CourtListener 10692028•People v. Hernandez CA2/8
Texto completo
Filed 10/7/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B340353
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23ARCF00174-01)
v.
ISRAEL SANTIAGO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. James P. Cooper III, Commissioner.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Jonathan M. Krauss,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Israel Santiago Hernandez was convicted of felony assault
(Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and sentenced to the upper term
of four years. On appeal, Hernandez argues the trial court erred
in imposing the upper term based on his status on probation and
two prior misdemeanor convictions. We conclude the trial court
improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors related to
Hernandez’s status and performance on probation in imposing
the upper term sentence. We further conclude the error was
prejudicial because a jury rationally could find that at least one of
the aggravating factors on which the trial court relied was not
true. We accordingly reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Charges
In an information, Hernandez was charged with one count
of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The information also alleged that the
charged offense was a hate crime (§ 422.75, subd. (a)), and that
Hernandez personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). It further alleged, as aggravating factors,
that Hernandez committed a hate crime (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(c)), and that the crime involved great violence, great
bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing
a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)).
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
2. Evidence at trial
On the morning of December 20, 2023, Debra Ansell was
driving on Santa Monica Boulevard when she saw Hernandez
and another man in the intersection. The other man was on the
ground, and Hernandez “was standing over him, punching down
at him.” Ansell saw Hernandez make contact with the man’s face
or upper body once. She also saw Hernandez swing his arm
toward the man several more times, but she did not know if those
punches landed. The man did not fight back, and instead tried to
cover himself on the ground. After several cycles of punching
down at the man, Hernandez turned and walked away.
While in her car, Ansell took a photo of Hernandez with her
cell phone and called 911. Shen then got out of the car and went
to assist the man on the ground. Ansell saw that the man was
bleeding profusely from his mouth, and appeared to be missing a
couple of teeth. He was also moving very slowly and seemed
meek. Once the police arrived, Ansell told them what she saw
and shared the photo of Hernandez.
Los Angeles police officer Brent Baker-Dunlap responded to
the scene and met with the injured man. The officer observed
that the man was approximately 60 years old and five feet, eight
inches in height. He had a laceration on his bottom lip, a cut on
his chin, blood inside his mouth, and several missing teeth. He
appeared scared, feeble, and disoriented. While the man was
being tended to in an ambulance, Officer Baker-Dunlap and his
partner searched the area and found Hernandez about one block
from the scene. When the officers approached, Hernandez
refused to follow their orders. He appeared to be under the
influence of alcohol and told the officers that he used
methamphetamine.
3
Los Angeles police detective Jaime Martinez interviewed
Hernandez shortly after his arrest. During the interview,
Hernandez became agitated. At one point, Hernandez assumed a
fighting stance, called the detective a derogatory name, and
threatened to hurt him. Early in the investigation, Detective
Martinez contacted the victim. However, by the time of trial, the
victim’s whereabouts were unknown.
3. Jury verdict and sentencing
The jury found Hernandez guilty of assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), but
found the enhancement allegation that Hernandez personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) to
be not true. At the People’s request, the trial court dismissed the
hate-crime enhancement allegation (§ 422.75, subd. (a)), and the
two aggravating factor allegations (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1), (c)) under section 1385.
The sentencing hearing was held on April 26, 2024. At the
start of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it intended to
impose the high term. In response, defense counsel argued that
probation was warranted because Hernandez had a minimal
criminal record with only two misdemeanor convictions, there
was evidence of substance abuse, and the jury found the great-
bodily-injury enhancement to be not true. The court stated that
it considered imposing the low term, but it did not find any of the
factors in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) to be present. The court
also acknowledged that there was a statutory presumption in
favor of the middle term, but noted that Hernandez had prior
convictions for misdemeanor trespass and misdemeanor battery,
and that “those two convictions, by itself, are enough to support
the high-term.”
4
The court stated that it “searched long and hard” for
mitigating factors, but there were none. The court found that
Hernandez was not a passive participant or a minor role player
in the offense, and that the crime was not the result of an
unusual circumstance that was unlikely to recur. In support of
this finding, the court noted that Hernandez had two other
pending battery charges as well as a previously dismissed battery
charge, and that this “history shows that he has a propensity for
putting his hands on people and taking names.” The court also
found that Hernandez was not coerced or induced by others to
commit the offense, but instead “he does appear to have an
apparent predisposition to use force and violence against other
people.” In addition, the court found that there was no evidence
that Hernandez exercised caution to avoid harm to the victim,
but rather “the evidence is undisputed that [he] inflicted
significant harm” upon the victim and “left him laying in the
street.”
