which are materially identical to
those of section 1281.98. We therefore reverse the trial court’s
1Unspecified statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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order vacating the order compelling arbitration, which was based
on a statutory interpretation rejected in Hohenshelt. We affirm,
however, the trial court’s award of sanctions to plaintiff under
section 1281.99, a provision Hohenshelt held applied even when
nonpayment was not willful, grossly negligent or fraudulent.
BACKGROUND
On March 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant, her employer, under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA).
On February 16, 2024, the trial court granted defendant’s motion
to compel plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration.
On March 19, 2024, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) sent a letter to the parties asking defendant to pay a filing
fee of $2,100 by April 18, 2024.
On May 29, 2024, AAA informed the parties that defendant
had not paid the requested filing fee, and AAA therefore had
administratively closed the file on the matter pursuant to
section 1281.97.
Plaintiff then moved under section 1281.972 to vacate the
order compelling arbitration, return the matter to court, and
impose monetary sanctions on defendant. Defendant opposed,
arguing, inter alia, the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq.; FAA) preempts section 1281.97. Defendant also
submitted a declaration from its in-house counsel explaining the
missed payment was due to miscommunications between
defendant’s legal department and accounts payable department,
2 Plaintiff’s motion erroneously identified the applicable
statute as section 1281.98, but the trial court construed the
motion as brought under section 1281.97, as do we.
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which led the legal department to believe, incorrectly, that the
accounts payable department had submitted the payment.
Defendant did not dispute that it failed to pay the required fee.
In reply, plaintiff argued the FAA was inapplicable to the
parties’ arbitration agreement, and defendant’s “purported
excuses for failing to pay the required arbitration fees” were
“entirely immaterial” given case law requiring strict application
of section 1281.97’s deadlines.
The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion, “finding
defendant in material breach of the arbitration agreement and in
violation of section 1281.97(a).” The court stated, “The Court
understands that defendant’s default in not paying the AAA
invoice was . . . operational rather than . . . intentional but the
appellate courts have interpreted the statute to allow no delay in
paying arbitral invoices.” The court imposed $6,315 in sanctions
under section 1281.99, reflecting attorney fees incurred by
plaintiff to initiate the arbitration and bring the motion under
section 1281.97.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the parties dispute whether the FAA preempts
section 1281.97. As we discuss, Hohenshelt, issued shortly after
plaintiff filed the respondent’s brief, resolved this question. The
parties have had the opportunity to address the impact of
Hohenshelt—defendant in its reply brief, and plaintiff in a
surreply requested by this court.
A. Section 1281.97
“In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 707 (2019–
2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill [No.] 707) . . . in response to ‘a
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concerning and troubling trend’ in consumer and employment
arbitrations: ‘employers are refusing to pay required fees to
initiate arbitration, effectively stymieing the ability of employees
to assert their legal rights.’ [Citations.] The Legislature noted
instances in which companies, having drafted and enforced
waivers of class proceedings in employment contracts, faced large
numbers of individual arbitration demands and then failed to
timely pay arbitration fees, thereby frustrating adjudication of
employees’ claims.” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 329.)
Section 1281.97 was enacted under Senate Bill No. 707.
(Stats. 2019, ch. 870, § 4.) Section 1281.97 provides if the
drafting party of an employment or consumer arbitration contract
fails to pay within 30 days any fees and costs required to initiate
the arbitration proceeding, then “the drafting party is in material
breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the
arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration.”
(§ 1281.97, subd. (a)(1).) As a result of this material breach, the
employee or consumer may either “[w]ithdraw the claim from
arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction” or
“[c]ompel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs related to the arbitration.”
(Id., subd. (b).)
If the employee or consumer “proceeds with an action in a
court of appropriate jurisdiction, the court shall impose sanctions
on the drafting party in accordance with Section 1281.99.”