Defense counsel responded that Hernandez’s misdemeanor
convictions did not justify the high term, and that the remaining
facts that the court put on the record were not found true by the
jury, including the great-bodily-injury enhancement. Defense
counsel also argued that the evidence showed that Hernandez
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs when he committed
the current offense. In rejecting these arguments, the court
explained that, even if Hernandez was under the influence of
drugs, it “doesn’t mean that he didn’t know what he was doing.”
The court stated that the evidence was “undisputed” that
Hernandez “put a beatdown” on the victim, who appeared to be
“older” and “significantly smaller” than him. The court further
asserted that the jury’s not-true finding on the great-bodily-
5
injury enhancement was “not inconsistent with [the victim]
suffering a significant injury” because the standard was
“different.”
The court again referenced Hernandez’s “history” and the
“pending two battery offenses.” The court then raised
Hernandez’s probationary status, stating: “[H]e is still on
probation on one of those misdemeanors. . . . [H]e failed to
appear and the court issued a warrant. . . . So March 8, 2022,
case number 1AR01281, your client was supposed to appear. He
didn’t show up. Ironically, he had been arrested on November 9,
2021, on the warrant he had been cited out. He failed to appear
on the date he had promised to appear on, so the court issued
another warrant. So when he’s on probation in 1AR01281, he
then uses force and violence against John Doe.” The court added
that the defense was seeking leniency for Hernandez “when all
that he’s done is disobeyed court orders” and “repeatedly used his
hands on people.”
In response, defense counsel reiterated that Hernandez’s
two misdemeanor convictions did not, on their own, warrant a
high-term sentence, and that the other facts referenced by the
court could not be used “as aggravators either since they were not
found.” The court replied that those facts were not being used to
find the presence of aggravating factors, but rather the absence of
mitigating factors, which did not need to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
sentenced Hernandez to the upper term of four years to be served
in county jail.
Hernandez filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hernandez challenges the trial court’s decision
to impose an upper term sentence. Hernandez argues the trial
6
court erred when it stated that he was on probation at the time of
the current offense, and abused its discretion because the
severity of his prior misdemeanor convictions did not justify a
sentence exceeding the middle term. In their briefing, the People
assert Hernandez forfeited his claim regarding his probationary
status by failing to object, and even if the trial court improperly
considered this factor, it relied on several other aggravating
factors that justified the imposition of the upper term. After the
briefing in this case was completed, the California Supreme
Court issued its decision in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069
(Wiley), which considered whether a defendant is entitled to a
jury trial on certain aggravating factors related to his or her
criminal history. Following the Wiley decision, Hernandez
submitted a letter informing the court of this new authority and
its potential relevance to his appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.254.)
Based on Wiley and the record in this case, we conclude the
trial court erred in imposing the upper term sentence because
Hernandez was entitled to a jury trial on the aggravating factors
related to his status and performance on probation. Because we
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would
have found each aggravating factor relied upon by the trial court
to be true, the matter must be remanded for resentencing.
1. Governing law
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, “any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater
potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and
established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281; accord, Erlinger v. United States (2024)
7
602 U.S. 821, 830–832.) The Sixth Amendment thus prohibits a
court from imposing a higher sentence “based on a fact, other
than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the
defendant.” (Cunningham v. California, at p. 275.)
California’s determinate sentencing scheme incorporates
this constitutional principle. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730, 759–761 (Lynch).) Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides, in
relevant part, that where a statute specifies three possible terms
of imprisonment, the court “may impose a sentence exceeding the
middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify” the upper term and “the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subds. (b)(1), (b)(2).)
However, as an exception to this rule, the court “may consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on
a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The statute therefore
“requires that, excepting prior convictions and in the absence of a
waiver or stipulation, aggravating facts relied upon to justify an
upper term must be resolved by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Lynch, at p. 755.)
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (Rule 4.421) sets forth
a nonexhaustive list of aggravating sentencing factors that may
be used to increase a defendant’s sentence to the upper term
under section 1170, subdivision (b). Factors related to the
charged crime include: “(1) The crime involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; [¶]
(2) The defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time
8
of the commission of the crime; [and] [¶] (3) The victim was
particularly vulnerable.” (Rule 4.421(a)(1)–(3).) Factors related
to the defendant include: “(1) The defendant has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society; [¶]
(2) The defendant’s prior convictions . . . are numerous or of
increasing seriousness; [¶] (3) The defendant has served a prior
term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h); [¶] (4) The
defendant was on probation . . . or parole when the crime was
committed; and [¶] (5) The defendant’s prior performance on
probation . . . or parole was unsatisfactory.” (Rule 4.421(b)(1)–
(5).) In addition, the court may consider “[a]ny other factors . . .
that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances
under which the crime was committed.” (Rule 4.421(c).)
In Lynch, our Supreme Court held that, under section 1170,
subdivision (b), “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the
trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an
upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied
on have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 768.) Applying the harmless error standard in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, the court further held that “[t]he
violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all
of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an
upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved
true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If
the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman
standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing.” (Lynch, at p. 768.)
More recently, in Wiley, the Supreme Court considered the
scope of the right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors
9
and the exception to this right for a defendant’s prior convictions.
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 1076.) The court recognized that,
under the Sixth Amendment and section 1170, subdivision (b), “a
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other
than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that
expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious
than the statutorily provided midterm.” (Wiley, at p. 1086, fn.
omitted.) The court held that this right to a jury trial extends to
the aggravating factor that a defendant’s prior convictions were
of “increasing seriousness.” (Wiley, at p. 1082.) It also extends to
the aggravating factor that a defendant’s prior performance on
probation or parole was “unsatisfactory.” (Id. at p. 1083.)
Accordingly, absent a proper waiver or stipulation, a defendant is
“entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions
were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed
unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those
aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term
sentence.” (Id. at p. 1085.)
2. The trial court prejudicially erred in imposing the
upper term based on unproven aggravating factors
related to Hernandez’s probation
The record reflects that, in sentencing Hernandez to the
upper term, the trial court relied on three aggravating factors
related to his criminal history: (1) his two prior misdemeanor
convictions for trespass and battery; (2) his failure to appear in
court while on probation in the battery case; and (3) his
commission of the current offense while on probation in the
battery case. However, consistent with the holding in Wiley,
Hernandez was entitled to have a jury determine whether his
performance on probation was unsatisfactory (Rule 4.421(b)(5)),
10
and whether he was on probation when he committed the current
offense (Rule 4.421(b)(4)). Because Hernandez did not waive his
right to a jury trial on these factors or stipulate to their truth, the
trial court could not use them to justify an upper term sentence.
As the Supreme Court explained in Wiley, the aggravating
factor that the defendant performed unsatisfactorily on probation
“may be proved ‘by evidence demonstrating that, while previously
on probation or parole, [the defendant] committed and was
convicted of new offenses.’ [Citation.] Alternatively, proof may
be ‘based upon other evidence of misconduct that was not
previously adjudicated in a criminal trial’ such as evidence that
the defendant ‘did not appear for appointments, failed a drug
test, or stopped attending counseling sessions as directed.’
[Citation.] The latter circumstances clearly go beyond the fact of
prior conviction and its elements. [Citation.] And even where a
finding of unsatisfactory probation performance is based on
conviction of a new offense, it is not strictly limited to that fact.
Rather, it must be proven that the defendant was ordered to
serve a term of probation and remained on probation at the time
he or she committed the new offense. These facts, too, go beyond
the mere existence of a prior conviction and its elements.” (Wiley,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at 1083.)
In this case, a finding that Hernandez was on probation
when he committed the current offense would require proof that
he was “ordered to serve a term of probation” in a prior case, and
that he “remained on probation at the time he . . . committed the
[current] offense.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1083.)
A finding that Hernandez’s performance on probation was
unsatisfactory likewise would require proof that he either
committed a new offense or engaged in some other form of
11
misconduct while serving a probationary sentence. (Ibid.)
Because these facts “go beyond the mere existence of a prior
conviction and its elements,” Hernandez was entitled to have a
jury determine whether they were true beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Ibid.) As the Wiley court observed, “[t]his jury trial
guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is
‘ “ ‘straightforward.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1084.) “Only when aggravating
facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the
court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those
facts justify an upper term.” (Ibid.)
Because Hernandez was deprived of a jury trial on at least
one of the aggravating factors that the trial court used to justify
the upper term sentence, we must apply the Chapman standard
of review to determine if the error was prejudicial. (Wiley, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 1087; Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743.)