(§ 1281.97, subd. (d).) Section 1281.99 mandates a monetary
sanction of “the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees
and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of
the material breach” (§ 1281.99, subd. (a)), and further allows the
court to impose evidentiary, terminating, or contempt sanctions
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“unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted
with substantial justification or that other circumstances make
the imposition of the sanction unjust” (id., subd. (b).)
B. Hohenshelt
Hohenshelt concerned the validity of section 1281.98, the
sister statute to section 1281.97. Whereas section 1281.97
applies when the drafting party of an employment or consumer
arbitration agreement fails timely to pay fees required to initiate
an arbitration, section 1281.98 applies when the drafting party
fails timely to pay fees required to continue an arbitration
already in progress. (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(1).) As with section
1281.97, the consequence of nonpayment is material breach of the
arbitration agreement and waiver of the right to compel
arbitration. (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(1).) Upon this material breach,
the employee or consumer may, among other remedies,
“[w]ithdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of
appropriate jurisdiction.” (§ 1281.98, subd. (b)(1).) Also akin to
section 1281.97, should the employee or consumer choose to
proceed in court, the court must impose sanctions under
section 1281.99. (§ 1281.98, subd. (c)(2).)
The question in Hohenshelt was whether the FAA preempts
section 1281.98’s provision that drafting parties waive their right
to arbitrate if they fail timely to pay arbitration fees.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 322–323.) The FAA sets
forth “ ‘ “an equal-treatment principle” ’ ” that allows courts to
“ ‘ “invalidate an arbitration agreement based on ‘generally
applicable contract defenses,’ ” ’ ” but preempts state rules that
“ ‘ “ ‘apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”
(Hohenshelt, at p. 327.)
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Our high court agreed with the employer’s argument “that
if section 1281.98 were construed to mean that any failure to
make timely payment, regardless of the circumstances,
invariably results in forfeiture of arbitral rights, the statute
would be anomalous in the context of general contract law
principles.” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 343.) The court
held, however, that “section 1281.98, properly construed, is not
preempted by the FAA.” (Hohenshelt, at p. 323.) “[T]he statute
does not abrogate the long-standing principle, established by
statute and common law, that one party’s nonperformance of an
obligation automatically extinguishes the other party’s
contractual duties only when nonperformance is willful, grossly
negligent, or fraudulent.” (Ibid.)
As examples of this “long-standing principle,” our high
court cited Civil Code section 3275, which “excuses a failure to
perform an ‘obligation’ ” if the breaching party “ ‘mak[es] full
compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly
negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.’ ” (Hohenshelt,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 332, quoting Civ. Code, § 3275.) The court
also cited section 473, subdivision (b) as a “path by which a
drafting party that does not timely pay fees can be relieved from
forfeiting its right to arbitration.” (Hohenshelt, at pp. 334–335.)
The high court thus rejected lower courts’ strict application
of section 1281.98’s deadlines. It concluded the Legislature
did not intend “to strip companies and employers of their
contractual right to arbitration where nonpayment of fees results
from a good faith mistake, inadvertence, or other excusable
neglect.” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 323.) Rather, the
Legislature’s intent was “to deter companies and employers from
engaging in strategic nonpayment of arbitration fees.” (Ibid.)
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The Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal “to
remand the matter to the trial court for consideration of whether
[the employer] may be excused for its failure to timely pay
arbitration fees, such that the stay of litigation should not be
lifted and the parties should be returned to arbitration, and
whether the delay resulted in compensable harm to [the
employee].” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.)
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling Vacating the Order
Compelling Arbitration Must Be Reversed Under
Hohenshelt
The trial court in this case, following pre-Hohenshelt case
law, strictly applied section 1281.97 to conclude defendant had
forfeited its right to arbitrate, despite acknowledging defendant’s
nonpayment was “operational” as opposed to “intentional.” This
ruling is no longer valid after Hohenshelt.
To avoid preemption, our Supreme Court interpreted
section 1281.98 to allow courts to excuse forfeiture based on
untimely payments that are not willful, grossly negligent, or
fraudulent. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 323.) This
interpretation applies equally to section 1281.97, the forfeiture
provisions of which are materially identical to those of section
1281.98. Absent this interpretation, section 1281.97 “would be
anomalous in the context of general contract law principles” and
preempted. (Hohenshelt, at p. 343.) The parties do not contend
otherwise.
The parties agree that under Hohenshelt, defendant is
entitled to argue its nonpayment was excusable. The parties
disagree as to the proper disposition.
Defendant argues the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant’s nonpayment was “operational” and not “intentional”
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establishes that had the trial court applied the standards
articulated in Hohenshelt, it would have denied plaintiff’s motion
to vacate the order compelling arbitration. Defendant contends
the trial court’s finding the nonpayment was “operational” is also
supported by “extensive and uncontroverted evidence.”
Defendant thus contends remand is unnecessary, and we should
reverse the trial court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion, including the
sanctions award.
Plaintiff counters we must remand, despite the trial court’s
comments that defendant’s nonpayment was “operational,” rather
than “intentional,” because the court “did not reach the factual
issue of whether the breach had been cured or was in good faith.”
We agree with defendant that remand is unnecessary given
the trial court’s express finding the nonpayment was
unintentional. In contrast, in Hohenshelt, the trial court made
no such findings. In Hohenshelt, the plaintiff brought a
section 1281.98 motion on September 30 after the defendant
failed to pay arbitration invoices issued July 29 and August 29.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 324.) The defendant paid the
fees “[s]hortly thereafter,” and raised several arguments as to
why its delay should be excused, including, inter alia, that
defense counsel was unaware of the invoices because of an earlier
notice stating the arbitrator was unavailable, and because
counsel was preparing to go out on paternity leave. (Id. at
p. 325.) The plaintiff disputed this explanation and argued
counsel’s claim of inattention was belied by counsel’s
participation in the matter during the relevant time frame.
(Ibid.)
There is no indication in Hohenshelt that the trial court or
Court of Appeal reached these factual disputes. Rather, the trial
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court denied the section 1281.98 motion upon finding the
arbitration provider effectively extended the deadline for
payment by issuing a notice on September 30 stating the
arbitration would be cancelled if the defendant did not pay by
October 28. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 325.) The Court
of Appeal reversed, holding the arbitrator could not unilaterally
change the 30-day deadline under section 1281.98, and the
defendant, by not paying by that deadline, was in material
breach. (Hohenshelt, at p. 325.)
Unlike in Hohenshelt, the trial court here addressed the
evidence presented by defendant, uncontroverted by any evidence
presented by plaintiff, and concluded the nonpayment was
unintentional. This precludes a finding the nonpayment was
strategic or, as plaintiff suggests, in bad faith. In plaintiff’s
surreply, plaintiff identifies no additional evidence plaintiff might
present to undercut the trial court’s conclusion, nor does plaintiff
argue the nonpayment rises to the level of gross negligence, much
less fraud. The trial court’s finding establishes, as a matter of
law, that defendant has not forfeited its arbitral rights, which
requires reversal of the order vacating the order compelling
arbitration.
We affirm, however, the award of $6,315 in sanctions under
section 1281.99. Defendant does not contest the amount of
sanctions—its sole argument is reversal of the order vacating the
order compelling arbitration necessarily compels reversal of the
sanctions award. This argument fails under Hohenshelt, which
stated, “[S]ection 1281.99’s mandatory sanction provision . . .
requires the drafting party to pay any reasonable expenses
incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of its failure to
timely pay arbitration fees [citation]—in essence, to make the
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other party whole (Civ. Code, § 3275)—whether the nonpayment
was willful or not.” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 339–
340.) Thus, the trial court was statutorily required to impose
monetary sanctions regardless of its finding that defendant’s
nonpayment was unintentional.
DISPOSITION
The order vacating the order compelling arbitration is
reversed. The order awarding monetary sanctions is affirmed.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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