Under that standard, a remand for resentencing is required
unless we can conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury,
applying that same standard, would have found true all of the
aggravating facts upon which the [trial] court relied to conclude
the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise
proved true in compliance” with section 1170, subdivision (b).
(Lynch, at p. 743.) “Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under
Chapman if ‘the record contains evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact
at issue.” (Wiley, at p. 1087.)
Here, the error was not harmless because, as Hernandez
contends, his record of conviction indicates that he was not on
probation at the time of the current offense. According to these
records, on July 26, 2021, Hernandez was sentenced to 12 months
of probation in the misdemeanor battery case and 12 months of
12
probation in the misdemeanor trespass case. The trial court later
summarily revoked the probation in the battery case, and set a
probation violation hearing in both cases for March 8, 2022.
However, for reasons that are not clear from record, the court
never held a probation violation hearing or terminated probation
in either case. As a result, Hernandez’s probationary term in
each case expired on July 26, 2022, 12 months after it was
originally imposed. (See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498,
509, 515 [summary revocation of probation preserves the trial
court’s authority to adjudicate a probation violation claim, but
does not automatically extend the conditions of probation beyond
the expiration of the court-imposed probationary period].) It thus
appears that, as of December 20, 2023—the date of the offense in
this case—Hernandez was no longer on probation. Under these
circumstances, a rational jury could find that the aggravating
factors related to Hernandez’s status and performance on
probation were not true beyond a reasonable doubt.
In their respondent’s brief, the People argue Hernandez
forfeited his claim that the trial court improperly relied on his
probationary status in imposing the upper term because defense
counsel did not object to the court’s statement about Hernandez
being on probation at the time of the current offense. Although
defense counsel did not dispute the factual accuracy of the trial
court’s statement at the sentencing hearing, she did object to the
court’s use of aggravating factors that were not found true by the
jury. In particular, after the court raised Hernandez’s status and
performance on probation as additional factors that justified the
upper term, defense counsel asked to “make a brief record” in
response to the court’s remarks. Defense counsel then argued
that Hernandez’s prior misdemeanor convictions did not warrant
13
the upper term, and that she did not believe “any other facts that
the court mentioned can be used as aggravators . . . since they
were not found.” This was sufficient to preserve a claim of error
based on the trial court’s reliance upon unproven aggravating
factors to impose an upper term sentence. In light of this
conclusion, we need not consider the parties’ arguments
regarding whether the defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to object to the trial court’s misstatement of
fact about Hernandez’s status on probation.
The People further contend that, even if the trial court
improperly relied on Hernandez’s probationary status, it did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the upper term because it based
its decision on several other aggravating factors along with a
dearth of mitigating factors. As described by the People, the
aggravating factors on which the trial court relied in imposing
the upper term included that Hernandez inflicted significant
harm on the victim during the assault (Rule 4.421(a)(1)), the
victim appeared older and significantly smaller than Hernandez
(Rule 4.421(a)(3)), and Hernandez’s criminal history showed a
predisposition for committing violence against other people (Rule
4.421(b)(1), (b)(2)). However, as Hernandez correctly asserts, the
trial court could not have properly relied upon these additional
aggravating factors cited by the People because none of them
were found true by a jury or stipulated to by Hernandez.
In any event, we need not decide whether the trial court
based its sentencing decision on any aggravating factors other
than (1) Hernandez’s prior misdemeanor convictions, (2) his prior
performance on probation, and (3) his status on probation at the
time of the current offense. Assuming that the trial court solely
relied upon these three factors in imposing the upper term, it
14
erred in doing so because Hernandez was entitled to have a jury
decide whether his performance on probation was unsatisfactory
and whether he remained on probation at the time he committed
the current offense. As our Supreme Court explained, “the facts
supporting every aggravating circumstance upon which the trial
court relies to ‘justify’ imposition of the upper term must be
properly proven” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 757), and
“[w]hen the trial court actually relies on improperly proven
aggravating facts to ‘justify’ an upper term sentence, a Sixth
Amendment violation occurs and Chapman must be satisfied” (id.
at p. 761). In this case, because the record does not support at
least one of the aggravating factors on which the trial court
expressly based its sentencing decision, we cannot conclude that
“the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify
an upper term sentence.” (Id. at p. 775.) Hernandez accordingly
is entitled to a remand for resentencing.
15
DISPOSITION
Hernandez’s conviction is affirmed. The judgment
imposing an upper term sentence on count 1 is reversed, and the
matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to conduct
further proceedings under section 1170, subdivision (b).
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
16
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.